Petitioners challenged process issued under Section 138 NI Act alleging non-signatory liability and failure by Magistrate to conduct Section 202 CrPC inquiry. Court held Section 141 NI Act covers company directors and that Sections 143-147 override CrPC Section 202, dismissing the writ petition.
Criminal Writ Petition dismissed with no costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
crwp582.17
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, AURANGABAD BENCH, AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 582 OF 2017
1] Raj Buildhome Pvt. Ltd., Registered under the Companies Act Ref. Off : 120, New Bohra Bazar, Hathipole, Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan, through its Directors,2] Bherulal Gulabchand Nagda, Managing Director, Age 79 years, occ. Business, R/o 10, Shantivan, Fatehpura-Bedla Road, New Aalok School, Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan,3] Ali Asgar Magar (Director), age 40 years, occ. Business, R/o 120, Pannadhay Marg, Hatipole, Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan,4] Adil Mohsin Magar (Director), age 45 years, occ. Business, R/o Flat No. 3, Prime Vihar CHS Ltd., Opp. Salunkhe Vihar Society, Kondhwa, Pune-411040,5] Fida Hussain (Director), age 71 years, occ. Business, R/o 13, New Ashwani Bazar, Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan,6]Imdad Hussain (Director),
age 76 years, occ. Business,
R/o Hitawala Ki Badi, Nar Tak
Building, Kharol Colny,
Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan,
2crwp582.17
7]Hussaini Magar (Director),
age 71 years, occ. Business,
R/o 9, 1C, Kharol Colny,
Udaipur-313001, Rajasthan,
8]Saffudin Bohara (Director),
age 68 years, occ. Business,
R/o A to Z Explosives,
Yadav Mohalla,
Fatehnagar, Udaipur-313001,
Rajasthan...Petitioners
(Orig.Accused)
VERSUS
Khozim Yusuf Nagarwala,
age 49 years, occ. Nil,
R/o Plot No. 3, Chowdhary Nagar,
Kombdiwala Mala, Solapur Road,
Ahmendagar… Respondent
.....
Mr. S.S.Chapalgaonkar, advocate for the
petitioners
Mr. N.B.Narwade, advocate for respondent
.....
CORAM: K.L.WADANE, J.
Reserved on : 24.1.2018
Pronounced on : 06.2.2018
JUDGMENT :
Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. With
the consent of the learned counsel for the
parties, Petition is taken up for final hearing.
Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
3crwp582.17
2.The order, passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Ahmednagar, below Exh.1
in Summary Criminal Case No. 414 of 2017, dated
21.1.2017 is challenged in this Writ Petition. By
the said order, the process is issued against
petitioners for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
3.Brief facts of the case may be stated as
follows :-
On17.1.2017,respondent/original
complainant had filed Summary Criminal Case No.
414 of 2017 in the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ahmednagar for
the offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant
alleged that he is an automobile engineer
having experience of more than 22 years and
was doing job as a Manager-fleet at Abudhabi
(UAE). Accused no.1 is a Registered Company.
Accused no.4 is residing at Pune and having
4crwp582.17
friendlyrelationswiththecomplainant.
Respondent no.4 was having knowledge about
complainant's job at Abudhabi and his salary for
more than Rs.3.5 Lckh per month.
4.Complainantfurtherallegedthat
thereafter accused no.4 met the complainant in the
month of June, 2012. Thereafter accused no.4
informed the complainant that he and his 7
partners are developing the properties at Udaipur
and Pune and are forming a Company. Thereafter
accused nos. 2 to 8 impressed the complainant that
they are already getting huge profit from their
earlier investments. Therefore, the accused had
requested the complainant to join them to develop
company business and assured the complainant that
they will pay Rs.Two Lakh fees per month minimum
in addition to the profit percentage.
5.As per the assurance given by the accused,
complainant, his wife and mother have invested an
amount of Rs.Fifty Lakh and such amount was
5crwp582.17
transferred through R.T.G.S. from Ahmednagar to
the Firm run by accused nos. 3 and 4 in their
Bank accounts.
6.Since April, 2013, the complainant has
demanded due amount from the accused on many
times, but accused did not pay any amount.
Thereafter, the accused agreed to pay the said
amountandaccordinglyachequefor
Rs.1,58,27,634/-, dated 1.10.2016 was given to the
complainant. The cheque was deposited in the
Bank, however, same was returned unpaid with
remark, “funds insufficient”. Hence, according to
the complainant, all the accused persons have
committed offence punishable under Sections 138
r/w 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
7.Upon presentation of the complaint, after
perusal of the verification of the complainant,
the learned Magistrate has issued process for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
6crwp582.17
8.I have heard the arguments of Mr.
