Allowed¶94

Mangesh S/O Bhojrajji Urade v. the State of Maharashtra through Pso Kelwad Dist Nagpur and Another

Bombay HC5 Feb 2026APL/110/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of FIR — Crime No.46/2023 — Sections 195-A, 294, 506 IPC — chargesheet No.54/2023 — abuse in filthy language and criminal intimidation — test of obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC — lascivious elements — absence of annoyance ingredient — Section 506 criminal intimidation ingredients — State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal quashing principles — no prima facie case — Bombay High Court Nagpur Bench — Criminal Application APL No.110 of 2025 — decided 05/02/2026 — neutral citation 2026:BHC-NAG:2440-DB.

What did the court decide?

The FIR in Crime No.46/2023 (Sections 195-A, 294, 506 IPC) and the consequent proceeding bearing chargesheet No.54/2023 were quashed and set aside to the extent of applicant Mangesh s/o Bhojraj Urade; the application stands disposed of. ¶94

Mangesh S/O Bhojrajji Urade vs the State of Maharashtra through Pso Kelwad Dist Nagpur and Another — Bombay HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

¶94

Issue for consideration

Whether the FIR in Crime No.46/2023 (Sections 195-A, 294 and 506 IPC) and the consequent proceeding (chargesheet No.54/2023) should be quashed against the applicant. +2 more

¶20

Court's answer

In view of the above, no prima facie case is made out against the applicant, satisfying the Bhajan Lal principle that allegations taken at face value do not constitute an offence; the FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed to the extent of the applicant.

¶66

Ratio / Principle

The words attributed to the applicant, even accepted at face value, do not pass the 'test of obscenity'; the record discloses no lascivious elements showing sexual thoughts or feelings, hence the offence under Section 294 IPC is not made out.

¶55

Key takeaways

Mere utterance of obscene words is insufficient; the ingredient of annoyance is absent because no one deposed that the obscene words caused annoyance, so the ingredients of Section 294 are absent in the present case.ratio¶63
Considering all the aspects and applying them to the case, the offences under Sections 294 and 506 IPC are admittedly not made out against the applicant.ratio¶65

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench (Urmila Joshi-Phalke, J.), Criminal Application APL No.110 of 2025, decided 05/02/2026 (neutral citation 2026:BHC-NAG:2440-DB) — Allowed. FIR in Crime No.46/2023 (Ss.195-A, 294, 506 IPC) and consequent proceeding (chargesheet No.54/2023) quashed to the extent of the applicant. Held: the words attributed to the applicant, even taken at face value, fail the 'test of obscenity' — no lascivious elements showing sexual thoughts or feelings are disclosed (relying on N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818; Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0080/1964); mere utterance of obscene words is insufficient absent proof of annoyance to others, which was lacking (relying on Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0134/2025); the ingredients of Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation by threat to person, reputation or property) are likewise absent. Accordingly, applying the Bhajan Lal guidelines (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), no prima facie case is made out and the FIR stands quashed against the applicant.

¶1

2026:BHC-NAG:2440-DB

Judgment

1 apl110.25

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

¶6

CRIMINAL APPLICATION APL NO.110 of 2025

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Mangesh s/o Bhojraj Urade, age- 40 years, occupation- private, r/o Rakelwad, taluka Saoner, district Nagpur. ….. Applicant. :: V E R S U S ::

¶8

State of Maharashtra, through– PSO – Kelwad, district- Nagpur.

¶9

Vitthal s/o Marotrao Kamdi, age- 71 years, occupation– private, r/o ward No.2, Beedgaon, taluka Saoner, district– Nagpur. ….. Non-applicants .

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============================== Shri S.S.Kulkarni, Counsel for the Applicant. Shri Nikhil Joshi, APP for Non-applicant No.1/State. None appears for the Non-applicant N.2.

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============================== CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J. DATE : 05/02/2026

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned

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APP for the State. Despite service, none appears for the non-

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applicant No.2. Admit . Heard finally by consent.

.....2/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

By the present application, the applicant is seeking quashing of FIR in connection with Crime No.46/2023 registered for offences under Sections 195-A, 294, and 506 of the IPC and consequent proceeding arising out of the same bearing chargesheet No.54/2023.

¶21

The crime is registered against the applicant on the basis of a report lodged by Vitthal Marotrao Kamdi on allegation that, in his village, the applicant is residing, who is a mischievous person and offences are registered against him. On 16.3.2023, at about 4:00 pm, when he was proceeding towards Bank of India, the applicant called him and abused him in a filthy language as well as threatened him. On the basis of the said report, the police have registered the crime against the applicant.

