Dismissed

Dnyaneshwar Laxman Mane v. the Union of India and Another

Bombay HC24 Aug 2018WP/284/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging termination from the CISF during probation. The court held that natural justice was not violated by the lack of a hearing under CISF Rules 2001, Rule 25(2), and affirmed the Screening Committee's decision to reject the candidate due to criminal antecedents and suppression of facts.

What did the court decide?

Writ Petition dismissed; termination order upheld; rule discharged.

Dnyaneshwar Laxman Mane Vs the Union of India… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Bombay HC (2018)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD

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WRIT PETITION NO. 284 OF 2018

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Dnyaneshwar s/o Laxman Mane,
age 25 years, occ. service,
R/o Village Eknathwadi,
Post Munguswade,
Tq. Pathardi, Dist. Ahmednagar ...Petitioner

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VERSUS

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1]Union of India,
through Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block, Central Secretariat,
New Delhi 110001

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2]The Senior Commandant,
Central Industrial Security
Force, KRTC, Mundali,
Dist. Cuttack,
State-Orissa, PIN 754 013 ...Respondents

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…..

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Mr. S.S.Jadhavar, advocate with
Mr. S.R.Shirsat, advocate for the petitioner
Mr.S.B.Deshpande, ASG for respondent nos. 1 and 2

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 CORAM : S.V.GANGAPURWALA& SUNIL K.KOTWAL,JJ.

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 DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT : 12.7.2018
 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT : 24.8.2018

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J U D G M E N T (Per Sunil K. Kotwal, J.)

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Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

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With the consent of the learned counsel for the
parties, the petition is taken up for final
hearing.

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2.By filing this Writ Petition, the

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petitioner sought quashment of termination notice
cum orders, dated 6.9.2017 and 8.9.2017, passed by
respondent no.2, thereby terminating service of the
petitioner as constable in Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF).

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3.Heard strenuous arguments submitted by Mr.
S.S.Jadhavar, advocate holding for Mr. S.R.Shirsat,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
S.B.Deshpande, learned Additional Solicitor General
for respondents.

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4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that in response to the advertisement published by
Staff Selection Commission, the petitioner applied
and he was selected for the post of constable.
After undergoing all the process of physical test,
efficiency test, medical test, etc. and after
receiving the appointment order, the petitioner

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joined at RTC, Mundali, Batalian 2, Kharavela
Recruit Training Center, Mundali, Orissa on
2.5.2017. When the petitioner was undergoing

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training at the said training center on 8.9.2017,
respondent no.2 served notices/termination orders,
thereby terminating service of the petitioner, on
the ground that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he faced criminal trial.

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5.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that after issuing termination notice, dated

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6.9.2017, no opportunity of submitting explanation
was given to the petitioner. He pointed out that
during past, the petitioner and co-accused were
prosecuted for the offences punishable under
Sections 307, 326, 325, 324, 323, 504, 506 r/w 149

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and under Sections 120B, 143, 147 and 148 of the
Indian Penal Code. However, in the said Sessions
Case No. 301 of 2011 the petitioner was acquitted
on 22.4.2015. Therefore, the impugned termination
order being passed in violation of principles of
natural justice is illegal and deserves to be set
aside.

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6.Learned counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this

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Court in Writ Petition No. 910 of 2018 [Jayram

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Babanrao Sanap vs Union of India and others], dated
19.3.2018, wherein only direction was given by this

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Court to the competent authority to take
appropriate decision in respect of appointment of
the then petitioner in furtherance of his
selection. Validity of opinion of Standing
Screening Committee is not examined by this Court.

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7.Learned counsel for respondents submits

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that at the time of reporting at regional training
center, Mundali on 2.5.2017, the petitioner was
directed to fill up two copies of attestation form

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duly filled in completely and if the answer to any
question of column 12 of the attestation form is
"yes", then the petitioner was directed to submit

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complete details of the criminal case to the
Principal, RTC, Mundali. The petitioner was also

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directed to fill up questionnaire form. Though
while filling up questionnaire form the petitioner
has admitted that in the past he was kept under

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detention and he was neither convicted by any
criminal Court nor any criminal case is pending

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against him, while answering question no.3,

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"Whether any FIR has been lodged against you?", the
petitioner answered the said question as "no".
However, it was noticed that criminal case for the
above said offences was registered against the
petitioner, and therefore, the matter was referred
to the Standing Screening Committee for their
opinion. The Standing Screening Committee

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considered the antecedents of the petitioner and
opined that the petitioner was not suitable for
appointment in the Central Industrial Security
Force. Therefore, service of the petitioner was
terminated by serving notice, dated 6.9.2017 on
payment of one month salary in lieu of one month
notice period as per Rule 25 (2) of the Central
Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001.

