Appeal against conviction under Sections 307/324/323 IPC for an armed land-fencing assault. Court held intention to kill was proved by the targeted blow to the shoulder, threats and grievous injury; weapon-name variations and investigation lapses were immaterial; sentence reduced to imprisonment already suffered.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
1
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
C.R.A. 70 of 2009
Badal Dutta Chowdhury & Ors.
-Vs-
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellants
For the State : Mr. Avishek Sinha Judgment on : 25.03.2026
Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
2
fine of Rs.100/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 2 days more, for the offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code.
3
4
it was stated by PW-1 that she was assaulted with “Hansua” and “Hansua” was called as “Bhojali” by PW-1. The Learned Trial Judge had failed to appreciate “Bhojali” and “Hansua” were two different articles and nature of injury inflicted by two different weapons were different in nature as stated by the doctor i.e. PW-9 in his evidence.
vii. The Leaned Trial Judge failed to appreciate the complainant i.e. PW-1 was advised by the doctor i.e. Medical Officer, Patashpur, B.P.H.C to carry on treatment at Contai Sub-Divisional Hospital but the injured complainant was admitted at a private nursing home and the discharge certificate issued by the Private Nursing Home was highly doubtful so far as genuinity and authenticity was concerned and did not support the prosecution case as no rubber stamp or seal of the nursing home authority was affixed on the discharge certificate. The date written over the discharge certificate was over written and that was admitted by the concerned doctor i.e. PW-9. The discharge certificate also did not disclose the history of wounds and the discharge certificate was not bearing any chronological number.
5
6
7
kicked his abdomen and was also assaulted with blow of fists on his face by appellant no.4. The appellant no.2 assaulted PW-1’s nephew namely Chinmoy Paul on his right shoulder at the neck, or on his right upper arm by “Bhojali” or “Hansua” . Thereafter, PW-1 cried aloud seeking for help. The appellant no.1 rushed to PW-1, gripping the “Bhojali” in his hand, uttering words that expressed his intention to kill her and assaulted PW-1’s right shoulder by a “Bhojali” causing bleeding injury.
PW-1 further deposed she was brought by a trolly to the P.S. and shifted therefrom to Patashpur B.P.H.C., for treatment. From Patashpur B.P.H.C., she was referred to Contai S.D. Hospital. PW-1 bleeding profusely went to Egra B.P.H.C., for treatment. Due to severity, PW-1 was treated at the Nursing Home of Dr. Deb Roy of Contai for considerable period. Thereafter, she was treated by Dr. Tapash Chakraborty.
8
off. The bone was sliced off by 1” x ½”. Acromion process of the right scapula was sliced off ½” x ½” bone and profuse swelling, tenderness, pain with difficulty in raising the right forearm, X-ray of the right shoulder grid confirmed the fracture. He referred the patient to the surgeon of Contai S.D. Hospital. He further deposed that the injury was grievous in nature and it could be caused by sharp-cutting weapon. The injury report prepared by him, was marked as Exbt.-2.
9
vii) PW-6 deposed he was one of the victims of the case. His evidence corroborated with the evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 described on the date of occurrence he and PW-4 were repairing the fencing around a purchased land. The appellant no.1 and his three sons rushed to that land with lathi , “Bhojali” and “Tangi” . The appellant no.1 caught hold his hair and kicked his abdomen and pushed him on the ground. The appellant no.4 throttled him and assaulted him by blows and fists, whereby he sustained bleeding and swelling injury on his nose.
PW-6 also deposed the appellant no.1 uttered words before assaulting PW-1, which expressed his intention to commit murder. He further stated PW-1 and PW-4 were sent to the hospital for treatment. PW-4 and PW-6 were discharged from the hospital but PW-1 was referred to Contai S.D. hospital for treatment. On their way to Contai S.D. Hospital from Patashpur B.P.H.C., condition of PW-1 deteriorated and she was taken to Egra hospital. The doctor of Egra hospital advised to take her to Contai S.D. hospital for better treatment and she was taken to the nursing home of Dr. B. Deb Roy, Contai.
