A former Home Minister challenged a CBI corruption FIR following a court-directed preliminary enquiry. The Court rejected objections based on State consent, prior approval and the enquiry’s scope, and declined to quash the FIR. The petition and subsequent request to stay the judgment were rejected.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
CRIWP1904-2021.DOC
Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1904 OF 2021
Anil Vasantrao Deshmukh
Aged 70 years, Occu. Agricultural & Social Service, having his address at Dyaneshwar Bungalow, Malabar Hill, Mumbai – 400006.
... Petitioner
Versus
… Respondents
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CORAM: S. S. SHINDE & N. J. JAMADAR, JJ RESERVED ON: 12th JULY, 2021 PRONOUNCED ON: 22nd JULY, 2021 (Through Video Conferencing)
JUDGMENT:-
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2021, directing a preliminary eniuiry, came to be passed.
( a ) The genesis is in an FIR bearing CR No.35 of
2021, registered with Gamdevi Police Station, in connection with the occurrence wherein a gelatin laden SUV was found near the residence of an industrialist. Eventually, the National Investigation Agency (“NIA”) took over the investigation in the said crime. As the investigation allegedly revealed the complicity of Mr. Sachin Vaze, the then API attached to Crime Investigation Unit of Crime Branch, Mumbai, he was arrested. In the wake of the controversy, Mr. Param Bir Singh, the then Commissioner of Police was transferred as Commandent General, Home Guards, Maharashtra, by an order dated 17th March, 2021.
( b ) The petitioner, who was then holding the offce of Home Minister, alleges that, in retaliation to the transfer, Mr. Param Bir Singh addressed a letter, dated 20th March, 2021, to the Hon’ble Chief Minister, making wild, malafde and unjustifed allegations. As the said letter came in the public domain, respondent no.3 lodged a complaint with Malbar Hill Police Station annexing thereto a copy of the letter addressed by Mr. Param Bir Singh.
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of 2021, before the Supreme Court seeking, inter alia, a direction to the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct impartial, unbiased and fair investigation, in the various “corrupt malpractices” of the petitioner. It was withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court. PIL Petition No.6 of 2021 (Param Bir Singh s/o Hoshiyar Sing vs. The State of Maharashtra & ors.) was fled by Mr. Param Bir Singh for the aforesaid relief. In addition, a direction was sought against the State of Maharashtra to ensure that transfer and posting of police offcials are neither done on any consideration of pecuniary benefts to any politician nor in contravention of the direction of the High Court in Prakash Singh & ors vs. Union of India & ors.1 Dr. Jayahree Patil – respondent no.3 herein, preferred Writ Petition No.1541 of 2021, again seeking an unbiased, uninfuenced, impartial and fair investigation in various “corrupt malpractices” of the petitioner and others, who were named in her complaint. Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyaya preferred a PIL, being Criminal Public Interest Litigation (ST) No.6072 of 2021, for thorough investigation. All these petitions, along with Criminal Public Interest Litigation (ST) No.6166 of 2021, fled by Mr. Mohan Prabhakar Bhide, seeking appointment of a Committee headed by a
1 (2006) 8 SCC 1.
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retired Judge of the Supreme Court or this Court to investigate the allegations made by Mr. Parm Bir Singh, were heard and disposed of by the Division Bench (Coram: Hon’ble The Chief Justice and G. S. Kulkarni, J) by order dated 5th April, 2021.
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would be suffciently served if the Director, CBI, was directed to initiate a preliminary eniuiry into the complaint of Dr. Patil, which had the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh addressed to the Hon’ble Chief Minister, as an annexture. The Director (CBI) was, thus, ordered to conduct the preliminary eniuiry, preferably within 15 days. Post completion of iniuiry, the Director (CBI) was also given liberty to decide on the future course of action, in accordance with law.
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6th April, 2021. After completion of preliminary eniuiry, Mr. R. S. Gunjiyal, DSP, AC-V, CBI, New Delhi, lodged complaint against the petitioner and unknown others, purportedly on the basis of the fndings of the preliminary eniuiry. On the strength thereof, RC No.2232021/A0003 came to be registered on 21st April, 2021 alleging, inter alia, that the preliminary eniuiry, prima facie, revealed that the cognizable offence is made out wherein the petitioner and unknown others attempted to obtain undue advantage for improper and dishonest performance of their duty. Thus FIR came to be registered for the offences punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the PC Act”) and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for short “the IPC”) against the petitioner and unknown others.
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there is a legal bar to the registration of the FIR, incorporated in Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (“the DSPE Act”) and Section 17A of the PC Act, the action of respondent no.2 in registering the FIR is not in accordance with law, the only course which the Division Bench had directed respondent no.2 to pursue post preliminary eniuiry.
( b ) The petitioner further asserts that respondent no.2 by registering the aforesaid FIR has endeavoured to enter into the matters which were expressly excluded by the order of the Division Bench from the very purview of the preliminary eniuiry. Aspect of transfer and posting of police offcials was specifcally kept out of the ambit of the preliminary eniuiry. The insistence of respondent no.2 to delve into the transfer and posting of police offcials is again in teeth of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the DSPE Act as in the absence of the consent of the State Government respondent no.2 is not authorized to investigate into a matter which siuarely falls within the province of the State.
( c ) Even otherwise, according to the petitioner, the FIR, as it stands, does not make out the essential ingredients of Section 7 of the PC Act. Nor a prima facie case for the
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offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC is made out. Hence, the FIR and the conseiuent investigation, which is tainted with malice and ulterior motive, deserves to be iuashed and set aside.
