Dismissed

Govind B. Bajaj v. G.S. Developers and 4 Ors.

Bombay HC19 Aug 2014NMS/999/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Defendants sought to bar the Plaintiff's second suit for specific performance, claiming the earlier injunction suit omitted the same relief without leave. The Court held the causes of action were distinct: the first was apprehension of alienation, while the second arose from subsequent repudiation of the contract, thus allowing the suit. Request for rejection of plaint dismissed.

What did the court decide?

Notice of Motion rejected; preliminary issue decided in favour of Plaintiff dismissing the challenge to jurisdiction.

Govind B. Bajaj Vs G.S. Developers and 4 Ors. — Contract and Commercial Disputes | Bombay HC (2014)

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dik

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

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NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 999 OF 2013 IN SUIT NO.186 OF 2013

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G.S.Developers & Ors. ...Applicants In the matter between Govind B. Bajaj ...Plaintiff vs G.S.Developers & Ors. ...Defendants

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Mr Arif Bookwala Sr Advocate with Mr Ashish Kamat i/b M/s Ranjit & Co. for the Plaintiff.

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Mr K.T.Kukreja with Mr Sandeep Dhangar i/b Jayesh R. Vyas for Defendant Nos. 1 to 3.

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CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J.

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AUGUST 19, 2014

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(JUDGMENT):

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Notice of Motion No.999 of 2013 is taken out by Defendant Nos.1 to 3 for rejection of the plaint, under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( for short “CPC”), for want of leave of the Court under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of CPC. At the time of hearing of the Notice of Motion, the parties submitted that the Court may also frame and decide a preliminary issue of jurisdiction concerning the bar under sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 of CPC on the ground of the Plaintiff having omitted to sue for the present reliefs with the leave of the Court, when the previous suit was instituted by the Plaintiff on the same cause of action. Accordingly, the following issue is framed as a preliminary issue:

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“ Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the

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present suit, for want of leave under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of CPC in Suit No. 1100 of 2012 pending before the City Civil Court, Mumbai ?”

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2 The parties do not desire to lead any oral evidence on the issue and want the Court to decide the issue on oral submissions. Accordingly, the following order deals with the prayer for rejection of the plaint and the determination of the preliminary issue framed as above after hearing the parties.

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3 The Plaintiff has filed the present suit for specific performance of an agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.1 to 3, which is contained in a term-sheet executed by the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2. The term sheet purportedly contains an agreement between the parties to develop the suit property by a joint venture. The suit property was originally owned by three fractions of Ghantiwala family, each having 1/3^rd share in the property. Defendant No.2 had agreed to purchase their respective 1/3^rd shares from two branches of the family, whilst negotiations were under way in respect of the 1/3^rd share of the third branch. It is the Plaintiff's case that during the pendency of these negotiations the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 had executed the term-sheet, under which the Plaintiff agreed to invest a sum of Rs.15 crores out of the total outlay of Rs.20 crores agreed upon for the development of the suit property, against which investment Defendant Nos.1 to 3 agreed to grant 75 % joint development rights to the Plaintiff. It is the Plaintiff's case that the term-sheet acknowledges the payment of Rs.4 crores by the Plaintiff to Defendant Nos.1 to 3 in pursuance of the agreement of joint development. This term-sheet was kept in a locker, the keys of which were kept with Defendant No.4, who was the middleman for the joint venture agreement between the parties. It is the Plaintiff's case that three conveyances were executed by the three branches of Ghantiwala family in favour of Defendant No.1 in course of time, conveying the suit property to Defendant No.1. It is the Plaintiff's case that the Plaintiff's funds were used to purchase the suit property. In pursuance of the arrangement between the parties, there was correspondence between them, at the end of which the Plaintiff issued a public notice asserting his right, title and interest in the suit property and repudiating the right of Defendant No.1 to deal with the suit property. On 9 May 2012, the Plaintiff noticed on the suit property a board of one “Platinum Group” claiming possession of the suit property. The Plaintiff, in the premises, filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court, being Suit No.1100 of 2012, inter alia seeking

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permanent injunction against the Defendants from dealing with or alienating the suit property. In their reply to the Plaintiff's suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay, Defendant Nos.1 to 3 claimed that the suit contract, i.e. the term-sheet of 13 April 2010, was not a subsisting and binding contract. The Defendants inter alia claimed that the term-sheet was illegal, null and void and that at any rate the same was to be treated as terminated. The Defendants also filed a Notice of Motion in that suit challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay City Civil Court. Defendant No.1, through its advocate, also addressed a notice to the Plaintiff repudiating the suit contract and claiming that the same was not an agreement for development but a loan transaction between the parties. In these premises, the Plaintiff filed the present suit on 2 November 2012. The Plaintiff took out a Notice of Motion in the suit, being Notice of Motion No.1015 of 2013, for interim reliefs.

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4 Defendant Nos.1 to 3 have taken out the present Notice of Motion claiming inter alia that the facts narrated in the plaint in the City Civil Court suit gave a complete cause of action to the Plaintiff to institute a suit for specific performance; yet the Plaintiff chose to file a suit merely for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from creating third party rights, omitting to sue for specific performance of the suit contract, namely, the term-sheet of 13 October 2010. It is submitted by the Defendants that whilst omitting to sue for the relief of specific performance, the leave of the Court was not obtained for such omission and that, in the premises, the Plaintiff cannot be permitted to sue for the relief of specific performance so omitted. The Notice of Motion is opposed by the Plaintiff on the ground that the cause of action for instituting the City Civil Court suit and the cause of action for institution of the present suit are different and distinct. It is submitted by the Plaintiff that the earlier suit filed in the City Civil Court was founded on an apprehension that the Defendants were attempting to alienate, or part with possession of, the suit property. It is submitted that at that stage there was no repudiation of the suit contract by the Defendants. It is submitted that during the pendency of the earlier suit, the Defendants by their affidavit in reply filed in the Plaintiff's Notice of Motion in that suit as well as by their Advocate's letter addressed to the Plaintiff repudiated the suit contract and alleged that the same was illegal, null and void. It is submitted that upon such repudiation of the

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suit contract, a cause of action for seeking specific performance of the suit contract has accrued in favour of the Plaintiff and accordingly the present suit has been filed. It is submitted that the two suits having been founded on different causes of action, there was no requirement in law to obtain leave under order 2 Rule 2 of CPC at the time of filing of the earlier suit. This is the main controversy between the parties in the present Notice of Motion.

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5 It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Defendants that if one has regard to the averments made in the earlier suit filed in the City Civil Court, a complete cause of action had ripened or accrued to the Plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance of the suit contract. It is submitted that the Plaintiff not having sued for the relief of specific performance and not having chosen to obtain leave of the Court for such omission, under the provisions of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 of CPC, the present suit is barred. Learned counsel relies upon the Judgments of Canning Miyra Phoenix Ltd & Ors Vs M/s Popular Construction & Ors¹ , Tayabhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr Vs Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors² , Immigrants Ideal Producers Co-op. Soc.Ltd. Vs Mrs Jahanara Moiz Dalal³ , Kamal Kishor Saboo Vs Nawabzada Humayun Kamal Hasan Khan⁴ N.V.Srinivasa Murthy & Ors Vs Mariyamma (Dead) by proposed LRS & Ors⁵ M/s Vimal Builders Thane Vs Ketan Kantilal Thakkar & Ors⁶ , Virgo Industries (Eng.) Pvt. Ltd. Vs Venturetech Solutions Pvt. Ltd.⁷ , Gajanan R Salvi Vs Satish Shankar Gupte & Ors⁸ , Smt. Usha Rani Banik Vs Haridas Das & Ors⁹ , M/s Raptakos Brett & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs M/s Modi Business Centre (Pvt)Ltd.¹⁰ , Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha Jaipur (Trust) Vs Mahant Ram Niwas & Anr¹¹ , and State Bank of India Vs Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd¹² .

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1 1994 (4) Bom. C.R. 414 (DB) 2 AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1240 (1) 3 2004 AIMC 138 4 AIR 2001 Delhi 220 (DB) 5 (2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 548 6 2010 (1) AIR Bom. R 76 (DB) 7 (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 625 8 AIR 2004 Bom 455 9 AIR 2005 Gauhati 1 10 AIR 2006 Madras 236 11 AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2187 12 2014(4) Mh.L.J. 20

