then dealing with the application on merits. If it was not inclined to condone the delay, then, the same should have been said in clear terms. If it was inclined to condone the delay, then, it ought to have taken up the main application and thereafter, it ought to have given some time to the parties to prepare themselves and argue it as that concerns serious challenge to its order restoring possession and when it is claimed to be passed ex-parte. One does not find any discussion on either of the issues, namely, on the point of condonation of delay and merits of the application seeking review or setting aside of the order dated 28.07.2010. The reasons assigned in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 do not indicate as to whether the lower Appellate Court was inclined to condone the delay or not. However, from reading of paragraph 10, it appears that a case was made out to condone the delay in applying for setting aside the judgment and order dated 28.07.2010. If that was so, in one line the lower Appellate Court could not have held that no case is made out for providing an opportunity of being heard by setting aside the order dated 28.07.2010. This is hardly a manner in which such applications have to be dealt with. The application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is a serious proceeding and that power is not exercised routinely or as a matter of course.
