wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the Legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The Legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. None of these vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present case and hence there was no scope at all for the High Court to invalidate the provision contained in clause (3) of Regulation 104 as ultra vires on the grounds of its being in excess of the regulation-making power conferred on the Board. Equally untenable, in our opinion, is the next and last ground by the High Court for striking down clause (3) of Regulation 104 as unreasonable, namely, that it is in the nature of a bye-law and is ultra vires on the ground of its being an unreasonable provision. It is clear from the scheme of the Act and more particularly. Sections 18, 19 and 34 that the Legislature has laid down in broad terms its policy to provide for the establishment of a State Board and Divisional Boards to regulate matters pertaining to secondary and higher secondary education in the State and it has authorised the State Government in the first instance and subsequently the Board to enunciate the details for carrying into effect the purposes of the Act by framing regulations. It is a common legislative practice that the Legislature may choose to lay down only the general policy and leave to its delegate to make detailed provisions for carrying into effect the said policy and effectuate the purposes of the statute by framing rules/regulations which are in the nature of subordinate legislation. Section 3(39) of the Bombay General clauses Act, 1904, which defines the expression “rule” states:“Rule shall mean a rule made in exercise of the power under any enactment and shall include any regulation made under a rule or under any enactment”. It is important to notice that a distinct power of making bye-laws has been conferred by the Act on the State Board under Section 38. The Legislature has thus maintained in the statute in question a clear distinction between “bye-laws” and “regulations”. The bye-laws to be framed under Section 38 are to relate only to procedural matters concerning the holding of meetings of the State Board, Divisional Boards and the Committee, the quorum required, etc. More important matters affecting the rights of parties and laying down the manner in which the provisions of the
