Dismissed¶39

Madan Mohan Chibbar v. Arnab Ray

Calcutta HC9 Jul 2026CO/2409/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997; Section 7(3); striking off defence of tenant; failure to deposit under order under Section 7(1)/7(2); part payment/deposit of arrears insufficient; mandatory versus directory compliance; no discretion to extend statutory time; Section 151 C.P.C. application for deposit of remaining rent pending; C.O. 2409 of 2024; decided 09.07.2026; Dinesh Kumar Sharma, J.; precedents relied on: (2019) 10 Supreme Court Cases 660; 2025 SCC Online SC 1696.

What did the court decide?

None; the petition was dismissed. The learned Trial Court was to ensure that all pending applications, if any, as well as the suit be disposed of in accordance with law expeditiously. ¶39

Madan Mohan Chibbar Vs Arnab Ray — Calcutta HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; the petition was dismissed. The learned Trial Court was to ensure that all pending applications, if any, as well as the suit be disposed of in accordance with law expeditiously.

¶39

Issue for consideration

Whether the order dated 6th October, 2023 striking off the petitioner's defence under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 is erroneous in law and liable to be set aside. +1 more

¶11

Court's answer

There is nothing on the record to suggest any illegality or infirmity in the learned Trial Court's order, as the petitioner admittedly did not deposit the entire rent in terms of the order dated 21st June, 2022.

¶38

Ratio / Principle

Under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, failure by the tenant to deposit or pay any amount in terms of an order under Section 7(1) or 7(2) within the time provided or extended results in the defence being struck off; there is no concession permitting deposit of only part of the amount.

¶14

Key takeaways

The legal proposition is well settled and there is no discretion with the Court to extend the time as prescribed by the statute.ratio¶38

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

C.O. 2409 of 2024 (Dinesh Kumar Sharma, J.) — Petitioner challenged the order dated 06.10.2023 striking off his defence under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 for failure to deposit the entire amount directed by order dated 21.06.2022, contending part of the rent had been deposited and that Section 7(3) is directory, not mandatory. Relying on Bijay Kuamr Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamariya, (2019) 10 SCC 660 and Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v. Ismat Ahmed, 2025 SCC Online SC 1696, the Court held that deposit of the entire amount in terms of the order under Sections 7(1)/7(2) is mandatory, that there is no concession for part deposit, and that the Court has no discretion to extend the statutorily prescribed time. Petition dismissed; Trial Court directed to dispose of pending applications and the suit expeditiously.

¶1

C.O. 2409 of 2024

¶2

09.07.2026 Sl no. 48 Ct no. 2 P.M.

¶3

Madan Mohan Chibbar. - Vs –

¶4

Arnab Ray.

¶5

Mr. Falguni Bandyopadhyay, Ms. Riya Ballav ... for the petitioner. Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya, Mr. Netai Chandra Saha, Mr. Sounak Mondal, Mr. A. Saha Roy, Ms. Bipasha Bhattacharyya ... for the opposite party

¶6

Present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 6^th October, 2023 whereby pursuant to an application under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 the defence of the petitioner has been struck off.

¶7

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is factually incorrect as the learned Judge has mentioned that no rent has been deposited whereas the part of rent has been deposited as per the record.

¶8

Learned counsel also submits that it is an old proposition that Section 7(3) has to be read as directory and not mandatory. Learned counsel submits that his another application under

¶9

¶10

Section 151 C.P.C. for deposit of remaining rent is still pending disposal.

¶11

Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned order being erroneous in law is liable to be set aside.

¶12

Per contra Mr. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the opposite party submits that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law and there is no infirmity or illegality in the order.

¶13

Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 provides that if the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount in terms of order passed by this court under Section 7(1) or 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 within the time provided or within the extended time as may be granted by the learned Judge, defence shall be struck off.

¶14

The bare perusal of this makes it clear that there is no concession to deposit the part of the amount.

¶15

In Bijay Kuamr Singh & Ors. – Vs – Amit Kumar Chamariya & Anr. (2019) 10 Supreme Court Cases 660 it was inter alia held :

¶16

“19. Sub section (1) of Section 7 of the Act relieves the tenant from the ejectment

¶17

¶18

on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent if he pays to the landlord or deposits it with the Civil Judge all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and up to the end of the month previous to that in which the payment is made together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. Such payment or deposit shall be made within one month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the suit without the summons being served upon him, within one month of his appearance.

¶19

20. Therefore, sub section (1) deals with the payment of arrears of rent when there is no dispute about the rate of rent or the period of arrears of rent. Sub section (2) of the Act comes into play if there is dispute as to the amount of rent including the period of arrears payable by the tenant. In that situation, the tenant is obliged to apply within time as specified in sub section (1) that is within one month of the receipt of summons or within one month

¶20

¶21

of appearance before the court to deposit with the Civil Judge the amount admitted by him to be due. The tenant is also required to file an application for determination of the rent payable. Such deposit is not to be accepted, unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of rent payable. Therefore, sub section (2) of the Act requires two things, deposit of arrears of rent at the rate admitted to be due by the tenant along with an application for determination of the rent payable. If the two conditions are satisfied then only the Court having regard to the rate at which rent was last paid and for which tenant is in default, may make an order specifying the amount due. After such a determination the tenant is granted one month’s time to pay to the landlord the amount which was specified. The proviso of the Act, limits the discretion of the court to extend the time for deposit of arrears of rent. The extension can be provided once and not exceeding two months.