( b ) Legal bar sought to be raised to the registration of the FIR, both under Section 6 of the DSPE Act and 17A of the PC Act, is stated to be misconceived. Since the investigation by CBI is ordered by the constitutional court, according to Respondent no.2, the interdict contained in Section 6 of the DSPE Act does not come into play. Nor the prior approval of the competent authority, as envisaged by the provisions contained in Section 17A of the PC Act, is warranted as the offence of attempt to obtain undue advantage for improper and dishonest performance of the public duty does not form
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part of, “recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his offcial functions or duties”. Moreover, where the investigation is ordered by the Constitutional Courts no iuestion of prior approval for investigation arises. Respondent no.2 thus contends that the FIR has been registered in conformity with the order of this Court and the governing provisions.
( c ) On merits, it is categorically denied that the FIR does not, prima facie, disclose commission of the offences. Both the offences punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and 120B of the IPC are made out by the assertions in the FIR and the documents annexed thereto.
“ 6 . At one of the briefng sessions in the wake of the Antilia incident held in mid-March 2021 when I was called late evening at Varsha to brief you, I had pointed out several misdeeds and malpractices being indulged into by the Hon’ble Home Minister……………..”
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thereafter, the Hon’ble Home Minister had called Shri Vaze to his offcial residence. At that time, one or two staff members of the Hon’ble Home Minister including his personal secretary, Mr. Palande, were also present. The Hon’ble Home Minister expressed to Shri Vaze that he had a target to accumulate Rs.100 Crores a month for achieving the aforesaid target, the Hon’be Home Minister told Shri Vaze that there are about 1,750 bars, restaurants and other establishments in Mumbai and if a sum of Rs.2-3 lakhs each was collected from each of them, a monthly collection of Rs.40-50 crores was achievable. The Hon’ble Home Minister added that the rest of the collection could be made from other sources.
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Dnyaneshwar for giving instructions to adopt a specifc course of action in police investigations…………..”
12. How the Division Bench viewed the aforesaid allegations
and proceeded to deal with the method of iniuiring into the same, in a manner known to law, becomes evident from the observations of the Division Bench in paragraphs 75, 80, 82 and 83 of the order dated 5th April, 2021. They deserve
extraction in extenso:
“ 75 . We have perused the complaint of Dr. Patil to consider as to whether it makes out a prima facie case of a cognizable offence. Examination of the veracity and/or credibility of the allegations contained therein is not our task, at this stage. Dr. Patil annexed to her complaint a copy of Shri Param Bir’s letter to the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Relevant portions thereof have been extracted supra. The information furnished therein discloses commission of cognizable offences by Shri Deshmukh and in our prima facie view, should have been acted upon in the manner reiuired by the CrPC, and as judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra). Whether or not an FIR ought to be straightaway registered on the basis thereof or a preliminary iniuiry ought to precede registration of an FIR, is a matter which we propose to consider after applying our mind as to whether the present case deserves to be referred to the CBI.
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the highest functionary of the Government of Maharashtra, when it comes to the functioning of the police department. Prima facie, the issues are such that the very faith of citizens in the functioning of the police department is at stake. If there is any amount of truth in such allegations, certainly it has a direct effect on the citizens’ confdence in the police machinery in the State. Such allegations,therefore, cannot remain unattended and are reiuired to be looked into in the manner known to law when, prima facie, they indicate commission of a cognizable offence. It is, hence, certainly an issue of credibility of the State machinery, which would stare at the face when confronted with the expectations of the law and when such complaints are received against high ranking public offcials. This Court cannot be a mere spectator in these circumstances. There is certainly a legitimate public expectation of a free, fair, honest and impartial iniuiry and investigation into such allegations which have surfaced in the public domain. The necessity to have a probe into such allegations by an independent agency, would also certainly be a reiuirement of the rule of law. To instill public confdence and safeguard the Fundamental Rights of the citizens, it is necessary that an iniuiry and investigation is conducted by an independent agency and for such reasons, we consider it to be in the paramount public interest that an independent probe in the present circumstances would meet the ends of justice.
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appreciation in the correct perspective, we deem it appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the FIR:
“The Preliminary Eniuiry prima facie revealed that a cognizable offence is made out in the matter, wherein the then Home Minister of Maharshtra, Shri Anil Deshmukh and unknown others have attempted to obtain undue advantage for improper and dishonest performance of their public duty.
Eniuiry has also revealed that Shri Sachin Vazze, Assistant Police Inspector, Mumbai Police had been reinstated into the police force after being out of the police service for more thatn 15 years. The eniuiry further reveled that Shri Sachin Vaze was entrusted with most of the sensational and important cases of Mumbai City Police and that the then Home Minister was in knowledge of the said fact.
Further, the petition of Shri Param Bir Singh (Annexure -C, 104 pages) also fnds attention of the fact that the then Home Minister of Maharashtra and others exercised undue infuence over the transfer & posting of offcials and thereby exercising undue infuence over the performance of offcial duties by the offcials.”
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emphasis on the fact that the Division Bench had directed only a preliminary eniuiry and that too in accordance with the law. Post completion of preliminary eniuiry, respondent no.2 was duty bound to seek the consent of the State Government as envisaged by Section 6 of the DSPE Act. Since the Division Bench did not direct the registration of the FIR, it was not open to CBI to straightway register the FIR and enter upon investigation in teeth of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the DSPE Act, urged Mr. Desai. The endeavour of respondent no.2 to enter into investigation without the consent of the State Government, according to Mr. Desai, is in gross violation of the principle of federalism, which is the basic structure of the Constitution. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Desai placed a very strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal and others vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, and others2 (“CPDR”).
