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Shri.Sonu Tigga v. the State

Calcutta HC9 Jul 2026CRA(DB)/10/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

POCSO s.6 conviction set aside; consenting adolescent relationship; appellant married the victim with two children; victim and mother declared hostile; hearsay; DNA report sole paternity evidence; s.482 CrPC / s.528 BNSS inherent power; Parbatbhai Aahir guidelines; Anurudh four factors; Romeo-Juliet clause observation; 20 years rigorous imprisonment and Rs.20,000 fine quashed; exoneration; High Court at Calcutta Circuit Bench at Port Blair; CRA(DB)/10/2025; Special (POCSO) Case No.005 of 2023, Mayabunder; judgment dated 27/10/2025 set aside.

What did the court decide?

Impugned judgment dated 27/10/2025 and order of sentence dated 28/10/2025 set aside; appellant set at liberty, released from the bail bond and exonerated from all charges; appeal disposed of; trial court record to be returned. ¶20

Shri.Sonu Tigga Vs the State — Child Sexual Offences (POCSO) | Calcutta HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the conviction of the appellant under section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and the sentence of twenty years' rigorous imprisonment should be set aside, the evidence of the victim and her mother being contradictory and hostile and only the DNA report identifying paternity. +1 more

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Court's answer

The statement of P.W.2 (mother of the victim) that she learnt from the victim girl that the appellant impregnated her daughter is hearsay evidence and has no evidentiary value.

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Ratio / Principle

The victim girl was a minor about 17 years old, about to turn major, and the penetrative sexual assault was preceded by a love affair between her and the appellant.

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Key takeaways

The victim girl had no complaint against the appellant; they had a romantic relationship preceding the incident, are married with a happy conjugal life blessed with two issues, and the case squarely falls under the mischief of misapplication of the POCSO Act.ratio¶16
Stringent application of the law on these facts will have a devastating effect on the life of the victim, causing serious aberration of justice.ratio¶16
The evidence of the victim and her mother were contradictory and did not support the prosecution case; it is only the DNA report that identified the paternity, inviting presumption and conclusion of offence under section 6 of the Act.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

CRA(DB)/10/2025 (High Court at Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port Blair; Sugato Majumdar, J., Om Narayan Rai, J. concurring) — Appeal against conviction under S.6 POCSO Act, 2012 and sentence of 20 years' rigorous imprisonment with Rs.20,000/- fine (Special Judge (POCSO), Mayabunder; judgment dated 27/10/2025, sentence dated 28/10/2025). Held: (i) P.W.2's statement that the appellant impregnated the victim was hearsay with no evidentiary value; (ii) the evidence of the victim and her mother — both declared hostile — was contradictory and did not support the prosecution; only the DNA report (P16/P/17) identified paternity; (iii) the victim, about 17 years old, had a love affair with the appellant, had no complaint against him, and they are married with two children; (iv) relying on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh (2026 SCC OnLine SC 40) (four factors for consenting adolescent relationships), Roshan Lakra v. State (2026 SCC OnLine Cal 5120), and the S.482 CrPC principles in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 (corresponding power under S.528 BNSS 2023), stringent application of POCSO would devastate the victim's life and cause serious aberration of justice. Impugned judgment and sentence set aside; appellant set at liberty, released from bail bond and exonerated of all charges; appeal disposed of.

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR]

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PRESENT : THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SUGATO MAJUMDAR AND

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THE HON’BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI

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CRA(DB)/10/2025

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(IA NO: CRAN/1/2025)

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SHRI SONU TIGGA	… APPELLANT
	VS.
THE STATE AND ANOTHER	… RESPONDENTS
For the appellant	: Mr. D. Ilango Mr. S. Vinod Krishnan
For the State	: Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar
For the V.G.	: Ms. Shipra Mandal
Heard on	: July 03, 2026
Judgment delivered on	: July 09, 2026

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SUGATO MAJUMDAR, J.