¶22

¶23

21. Sub section (3) provides for consequences of non-payment of rent i.e. striking off the defence against the delivery of the possession and to proceed with the hearing of the suit. Such provision is materially different from sub sections (2A) and (2B) which was being examined by this Court in B.P. Khemka. Sub sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 of 1956 Act confer unfettered power on the court to extend the period of deposit of rent, which is circumscribed by the proviso of sub sections (2) and (3) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of sub section (2) are mandatory and required to be scrupulously followed by the tenant, if the tenant has to avoid the eviction on account of non-payment of arrears of rent under Section 6 of the Act. There is an outer limit for extension of time to deposit of arrears of rent in terms of the proviso to sub section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The consequences flowing from nondeposit of rent are contemplated under

¶24

¶25

sub section (3) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, if the tenant fails to deposit admitted arrears of rent within one month of receipt of summons or within one month of appearance without summons and also fails to make an application for determination of the disputed amount of rate of rent and the period of arrears and the subsequent non-payment on determining of the arrears of rent, will entail the eviction of the tenant. Section 7 of the Act provides for a complete mechanism for avoiding eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, provided that the tenant takes steps as contemplated under sub section (2) of Section 7 of the Act and deposits the arrears of rent on determination of the disputed amount. The deposit of rent along with an application for determination of dispute is a pre-condition to avoid eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In view thereof, tenant will not be able to take recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act as it is not an application

¶26

¶27

alone which is required to be filed by the tenant but the tenant has to deposit admitted arrears of rent as well.”

¶28

In Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School – Vs – Ismat Ahmed & Ors. 2025 SCC Online SC 1696 it was inter alia held :

¶29

“22. Now reverting on the ancillary issue, whether compliance of the provisions of Sections 7(1) and 7(2) so far as it relates to payment or deposit of the rent and filing of application within the time as specified is mandatory or directory? In order to understand whether such compliance is mandatory or directory, it is essential to look into the language as used in those provisions. After perusal of Section 7(1) (a), it is clear that on institution of a suit, it is incumbent on the tenant to deposit the rent, therefore, the word ‘tenant shall’ has been used with ‘pay to landlord or deposit’. Even in Seciton 7(1)(b), it is provided that such payment or deposit ‘shall’ be within one month of the service of summons or within one month from the date of

¶30

¶31

appearance. Further, in Section 7(1) (c) it is provided that after the payment or deposit has been made by the tenant in terms of Section 7(1) (a), the tenant ‘shall’ continue to do the same by 15^th of each succeeding month.

¶32

23. Similarly, in Section 7(2) which deals with the situation of disputed rent, the tenant within the time specified in that Section i.e. 7(1) (b), “shall” deposit the amount admitted by him to be due along with application for determination of rent. The proviso appended therein relates to extension of time only once and upto a maximum period of two months. The proviso reads as “... an extension of time may be granted...”

¶33

33. At this juncture, we also deem it relevant to refer sub-section (3) of Section 7, wherein it is specified that if tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be granted by the court, his defence against

¶34

¶35

delivery of possession shall be struck out. So it deals with the following contingencies; first is of Section 7(1) (a) (b) (c), second is of former part of Section 7(2) and third is of latter part of section 7(2) and in default of either of the situations, the Judge shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit specifying the consequences of failure to do any of the three situations. While using the word extended time in sub-section (3), the word shall has been used, therefore, this would also be referable to the provision which leads to 6 the conclusion that in case, the tenant fails to deposit the determined amount within the time specified or within the extended time. In that contingency the order of striking out of defence be passed and suit be proceeded for hearing. As explained from above discussion, we are constrained to say that the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the paragraphs

¶36

¶37

17, 18 and 19 of the judgement in Debasish Paul (supra) are not germane, hence repelled.”

¶38

The Court considers that there is nothing on the record to suggest that there is any illegality or infirmity in the order of the learned Trial Court. Admittedly the petitioner has not deposited the entire rent in terms of order dated 21^st June, 2022. The legal proposition is very well settled and there is no discretion with the Court to extend the time as prescribed by the statute.

¶39

The Court considers that present petition is liable to be dismissed.

¶40

Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court may be directed to dispose of the pending application. It goes without saying that learned Trial Court shall ensure that all pending applications, if any, as well as suit be disposed of in accordance with law expeditiously.

¶41

Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, duly applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all usual requisite formalities.

¶42

(Dinesh Kumar Sharma, J.)

Madan Mohan Chibbar v. Arnab Ray

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Madan Mohan Chibbar v. Arnab Ray

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

B.B Logistics Vs State of West Bengal and Ors.

M/S. S. K. Construction Vs Dulal Chandra Naskar

Sandip Kr. Nandi Vs State of West Bengal and Ors.

Shew Kumar Tripathi Vs Smt. Dipasree Seth and Anr.

Sri Prasanta Roy Vs Nupur Roy(Biswas) and Anr.

Babu Das Vs Dipak Saha and Ors.