S.S.Chapalgaonkar, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners/accused and Mr. N.B.Narwade,
learnedcounselappearingforthe
respondent/complainant.
9.Mr. Chapalgaonkar, learned counsel while
canvassing concentrated his arguments on two
points.
(1) All the petitioners are not signatory
to the cheque, therefore, the process
issued against the accused persons is
incorrect.
(2) Since the case is filed by the
complainant for the offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act and the accused persons are
residing outside the jurisdiction of the
Criminal Court i.e. beyond the jurisdiction
of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Ahmednagar, it is obligatory on the
part of learned Magistrate to make inquiry
under Section 202 (1) as per amended
provisions of Criminal Procedure Code in
the year 2005-06.
7crwp582.17
10.Learned counsel further argued that it is
the allegation of the complainant in the complaint
itself that accused nos. 2 and 3 on behalf of
accused no.1 Company have signed the cheque.
Therefore, rest of the accused persons are not
responsible for dishonor of the cheque, since they
have not signed the cheque. therefore, they
cannot be prosecuted.
11.On perusal of the contents of the
complaint, it appears that it is the allegation of
the complainant that accused nos. 2 and 3 have
signed the cheque.
12.Mr.Chapalgaonkar,learnedcounsel
appearing for the petitioners has, therefore,
relied upon the observations in the case of Aparna
A.Shah vs Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.,
reported in 2013 (4) Bom.C.R.879, particularly
para nos. 22 and 23, which read thus :-
“ 22) In the light of the above discussion,
we hold that under Section 138 of the Act,
it is only the drawer of the cheque who can
be prosecuted. In the case on hand,
8crwp582.17
admittedly, the appellant is not a drawer of
the cheque and she has not signed the same.
A copy of the cheque was brought to our
notice, though it contains name of the
appellant and her husband, the fact remains
that her husband alone put his signature. In
addition to the same, a bare reading of the
complaint as also the affidavit of
examination-in- chief of the complainant and
a bare look at the cheque would show that
the appellant has not signed the cheque.
23) We also hold that under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act, in case of issuance of cheque
from joint accounts, a joint account holder
cannot be prosecuted unless the cheque has
been signed by each and every person who is
a joint account holder. The said principle
is an exception to Section 141 of the N.I.
Act which would have no application in the
case on hand. The proceedings filed under
Section 138 cannot be used as an arm
twisting tactics to recover the amount
allegedly due from the appellant. It cannot
be said that the complainant has no remedy
against the appellant but certainly not
under Section 138. The culpability attached
to dishonour of a cheque can, in no case
“except in case of Section 141 of the N.I.
Act” be extended to those on whose behalf
the cheque is issued. This Court reiterates
that it is only the drawer of the cheque who
can be made an accused in any proceeding
under Section 138 of the Act. Even the High
Court has specifically recorded the stand of
the appellant that she was not the signatory
of the cheque but rejected the contention
that the amount was not due and payable by
her solely on the ground that the trial is
in progress. It is to be noted that only
after issuance of process, a person can
approach the High Court seeking quashing of
the same on various grounds available to
him. Accordingly, the High Court was clearly
wrong in holding that the prayer of the
appellant cannot even be considered.
Further, the High Court itself has directed
the Magistrate to carry out the process of
9crwp582.17
admission/denial of documents. In such
circumstances, it cannot be concluded that
the trial is in advanced stage. “
On perusal of the facts and observations
of the above cited case, it appears that appellant
in that case was not a drawer of the cheque and
she had not signed the same. Further, it appears
that the cheque was issued by the husband of the
appellant but from the joint account.