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The instant appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 27/10/2025, passed by the Special Judge (POCSO), North & Middle Andaman Islands, Mayabunder in Special (POCSO) Case No.005 of 2023/Special (POCSO) S.T.No.003 of 2023 whereby the Learned Trial Judge had convicted the Appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012.

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The prosecution case, in nutshell, was that the victim girl had a love affair with the appellant. The appellant represented that he desired to marry the victim girl. For the first time in the month of September, 2022, the appellant made forceful penetrative sexual assault on the victim girl. Later on, she started living with the appellant. Subsequently her pregnancy was detected. On the basis of the statement of the victim girl, F.I.R was lodged which was registered as F.I.R No. 11 of 2023 dated 20/03/2023 P.S.Baratang under sections 5(j)(ii)(I)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Investigation began thereafter which culminated in filing of charge sheet being C.S No. 15 of 2023 dated 14/04/2023 under sections 5(j)(ii)(I)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

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Charges were framed against the appellant, which were read over and explained to him. He pleaded “ not guilty ” and claimed to be tried. Trial began thereafter.

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In course of trial the prosecution examined seventeen witnesses and produced various documentary evidences, too. The appellant was examined under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972.

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On hearing the Learned Counsels for the prosecution as well as the appellant and after appreciating the evidences adduced, the Learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and also sentenced him, in terms of the order dated 28/10/2025 to suffer rigorous imprisonment of 20 years and with fine of Rs.20,000/- in default, a further imprisonment of 2 months. The fine amount was directed be handed over to the mother of the victim girl, if realized.

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Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied thereto, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal.

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At the time of hearing of the appeal, the victim girl appeared through her Learned Counsel.

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The main plea of the Learned Counsels for the appellant and the victim was that the victim girl and the appellant are married and have a conjugal life. They have two issues from the wedlock. If a rigorous imprisonment of twenty years is implemented, the family life of them would be ruined. Plea before us was to acquit the appellant so that both the appellant and the victim girl may lead a happy conjugal right. The learned Public Prosecutor however opposed the appeal.

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We have heard the submissions of the Learned Counsels as well as the Learned Public Prosecutor.

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The Learned Trial Judge found that the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim girl which is an offence under section 6 of the Act. The Learned Trial Judge, considered testimony of the witnesses, considered that the mother of the victim girl (P.W.2) became hostile, though stated that from the victim girl she came to know that the appellant impregnated her daughter. The Learned Trial Judge also considered testimony of P.W.17, Dr. Ajay Kumar Rana, Scientist B (Biology) at CFSL, Hydrabad along with the report submitted by him (P16/P/17). The DNA report states that the appellant and the victim girl are the father and the mother of the child which was born. Testimony of P.W.15, Dr. Rahul and the Medico Legal Examination Report produced by him were also

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considered to come to the conclusion that the appellant was capable of sexual intercourse.

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We have considered the evidences appreciated by the Learned Trial Judge. Firstly, we note that the statement of P.W.2 that from the victim girl she came to know that the appellant impregnated her daughter is hearsay evidence and the same has no evidentiary value. Secondly , that the victim was minor and the D.N.A report (P16/P/17) shows that the appellant and the victim girl are father and mother of the baby born. It is on record that penetrative sexual assault was preceded by a love affair between them. Thirdly, that the victim girl was about 17 years old i.e. about to turn major.

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We may now turn to the evidence adduced. The statement of victim was recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972 which was marked as Ext.P-2. The victim stated that she loved the accused and had physical relationship and she became pregnant. She left home and moved with the appellant. She had no complaints against the appellant and that the appellant had not abused her. In course of her oral testimony she identified Ext P-2 and admitted the statement. She also stated that she did not file any case. She was declared hostile by the prosecution. In course of cross-examination by the prosecution she stated that she could not say the person responsible for such pregnancy. She had nothing to say anything against the accused. She denied that the appellant impregnated her. The mother of the victim girl was examined as P.W.2. She was also declared hostile. She stated that the appellant was responsible for pregnancy of the victim girl. She stated also that she did not wish to proceed against the appellant.