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annexed. Respondent no.2 could not have transgressed beyond the ambit of the order of the Division Bench. The matter of reinstatement of Mr. Sachin Vaze, the alleged entrustment of sensational and important cases to Mr. Vaze as well as alleged exercise of undue infuence over transfer and posting of offcials, referred to in the FIR, (extracted above) were clearly beyond the scope of the eniuiry ordered by the Division Bench. Such endeavour of respondent no.2 to usurp the jurisdiction to investigate stands foul of the interdict contained in Section 6 of the DSPE Act. Support was sought to be drawn from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ms. Mayawati vs. Union of India and others.3
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negation of the constitutional guarantee of right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In view of the provisions contained in Section 17A of the PC Act, introduced by the Amendment Act, 2018, the professed investigation into the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in discharge of public duty, without the approval of the competent authority, is in clear violation of the procedure established by law. In the absence of such approval, the continuation of the further proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court and deserves to be iuashed, urged Mr. Desai.
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reiteration of the ingredients which constitute an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act in the FIR is of no legal conseiuence. By applying the settled principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction to iuash the FIR/prosecution, the FIR in the instant case is reiuired to be iuashed, submitted Mr. Desai.
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submitted that the Division Bench has recorded at more than one places that the allegations against the petitioner, prima facie, made out a cognizable offence. In the face of such observations, the endeavour on the part of the petitioner to urge that no offence is, prima facie, made out is unworthy of countenance.
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the petitioner that the allegations in the FIR are bereft of facts and do not make out an offence is unworthy of acceptance. The FIR in iuestion explicitly refers to the complaint of Dr. Patitl as well as the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh, as annexures thereto. Since the Division Bench in its order dated 5th April, 2021 has recorded in clear and explicit terms that the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh, prima facie, discloses cognizable offences, it is now not open for the petitioner to agitate the said issue, especially when the order of the Division Bench was affrmed by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner.
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investigation are in conformity with the order of the
Division Bench?
The thrust of the submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the Division Bench consciously and cautiously chose to order a preliminary eniuiry and not registration of the FIR. The Division Bench was further circumspect in expressly directing that after the completion of the eniuiry, the Director, CBI, shall be at liberty to decide on the future course of action, also in accordance with law. Mr. Desai would urge that the mandate of the order dated 5th April, 2021, stops at that. After completion of the preliminary eniuiry, before the respondent no.2 proceeded to register the FIR and enter into investigation, it was enjoined to seek the consent of the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. Any deviation therefrom would infringe the federal structure of the Constitution, urged Mr. Desai.
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that there is a well recognized distinction between an eniuiry and investigation, especially where the CBI exercised the power and jurisdiction under DSPE Act. ( Shashikant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation4 ) Such distinction cannot be obliterated to the prejudice of the State concerned. What exacerbates the situation, according to Mr. Desai, is the fact that respondent no.2 is fully conscious of its limitations in registration of the FIR, despite the order of the constitutional court to conduct a preliminary eniuiry, and has chosen to follow the said course in somewhat similar circumstances before the Gauhati High Court in the case of Taba Tedir and another vs. Central Bureau of Investigation5
4 (2007) 1 SCC 630.
5 2019 SCC Online Gaui 3451.
6 (2002) 5 SCC 521.
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agency. In the case at hand, the Division Bench referred to the aforesaid position in law and recorded that the allegations against the petitioner prima facie disclose cognizable offence. Ultimate direction for institution of a preliminary eniuiry is reiuired to be viewed through the aforesaid prism of prima facie satisfaction recorded by the Division Bench about its necessity.
is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary eniuiry into the allegations by a responsible offcer. The Division Bench also found the said course to be in perfect accord with paragraph 120.6 of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of UP.8
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observations of the Division Bench, we fnd it rather diffcult to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the direction for the institution of the preliminary eniuiry was for the reason that the Division Bench did not fnd the allegations worthy of directing registration of the FIR. The ultimate direction for preliminary eniuiry cannot thus be construed in isolation and torn of the observations which precede the said direction.
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the Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, without the consent of the Government of that State.
“ 68. ( i )….
( ii ) ….
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( iii ) …. ( iv ) ….
( v ) Restriction on Parliament by the Constitution and restriction on the Executive by the Parliament under an enactment, do not amount to restriction on the power of the Judiciary under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
( vi ) If in terms of Entry 2 of List II of The Seventh Schedule on the one hand and Entry 2-A and Entry 80 of List I on the other, an investigation by another agency is permissible subject to grant of consent by the State concerned, there is no reason as to why, in an exceptional situation, Court would be precluded from exercising the same power which the Union could exercise in terms of the provisions of the Statute. In our opinion, exercise of such power by the constitutional courts would not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, if in such a situation the court fails to grant relief, it would be failing in its constitutional duty.
( vii ) When the Special Police Act itself provides that subject to the consent by the State, the CBI can take up investigation in relation to the crime which was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the State Police, the court can also exercise its constitutional power of judicial review and direct the CBI to take up the investigation within the jurisdiction of the State. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away, curtailed or diluted by Section 6 of the Special Police Act. Irrespective of there being any statutory provision acting as a restriction on the powers of the Courts, the restriction imposed by Section 6 of the Special Police Act on the powers of the Union, cannot be read as restriction on the powers of the Constitutional Courts. Therefore, exercise of power of judicial review by the High Court, in our opinion, would not amount to infringement of either the doctrine of separation of power or the federal structure.”
