Allowed

Shailesh Ratilal Kamani v. Mrs. Suzy Valerian Norohna and Ors.

Bombay HC9 Apr 2026IA/9357/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Single Judge allowed an interim application condoning a 48-day delay in filing the First Appeal, relying on Supreme Court precedents allowing liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' for substantial justice.

What did the court decide?

Interim application allowing condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal is granted.

What the court decided

Shailesh Ratilal Kamani vs Mrs. Suzy Valerian… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Bombay HC (2026)

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Digitally signed KANCHAN by KANCHANVINOD VINOD MAYEKAR MAYEKAR Date:2026.04.11 15:04:48 +0530

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 22078 OF 2023

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ALONGWITH

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9357 OF 2024 IN

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FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 22078 OF 2023

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SHAILESH RATILAL KAMANI

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….. APPELLANT/ APPLICANT

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MRS. SUZY VALERIAN NOROHNA & ORS. ….. RESPONDENTS

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Adv. Ranvir Shekhawat i/b. M/s. Raj Legal for the Appellants/Applicants.

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Adv. Aakansha Anand a/w. Adv. Sweta Jalgaonkar i/b. Mahesh Menon & Co. for the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

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CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

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DATE : 9 APRIL, 2026

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P.C. :-

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9357 OF 2024

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This interim application is filed seeking condonation of

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delay in filing First Appeal.

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1. There is delay of 48 days in filing the First Appeal.

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I have heard learned advocates for the parties and I have

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gone through the contents of the interim application.

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Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land

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Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported

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in 1987 SC 1353 , has held that:

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“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

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1. Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead)

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through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341 , more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should

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be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

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The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

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The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

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Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported

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in 2007 (1) MH. L.J. 807 , paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

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The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

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“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

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The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

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