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8.Learned counsel for the respondents submits

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that the petitioner was guilty of suppression of

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registration of FIR while filling up the
questionnaire as well as after examining the
antecedents of the petitioner and his involvement
in serious crime like attempt to commit murder and

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riot by holding deadly weapons. The Screening

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Committee rightly opined that the petitioner was not suitable for being appointed to the post of constable in CISF. He placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of (1) " Avtar Singh vs Union of India and others (AIR 2016 SC 3598) " and (2) " Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and others vs Mehar Singh (AIR 2013 SC 2861) "

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9.With the help of learned counsel for both
the parties, we have gone through the documents

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placed on record. After going through the
termination notice cum order, dated 6.9.2017, it
emerges that under the provisions of Sub-rule 2 of

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Rule 25 of the CISF Rules, 2001 the service of the
petitioner was terminated on payment of one month
salary in lieu of one month notice for the reason
that the 18th Standing Screening Committee of CISF
opined that the petitioner was not suitable person

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to be continued in CISF, as he was involved in
criminal case before joining CISF. The second
termination order, dated 8.9.2017 is nothing but

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further directions to remove the name of the

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petitioner from the strength/pay roll of CISF.

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10.Rule 25 (2) of CISF Rules, 2001 reads

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thus : -

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" 25. Probation: -
(1) ....................
(2) If during the period of
probation the appointing authority
is of the opinion that a member of
the Force is not fit for permanent
appointment,theappointing
authority may discharge him or
terminate the service from the
Force after issue of notice of one
month or after giving one month pay
in lieu of such notice, or revert
him to the rank from which he was
promoted or repatriate to his
parent department, as the case may
be."

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Undisputedly, appointment of petitioner in
2017 was on probation of two years. A bare glance
at Rule 25 (2) of the CISF Rules makes it clear
that during the period of probation of two years,
if the appointing authority is of the opinion that
a member of the Force is not fit for permanent
appointment, his services can be terminated after
issue of one month notice or after giving one month

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salary in lieu of such notice. In view of this
clear provision in CISF Rules, when termination
notice, dated 6.9.2017 indicates that the service
of the petitioner was terminated as 18th Standing
Screening Committee found him unsuitable for
appointment as a member in CISF on account of his
criminal antecedents and in lieu of one month
notice, one month pay was paid to the petitioner,
no further opportunity of hearing needs to be given
to the petitioner. Even the petitioner by filing
rejoinder has not disputed the payment of salary of
one month to him in lieu of one month termination
notice. In the circumstances, as under the CISF
Rules, before terminating the services of the
petitioner no hearing needs to be given to the
petitioner, the petitioner cannot object that there
is violation of principles of natural justice as
opportunity of submitting explanation was not given
to him. Thus, initial objection raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
violation of principles of natural justice deserves
to be rejected.

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11.Now, question arises whether only because

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before joining CISF service, the petitioner faced
criminal trial for the offences punishable under
Sections 307, 326, 325, 324, 323, 504, 506 r/w 149
and under Sections 120B, 143, 147 and 148 of the
Indian Penal Code, the 18th Standing Screening
Committee can declare him not suitable for
appointment to the post of constable in CISF. This
aspect has been already considered in detail by the
Supreme Court in the case of "Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi and others vs Mehar Singh" (cited

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supra). The facts of that case are identical like
the present case. In the case before Supreme
Court, one Mehar Singh was prosecuted for
committing offences under Sections 143, 341, 323

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and 427 of the Indian Penal Code for causing hurt
by iron chain, lathi, belt, stones, etc. Parties
in that case arrived at compromise and accused were
acquitted of the offences under Sections 323, 341,
427 of the Indian Penal Code. As regards offence
under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code, the
Trial Court acquitted Mehar Singh as witnesses
turned hostile. On selection of Mehar Singh in