viii) PW-6 in his cross-examination stated PW-1 purchased 22 decimals land out of 102 decimals land being dag no.105/690 in the year 1995. Originally the entire land was in the name of Ananda, Sunil and Gita Dutta Chowdhury. Gita was the wife of appellant no.1. Vendors of PW-1 purchased the land from Ananda and Sunil. Out of total 102 decimals of land Gita Dutta Chowdhury was owner of only
10
34 decimals of land and rest 68 decimals of land was owned by Ananda and Sunil. So, Ananda and Sunil did not sell in excess of their share to Badal Jana and Narayan Jana, who again sold 12 decimals of land to the complainant. It further revealed that neither the appellant no.1 nor the appellants no.2, 3 and 4 were co-owners of the plot no.105/690. So their criminality could not be guarded under cover of the terms of nature of civil dispute. The witness PW-6 also could not be shaken by the defence during cross-examination. The cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-4, the cross-examination of PW-6 also proved the incident really occurred.
11
possessing her 12 decimals of land by raising fencing all around. Therefore, in no way it could be said that by purchasing 12 decimals of land and by raising or repairing fencing the complainant provoked the appellants to create such an incident.
12
further deposed the age of injury was recent within 6 hours of his examination. The injury report was marked as Exbt.-6. On the same day, he also examined one Chinmoy Paul and found 1½” x 2”/3” incised injury over the right neck with bleeding. He also found lacerated wound measuring 1” x ½” over his right leg and another incised injury measuring 2” x ⅙” over his right arm. Age of injury was recent within 6 hours of his examination. According to PW-17 all the injuries of Chinmoy Paul were simple in nature. He prepared the injury report which was marked as Exbt.-7.
xiv) DW-1 deposed on 03.06.97 he was attached to Patashpur B.P.H.C., at a medical officer. On that date, he examined one Puspendu Dutta Chowdhury i.e. the appellant no.3 with the history of assault by one Saraswati Pal with an axe. On examination he noticed 5” linear incised injury over left arm and scapular region. He also found swelling on left hand with fracture 5th metacarpal bone. The third injury which he found was abrasions over neck. The nature of injury was grievous but was to be confirmed after radiological investigation. Prognosis was favourable. He mentioned the identity mark of the patient in the injury report which was marked as Exbt.A. He opined the injury might be caused if someone was assaulted by a sharp cut weapon and the fracture injury might be caused if assaulted by any hard and blunt weapon. The third injury might be caused if the victim was throttled.
13
On 07.06.1997, he examined one Badal Dutta Chowdhury i.e. the appellant no.1 with the history of physical assault by one Sumit Pal by boulder. On examination, he found fracture on right leg with gross swelling of the leg with lacerations. The injury no.2 was 1½” laceration on right elbow dorsal aspect. The injury no.3 was abrasion on back. The patient was advised admission and X-ray of the injured places, age of injury was 4/5 days. Cause of injury might be assaulted by blunt weapon. Nature of injury was grievous. Prognosis was favourable. He had noted the identification mark of the patient in the report which was marked as Exbt.-B. The injury no.1 was grievous injury. Gross swelling meant inflammation of the entire effected portion. Patient with fracture of leg injury could not even walk.
xv) DW-1 in his cross-examination stated the linear incised injury on Puspendu Dutta Chowdhury i.e. appellant no.3 was a superficial one and for that reason he did not mention its depth. If an axe was used for assaulting a person for the purpose of assault, then some deeper incised injury was expected. However it depended upon the manner of use. Such type of linear incised injury might be caused by a blade. Such incised linear injury on the scapular region could not be selfinflicted but the other linear injury might be self-inflicted.
He did not mention the measurement of the swelling of left hand of appellant no.3. He did not mention the dimension of the abrasion on neck. Such abrasion on neck might be self-inflicted. He was not sure
14
about the fracture on metacarpal region and for that reason he advised X-ray of the injured portion. From Exbt.-A and Exbt.-B, it was not possible for him whether he informed the police station or not of injuries caused or when he sent such information. Since there was no X-ray machine at Patashpur B.P.H.C., patients were referred to Sub-Divisional Hospital. In the reports, it was not mentioned whether he referred the patient to Contai S.D. Hospital or not.
