circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the
testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds
interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the
relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural,
improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for
doubting that the dispositions of the Will are not the result of the
testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be
legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and
satisfactorily explained before the Will is accepted. Again in cases
where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the
execution of the Will which confers on him substantial benefit that
is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove
by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the
conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature
and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to
satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a
reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case,
entertain. (See H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma¹,
and Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev2.) In the
latter case this Court, after referring to the principles stated in the
former case emphasised that where there are suspicious
circumstances the onus will be on the propounder to explain them
to the satisfaction of the court before the Will could be accepted as
genuine; and where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud
and coercion the onus is on him to prove same. It has been further
pointed out that the suspicious circumstances may be as to the
genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the
testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will which may be
unnatural or unfair or improbable when considered in the light of
the relevant circumstances. If the caveator does not discharge the
burden which rests upon him in establishing the circumstances
which show that the Will had been obtained by fraud or undue
influence, a probate of the Will must necessarily be granted if it is
established that the testator had full testamentary capacity and
had in fact executed it validly with a free will and mind. The
observations of the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga v.
Jamsetjee Hormusjee Kanga support the above proposition. Mr.
Ammer Ali observed at p. 33:
