coparcener of a joint Hindu family at the time of the adoption of Sidhu and accordingly, the property in the hands of Rajaram would devolve upon Sidhu, the adoptive son, by way of succession and not by way of survivorship as in the case of a Hindu caparcenery. In other words, the submission is that the property coming to the hands of a sole surviving coparcener is no longer a joint family property, but should be treated on par with self acquired property of the sole surviving coparcener. There is no principle of Hindu Mitakshara Law, by which the parties are admittedly governed in the present case, that joint family property going into the hands of a sole surviving member of a coparcenery looses its character as a joint family property. It is only if the deceased was at the time of his death a sole surviving coparcener that the whole of his property including the coparcenery property would pass to his heirs by succession. In other words, the sole survivorship of the coparcener must subsist at the date of his death, when the succession opens for it to devolve upon his heirs by succession. A necessary corollary is that if a son is born to the sole surviving coparcener during his lifetime, the son will get a right in the property by birth. In such case, there is no question of the property or the share of the original sole surviving coparcener going by succession. As much as a natural born son, even an adoptive son gets a right into the coparcenery property by virtue of his adoption. The adopted son takes a legal birth in the adoptive family at the time of his adoption and accordingly gets a right in the property of his adoptive father as much as a natural born son would. On this principle, upon his adoption by late Rajaram, Sidhu got a right in the property of Rajaram, which came to the latter as the sole surviving coparcener of the original joint Hindu family. The property, in other words, in the hands of Sidhu is a joint family