The patient/appellant no.1 stated to him that the incident of assault on him took place at 12:00 p.m. on 03.06.1997. It was not mentioned in the Exbt.-B as to whether before coming to him for treatment, the patient was treated by any other doctor on that date or on previous dates after receiving injury.
observations:-
“9. Shri Rana appearing for the State strenuously contended that the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the offence under Section 307 IPC was not made out merely because the injuries inflicted on the witnesses were in the nature of a simple hurt and in these circumstances it is not possible to hold any of the accused persons guilty in respect of that offence. We find considerable force in this contention. A bare perusal of Section 307 IPC would show that the reasons given by the High Court for acquitting the accused of the offence under Section 307 were not tenable. Section 307 IPC reads:
“Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be
1(1983) 2 SCC 28
15
guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”
To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
10. The High Court, in our opinion, was not correct in acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victims were in the nature of a simple hurt. Therefore, that part of the judgment of the High Court acquitting Accused 1, 2 and 11 of the offence under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained and must be set aside. ”
16
SINGH AND OTHERS2 , has made the following observations: -
“7. …Under Section 307 IPC what the court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in that section. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of “attempt to murder”. Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. The nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention… ”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA vs.
KASHIRAO AND OTHERS3 , has made the following observations: -
“20. So far as the assaults on PW 1 are concerned, the nature of the assaults and the injuries found clearly bring in application of Section 307 IPC. The trial court was therefore justified in convicting accusedRespondent 1 under Section 307 IPC. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 are: (i) that the death of a human being was attempted;
(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and
(iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so
2(1988) 4 SCC 551
3(2003) 10 SCC 434
17
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.
21. In offence under Section 307 all the ingredients of the offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. For the application of Section 307, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 IPC. ”
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA4 , has made the following observations: -
“9. In the aforesaid factual scenario it has to be seen whether Section 307 has application. Section 307 IPC reads as follows:
To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It
4(2004) 9 SCC 31
18
is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
10. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.
…
13. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstance that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not nature of the injury.
14. In the case at hand the accused fired the gun from a very close range of about 6-8 feet aiming at the victim when he was sleeping. The bullet broke into pieces and three such pieces struck the victim. Both intention and knowledge in terms of Section 307 can be attributed to the accused. Therefore, the High Court was justified in recording conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 307 IPC. ”
19
OTHERS vs. STATE OF BIHAR5 , has made the following observations: -
“15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present:
For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence “of attempt to murder”. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place. ”
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
vs. MOHAN AND OTHERS6 , has made the following observations: -
“14. The High Court was of the opinion that the injuries have not been caused on the vital parts of the body. In order to attract Section 307, the injury need not be on the vital parts of the body. In order to attract Section 307, causing of hurt is sufficient. If anybody does any act with intention or knowledge that by his act he might cause death and hurt is caused, that is sufficient to attract life imprisonment. Section 307 uses the word “hurt” which has been explained in Section 319 IPC and
5(2004) 13 SCC 189
6(2013) 14 SCC 116
20
not “grievous hurt” within the meaning of Section 320 IPC. Therefore, in order to attract Section 307, the injury need not be on the vital part of the body. A gunshot, as in the present case, may miss the vital part of the body, may result in a lacerated wound, that itself is sufficient to attract Section 307. ”
“12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. ”
(UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH)8 , has made the following
observations: -
“19. Before we advert to the factual matrix or gauge the trustworthiness of the witnesses, it will be beneficial to brace ourselves
7(2015) 11 SCC 366
8(2021) 20 SCC 24
21
of the case law qua the essential conditions, requisite for bringing home a conviction under Section 307IPC. In State of M.P. v. Saleem [State of M.P. v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329], this Court, while re-appreciating the true import of Section 307IPC held as follows:
“12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307IPC cannot be
22
acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the later decisions, including in State of M.P. v. Kashiram [State of M.P. v. Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] , Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425] and State of M.P. v. Kanha [State of M.P. v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 247] .
21. It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 307IPC, there are two ingredients that a court must consider, first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause death of the victim, and, second, such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The courts may deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances of the offence, including the nature of weapon used or the nature of injury, if any. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307IPC.
22. It would also be fruitful at this stage, to appraise whether the requirement of “motive” is indispensable for proving the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307IPC.
