Dismissed¶16

Tumpa Santra v. Sushila Das and Ors.

Calcutta HC16 Jun 2025FAT/60/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Condonation of delay refused; Section 5 Limitation Act; about five-year delay; judgment February 27, 2019; preliminary decree of partition March 30, 2019; Covid-19/Pandemic excuse insufficient; no diligence; palpably negligent litigant; certified copy applied December 2, 2024; CAN 1 of 2025 dismissed on contest; FAT 60 of 2025 dismissed as time-barred; CAN 2 of 2025 dismissed; no order as to costs; Smt. Tumpa Santra Vs. Smt. Sushila Das and others.

What did the court decide?

The explanation had glaring gaps: the Pandemic started only in or about March, 2020 whereas the impugned judgment and decree were passed on February 27, 2019, and the explanation for the period in-between was missing. ¶7

Tumpa Santra Vs Sushila Das and Ors. — Calcutta HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶16

Issue for consideration

Whether the reasons shown in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were sufficient for preferring the appeal late (the delay being of about five years from the judgment of February 27, 2019 and preliminary decree of March 30, 2019), i.e., whether the appellant had been diligent in conducting her litigation.

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Court's answer

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Ratio / Principle

There was nothing to prevent the appellant from at least taking information about her case from the learned Advocate conducting the matter in the trial court over telephone even during the Pandemic period.

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Key takeaways

No averment whatsoever was made that between February 2019, when the impugned judgment was passed, and the middle of 2024, when the appellant allegedly engaged another learned Advocate, any step whatsoever was taken by the appellant to enquire about her case.ratio¶9
Even thereafter, a flimsy application was made in the trial court and rejected, which excuse is neither here nor there.ratio¶10
No plausible explanation whatsoever having been furnished in the application, the court was accordingly unable to hold that the appellant was at all diligent in conducting her litigation at any point of time.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Appeal (F.A.T 60 of 2025, with CAN 1 and CAN 2 of 2025) arising from a judgment passed on February 27, 2019 and a preliminary decree of partition signed on March 30, 2019. The delay in filing was about five years. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act pleaded that the appellant did not know of the order for a couple of years because of the Covid-19 Pandemic, learnt of the judgment and decree in the middle of 2024, engaged another lawyer, and made an application praying for declaration of her share, which was rejected by the learned trial Judge; the certified copy was applied for only on December 2, 2024. The bench found glaring gaps: the Pandemic began only around March, 2020 with no explanation for the intervening period; nothing prevented the appellant from telephoning her trial-court Advocate; there was no averment of any step to enquire about the case between February 2019 and mid-2024; the subsequent trial-court application was flimsy and rejected ('neither here nor there'). Finding no plausible explanation and that the appellant was not at all diligent, and holding that the lenient approach in condonation applications cannot be extended to a palpably negligent litigant, the court found no sufficiency in the reasons shown for the late appeal. CAN 1 of 2025 dismissed on contest; FAT 60 of 2025 dismissed as time-barred; CAN 2 of 2025 consequently dismissed; no order as to costs.

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16^th June, 2025 (AK) 24

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F.A.T 60 of 2025 IA No: CAN 1 of 2025 CAN 2 of 2025

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Smt. Tumpa Santra Vs. Smt. Sushila Das and others

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Mr. Sanat Kumar Roy Mr. Baidurya Ghosal

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...for the appellant.

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Mr. Soumak Bera

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...for the respondent nos. 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 & 15.

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The delay in filing the appeal is of about five years.

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The impugned judgment was admittedly passed on February 27, 2019 and the preliminary decree of partition from which the appeal arises was signed on March 30, 2019.

¶10

The explanation proffered in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is that the said order was not known to the appellant for a couple of years because of the Pandemic (Covid-19) situation prevalent at the material time and that on coming to know of the said judgment and decree in the middle of 2024, the appellant engaged another lawyer to look into the case and an application was made praying for declaration of the share of the appellant.

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Such application was apparently rejected by the learned trial Judge.

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The appellant, only thereafter, applied for having the certified copy of the judgment and preliminary decree on December 2, 2024 and the same was made ready subsequently, upon which the present appeal has been preferred.

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However, there are glaring gaps in the explanation.

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First, the Pandemic started only in or about March, 2020 whereas the impugned judgment and decree were passed on February 27, 2019. The explanation for the period in-between is missing.

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Moreover, there was nothing to prevent the appellant from at least taking information about her case from the learned Advocate conducting the matter in the trial court over telephone even during the Pandemic period.

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There is no averment whatsoever that between February 2019, when the impugned judgment was passed, and the middle of 2024, when the appellant allegedly engaged another learned Advocate, any step whatsoever was taken by the appellant to enquire about her case.

¶18

Even thereafter, a flimsy application was made in the trial court and rejected, which excuse is neither here nor there.

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¶20

The certified copy of the judgment of preliminary decree impugned herein was applied for only on December 2, 2024, that is, more than five years after the passing of the same.

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We do not find any plausible explanation whatsoever having been furnished in the application and accordingly are unable to hold that the appellant was at all diligent in conducting her litigation at any point of time.

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The lenient approach generally adopted in condonation applications cannot be extended to a palpably negligent litigant such as the present appellant, who did not care to look after her own case or contact her lawyers.

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