In an appeal under POCSO, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence for rape resulting in pregnancy. The Court applied the statutory presumption of guilt and rejected the Romeo-Juliet clause application due to the victim's subsequent marriage to another person, dismissing the appeal.
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence under POCSO Act upheld.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR]
PRESENT: THE HON'BLE JUSTICE RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE REETOBROTO KUMAR MITRA
CRA(DB)/4/2025 CRAN 2/2025
RUPESH BECK … APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE and Anr. … RESPONDENT
| For the appellant | : Mr. Alokesh Sarkar |
|---|---|
| For the State | : Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar |
| For the Victim Girl | : Ms. Gloria Mary |
| Reserved on | : June 19, 2026 |
| Judgment on | : August 25, 2026 |
REETOBROTO KUMAR MITRA, J.
2
3
pregnancy was attributable to the said activity. In fact, in her initial statement to the Police Authorities on 22nd May, 2023 at about 5:00 p.m., she also stated that the appellant continued the sexual assault and/or physical relationship with her, even after coming to know that she was a minor.
4
5
direction of such authorities. On account thereof, the FIR is contradictory.
c) Therefore, the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, would not be applicable as the victim girl had turned hostile and she had indeed supported the case of the appellant.
d) The Learned Special Judge had failed to appreciate that the evidence recorded during trial is contrary to the statement of the victim girl in the fardbayan as well as contrary in the statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given by the victim girl.
e) Apparently, the victim girl and the appellant had decided to marry and that she would continue to remain with her parents till the appellant was released from jail whereupon they would get married.
6
7
8
9
victim girl and her mother can be deemed to have been admitted by the appellant. 21. The Counselor at the District Child Protection Unit, Mayabunder (PW5), the District Child Protection Officer, Andaman and Sub Registrar (PW6) and Ward Junior Investigator (PW7) were also not cross-examined by the appellant.
The first of such issue is whether the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO can be applied ?
The presumption is contrary to the normal law of the land.
Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abating any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the POCSO Act, the
10
presumption is that he has committed or abetted such an act as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved.
Thus, what has to be proved is not the offence but quite the opposite, that he was not responsible for such an offence. The general presumption of innocence of accused is not applicable to these cases, infact, it is the contrary, the presumption of guilt.
The issue of mental culpability as enshrined in Section 30 of the POCSO is also of relevance as PW-9, the doctor who had examined the appellant, had in no uncertain terms opined that the appellant was capable of sexual intercourse.
There is nothing on record to disbelieve the statement of the victim girl wherein she has clearly stated that she had been cohabiting with the appellant for several months before her pregnancy. To relieve himself of this charge, the appellant ought to have led evidence to show that the victim girl was not cohabiting with him or that he had not engaged in any sexual assault with the VG. The appellant has led no such evidence and there is no reason to disbelieve the statement made by the victim girl, which finds merit from the medico legal reports relied upon by the prosecution.
The appellant in fact chose not to cross-examine the victim girl or her mother.
11
The second issue that falls for consideration at this stage is whether the appellant committed any penetrative sexual assault on the victim girl leading to her pregnancy. The victim girl in her cross-examination by the prosecution had admitted her intimacy with the appellant and also deposed that they were in a relationship of love which also resulted in a physical relationship. This portion of the evidence of the victim girl has not been refuted by the appellant.
12
the presumption by the Special Court, which is enabled under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, that the person charged with the offence has committed the offence, unless the contrary is proved. In this case, the contrary that is the appellant was not responsible for the offence has not been proved in any manner whatsoever.
13
Court of India and by several other High Courts that parents of adolescent/teenage lovers often invoke provisions of the POCSO Act to deter inter-caste relationships that are growing between their children. This is not one of those cases.
14
the appellant herein. The appellant will have to face the consequences of the offence under the POCSO Act.
15
(Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, J.)
(Rajarshi Bharadwaj, J.)
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act applies where the appellant failed to cross-examine the victim or rebut the evidence of physical relationship.
Whether the Romeo-Juliet clause parameters should be applied to mitigate the offence given the victim girl's subsequent marriage.
Whether the appeal against conviction and sentence under POCSO should be allowed.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
4 provisions across 2 enactments
RUPESH BECK
THE STATE
REETOBROTO KUMAR MITRA
RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