23. It is significant to note that “motive” is distinct from “object and means” which innervates or provokes an action. Unlike “intention”, “motive” is not the yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive would not constitute an offence but it may not be true when an unlawful act is committed with best of the motive. Unearthing “motive” is akin to an exercise of manual brain-mapping. At times, it becomes Herculean task to ascertain the traces of a “motive”.
23
24. This Court has time and again ruled : (Bipin Kumar Mondal case [Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150]
“23. … that in case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is infallibly a crucial factor, and is a substantial aid for evincing the commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point towards the guilt of the accused and testaments of eyewitnesses to the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record. ”
“5. It is worthwhile to extract Section 307IPC for a proper consideration of the aforesaid question. It reads thus:
“ 307. Attempt to murder .—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
9(2024) 15 SCC 42
24
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life-convicts .—[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.]”
6. A perusal of Section 307IPC, would make it clear that it really imbibes the true spirit of the maxim “culpae poena par esto” — means “let the punishment be proportionate to the offence; let the punishment fit the crime”. It itself prescribes three types of sentences imposable on a convict thereunder. If it is an attempt to murder simpliciter, the offence is punishable maximum with by a term of imprisonment of either description up to ten years and fine. The last part of Section 307 prescribes death sentence as the only punishment when the offender during the commission of the crime is under the sentence of imprisonment for life and hurt is caused to the victim.
9. Section 307IPC makes it clear that to attract the said offence the victim need not suffer any kind of bodily injury. The offence to commit murder punishable under Section 307IPC is constituted by the concurrence of mens rea followed by actus reus, to commit an attempt to murder though its accomplishment or sufferance of any kind of bodily injury to the victim is not a “sine qua non”. In other words, if a man commits an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if death had been caused, the offence would have amounted to murder or the act itself is of such a nature as would have caused death in the usual course of an event, but something beyond his control prevented that result, his act would constitute the offence punishable as an attempt to murder under Section 307IPC. ”
25
26
threatened which conceivably disclosed a premeditated and malicious intent. Such pernicious act constitutes contemporaneous expressions of mens rea to attract the element of criminality. The attempt to trivialize her testimony on minor lexical variations, whether the weapon is described as “Bhojali” or “Harsha” is entirely misconceived. PW-1 has clarified the interchangeable local usage and this Court finds no inconsistency of a nature that will impair the essential framework of the prosecution case.
27
28
The appellant no. 1 uttered words that explicitly conveyed an intention to kill. The attack was unprovoked and concerted, indicating a shared design. These elements when read cumulatively obliterates doubt that the act was momentary and impulsive on these threshold ingredients of Section 324 Indidan Penal Code and Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are attracted.
29
appellants have inflicted the assault. The suggestion of provocation is thus entirely untenable.
30
parties on priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the conviction under Section 307 IPC could be sustained where the injury, though grievous, was a single incised wound on the shoulder.
Whether minor variations in the description of the weapon ('Bhojali'/'Hansua') and non-forensic examination of the weapon vitiated the prosecution case.
Whether a pending civil dispute over land negatived the criminality of the appellants' assault.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Maharashtra vs. Balram Bama Patil and OthersRelied on¶9
(1983) 2 SCC 28 · Who else cites this
Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and OthersRelied on¶10
(1988) 4 SCC 551 · Who else cites this
State of Maharashtra vs. Kashirao and OthersRelied on¶11
(2003) 10 SCC 434 · Who else cites this
Vasant Vithu Jadhav vs. State of MaharashtraRelied on¶12
(2004) 9 SCC 31 · Who else cites this
Parsuram Pandey and Others vs. State of BiharRelied on¶13
(2004) 13 SCC 189 · Who else cites this
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mohan and OthersRelied on¶14
(2013) 14 SCC 116 · Who else cites this
Jage Ram and Others vs. State of HaryanaRelied on¶15
(2015) 11 SCC 366 · Who else cites this
Surinder Singh vs. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh)Relied on¶16
(2021) 20 SCC 24 · Who else cites this
Amit Rana and Another vs. State of HaryanaRelied on¶17
(2024) 15 SCC 42 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 1 enactments
Badal Dutta Chowdhury & Ors.
The State of West Bengal
Ananya Bandyopadhyay
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