(emphasis supplied)
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albeit with the consent of the State, in relation to the crime which was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the State Police, the Court can also, in exercise of its power of judicial review, direct the CBI to take up the investigation within the jurisdiction of the State. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away, curtailed or diluted by Section 6 of the DSPE Act.
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judicial review. Once a constitutional court passes an order authorizing CBI to iniuire into a matter, the latter is invested with the reiuisite power and jurisdiction to pursue the proceeding to a logical culmination. If the State Government were to interdict the investigation, at an intermediate stage, by withholding or denying the consent, the order of the constitutional court directing eniuiry would be denuded of mandate and effcacy.
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FIR was registered assailed the prosecution, inter alia, on the
ground that the it was incumbent upon CBI to obtain approval under Section 17A of the PC Act before registering the FIR. When the matter came up before the Court, a statement was made on behalf of the CBI that CBI was open to obtain necessary approval from the competent authority. In the backdrop of the said statement the Court did not fnd it necessary to enter into the merits of the contentious issue, and the petition came to be disposed of by granting leave to CBI to take steps for obtaining approval under Section 17A.
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the peremptory nature of the said reiuirement.
39. Question No.(ii): Bar under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act:
A more vigorous attack against the continuation of the
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investigation was mounted on the premise that the investigation is wholly without jurisdiction in view of the bar created by Section 17A of the PC Act, inserted by the Amendment Act 16 of 2018. Mr. Desai submitted that the history of prevention of corruption laws would indicate that there has been a constant tension between the two objectives: eradication of corruption and protection of innocent public servants. Corrupt must be punished. At the same time, the procedure established by law to protect the innocent public servants from motivated, vexatious and frivolous proceedings, also serves a defnite public interest. The anxiety to protect the public servants manifested in repeated attempts to introduce a mechanism which envisages such protection, despite such measures having been struck down, underscores the legislative intent as well as the necessity to protect the public servants. Alluding to single directive No.4.7(3), which warranted prior sanction before eniuiry was initiated by CBI against a decision making level offcer, which was struck down in Vineet Narain and others vs. Union of India and another,9 Section 6A of the DSPE Act, which came to be enacted after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vineet Narain (supra) and was, in turn, struck down
9 (1998) 1 SCC 226.
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by the Supreme Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another10 as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Mr. Desai urged that with a view to provide the protection to all the public servants, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of their offcial functions or duties, the Parliament has now barred eniuiry or investigation without the approval of the competent authority, by inserting Section 17A in the PC Act. This protection is a part of the procedure established by law, under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was urged that in the instant case, since the investigation is commenced sans the approval of the competent authority, the entire exercise is vitiated. Therefore, this Court is called upon to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of balancing the rights, submitted Mr. Desai.
“ 17-A . Eniuiry or Iniuiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of offcial functions or duties: (1) No police offcer shall conduct any eniuiry or iniuiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his offcial functions
10 (2014) 8 SCC 682.
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or duties, without the previous approval—
( a ) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;
( b ) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;
( c ) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his offce, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month.‟
shown to have nexus with the recommendation made or
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decision taken by a public servant in discharge of such functions or duties, the interdict operates.
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judicially recognized, cannot be construed too narrowly so as to render the protection illusory. The statutory safeguard must be strictly complied with as it is conceived in public interest. If the offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant has something to do or related in some manner with the discharge of a offcial duty, the protection must be extended.
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to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Matajog Dobey vs. H. C. Bhari,15 wherein the legal position was illuminatingly postulated as under: “In the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of offcial duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the offcial duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duties”.
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may be reasonably necessary for execution of the public duty. At best, the petitioner is laying a pretended and fanciful claim of performance of public duty as the offcial status only furnished the opportunity for the commission of the offences, urged Mr. Lekhi. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakashsingh Badal vs. State of Punjab,16 wherein it was held that the offence of cheating and cognet offences can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of offcial duty. In such a case, offcial status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.
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performance of public duties by those police offcials.
17 (2006) 8 SCC 1.
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Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, Police Establishment Boards have been constituted, inter alia, to make recommendations to the State Government regarding the transfer and posting of police offcers and also decide transfer and posting of police offcers, based on their rank. Under Section 22N, the competent authority for general transfer and the mid-term transfer of the Maharashtra police service offcers of and above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police is Home Minister, the position which the petitioner occupied.
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provisions of Section 17A are mandatory in nature. Investigations commenced, without the approval of the competent authority, and the conseiuent prosecutions also have been iuashed and set aside. Attention of the court was invited to the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the
case of Hemant Nimbalkar vs. State of Karnataka and others,18 the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bhayabhai Gigabhai Sutreja vs. State of Gujarat,19 the Kerala High Court in the case of Ramesh Chennithala vs. State of Kerala20 and the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kailash Chandra Agarwal and another vs. State of Rajasthan and another.21
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nature of the prior approval envisaged by Section 17A of the PC Act, there can be no iualm over the propositions enunciated therein as the phraseology of Section 17A is explicitly clear and unambiguous. In our view, the moot iuestion that wrenches to the fore, in the instant case, is whether Section 17A of the PC Act operates as a fetter on the power of the High Court to direct iniuiry and/or investigation in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution? In our endeavour to fnd an answer to this iuestion, we will advert to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Yashwant Sinha (supra).
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an injunction against the constitutional court directing iniuiry or investigation?
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the jurisdiction under Article 226, which is exercised to uphold the Constitution and maintain the rule of law.
“Section 6A of the DSPE Act reads as under:
( 1 ) The Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any iniuiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of PC Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegation relates to—
( a ) the employees of the Central Government of the Level of Joint Secretary and above; and
( b ) such offcers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government.