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In State of Uttar Pradesh vs Anurudh & Anr.( 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while, referring to Satish alias Chand v. State of U.P (Crl. Misc. Bail Appl. No. 18596 of 2024) and considering a situation of consenting adolescent’s sexual relation observed that four factors should be kept in mind:

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“A. Assess the Context: Each case should be evaluated on its

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individual facts and circumstances. The nature of the relationship and the intentions of both parties should be carefully examined.

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B. Consider Victim's Statement: The statement of the alleged

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victim should be given due consideration. If the relationship is consensual and based on mutual affection, this should be factored into decisions regarding bail and prosecution.

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C. Avoid Perversity of Justice: Ignoring the consensual nature of a

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relationship can lead to unjust outcomes, such as wrongful imprisonment. The judicial system should aim to balance the protection of minors with the recognition of their autonomy in certain contexts. Here the age comes out to be an important factor.

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D. Judicial Discretion: Courts should use their discretion wisely,

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ensuring that the application of POCSO does not inadvertently harm the very individuals it is meant to protect.”

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In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had also expressed its opinion on introduction of a Romeo - Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law.

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We may refer to another judgment passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in Roshan Lakra vs State (2026 SCC OnLine Cal 5120), where the Bench was confronted with a similar situation. The following excerpt is relevant:

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“43. As discussed above, the present case is not a run of the mill POCSO case where a minor has been forcibly violated. The physical relationship between Roshan and Anjali was admittedly consensual. It may be true that consent of a minor is of no effect. However, the same has to be taken into account along with other factors indicated above, to decide whether or not prosecuting Roshan is warranted in the present factual matrix. At the cost of repetition we say that Anjali has pleaded before us to put an end to the prosecution so that the family survives. Blindly prosecuting Roshan under the provisions of the POCSO Act will be counterproductive. Such prosecution will almost certainly destroy Roshan's wife Anjali for the protection of whom and the like, the POCSO Act was promulgated, not to talk of the two children born to Roshan and Anjali.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has considered misuse/misapplication of statutes specifically enacted to address particular social evil. POCSO Act, 2012 was also enacted and subsequently amended to reach that goal. But, as expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and other High Courts, the same should not be applied in a manner which, instead of protecting the victim, ruins her actually. This case squarely falls under such mischief. The victim girl had no complaint against the appellant. They had romantic relationship preceding the incident. She was living with the accused. They are married and have a happy conjugal life blessed with two issues. Once the

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stringent application of law is resorted to, that will have a devastating effect on the life of the victim causing serious aberration of justice.

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As discussed above, we have noted that evidence of victim and her mother were contradictory and did not support the prosecution case. It is only the D.N.A report that identified the paternity, inviting presumption and conclusion of offence under section 6 of the Act. There is an old adage in criminal jurisprudence that the graver in the offence, the stricter is the proof. The appellant has been slapped with twenty years of imprisonment without any cogent and convincing evidence which, in our opinion, undermined justice.

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We are also remindful of the extra-ordinary power of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972 as well as the corresponding provision of section 528 of BNSS 2023. In Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, [(2017) 9 SCC 641], a three Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid down certain guidelines on exercise of power conferred on High Courts by section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972. Relevant portion may be quoted here:

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“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

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16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

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16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a

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settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

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16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

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16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised ( i ) to secure the ends of justice, or ( ii ) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

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16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

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16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such

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cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

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16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

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16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

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16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

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16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

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We are of view that sub-para 16.1 to 16.4 are relevant for this case. On the one hand, we observe that the Learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate evidence in proper perspective and manner warranting setting aside of the impugned

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judgment. On the other hand, the situation herein warrants exercise of power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972.

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In nutshell, based on the discussion made above, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 27/10/2025 and the order of sentence dated 28/10/2025 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO), North & Middle Andaman Islands, Mayabunder in Special (POCSO) Case No.005 of 2023/Special (POCSO) S.T.No.003 of 2023.

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