Allowed

Sarfaraj Khan Amirulla Khan v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Bombay HC8 Sept 2021APPLN/763/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed the criminal application under Section 482 CrPC, setting aside the conviction and sentencing for offences under Sections 354 and 451 IPC. The court quashed the proceedings relying on a voluntary settlement between the parties and their families, distinguishing compounding of non-compoundable offences from the exercise of inherent powers to secure ends of justice.

What did the court decide?

The impugned judgment and orders convicting the applicant were quashed. The applicant was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 451 of the Indian Penal Code.

Sarfaraj Khan Amirulla Khan Vs the State of… — Criminal Trial and Appeal | Bombay HC (2021)

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Cri. Appln. No. 763 of 2020 .odt

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD

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CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 763 OF 2020 IN CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 131 OF 2017

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Sarfarajkhan Amirulla Khan, Age : 45 Years, Occ. Business, R/o. Junabazar, Patwekar Lane, Ahmednagar .. Applicant

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V E R S U S

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The State of Maharashtra Through Police Inspector, Kotwali Police Station, Ahmednagar

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Ayesha W/o Firoj Khan, Age : 40 Years, Occ. Household, R/o. Juna Bazar, Patwekar Lane, Ahmednagar. .. Respondents

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Mr. R. R. Karpe, Advocate for the Applicant Mr. R. B. Bagul, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. Mr. Y. S. Chaudhari, Advocate for respondent No.2

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CORAM : SURENDRA P. TAVADE, J. DATE : 08.09.2021

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PER COURT :-

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This is an application preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The applicant was prosecuted for the ofences punishable under Section 354, 451 of the Indian Penal Code before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate (F.C.)

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Ahmednagar in S.T.C. 327 of 1999. Respondent No.2 is the original complainant. The applicant was convicted by the trial Court vide Judgment and order dated 23.06.2014 for the ofence punishable under Section 451 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to sufer rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/0 in default he was directed to sufer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The applicant was also convicted under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to sufer rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/0 in default he was directed to sufer rigorous imprisonment for three months.

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The applicant had challenged the said order of conviction by preferring Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2014 before the Sessions Court, Ahmednagar. The said appeal was dismissed but the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed in S.T.C. No. 327 of 1999 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ahmedngar was modified in the quantum of sentence namely the appellant was directed to undergo sentence of Simple Imprisonment for six months and to pay to fine of Rs. 5,000/0 and in default Simple Imprisonment for 30 days for the ofence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. He was also sentenced to sufer Simple imprisonment for six months and to pay fine Rs. 5000 in default to sufer simple imprisonment for

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30 days for the ofence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. The said conviction order was challenged before this Court by way of Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 2017.

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During pendency of the Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 2017, the applicant preferred present application, wherein he contended that during the pendency of the Criminal Revision Application, due to intervention of elderly persons, the parties have settled their dispute and in view of settlement, the original complainant does not intents to pursue the proceeding against the applicant. It is contended that, the applicant is aged about 56 years, having business of Flour Mill, he is real brother of the husband of the original complainant. It is contended that applicant is having a son, a daughter and wife. One daughter of the applicant is recently married. The son of the applicant is pursuing his study. Similarly, the original complainant is having four daughters out of which one is married and other three daughters are pursuing their study. It is contended that the family of the applicant and the original complainant along with other family members have unanimously decided to settle the dispute between them. It is contended that in the light of amicable settlement between the parties, the long standing dispute in respect of residential portion between the parties at Juna Bazar, Patvekar lane, Ahmednagar has also been settled. They have

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drawn the settlement map to that efect. It is taken on record and marked as ‘X’ for identification. It is contended that to have a peaceful future, the parties have settled the dispute. It is contended that in the identical circumstances the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the interest of justice in various pronouncements issued the orders for compounding of ofences which are non compoundable. It is contended that in view of the settlement arrived between the parties, the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmendnagar in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2014 as well as the Judgment and order dated 23.06.2014, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate ( F.C.) Ahmednagar in S.C.C. No. 397 of 1999 be set0aside and the applicant may be acquitted for the ofences punishable under Section 354, 451 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended that the original complainant has afrmed that the contents of the compromise pursis from paragraph No. 1 to 10 and prayer clause A to D, were explained to her and those are true and correct to her best of knowledge and the belief.