( 2 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or
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attempting to accept any gratifcation other than legal remuneration referred to in clause (c) of the Explanation to section 7 of the Prevention of PC Act, 1988 (49 of 1988).]”
“ 49 . The argument of the learned Attorney General that Section 6-A is in the nature of procedure established by law for the purpose of Article 21 and where conseiuences follow in criminal law for an accused, the Court is not at liberty to negate the same even in exercise of powers under Article 32 of Article 142 overlook the vital aspect that Court monitoring of the iniuiry/ investigation conducted by CBI is itself a very strong check on CBI from misusing or abusing its power of iniuiry/ investigation. The fltration mechanism which Section 6-A provides to ensure that the senior offcers at the decision making level are not subjected to frivolous iniuiry is achieved as the constitutional court that monitors the iniuiry/ investigation by CBI acts as guardian and protector of the rights of the individual and, if necessary, can always prevent any improper act by CBI against senior offcers in the Central Government when brought before it.
23 (2014) 2 SCC 532.
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restricted to the cases where the Court monitors investigation. Secondly, the deviation from the statutory reiuirement is permissible only when the Supreme Court exercises its plenary jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, where it does not monitor the investigation, is not within its rights in overriding the statutory provision. Since in the instant case the Division Bench simply ordered preliminary eniuiry and the petitions were disposed of, the aforesaid pronouncement is of no assistance to the respondent – CBI, urged Mr. Desai.
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submission, it is imperative to consider the backdrop of the decision in the case of M.L.Sharma (supra). The aforesaid iuestion came up for consideration before the Supreme Court, in the backdrop of the fact that the iniuiry and investigation into the allocation of the coal blocks were being monitored by the Supreme Court and CBI had submitted report about the status of the progress made in that regard. In the said case, the Supreme Court had put two iueries to the learned Attorney General. The second was, “why the approval of the Government (under Section 6A) was necessary in respect of “Court monitored” or “Court directed” investigation”. The submissions of the learned Attorney General in response to the second iuery were noted in paragraph 19 as under:
“19 . In response to the second iuery, the learned Attorney General submits that Section 6-A is in the nature of procedure established by law for the purposes of Article 21 and where conseiuences follow in criminal law for an accused, the Court is not at liberty to negate the same even in exercise of powers under Article 32 of Article 142. According to him, reiuirement of sanction under Section 6-A is to be interpreted strictly and cannot be waived under any circumstances. That the Court monitors or directs an investigation does not affect the basis of protection available under law and CBI cannot be asked to proceed with iniuiry or investigation dehors the statutory mandate of Section 6-A. The learned Attorney General, thus, submits that Section 6- A which was a defnite objective must be allowed to operate even in the cases where the investigation into the crimes under the PC Act is being monitored by the Court.”
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Supreme Court observed as under:
“53. The learned Attorney General is right that the two provisions, namely Section 6 and Section 6A are different provisions and they operate in different felds, but the principle of law laid down in respect of Section 6, in our view, can be extended while considering applicability of Section 6-A to the Court-monitored investigations. If Section 6 necessitates the prior sanction of the State Government before investigation is carried outby CBI in terms ofthat provision and the principle of law laid down by the Constitution bench of this Court is that the constitution courts are empowered to direct the investigation of a case by CBI and in such cases no prior sanction of the State Governemtn is necessary under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, there is no reason why such principle is not extended in holding that the approval of the Central Government is not necssary under Section 6A of the DSPE Act in a matter where the iniuiry/investigation into the crime under the PC Act is being monitored by the Court. It is the duty of this Court that anti-corruption laws are interpreted and worked out in such a fashion that helps in minimising abuse of public offce for private gain.”
(emphasis supplied)
as to why the principle expounded in CPDR (supra) cannot
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be extended to hold that the approval of the Central Government is not necessary under Section 6A of the DSPE Act in a matter where the iniuiry/investigation into the crime under the PC Act is monitored by the Court, constitutes a complete answer to the submissions sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner.
“ 95 . The iuestion therefore is, can a statutory fetter such as Section 6-A of the Act bind the exercise of plenary power by this Court of issuing orders in the nature of a continuing mandamus under Article 32 of the Constitution ? The answer is iuire obviously in the negative. Any statutory emasculation, intended or unintended, of the powers exercisable under Article 32 of the Constitution is impermissible.
98 . The law laid down by the Constitution Bench vis-a-vis a High Court exercising judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution and a statutory restriction under section 6 of the Act, would apply (perhaps with greater vigour) mutatis mutandis to the exercise of judicial review by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution with reference to a statutory restriction imposed by section 6-A of the Act. That being so, section 6-A of the Act must be meaningfully and realistically read, only as an injunction to the excutive and not as an injunction to a constitutional court monitoring an investigation under Article 32 of the Constitution in an exercise of judical review and of issuing a continuing mandamus.”
(emphasis supplied)
support and sustenance was drawn from the pronouncement
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of the Constitution Bench in the case of CPDR (supra). Indubitably, in CPDR (supra) the Supreme Court examined the contours of the authority of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
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be the only situation under which investigation sans such approval can be sustained. We do not fnd any iualitative difference in a court-monitored and court-ordered investigation, in the matter of ordering an iniuiry or investigation sans approval, in exercise of power of judicial review. The distinction sought to be made between a Court monitored and Court directed / ordered investigation thus seems artifcial. Once a constitutional court, examines and satisfes itself about the necessity and desirability of the iniuiry or investigation into the alleged crime, the reiuirement of approval by the competent authority is substituted by a more judicious determination. In the instant case, the observations of the Division Bench in the order dated 5th April, 2021, explicitly make out such satisfaction.
