Trust for the period 1956 to 1965 was accessed by the Vigilance Officer. The record was in the custody of the Accountant of the Trust and thus the Court would be compelled to presume that the custody of the documents was proper. The entries therein would also be entitled to the same benefit of presumption and thus we hold that the Caste Scrutiny Committee misdirected itself because it did not guide itself with the principles of law enunciated in Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. By no means, should we be understood to convey that the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would govern the decision to be taken by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, but the principles laid down therein which are common principles should be considered by the Committee. There are thus two pieces of evidence. First is the record of the Kurdu Handloom Weavers’ Trust and the second is the statements of two persons in the localities. Qua those statements, the Caste Scrutiny Committee has opined the evidentiary value thereof to be hearsay. Now, hearsay would be if said two persons said that somebody else told them that the family of the Petitioner i.e. the ancestors of the Petitioner were engaged in the trade of weaving. The two persons have not said this. They have said that they saw the ancestors of the Petitioner engaged in the avocation of weaving.