Dismissed¶33

Bipasha Nasrin v. Gulshan Shamrin Rahaman

Transfer of suit – Section 24, Code of Civil Procedure

Calcutta HC22 Jul 2025CO/115/2025

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri (Appellate Side), CO 115 of 2025, decided 22.07.2025 by Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. Wife's application under Section 24 CPC for transfer of husband's divorce suit from the District Judge, Cooch Behar to Alipurduar dismissed; apprehension of threat to life and limb not credible on preponderance of probabilities; only about 24 kilometers between the two towns; liberty to seek police protection; references to petitioner's criminal proceedings under Sections 498A/406 IPC and complaints before the Women Police Station, Sadar, Kotwali, Coochbehar.

What did the court decide?

In a proceeding under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the yardstick to be applied is the preponderance of probabilities. ¶28

Bipasha Nasrin Vs Gulshan Shamrin Rahaman — Dowry and Cruelty | Calcutta HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶33

Issue for consideration

Whether the divorce suit filed by the opposite party/husband against the petitioner/wife before the learned District Judge, Cooch Behar should be transferred under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a competent court at Alipurduar on the ground that the petitioner apprehends serious risk of life and limb, being threatened whenever she attends the suit at Coochbehar.

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Court's answer

In a proceeding under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the yardstick to be applied is the preponderance of probabilities.

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Ratio / Principle

On the preponderance of probabilities, the Court did not find the allegations made in the transfer application so credible as to transfer the suit from Coochbehar to Alipurduar.

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Key takeaways

Since the distance between Alipurduar and Coochbehar is only about 24 kilometers, there was nothing to prevent the opposite party and his family from repeating any threatening conduct when the petitioner attends court at Alipurduar; transfer would therefore not serve its purpose.ratio¶30
The chronology of events, including the petitioner lodging complaints on other allegations at Coochbehar on April 10, 2025 itself but lodging the alleged-harassment complaint only on April 14, 2025 (a date not fixed for hearing), did not inspire confidence in the allegations against the opposite party.ratio¶28

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Transfer of suit — Section 24, Code of Civil Procedure — wife's application to transfer husband's divorce suit from the Court of the learned District Judge, Cooch Behar to a competent court at Alipurduar, alleging threats to life and limb by the husband, his relatives and henchmen whenever she attends court — reliance on written complaint dated April 14, 2025 alleging that on April 10, 2025 (a date fixed for hearing) she was threatened with dire consequences unless she withdrew her proceeding under Sections 498A/406 IPC — Held: in a Section 24 proceeding the test is the preponderance of probabilities; the trial court's Order No. 16, though recorded in the certified order sheet as May 10, 2025, was actually dated April 10, 2025; on that date PW 1 was cross-examined with no mention of any alleged harassment, and the chronology of complaints did not inspire confidence; the distance between Alipurduar and Coochbehar being only about 24 kilometers, threats, if any, could equally be repeated at Alipurduar; petitioner free to seek police protection before the concerned court — CO 115 of 2025 dismissed on contest without any order as to costs.

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JPD-15 Ct No.01 22.07.2025 TN

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Calcutta High Court In The Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri Appellate Side

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CO 115 of 2025

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Bipasha Nasrin Vs.

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Gulshan Shamrin Rahaman

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Mr. Arnab Das

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…. for the petitioner

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Mr. Mayank Roy

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….for the opposite party

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The present application has been filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for transfer of a divorce suit filed by the opposite party/husband against the petitioner/wife before the learned District Judge, Cooch Behar.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a resident of Alipurduar. Although the distance between the two places is merely 24 kilometers, the petitioner, it is contended, apprehends serious risk of life and limb, since the petitioner is being threatened on very occasion when she goes to attend the suit at Coochbehar, by the opposite party/husband and his family members and henchmen.

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Learned counsel places particular reliance on several complaints lodged by the petitioner before the concerned police station, that is, the Women Police Station, Sadar, Kotwali, Coochbehar. In particular, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a written complaint dated April 14, 2025 where it was alleged by the petitioner that on April 10, 2025, which was a date fixed for hearing of the suit, the petitioner was seriously threatened of dire consequences by the opposite party/husband and his relatives unless the petitioner withdraws her proceeding under Sections 498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code.