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Supreme Court in the case of Paramjit Kaur vs. State of
Punjab.24 In the said case, in the context of the bar envisaged by Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Right Act, 1993 (‘the Human Rights Act’), which precluded the commission from iniuiring into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed, the Supreme Court held that the power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be curtailed by any statutory limitation including those contained in Section 36(2) of the Human Rights Act.
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Article 32 of the Constitution. In fact, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is much wider as the High Courts are reiuired to exercise the jurisdiction not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also for enforcement of any legal right.
“ 21. ………...The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. And observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only, guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community cannot be over-emphasized. There will be no social security without maintenance of adeiuate supplies and services essential to the community. But social security is not the only goal of a good society. There are other values in a society. Our country is taking singular pride in the, democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution and the most cherished of these ideals is personal liberty. It would indeed be ironic if, in. the name of social security, we would sanction the subversion of this liberty. We do not pause to
25 AIR 1974 SC 183.
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consider whether social security is more precious than personal liberty in the scale of values, for, any judgment as regards that would be but a value judgment on which opinions might differ. But whatever be its impact on the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community,'when a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, we think it our duty to see that that procedure is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears.”
(emphasis supplied)
26 (2011) 6 SCC 216.
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“To perpetuate an error is no virtue but to correct it is a compulsion of judicial conscience. We, therefore, unhesitatingly set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the offence under Section 193 IPC.”
27 (2000) 1 SCC 278.
28 (1996) 4 SCC 453.
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to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State
act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing authorities to act contrary to law.
29 (1988) 2 SCC 602.
30 2017 (5) Mh.L.J. 69.
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authority including a statutory tribunal to act contrary to the statutory provisions.
226 of the Constitution which is of wide plenitude. It bears repetition to record that the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of CPDR (supra) sets the issue at rest.
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writ petitions which sought investigation in the matter of purchase of Rafale Fighter Jets, were dismissed. The review petitions were disposed of by two separate yet concurring opinions. In the judgment delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. M. Joseph, the applicability of the bar contained in Section 17A of the PC Act, where a prayer is made for directing registration of the FIR against a public servant, was adverted to. His Lordship, observed as under:
“ 114 . The Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari(supra), had before it, the CBI Crime Manual. It also considered the decision of this Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) which declared the necessity for preliminary iniuiry in offences relating to corruption. Therefore, the petitioners may not be justifed in approaching this Court seeking the relief of registration of an FIR and investigation on the same as such. This is for the reason that one of the exceptions where immediate registration of FIR may not be resorted to, would be a case pointing fngers at a public fgure and raising the allegation of corruption. This Court also has permitted preliminary iniuiry when there is delay, laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over three months. A preliminary iniuiry, it is to be noticed in paragraph 120.7, is to be completed within seven days.
115 . The petitioners have not sought the relief of a preliminary iniuiry being conducted. Even assuming that a smaller relief than one sought could be granted, there is yet another seemingly insuperable obstacle.
117 . In terms of Section 17A, no Police Offcer is permitted to conduct any eniuiry or iniuiry or conduct investigation into any offence done by a public servant where the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his public functions without previous approval, inter alia, of the authority competent to remove the public servant from his Offce at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. In respect of the public servant, who is involved in this case, it is clause (c), which is applicable. Unless, therefore, there is previous approval, there could be neither
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iniuiry or eniuiry or investigation. It is in this context apposite to notice that the complaint, which has been fled by the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018, moved before the frst respondent-CBI, is done after Section 17A was inserted. The complaint is dated 04.10.2018. Paragraph 5 sets out the relief which is sought in the complaint which is to register an FIR under various provisions. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the complaint are relevant in the context of Section 17A, which reads as follows:
“ 6 . We are also aware that recently, Section 17(A) of the act has been brought in by way of an amendment to introduce the reiuirement of prior permission of the government for investigation or iniuiry under the Prevention of PC Act.
7 . We are also aware that this will place you in the peculiar situation, of having to ask the accused himself, for permission to investigate a case against him. We realise that your hands are tied in this matter, but we reiuest you to at least take the frst step, of seeking permission of the government under Section 17(A) of the Prevention of PC Act for investigating this offence and under which, “the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month”.
118 . Therefore, petitioners have fled the complaint fully knowing that Section 17A constituted a bar to any iniuiry or eniuiry or investigation unless there was previous approval. In fact, a reiuest is made to at least take the frst step of seeking permission under Section 17A of the 2018 Act. Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018 was fled on 24.10.2018 and the complaint is based on non-registration of the FIR. There is no challenge to Section 17A . Under the law, as it stood, both on the date of fling the petition and even as of today, Section 17A continues to be on the Statute Book and it constitutes a bar to any iniuiry or eniuiry or investigation. The petitioners themselves, in the complaint, reiuest to seek approval in terms of Section 17A but when it comes to the relief sought in the Writ Petition, there was no relief claimed in this behalf.
119 . Even proceeding on the basis that on petitioners complaint, an FIR must be registered as it purports to disclose cognizable offences and the Court must so direct, will it not be a futile exercise having regard to Section 17A . I am, therefore, of the view that though otherwise the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018 may
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have made out a case, having regard to the law actually laid down in Lalita Kumari (supra), and more importantly, Section 17A of the Prevention of PC Act, in a Review Petition, the petitioners cannot succeed. However, it is my view that the judgment sought to be reviewed, would not stand in the way of the frst respondent in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018 from taking action on Exhibit P1-complaint in accordance with law and subject to frst respondent obtaining previous approval under Section 17a of the Prevention of PC Act.”