13.In the present case, the cheque is issued
on behalf of the Company by accused no.1 signed by
accused nos. 2 and 3 and rest of the accused
persons are the Directors having knowledge of the
same and that can be gathered from the contents of
the complaint itself, wherein it is specifically
contended that the cheque dated 1.10.2016 was
given to the complainant after accused nos. 2 and
3 signed on behalf of accused no.1 and accused
nos. 2 to 8 gave assurance that the cheque will be
honoured on the due date and accordingly the
complainant had accepted the same. So, accused
nos. 2 to 8 are acting on behalf of accused no.1
10crwp582.17
Company and they are directly connected with the
day-to-day affairs of the Company. Therefore,
they are liable for the prosecution as per the
provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act reads thus : -
" 141. Offences by Companies - (1) If the
person committing an offence under section
138 is a company, every person who, at the
time the offence was committed, was in
charge of, and was responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of
the company, as well as the company, shall
be deemed to be guilty of the offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly :
Provided that nothing contained in
this sub-section shall render any person
liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge,
or that he had exercised all due diligence
to prevent the commission of such offence :
[Provided further that where a
person is nominated as a Director of a
company by virtue of his holding any office
or employment in the Central Government or
State Government or a financial corporation
owned or controlled by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the
case may be, he shall not be liable for
prosecution under this Chapter.]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), where any offence under
this Act has been committed by a company and
it is proved that the offence has been
committed with the consent or connivance of,
11crwp582.17
or is attributable to, any neglect on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or
other officer of the company, such director,
manager, secretary or other officer shall
also be deemed to be guilty of that offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly. Explanation.-- For
the purposes of this section,
--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and
includes a firm or other association of
individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means
a partner in the firm.] "
From the bare reading of aforesaid
provisions, it appears that if offence is
committed by the Company, then every person who,
at the time of offence was incharge and was
responsible for the conduct of business of the
Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded
against and punished accordingly.
14.In the present case, there is specific
allegation against accused nos. 2 to 8 about
commission of the offence.
In the case cited above, it is observed
12crwp582.17
that under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, in case of issuance of cheque
from joint account, a joint account holder cannot
be prosecuted unless cheque has been signed by
each and every person, who is a joint account
holder. It is further material to note that the
said principle is an exception to Section 141 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the present
case, cheque is issued by the Directors of the
Company. Therefore, the allegations clearly fall
within the definition of Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
15.In view of above, when all the Directors
are connected with the business of the Company, it
will make no difference if the cheque is issued by
one or all the Directors, because the cheque was
issued for and on behalf of the Company.
16.For the reasons stated above, I am of the
opinion that the first point argued by Mr.
Chapalgaonker, learned counsel is not acceptable.
13crwp582.17
17.ThenextaspectarguedbyMr.
Chapalgaonker, learned counsel is that the learned
Magistrate has issued process without complying
with the mandatory provisions of Section 202 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. Learned counsel
placed reliance upon the observations in the case
of Netcore Solutions Pvt. Ltd. And ors. Vs
Pinnacle Teleservices Pvt. Ltd. And ors., reported
in 2013 (4) Bom.C.R. (C ri.) 286.
18.Before analyzing the contention raised by
the learned counsel for the petitioners and
referring to the judgment cited, it would be
necessary to embark upon the provisions of
Sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
“ 200. Examination of complainant—A
Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence
on complaint shall examine upon oath the
complainant and the witnesses present, if
any, and the substance of such examination
shall be reduced to writing and shall be
signed by the complainant and the
witnesses, and also by the Magistrate;
Provided that, when the complaint is made
in writing, the Magistrate need not examine
the complainant and the witnesses,—
(a) if a public servant acting or
14crwp582.17
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duties or a Court has made the
complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case
for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate
under Section 192;
Provided further that if the Magistrate
makes over the case to another Magistrate
under Section 192 after examining the
complainant and the witnesses, the latter
Magistrate need not re-examine them.
202. Postponement of issue of process—(1)
Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint
of an offence of which he is authorised to
take cognizance or which has been made over
to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks
fit, postpone the issue of process against
the accused, and either inquire into the
case himself or direct an investigation to
be made by a police officer or by such
other person as he thinks fit, for the
purpose of deciding whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding;
Provided that no such direction for
investigation shall be made—
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that
the offence complained of is triable
exclusively by the Court of Session; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made
by a Court, unless the complainant and the
witnesses present (if any) have been
examined on oath under Section 200.
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1) the
Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take
evidence of witnesses on oath:
Provided that if it appears to the
Magistrate that the offence complained of
is triable exclusively by the Court of
Session, he shall call upon the complainant
to produce all his witnesses and examine
15crwp582.17
them on oath.
(3) If an investigation under sub-section
(1) made by a person not being a police
office,heshallhaveforthat
investigation all the powers conferred by
this Code on an officer in charge of a
police station except the power to arrest
without warrant.”
On perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it
appears that the object of Section 200 of the
Criminal Procedure Code is to test whether the
complainant makes out a sufficient ground for the
purpose of issuing process. Amended Section 202
(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code makes it
obligatory upon the learned Magistrate that before
summoning the accused residing beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court, he shall enquire the
case himself or direct the investigation to be
made by the police officer or such other person as
he thinks fit for finding out whether or not there
is sufficient ground to proceed against the
accused. Thus, it appears that the object of such
inquiry is to ensure that the innocent persons
residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
are not harassed by unscrupulous persons by filing
false complaints. Therefore, it casts a duty
16crwp582.17
upon the Magistrate to arrive at prima facie
satisfaction whether or not there is sufficient
ground to proceed against the accused residing
beyond his jurisdiction.