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It is further submitted that in view of such serious threats, which is also borne out by subsequent applications and complaints made by the petitioner, as annexed to the present application, the petitioner would be jeopardized if she has to contest the suit by travelling on each occasion to the Court of the District Judge at Cooch Behar and, as such, the suit may be transferred to any competent court at Alipurduar.

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Learned counsel for the opposite party/husband submits that if the petitioner was threatened/assaulted on April 10, 2025, which was admittedly a date of hearing of the suit, the petitioner could have pointed out such alleged

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threats to the learned District Judge for appropriate remedial measures being taken. However, it transpires from the order of that date (apparently mentioned erroneously as “10/05/2025” in the certified copy of the order sheet of the trial court), that the PW 1 was crossexamined on behalf of the defendant/present petitioner. There is no reflection whatsoever in the said order as to any such allegation being raised by the petitioner before the court of the District Judge seeking protection or complaining of the harassment she was allegedly suffering.

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Learned counsel for the opposite party further adds that the petitioner has been consistently making false complaints against the opposite party/husband and his family and has lodged several criminal cases. One of the criminal cases, lodged against distant relatives of the opposite party, has since been quashed, although the other cases against the opposite party and his immediate family members are still pending.

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Thus, it is submitted that the allegations made in the present application ought not to be believed.

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Upon a careful consideration of the annexures to the present application, it is seen that apparently the order dated April 10, 2025 has been erroneously mentioned in the order sheet as May

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10, 2025, which is also evident from the serial numbers of the said orders. Whereas Order No. 15 was dated February 07, 2025 and on the said date, April 10, 2025 was fixed as the next date, Order No. 16, that is, the very next order, is recorded in the certified copy of the order sheet to be of May 10, 2025. Since there was no date in-between and there is no reflection from the order-sheet that the matter was not taken up on April 10, 2025, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Order No. 16 was actually dated April 10, 2025.

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As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the opposite party, there is no semblance of a mention regarding the alleged harassment suffered by the petitioner in the hands by her in-laws on the said date. However, the benefit of doubt in that regard may be extended to the petitioner inasmuch as it is not clear from her complaint dated April 14, 2025 as to when the alleged threats took place, whether while going to court or when returning.

¶25

Be that as it may, it also seems to beg credibility that the petitioner, who had lodged a complaint against the opposite party on different allegations before the Women Police Station at Sadar, Kotwali, Coochbehar on the self-same date, that is, on April 10, 2025 itself, the petitioner forgot to or did not lodge a complaint before the self-same police

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station about the alleged harassment suffered by the petitioner in the hands of the opposite party and his relatives as well. It is also surprising that instead of adding the complaint of such harassment with the other complaints lodged by her on April 10, 2025 itself in a police station at Coochbehar, the petitioner merrily came back to her residence and returned to Coochbehar on April 14, 2025, which was not even a date fixed for hearing of the suit, just to lodge a separate complaint regarding the alleged harassment of April 10, 2025 before the Coochbehar police station.

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Such chronology of events does not inspire confidence in the allegations made against the opposite party by the petitioner. 12. That apart, this Court cannot entirely rule out the possibility of the present allegations being in support of and to strengthen the cause of the petitioner in the criminal cases initiated at her behest. However, nothing in the above observations should be deemed to be conclusive insofar as the conduct of the petitioner or the veracity of the complaints are concerned. Yet, in a proceeding under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the preponderance of probabilities which has to be looked into. On such yardstick,

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this Court does not find the allegations made in the present application to be so credible as to transfer the suit from Coochbehar to Alipurduar. In any event, in view of the nature of the allegations sought to be leveled, regarding threats being issued by the opposite party, if the opposite party and his family are so hell-bent upon threatening the petitioner, there is nothing to prevent them from repeating such conduct while the petitioner goes to the court at Alipurduar as well, since admittedly, the distance between Alipurduar and Coochbehar is only about 24 kilometers.

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If the petitioner is really aggrieved by warnings being issued by the opposite party and/or his family, it is always open to the petitioner to seek police protection before the concerned court.

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In view of the above, I do not find any substance in the present application for transfer.

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Accordingly, CO 115 of 2025 is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs.

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Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.

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(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

Bipasha Nasrin v. Gulshan Shamrin Rahaman

Case brief

What is this about?

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Bipasha Nasrin v. Gulshan Shamrin Rahaman

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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