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Delhi Police Force his antecedents were examined by
Screening Committee and considering his involvement
in above referred crime, the Screening Committee
did not recommend his case for appointment to the
post of constable. That matter went up to the
Apex Court and the Apex Court held that opinion
formed by the Screening Committee does not merit
any interference. The Apex Court observed

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thus : -

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" 28. The police force is a
disciplined force. It shoulders the
great responsibility of maintaining
law and order and public order in the
society. People repose great faith
and confidence in it. It must be
worthy of that confidence. A
candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost
rectitude. He must have impeccable
character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not
fit in this category. Even if he is
acquitted or discharged in the
criminal case, that acquittal or
discharge order will have to be
examined to see whether he has been
completely exonerated in the case

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because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide . In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with even hand. "

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In "Avtar Singh vs Union of India and

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12.

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others"(cited supra) Larger Bench of the Apex
Court considered the effect of suppression of fact
by the employee at the time of recruitment. After
elaborate discussion, the Apex Court summarised the
conclusions. The relevant conclusion is
reproduced as under: -

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" Para 30 : - ........
..............
(4) (c) - If acquittal had already
been recorded in a case involving
moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical
ground and it is not a case of clean
acquittal, or benefit of reasonable
doubt has been given, the employer
may consider all relevant facts
available as to antecedents, and may
take appropriate decision as to the
continuance of the employee.

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........................ "

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In view of this settled position of law, if
we go through the questionnaire filled up by the
petitioner at the time of joining the training
center, it emerges that while answering the
question, "Has any FIR been lodged against you ?",

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the petitioner answered as "no". When the

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petitioner was knowing that in the past he was
prosecuted for the offences under Sections 307,
326, 325, 324, 323, 504, 506 r/w 149 and under
Sections 120B, 143, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal
Code, he must be knowing that FIR was registered

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against him under those Sections. Suppression of
registration of that FIR indicates the dishonesty
of the petitioner. Apart from this, after going

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through the judgment in Sessions Case No. 301 of
2011, delivered by Sessions Court, Ahmednagar, it

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emerges that the petitioner and other co-accused
were facing charges for commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 307, 326, 325, 324, 323,
504, 506 r/w 149 and under Sections 120B, 143, 147
and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations

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against the petitioner and co-accused are that on
the date of incident on 26.7.2011 the petitioner
and co-accused assaulted complainant Annasaheb, his

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brother, wife and daughter-in-law by using axe,
iron pipe and stones. Axe blows were inflicted

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even on the head of the complainant. However, at
the stage of recording evidence, probably the

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matter was settled between the complainant and the

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accused, therefore, including complainant almost
all injured witnesses turned hostile. In the

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result, the petitioner and co-accused were
acquitted. He was absolved from criminal liability
only because the complainant and other witnesses
turned hostile. The acquittal was recorded only on
technical ground i.e. hostility of all prosecution
witnesses except the investigating officer.
Therefore, it was not the case of honourable
acquittal.

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13.If the Screening Committee considered the

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above discussed criminal antecedents of the
petitioner and his direct involvement while causing
bodily injury by deadly weapon like axe, certainly
the Screening Committee is justified while holding
that the petitioner was not suitable person to be
continued in CISF, which is important wing of the

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Armed Force of the India. In view of law
settled by the Apex Court in "Avtar Singh"and
"Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & others"(cited
supra), certainly the opinion expressed by the

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Screening Committee while rejecting the candidature

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of the petitioner in CISF cannot be faulted only
because the petitioner can get acquittal in the
above said criminal case.

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14.Accordingly, we have come to the conclusion
that the opinion expressed by 18th Standing
Screening Committee regarding unsuitability of the
petitioner for appointment as constable in CISF is
justified. The subsequent action initiated by the
respondents by following Rule 25 (2) of the CISF
Rules is within four corners of law and there is no
violation of principles of natural justice. We
find no reason to interfere with the impugned order
of termination passed by respondent no.2. It
follows that this petition fails. Writ Petition is
dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to
costs.

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 [SUNIL K.KOTWAL, J.] [S.V.GANGAPURWALA, J.]

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dbm

Dnyaneshwar Laxman Mane v. the Union of India and Another

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Dnyaneshwar Laxman Mane v. the Union of India and Another

Case brief

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