19.Learned counsel for the respondent has
relied upon the observations in the case of Vijay
Dhanuka vs Najima Mamtaj, reported in 2014 ALL MR
(Cri.) 1924 (SC). The Apex Court, while
considering the scope of Section has held that
Section 202 of Criminal Procedure Code, inter
alia, contemplates postponement of the issue of
the process, in a case where the accused is
residing at the place beyond the area in which he
exercises his jurisdiction, and thereafter to
either enquire into the case by himself or direct
an investigation to be made by the police officer
or by such other person as he thinks fit. The
Apex Court has held that the amendment of Section
202 of the Criminal Procedure Code was
necessitated, as false complaints were filed
against persons residing at far off places in
17crwp582.17
order to harass them. Considering the purpose for
which the amendment has been brought, the Apex
Court held that an inquiry or the investigation,
as the case may be, is mandatory before summons
are issued against the accused living beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
20.Learned counsel for the respondent has
brought to my notice the observations in the
case of Bansilal S.Kabra vs Global Trade Finance
Ltd., reported in 2010 ALL MR (Cri.) 3168, by this
Court (Coram : V.M.Kanade, J.) while
considering the applicability of the provisions of
Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the
complaints filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, this Court has held
that the inquiry, which has to be made in
complaint filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, is very limited to
certain documents and averments in the complaint.
It is held that the mandate of Section 202 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, if made applicable to the
18crwp582.17
complaints filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, would defeat the very
purpose behind the enactment of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Thus, upon
considering and analysing the object and ambit of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act vis-
a-vis the object of Sub-section (1) of Section 202
of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge
of this Court has observed as follows : -
" I am of the view that the said provision
may not apply to the provisions of
Negotiable Instruments Act and merely
because the accused reside outside the
jurisdiction of the court, in each and
every case it is not necessary for the
Magistrate to postpone the issuance of
process. The Magistrate, in my view, can
exercise his discretion and decide whether
to issue process, dismiss the complaint
after recording the verification of the
complainant and his witnesses, if any, or
postpone the issuance of process and in a
given case hold a further inquiry,
depending on facts and circumstances of
each case and non-compliance of the said
provision would not vitiate the issuance of
process if there is material to indicate
that there has been an application of mind
on the part of the Magistrate after going
through the verification and other material
brought on record by the complainant".
Considering the pendency of large number
of applications under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. for quashing the process for non
compliance of provisions of Section 202 of
Cr.P.C., and in order to avoid conflicting
19crwp582.17
judgments the learned Judge of this court
held that this important issue needs to be
finally resolved by the division bench or
the larger bench of this court. “
21.In the case of Vinod Vs. SBI Global
Factors Ltd., reported in 2011 (4) Mh.L.J. 282,
this Court has taken a similar view and concurred
with the judgment in the case of Bansilal S. Kabra
(supra).
22.Learned counsel for the respondent has
pointed out the observations in the case of Vimal
Powerloom vs Ravi Agency and Anr., reported in
2015 Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 475, wherein the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court (Nalawade T.V.,J.) observed as
follows : -
" The various decisions rendered by this
Court show that this court has held that
the provisions of Section 202 as amended is
mandatory in nature. Thus the courts are
following the amended provisions in the
State. In the case of Oman Bank cited
supra, it is laid down that it is mandatory
provision and procedure needs to be
followed by JMFC. In view of this position
of law, this court holds that the order of
issue process passed by the JMFC, without
following the aforesaid procedure cannot
sustain in law. The Magistrate needs to
follow the procedure with only object, to
ascertain the truth in the allegations made
20crwp582.17
and only prima facie case is required to be
made out. The scope of the enquiry under
Section 202 of Cr.P.C. is very limited. It
is also required to keep in mind the
relevant provisions of N.I.Act like Section
118 and 139 raise some presumptions. The
witnesses like bank officers are not
required to be examined to prove bank
documents. Similarly, in respect of other
evidence, the postal endorsement on the
notice, there are presumptions under
Section 27 of General Clauses act and those
presumptions can be kept in mind by the
JMFC. Thus the scope of enquiry, which may
be made by the Magistrate is very limited.
In such a case to send the matter to police
even for limited purpose of investigation
is not desirable. "
With the above observations, the process
was set aside and the matter was remanded with
direction to follow procedure laid down under
Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
23.Looking to the observations in the case of
Bansilal S.Kabra vs Global Trade Finance Ltd.,
reported in 2010 ALL MR (Cri.) 3168 and in the
case of Vimal Powerloom vs Ravi Agency and Anr.,
reported in 2015 Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 475, it appears
that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has
rendered conflicting view on the same question.