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The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submits that the applicant was convicted by the trial Court. The said conviction order was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar. The ofence charged against the applicant is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said

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ofence is against the society at large, therefore, the application be rejected.

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Heard the learned counsel for the applicant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.

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It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that though the ofence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, still this Court can grant permission for compounding of the ofence. To substantiate his point he relied on the ratio laid down in the case of Unnikrishnan @ Unnikuttan Vs. State of Kerala reported 2017 ALL SCR (Cri) 524 wherein the accused was convicted for the ofence punishable under Section 394 and was sentenced two years rigorous imprisonment. The ofence was non compoundable but the parties have settled their dispute amicably. In view of the above facts the Apex Court held that

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6.‘’ The short question which ultimately arose during the hearing is whether the ofence under Section 394 could at all be compounded since the same is not covered by the provisions of Section 320 Cr. P.C.

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7. The aforesaid question has troubled this Court on diferent occasions, not only in connection with compounding of ofences punishable under the criminal justice system, but also in respect of civil matters, and in respect of matrimonial matters in particular, where the Court had to strike a balance between the rigidity of the law and doing substantial justice to the parties.

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9. In the case on hand, the petitioners is convicted for the ofence punishable under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to two years Rigorous Imprisonment. We are aware that that said ofence is not compoundable within the scope of Section 320 Cr. P.C.

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10. In series of decisions i.e. Bharath Singh Vs. State of M.P. and Others 1990 (Supp) SCC 62, Ramlal Vs. State of J & K (199) 2 SCC 213: (1999 ALL MR (Cri) 515 (S.C.) Puttaswamy Vs. State of Karnatka and Another ( 2009) 1 SCC 711 : ( 2009 ALL MR ( Cri) 2486 (S.C.), this Court allowed the parties to compound the ofence even though the ofence is a nonncompoundable depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. In some cases this Court while imposing the fne amount reduced the sentence to the period already under gone.

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11. What emerges from the above is that even if an ofence is not compoundable within the scope of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure the Court may, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, reduce the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction.

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12. Having regard to the facts of the present case, while taking into account the settlement arrived at between the parties and also considering the afdavits fled before us by each one of the applicants by way of joint application, we allow the application seeking permission to compound the ofences.’’

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The learned counsel for the applicant also relied on the ratio laid down in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and

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Another reported in 2012 (4) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 428. Wherein reference as to validity of orders passed in 2004(1) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 93(S.C.); 2009(2) Bom C.R. (Cri.)page 148(S.C.) and 2008(16) S.C.C.10Questioned0 Section 320 of Cr.P.C permits compounding of ofences with permission of Court0Contention that Court cannot amend statute and must maintain judicial constraint0 That above referred decisions require to be re0considered because what cannot be done directly cannot be allowed to be done indirectly0 Held, section 320 articulates public policy as to compounding of ofences. It catalogues ofences which can be compound without permission of Court and composition of certain cases with permission of Court. When a person has been convicted and appeal is pending matter can be compounded with permission of Court only. Question is in regards to ofences in which compromise has been arrived at, but ofence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C by its very language suggests that High Court by virtue of being Superior Court, to prevent abuse of process and to secure ends of justice can exercise this power. Provision is an overriding provision and none of provisions of Cr.P.C limits or restrict inherent powers in section 482 Cr.P.C. Power under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide amplitude and has to be exercised with caution. Quashing of ofence or criminal proceedings on ground of settlement is not the same thing as allowing it to be compounded, where High Court quashes a proceeding on ground of compromise if it does so because in its opinion continuation of proceedings will be a futile exercise. In respect of serious ofences like murder, rape, dacoity or in ofence of moral turpitude or ofences under Prevention of Corruption Act etc. compromise can have no legal sanction at all. In certain cases having predominant civil favor like under civil, mercantile, commercial transactions, ofences under matrimony, dowry, family dispute where wrong is basically to victim and victim