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6 On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that a second suit is barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC only when it is founded on the same cause of action as the first suit and there was an omission in the first suit to seek the relief (claimed in the second suit) which the Plaintiff was entitled to seek on such cause of action, without the leave of the Court being taken. It is submitted by the learned counsel that in the present case, the two suits are founded on different and distinct causes of action and that, therefore, the provisions under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC do not apply to the filing of the present suit. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff relies on the judgments of Kumar Aditya Vs S.R.V.Production & Anr¹³ , Brunsden Vs Humphrey¹⁴ , Keshavlal Sakhidas Vs Amarchand Somchand¹⁵ , Ravjibhai Mathurbhai Solanki Vs Bijalbhai Devjibhai Prajapati¹⁶ , Jagat Singh Vs Jeet Singh & Anr¹⁷ , Josey Francis Vs Sunoj K Balan¹⁸ , and Narashalli Kempanna & Ors Vs Narashappa & Ors¹⁹

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7 The relevant provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 2 of CPC are quoted below:

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“1. Frame of suit. Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them.

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Suit to include the whole claim – (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

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13 Chamber Summons No.425 of 2013 in Suit No.2674 of 2004 decided on 11 November 2013 14 1884 VOI. XIV QBD 141

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15 AIR 1933 Bom. 398

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16 AIR 2004 Guj 102 17 AIR 2007 P & H 154 18 AIR 2009 Ker 188 19 AIR 1989 Kar 50

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(2) Relinquishment of part of claim – Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

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Omission to sue for one of several reliefs. A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted”

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8 Rule 1 of Order 2 requires that every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them. Rule 2 of Rule 2 requires every suit to include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. The Plaintiff, however, has an option to relinquish any portion of his claim if he chooses to do so. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 2 contemplates that in the event the Plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. Sub-rule 3 provides that a person omitting to sue for any of the reliefs to which he is entitled in respect of the same cause of action, shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted, unless whilst omitting to sue in respect of that relief he obtains leave of the Court. These provisions have been considered by the Supreme Court in a recent case in Virgo Industries (Eng.)Pvt.Ltd. (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court held as follows:

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“ 10. The object behind the enactment of Order 2 Rules 2(2) and (3) of CPC is not far to seek. The Rule engrafts a laudable principle that discourages/ prohibits vexing the defendant again and again by multiple suits except in a situation where one of the several reliefs, though available to a plaintiff, may not have been claimed for a good reason. A later suit for such relief is contemplated only with the leave of the court which leave, naturally, will be granted upon due satisfaction and for good and sufficient reasons. The situations where the bar under Order 2 Rules 2(2) and (3) will be attracted have been enumerated in a long line of decisions spread over a

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century now. Though each of the aforesaid decisions contains a clear and precise narration of the principles of law arrived at after a detailed analysis, the principles laid down in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh V. Bhooralal may be usefully recalled below: (AIR p. 1812,para 6)

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“6. In order that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar.”

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9 It may thus be seen that what is important for any decision on the defendant's plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of CPC is that there must be an identity of the cause of action in the previous and the subsequent suit; the subsequent suit must be in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; and the right to relief to which the plaintiff was entitled on such cause of action was omitted in the previous suit without leave of the Court.

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10 The next important question that falls for the consideration of the Court is: what is meant by the cause of action in this context. The Supreme Court in the case of Virgo Industries (Eng.)Pvt.Ltd. (supra) observed as under:

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“ 'Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from the earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every

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fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that particular action on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.”

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11 The cause of action thus, in this context, implies a particular factual situation or a particular action on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint or right of action. It is, therefore, necessary to see that the factual situation or action on the part of the defendant on which the plaintiff bases his grievances in the two suits, is the same.

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12 The fact situation or action of the Defendants in the present case on which the Plaintiff's right of action was based in the previous suit is contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the plaint in that suit, which are quoted below:

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“10. The Plaintiff was shocked and surprised when the plaintiff learnt that the Defendant Nos.1 to 3 herein kept the plaintiff on assurance that they are trying to comply the requisition of the Notice being Exhibit “D” hereto but at the same time they were trying to deal with third party contrary to the agreement between the Plaintiff and them. The Plaintiff states that on 4^th May 2012, the Plaintiff learnt that Platinum Group has put their signboard at the building in the suit property mentioning therein that they are in possession of the suit property. The Plaintiff immediately took photographs of the same. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit “E” is the copies of the photograph.