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observations are contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of CPDR and M.L. Sharma (supra).
31 (2019) 20 SCC 705.
32 (2012) 3 SCC 400.
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Section 17A, yet no relief was sought in that behalf. In this backdrop, the observations were made that even if it is assumed that the allegations in the petitioner’s complaint disclosed congnizable offences and the Court must direct the registration of the FIR, would it not be a futile exercise having regard to Section 17A.
85. Question No.(iii): Whether FIR beyond the ambit of the
order of Division Bench:
A two-pronged submission was advanced in support of
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the challenge that the registration of the FIR and the conseiuent investigation transgresses the ambit of the order of the Division Bench. One, the issues of transfer and posting of the police offcials and the reinstatement in service of Mr. Sachin Vaze and entrustment of important and sensitive cases, were not at all referred to in the complaint of Dr. Jayshree Patil nor in the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh. Thus, this Court had no occasion to consider those issues and order an iniuiry therein. Two, the Division Bench order manifests a clear contra-indication that the said aspect was beyond the province of the preliminary eniuiry entrusted to respondent no.2.
“ 87 . We also make it clear that Shri Param Bir shall be at liberty to raise grievances, if any, in regard to transfers and postings of police offcers and for enforcement of the directions in Praksh Singh (supra) before the appropriate forum in accordance with law, if so adviced.”
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cases to him, we have elaborately dealt with the challenge based on the provisions of Section 6 of the DSPE Act and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mayawati (supra). [The said Writ Petition No.1903 of 2021 is also disposed of simultaneously by a separate judgment.]. We are of the view that it may not be necessary to burden this judgment by incorporating all those reasons once more.
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without sanction, in September, 2002. In contrast,
purportedly on the basis of the order of the Supreme Court, another FIR was registered against the petitioner therein with the allegations of amassing assets disproportionate to the known sources of income from the year 1995 to 2003. In such fact situation, the Supreme Court held that there was no occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the said allegations of amassing disproportionate assets and, resultantly, the registration of the FIR was without jurisdiction. The aforesaid pronouncement, in our view, does not apply with eiual force to the facts of the case at hand.
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which were being investigated by the police offcers. The petitioner was repeatedly calling the offcers and giving them instructions in respect of the course to be adopted by them in the performance of their offcial duty. They were instructed to carry out offcial assignments and collection schemes including fnancial transactions.
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matters which are inextricably intermingled with the
allegations against the petitioner.
92. Question No.(iv): Whether a case for iuashment:
A strenuous effort was made to demonstrate that the allegations in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not, prima facie constitute any offence. Multi-fold grounds were urged. First, FIR is bereft of facts to make out the case against the petitioner. Second, it is based on vague and hearsay material. Third, there is no material to indicate the commission of the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and 120B of the Penal Code. Fourth, even if taken at face value, the acts attributed to the petitioner do not traverse beyond the stage of preparation. Lastly, the fact that the FIR alleges that the petitioner and unknown others have attempted to obtain undue advantage for improper and dishonest performance of their public duty and that the petitioner conspired with the unknown others, despite holding a preliminary eniuiry, justifes an inference that nothing of substance was found in the preliminary eniuiry.
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the case. At the cost of repeatation, we are constrained to record that in the backdrop of the allegations in the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh, the Division Bench, while directing independent probe by CBI, recorded in no uncertain terms that:
74 . While considering the Criminal Writ Petition on merits, we fnd that one other aspects cannot be overlooked. Shri. Kumbhkoni has not urged that the complaint of Dr. Patil does not disclose any cognizable offence. ……..”
75 . ……….. The information furnished therein discloses commission of cognizable offences by Shri Deshmukh and in our prima facie view, should have been acted upon in the manner reiuired by the CrPC, and as judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra). ……..”
(para 75.)
80 . “……… Such allegations, therefore, cannot remain unattended and are reiuired to be looked into in the manner known to law when, prima facie, they indicate commission of a cognizable offence. …….”
(para 80.)
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prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, who might fgure in the position of the accused in future, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the opportunity to agitate the ground that the FIR and the conseiuent investigation deserve to be iuashed as they constitute an abuse of the process of the court.
is again not in consonance with law. To ascertain as to whether there is a reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence, the investigating offcer can, in law, look into the allegations in the FIR, documents annexed to FIR, the evidence collected and the attendant circumstances as well. A proftable reference, in this context, can be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajanlal and others,33 wherein 33 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.
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the import of the expression, “reason to suspect the commission of an offence” and the material which can be taken into account to arrive at such inference, were expounded as under:
“ 48 . One should not lose sight of the fact that Section 157(1) reiuires the police offcer to have reason to suspect only with regard to the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, but not with regard to the involvement of an accused in the crime. Therefore, the express, “reason to suspect the commission of an offence” would mean the sagacity of rationally inferring the commission of a cognizable offence based on the specifc articulate facts mentioned in the frst information report as well as the annexures, if any, enclosed and any attending circumstances which may not amount to proof. In other words, the meaning of the expression “reason to suspect” has to be governed and dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case and at that stage the iuestion of adeiuate proof of facts alleged in the frst information report does not arise.”
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that the allegations in the letter of Mr. Param Bir Singh, deserve to be discarded, at this stage, on the ground of being hearsay. At the stage of consideration of the prayer for iuashing the FIR this Court is expected to look into only the allegations so as to fnd out whether an offence is prima facie disclosed or not? If the answer is in the affrmative, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations is a matter for investigation and trial.