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and family have settled it, then even if ofence is not compoundable, High Court may within its frame work quash criminal proceedings it is satisfied that on face of such settlement there is hardly any likelihood of ofender being convicted and by non quashing proceedings justice shall be a casually. In 2004(1) Bom.C..R. (Cri.)93(S.C.) principle that High Court may quash criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C can it be said that proceedings have been quashed in an indirect way answer is not because there is a distinction between a quashing under Section 320 of Cr.P.C and quashing under inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C Though aim may ultimately be same i.e. dismissal of indictment. Court finds no incongruity in above principle of law and in decisions of this Court in 1990(2) S.C.C 437, 1993 Cri. L.J. 1049 and A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2554. Inherent powers cannot be utilized to exercise powers in case which are expressly barred by Code like ofence under Section 307 I.P.C. not compoundable 2008(15) S.C.C. 667. Power of High Court to quash criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction are diferent from power under section 32 of Cr.P.C. Inherent power under section 482 of Cr.P.C is of wide amplitude with no statutory limits. But this has to be exercised in accordance with guidelines viz (i) to secure ends of justice (ii) to prevent abuse of process. Heinous and serious ofences of depravity like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be quashed, because same are not of private nature, but ofence which have a serious impact on society. Similarly compromise in ofence under special statues like P.C. Act or ofences by pubic servants in ofcial capacity cannot provide a basis for compromise. But case having predominately civil favour stand on diferent footing or cases of commercial financial mercantile civil, partnership, family dispute where ofence is basically private or personal and it has been resolved. High Court may quash cases of this category, because in view of

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compromise chances of conviction of accused would not be there and can be compromised in interest of justice. Hence, it can not be said that cases of 2004(1) Bom.C.R. (Cri) 93 (S.C.)2009(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 148(S.C.) and 2008(16) S.C.C. 1 case were not correctly decided. Reference answered accordingly. Matters be listed for decisions. ‘’

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The Apex Court has further held that

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‘’ Having surveyed the decisions of this Court which throw light on the question raised before us, two decisions, one given by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the other by Bombay High Court deserves to be noticed.

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A fvenJudge Bench of the Punjab and Harayana High Court in Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another (2007) 4 CTC 769 was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the compounding of the ofences in the cases which have been specifed as nonncompoundable ofences under the provisions of Section 320 of the Code. The fven Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye 12, Bhajan Lal 30, L. Muniswamy11, Simrikhia 14, B.S. Joshi 1 and Ram Lal 38 and framed the following guidelines:

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(a) case arising from matrimonial discord, even if other ofences are introduced for aggravation of the case.

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(b) Cases pertaining to property dispute between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a

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touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to larger number of people.

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(c) Cases of dispute between old partners or business concerns with dealing over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their fnancial or commercial claim.

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(d) Minor ofences as under Section 279, IPC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another ofence which remains nonn compoundable is Section 506(II), IPC, which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an ofence under Section 506 IPC in most cases is based on the oral declaration with diferent shades of intention. Another set of ofences, which ought to be liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148, IPC, more particularly where other ofences are compoundable. It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act No. 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made Sections 506 (II) IPC, 147 IPC and 148, IPC compoundable ofences by amending the schedule under Section 320, Cr.P.C. (e) The ofences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of transaction would fall in the category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous ofences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clearncut

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allegations of rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Ofenes committed by Public Servants purporting to act in that capacity as also ofences against public servant while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain nonncompoundable. Ofences against the State enshrined in ChapternVII (relating to army, navy and airforce)must remain nonn compoundable.

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(f) That as a broad guideline the ofences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when the court is in the position to record a fnding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair.

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While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution.

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To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice.

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It was further held as under :

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No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.

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The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C which can afect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in nonncompoundable ofences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice. The power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is to be exercised exn debito Justitiae to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defned paranmeters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under section 482 of the Cr.P.C has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and an extran ordinary efective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and evernlasting cogeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should

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attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endavour to give full efect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.