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The Plaintiff states that the plaintiff thereafter tried to contact the Defendant Nos.2 and 3 to seek explanation about the board but the Plaintiff found that they are evading the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff therefore, apprehends that the Defendants are trying to dispose off the Development right and the suit property without intimating the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiff states that as the Plaintiff has already invested a considerable huge amount in the project and he is still ready and willing to comply his part, the Defendants have no authority to deal with any other third party, contrary to the terms agreed between them in respect of Development rights of Suit property. Thus if the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are trying to execute any

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agreement of assignment of Development right in respect of the suit property the said attempt is required to be and should be prevented by appropriate orders of This Hon'ble Court. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to reliefs from this Hon'ble Court to declare that the Terms agreed upon by and between is Plaintiff and Defendants Nos.1 to 3 are still subsisting and binding upon the parties. The Plaintiff is also entitled to relief from this Hon'ble Court to declare that the Plaintiff has interest and right in development of the suit property as per the Terms agreed between the Parties.”

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In other words, it was the Plaintiff's case in that suit that despite the suit contract between the parties contained in the term-sheet, which was not disputed by them, the Defendants were trying to deal with third parties in breach of the agreement. The cause of action is essentially based on the Plaintiff's apprehension that the Defendants were trying to dispose of the suit property in breach of the suit contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants and that they had no authority to do so. In these premises, the Plaintiff applied for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from creating any third party rights.

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13 On the other hand, the cause of action pleaded in the present suit, as may be gathered from para 25 onwards of the plaint in the present suit, may be summarized as follows:

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i) In reply to the Plaintiff's Notice of Motion in the previously instituted suit, Defendant No.2 for self and partners of Defendant No.1, filed a reply on 15 May 2012, disputing the Plaintiff's claim in the suit. Defendant No.2 contended that the term sheet was not signed by Defendant No.3, who was one of the partners of Defendant No.1 firm. The Defendants, however, claimed that the Defendants are not creating any third party rights in respect of the suit property, but intended to develop the suit property themselves. In these premises, no ad-interim reliefs were granted to the Plaintiff in the Notice of Motion.

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ii) Subsequently, by a letter dated 11 September 2012, addressed by

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Defendant No.1 through his Advocate, the Defendants claimed that the dealings between the parties reflected in the term-sheet were not in the nature of a joint venture agreement for development of the suit property, but a transaction of loan carrying interest at the rate of 12 % p.a., and that the term sheet did not create any right, title or interest in favour of the Plaintiff with regard to the suit property.

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Accordingly, the factual situation or particular action of the Defendants complained of in the present suit is their reply to the Notice of Motion in the previous suit and their Advocate's notice referred to above, by which the Defendants repudiated the suit contract.

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14 Thus it may be seen that the cause of action pleaded by the Plaintiff in the present suit is the repudiation of the contract by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3. On the basis of such repudiation and the Plaintiff's readiness and willingness to comply with his part of the obligations under the suit contract, the Plaintiff has prayed for specific performance of the suit contract. This cause of action is materially different from the cause of action pleaded in the earlier suit, namely, the apprehended disposal of the property on the part of the Defendants despite acknowledging the validity of the suit contract. The cause of action pleaded in the present suit, thus, being distinct and separate from the cause of action pleaded in the previous suit, there is no question of application of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC to the relief claimed in the present suit.

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15 The Judgments relied upon by Defendant Nos.1 to 3 in this behalf are clearly distinguishable on facts, as may be seen below. In the case of Kamal Kishor Saboo (supra), Delhi High Court was concerned with a case, where the appellant/ plaintiff had filed the original suit for permanent injunction on the basis of allegations that certain persons claiming to be property dealers and intending buyers were proposing to deal with the suit property. The later suit filed by the applicant / plaintiff was on the basis of the same apprehension but with an additional plea that in the written statement filed in the first suit, the intention of

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the respondent became clear to the effect that he did not want to sell the suit property to the applicant/ plaintiff. In other words, the two suits were based on the same bundle of facts, namely, the apprehended sale in favour of a third party other than the plaintiff, in whose favour the suit agreement was executed. Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that from the averments in the plaint, it was clear that the appellant had pleaded that the respondent was not adhering to the terms of agreement to sell and in fact trying to sell the suit property to a third party. Thus, according to these averments in the plaint, which were not materially different from the averments in the second suit, the relief of specific performance sought in the second suit could very well have been applied for by the appellant/ plaintiff. Delhi High Court noted that the circumstances did not change between the first suit and the second suit; that the second suit was also based on the same averments; that interestingly a claver device was adopted to show as if the intentions of the defendant came to be known only from the written statement filed in the first suit. The Court held that such ingenuinity cannot be permitted when the averments made in the first suit and the cause of action disclosed therein, clearly state that the respondent was not willing and had failed to perform his part of the contract. Accordingly, the Court held the suit to be barred on the basis of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2(3) of CPC. These facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of our case, where, as noted above, there is no identity between the two causes of action.