21crwp582.17
24.Learned counsel for both the parties
submitted that Reference is pending in this Court
and controversy will be finally resolved in the
said Reference.
25.In the case of Manager, National Insurance
Company Limited vs Saju P.Paul and another,
reported in (2013) 2 SCC 41, it is observed that
the issue pending for consideration by Larger
Bench is no bar to follow the judgment under
Reference. In view of above, it is important to
take into consideration the view which is in
conformity with the scheme of the Act.
26.To consider this material aspect, it is
necessary to keep in mind the provisions of
Sections 143 to 147 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
2012, which came into force with effect from
6.2.2003. By this Act, Sections 138, 141 and 142
of the Act were amended and Sections 143 to 147 of
the Act were introduced with an aim to ensure
22crwp582.17
expeditious disposal of the cases relating to
dishonor of cheque, which are found to have
clogged the criminal justice system.
27.The provisions of Sections 142 to 147 of
the Act lay down special code for trial of
offences under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
28.While considering the scheme of the
amended provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, the Apex Court, in the case of Mandvi Co.op.
Bank Ltd. Vs Nimesh B. Thakore, reported in (2010)
2 SCC (Cri.) 1, held that provisions of Sections
143, 144, 145 and 147 of the Act expressly depart
and override the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code and observed as follows : -
“ 20. It may be noted that the provisions
of sections 143, 144, 145 and 147
expressly depart from and override the
provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the main body of adjective law
for criminal trials. The provisions of
section 146 similarly depart from the
principles of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 143 makes it possible for the
complaints under section 138 of the Act
to be tried in the summary manner, except,
23crwp582.17
of course, for the relatively small number
of cases where the Magistrate feels that
the nature of the case is such that a
sentence of imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year may have to be passed
or that it is, for any other reason,
undesirable to try the case summarily. “
29.So looking to the observations of the Apex
Court in the case cited supra, it appears that the
provisions of Section 143 to 145 and 147 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act expressly depart and
override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code. Therefore, the observations in the case of
Bansilal S. Kabra (cited supra) need to be
followed.
30.Considering the facts and circumstances
and the observations in various cases, referred
above, I am of the opinion that the learned
Magistrate is not under obligation to direct the
investigation to be made by the police officer.
If he himself is satisfied that there is prima
facie case to issue process, then on its
satisfaction, the learned Magistrate can issue
process directly.
24crwp582.17
31.In the present case, the complainant has
submitted his affidavit in the form of
verification of the complaint before the Court and
on perusal of the contents of verified affidavit
of the complainant and after satisfaction the
learned Trial Court has issued process.
32.In view of the above, I do not find any
illegality with the order passed by the learned
Magistrate, and as such, Criminal Writ Petition
deserves to be dismissed.
33.In the result, Criminal Writ Petition is
dismissed. No costs.
(K.L.WADANE, J.)
dbm
3 issues framed by the court
Whether persons who are directors of a company but not signatories to the accused cheque can be prosecuted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act under Section 141.
Whether a Magistrate is under an obligation to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC before issuing process against accused residing beyond jurisdiction in cheque dishonor cases.
Whether the special provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act override the procedural requirements of Section 202 CrPC.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Aparna A. Shah vs Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.Referred¶61
2013 (4) Bom.C.R. 879 · Who else cites this
Netcore Solutions Pvt. Ltd. and ors. Vs Pinnacle Teleservices Pvt. Ltd. and ors.Referred¶103
2013 (4) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 286 · Who else cites this
Vijay Dhanuka vs Najima MamtajReferred¶130
2014 ALL MR (Cri.) 1924 (SC)
Bansilal S. Kabra vs Global Trade Finance Ltd.Referred¶139
2010 ALL MR (Cri.) 3168
Vinod Vs. SBI Global Factors Ltd.Referred¶151
2011 (4) Mh.L.J. 282 · Who else cites this
Vimal Powerloom vs Ravi Agency and Anr.Referred¶22
2015 Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 475 · Who else cites this
Manager, National Insurance Company Limited vs Saju P. Paul and anotherReferred¶23
(2013) 2 SCC 41 · Who else cites this
Mandvi Co.op. Bank Ltd. Vs Nimesh B. ThakoreFollowed¶21
(2010) 2 SCC (Cri.) 1 · Who else cites this
5 provisions across 3 enactments
Raj Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. and others
Khozim Yusuf Nagarwala
K.L. Wadane
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court