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A threen Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abasaheb Yadav Honmane V. State of Maharashtra, 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 856 dealt with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code visnvis the express bar for compounding of the nonn compoundable ofences in section 320(9) of the Code. The High Court referred to various decisions of this Court and also the decisions of the various High Courts and then stated as follows:

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The power of compounding on one hand and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers on the other, are incapable of being treated as synonymous or even interchangeable in law. The conditions precedent and satisfaction of criteria in each of these cases are distinct and diferent. May be, the only aspect where they have any commonality is the result of exercise of such power in favour of the accused, as acquittal is the end result in both these cases. Both these powers are to be exercised for valid grounds and with some element of objectivity.

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Particularly, the power of quashing the FIR or criminal proceedings by the Court by taking recourse to inherent powers is expected to be used sparingly and that too without losing sight of impact of such order on the criminal justice delivery system. It may be obligatory upon the Court to strike a balance between the nature of the ofence and the need to pass an order in exercise of inherent powers, as the object of criminal law is protection of public by maintenance of law and order.

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Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, nothing in this Code which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent

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powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be excised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrated in any other provision of the Code.

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Quashing of ofence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an ofender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of ofence. They are diferent and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of ofence given to a court under Section 320 is materially diferent from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of ofences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal ofence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether

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the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

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Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the ofender and victim has been settled although ofences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful efect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well0being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime0doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court in respect of serious ofences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other ofences of mental depravity under IPC or ofences of moral trupitude under special statues, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the ofences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the

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settlement between ofender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain ofences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil favour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the ofences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the ofender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such ofences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of ofender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

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The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and diferent

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from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the ofences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the ofender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious ofences of mental depravity or ofences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the ofender have settled the dispute. Such ofences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and ofender in relation to the ofenes under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the ofences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal

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proceedings involving such ofences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and per0 dominatingly civil favour stand on diferent footing for the purpose of quashing, particularly the ofences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the ofences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the ofender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of

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justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in afrmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding ‘’.

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In view of the above observations of the Apex Court we have to see the facts of the present case, the applicant was charged for the ofences punishable under Section 354, 451 of the Indian Penal Code. He was held guilty and convicted for the said ofence and sentenced to sufer rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/0 in default he was to sufer rigorous imprisonment for three months on both the counts. In appeal the Judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (F.C.) was conferred. However the sentence was reduced namely two simple imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs. 5,000/0 in default for simple imprisonment for 30 days on both the counts.

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It appears that during the pendency of present Criminal Revision Application, the applicant and the family of the original complainant have unanimously settled the dispute. Similarly, they have also settled their dispute regarding residential property. The applicant was convicted for the ofence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC which was serious in nature, but the applicants and family of original complainant are residing adjacent to each other. The original complainant is sister0 in0 law of the applicant.

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Looking to the family back ground of the applicants and the original complainant, it would be just and reasonable to allow them to compound of the ofence, charged against the applicants. I have ascertained whether the original complaint is ready for compromise. The learned counsel for the original complainant submits that the original complainant has filed afdavit and confirmed the contents of the application, therefore, it can be said that the settlement is voluntarily and without any pressure on the original complainant.

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In light of the ratio laid down in the cases cited (supra) and considering the fact that the ofence which was alleged and considering the settlement between the parties the impugned judgment and order of conviction is required to be set0aside. In view of the above discussion I proceed to pass the following order :

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O R D E R

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(i) Criminal Application No. 763 of 2020 is allowed.

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(ii) The Judgment and order dated 23.06.2014, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.6 Ahmednagar in S.T.C. No. 327 of 1999, convicting the applicant and sentencing him to sufer rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine is hereby quashed and set0 aside.

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(iii) The Judgment and order dated 01.06.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,

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Ahmednagar in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2014 convicting the applicant and sentencing him to sufer simple imprisonment and to pay fine is hereby quashed and set aside.

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(iv) The applicant is acquitted for the ofences punishable under Sections 354, 451 of the Indian Penal Code.

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(v) The bail bond of the applicant stand cancelled.

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(vi) The amount of fine, if any paid by the applicant, be returned to him.

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(vii) Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 2017 is also be disposed of.

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( SURENDRA P. TAVADE ) JUDGE

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ysk

Sarfaraj Khan Amirulla Khan v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

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Sarfaraj Khan Amirulla Khan v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

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