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16 In the case of N.V.Srinivasa Murthy & Ors (supra), the Supreme Court noted that on the basis of the averments in the first suit, the relief claimed in the second suit, namely, the relief of declaring the registered sale-deed to be a loan transaction, and claiming specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance on that basis, was available and ought to have been claimed in the first suit, where all the facts necessary for claiming the said reliefs were already pleaded. The Court held that whatever relief the plaintiff desired to claim from the civil court, on the basis of averments with regard to the registered sale-deed in the later suit, could and ought to have been claimed in the original suit pending at the time of filing of the second suit and that, accordingly, the second suit was barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC.

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17 In Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha case (supra), the first respondent had filed a suit which concerned the succession and management of a Gaddi. The cause of action pleaded in that suit was the Plaintiff's succession to the Gaddi and ownership of the property on the basis of such succession. A second suit was filed thereafter for possession of the property belonging to the Gaddi. The Supreme Court held the second suit to be inter alia barred under Order 2 Rule 2. The cause of action in the two suits was the same, namely, the Plaintiff's succession to the Gaddi and ownership of the property on that basis but the relief of possession was not asked for in the first suit. These facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts in our case.

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18 Even in the case of M/s Vimal Builders (supra ), our Court was concerned with two suits with identical averments. The cause of action in the first suit, as noted by our Court in that case, arose on the basis of some correspondence between the parties, as was pleaded in the second suit. It was alleged in the second suit that apart from this correspondence which was in respect of an apprehended transfer of the suit property to a third party, there was a statement made in the written statement admitting that the suit property had been transferred in favour of the third party and that thereafter the Plaintiff noticed some activity on the suit property. On the basis of these facts, our Court noted that the cause of action in both the suits was substantially the same. The previous suit was filed for injunction alleging transfer of the suit property in breach of the agreement for sale, whereas the later suit alleged the same transfer, but with an admission of the defendant contained in a written statement in the previous suit. It is under these circumstances that our Court held that there was a substantial identity in the causes of action in the two suits and that, accordingly, the second suit was barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC.

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19 In the case of Gajanan R Salvi (supra), the cause of action pleaded in the two suits was substantially identical. Our Court noted that all the allegations made in the previous suit were sufficient to ask for the relief claimed in the second suit and that the second suit was filed substantially on the basis of the

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same allegations.

20 The cases of Canning Miyra Phoenix Ltd & Ors (supra), Tayabhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr (supra) and Immigrants Ideal Producers Co-op.Soc. Ltd. (supra) are on points, which we are not really concerned with in the present suit. In the case of Canning Miyra Phoenix Ltd (supra) the Court was dealing with the question concerning the stage at which leave under Order 2 Rule 2 ought to be granted; Whereas, in the case of Tayabhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr (supra), the Court was concerned with the case of disobedience of an order of interim injunction passed in the suit. In the case of Immigrants Ideal Producers Co-op.Soc. Ltd (supra), our Court was concerned with the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain interlocutory and miscellaneous applications, after framing of a preliminary issue of jurisdiction under Section 9A of CPC.

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21 In the case of State Bank of India (supra), the Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC and the basis thereof, namely, the cardinal principle that the defendant should not be vexed twice for the same cause. The Supreme Court at the same time affirmed that Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC requires the unity of all claims based on the same cause of action and does not contemplate unity of distinct and separate causes of action. As noted above, in the present case the causes of action in the two suits are distinct and separate, and the plea of bar under Order 2 Rule 2 cannot be sustained.

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22 For the reasons stated above, the preliminary issue is decided in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. There is no merit in the Notice of Motion. The Notice of Motion is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

( S.C.GUPTE J. )

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CERTIFICATE

Certified to be true and correct copy of the original signed Judgment/ Order.

Govind B. Bajaj v. G.S. Developers and 4 Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Govind B. Bajaj v. G.S. Developers and 4 Ors.

Case brief

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