¶22

Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that even accepting the allegations as it is, at its face value, the offence under Section 294 of the IPC is not made out as mere abuses

.....3/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

are not sufficient to attract the offence under Section 294 of the IPC.

¶28

He further submitted that as far as the offence under Section 506 of the IPC is concerned, the same is also not made out as there is nothing on record to show that there was criminal intimidation by the applicant by threatening the person with an injury or by threatening the person’s reputation or property.

¶29

In view of that, the application deserves to be allowed.

¶30

Per contra, learned APP for the State has strongly opposed the said contentions and submitted that considering the language used by the applicant and considering fact that there are offences registered against the applicant of the similar nature, the application deserves to rejected.

¶31

On hearing both the sides and perusing the entire investigation papers, it reveals that the applicant is charged for the offence under Section 294 of the IPC.

.....4/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

Section 294 of the IPC talks about obscene acts and songs. The said Section is reproduced as under for reference:

¶37

“ 294. Obscene acts and songs .- Whoever, to the annoyance of others – (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both”.

¶38

Perusal of the entire FIR shows that the words used

¶39

by the applicant are that, “….. eyk vf’yy f’kohxkG fnyh dh] lkY;k eknjpksn tj rw dk ek>;k fo#/n dksVkZr lk{k fnyh] rj rqyk dks.kR;krjh [kksV;k xqUg;kr Qloqu Vkdhu vls cksywu rqyk ikgqu ?ksbZu vls Eg.kwu /kedh fnyh-”

¶40

Even, if it is accepted at its value, admittedly, it does not pass “test of obscenity”.

.....5/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

The “test of obscenity” is referred by the Hon’ble

¶46

Apex Court in the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and anr vs. K.Lalitha, reported in (2022), 17 SCC 818 wherein it is laid down the “test of obscenity” under Section 294(b) of the IPC and observed that, “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.”

¶47

It has been further observed that, “this test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in MANU/SC/0080/1964 that the “test of obscenity” is the ‘substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires’.”

¶48

“In order to be “obscene” the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts. I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think

.....6/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

that the words are “obscene” and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under Section 294(b) of the IPC.”

¶54

Thus, to attract the offence under Section 294(b) of the IPC, some lascivious elements showing sexual thoughts or feelings are the requirements.

¶55

In the present case, record does not disclose that the alleged words used by the applicant are attracting any lascivious elements.

¶56

It is further considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

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in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in MANU/SC/0134/2025, “mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case”.

.....7/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

No one has spoken about the “obscene” words and

¶63

due to that, he felt annoyed and, therefore, the ingredients are absent in the present case.

¶64

As far as Section 506 of the IPC is concerned, it deals with criminal intimidation for which threatening a person with an injury or by threatening a person’s reputation or property is the requirement. To attract Section 506 of the IPC, threat must be with an intent

¶65

Thus, considering all these aspects and applying the same to the present case, admittedly, offences under Sections 294 and 506 of the IPC are not made out.

¶66

In view of that, no prima facie case is made out against the applicant.

¶67

The law relating to quashing of FIRs was explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and ors vs. Bhajan Lal and ors, reported in 1992 Supplementary

¶68

(1) SCC 335 wherein principles have been laid down which

.....8/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

are required to be considered while considering applications for quashing of the FIRs, which read as under:

¶74

“(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

¶75

(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investi- gation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

¶76

(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

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(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute

.....9/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

¶83

(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

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(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

¶85

(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

.....10/-

Judgment

1 apl110.25

accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge”.

¶91

18. In this view of the matter, prima facie case is not

¶92

made out against the applicant. In view of that, the application deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass following order:

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ORDER

¶94

(1) The criminal application is allowed .

¶95

(2) The FIR in connection with Crime No.46/2023 registered for offences under Sections 195-A, 294, and 506 of the IPC and consequent proceeding arising out of the same bearing chargesheet No.54/2023 are hereby quashed and set aside to the extent of applicant Mangesh s/o Bhojraj Urade.

¶96

Application stands disposed of.

¶97

( URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J. )

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Signed by: Mr. B. R. Wankhede Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 13/02/2026 10:16:22

¶99

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Mangesh S/O Bhojrajji Urade v. the State of Maharashtra through Pso Kelwad Dist Nagpur and Another

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Mangesh S/O Bhojrajji Urade v. the State of Maharashtra through Pso Kelwad Dist Nagpur and Another

Case brief

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