34 (2011) 2 SCC 532.
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nothing beyond that. There is no allegation that the petitioner, in fact, accepted or attempted to accept money. Reliance was sought to be placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Koppula Venkat Rao vs. State of A.P.35 and Lahore High Court in the case of High Court Bar Association vs. Crown36 wherein, the distinction between an attempt to commit a crime and intention and preparation for its commission was expounded.
35 (2004) 3 SCC 602.
36 1941 Indian Law Reporter 796.
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therefore do not deem it appropriate to delve deep into the iuestion as to whether those acts fall in the realm of preparation only.
or otherwise of the allegations. We agree with the submissions of Mr. Lekhi that at this stage when investigation is underway any attempt to sieve through the material with a fne gauze to ascertain the existence or otherwise of the ingredients of the offences is uncalled for. It is trite that FIR is not an encyclopedia and the purpose of investigation is to unearth the truth.
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respondent no.2 has shied away from naming the alleged coconspirators of the petitioner and continues to proceed with the investigation with the specious and convenient refrain of, “unknown others” gave us a cause for anxious consideration. During the course of the hearing, in the backdrop of the nature of the allegations, we called upon Mr. Lekhi, to clear the stand of respondent no.2 as regards the possibility of the complicity of other persons, apart from the petitioner. Mr. Lekhi, the learned ASG, assured the Court that the investigation would be conducted in scrupulous adherence to the mandate of the order of the Division Bench. Nobody would be spared. Respondent no.2 will not play favourite. It would be an unsparing investigation irrespective of the rank.
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dismissed. Hence, the following order:
: O R D E R :
At this stage, Mr. Desai, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that having regard to the substantial iuestion of law of general importance, which according to him, has arisen for consideration in this petition, the effect and operation of this judgment be stayed to facilitate the petitioner to raise the issue before the Supreme Court.
Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General, opposes the prayer. It was submitted that no interim relief was in operation during the pendency of this petition. Nor any substantial iuestion of law arises for consideration.
We have considered the submissions. We are of the view that in view of the consideration which we have bestowed to the submissions canvassed across the bar, in this judgment, there is no justifable reason to stay the effect and operation of this judgment. Hence, oral application for stay stands rejected.
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3 issues framed by the court
Did Section 6 of the DSPE Act or Section 17A of the PC Act bar investigation following the High Court-directed preliminary enquiry?
Did investigation into police transfers, postings and reinstatement exceed the scope of the court-directed enquiry?
Did the allegations and annexures warrant quashing the FIR and consequential investigation?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Prakash Singh & ors. vs. Union of India & ors.Referred¶244
(2006) 8 SCC 1. · Who else cites this
Ms. Mayawati vs. Union of India and others.Distinguished¶406
(2012) 8 SCC 106. · Who else cites this
Shashikant vs. Central Bureau of InvestigationReferred¶144
(2007) 1 SCC 630. · Who else cites this
Taba Tedir and another vs. Central Bureau of InvestigationDistinguished¶183
2019 SCC Online Gaui 3451. · Who else cites this
Minor Irrigation and Rural Engineering Services vs. Sahngoo Ram AryaRelied on¶145
(2002) 5 SCC 521. · Who else cites this
P. Sirajuddin vs. State of MadrasRelied on¶152
1971 SCC 595. · Who else cites this
Lalita Kumari vs. Government of UP.Relied on¶153
2014(2) SCC 1. · Who else cites this
Vineet Narain and others vs. Union of India and anotherReferred¶197
(1998) 1 SCC 226. · Who else cites this
Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and anotherReferred¶201
(2014) 8 SCC 682. · Who else cites this
Matajog Dobey vs. H. C. BhariApplied¶232
AIR 1956 SC 44.. · Who else cites this
Prakashsingh Badal vs. State of PunjabApplied¶236
(2007) 1 SCC 1. · Who else cites this
Yashwant Sinha and others vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and anotherExplained¶390
(2020) 2 SCC 338. · Who else cites this
Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary and othersApplied¶318
(2014) 2 SCC 532. · Who else cites this
Paramjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab.Explained¶328
(1999) 2 SCC 131. · Who else cites this
Prabhu Dayal Deorah vs. The District Magistrate, Kamrup and othersDistinguished¶359
AIR 1974 SC 183. · Who else cites this
Central Bureau of Investigation and others vs. Keshub Mahindra and othersDistinguished¶359
(2011) 6 SCC 216. · Who else cites this
M. S. Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and anotherDistinguished¶359
(2000) 1 SCC 278. · Who else cites this
Union of India and another vs. Kirloskar Company Ltd.Distinguished¶359
(1996) 4 SCC 453. · Who else cites this
A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Naik and anotherDistinguished¶359
(1988) 2 SCC 602. · Who else cites this
IDBI Bank Ltd. vs. Aditya Logistics (I) Pvt. Ltd. and othersDistinguished¶359
2017 (5) Mh.L.J. 69. · Who else cites this
State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajanlal and othersApplied¶437
1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. · Who else cites this
Kalyan Kumar Gogoi vs. Ashutosh AgnihotriDistinguished¶445
(2011) 2 SCC 532. · Who else cites this
Koppula Venkat Rao vs. State of A.P.Referred¶452
(2004) 3 SCC 602. · Who else cites this
High Court Bar Association vs. CrownReferred¶452
1941 Indian Law Reporter 796.
8 provisions across 6 enactments
Anil Vasantrao Deshmukh
The State of Maharashtra
Central Bureau of Investigation
Dr. Jayshree Patil
S. S. SHINDE
N. J. JAMADAR
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
