Allowed

The State of Maharashtra v. M/S. Ashoka Buildcon Ltd.

Bombay HC1 Apr 2013ARA/3/2009

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeals challenged a District Judge's order upholding an arbitration award. The High Court held that the plea of limitation could not be raised for the first time under section 37. It set aside the Judge's grant of rejected claims, directing remittal to the tribunal.

What did the court decide?

Award for claims 1A-1E upheld. Award for claims 2 and 3 set aside and remitted to the arbitral tribunal for fresh decision.

The State of Maharashtra Vs M/S. Ashoka Buildcon Ltd. — Arbitration | Bombay HC (2013)

ara.3-2009

acd

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 3 OF 2009

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The State of Maharashtra ] (Through Executive Engineer, Public ] Works Division, Miraj, Killa Road, ] near Laxmi Market, Oppossite Prant ] Office, Miraj- 416 410, District-Sangli ] ...Appellant.

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Vs.

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M/ s Ashoka Buildcon Limited ] (M/s Ashoka Infra Pvt. Ltd, merged ] vide High Court order dated 28.2.2005 ] in ABL). A Company incorporated & ] registered under the provisions of ] Companies Act, 1956, having its ] registered office at “Ashoka Marg, ] Nashik- 422 011 and Unit Office at ] “Ashoka Arch, E-28/29, Ground floor ] Opp. Darpan Hotel, Market Yard, ] Gultekdi, Pune-411 037. ] Through its authorized representative ] Shri S.B. Raisoni, Director, aged about ] 44 years. ] ..Respondent.

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WITH ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 4 OF 2009

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The State of Maharashtra ] (Through Executive Engineer, Public ] Works Division, Miraj, Killa Road, ] near Laxmi Market, Oppossite Prant ] Office, Miraj- 416 410, District-Sangli ] ...Appellant. Vs. M/ s Ashoka Buildcon Limited ] “Ashoka Arch, E-28/29, Ground floor ] Opp. Darpan Hotel, Market Yard, ] Gultekdi, Pune-411 037. ] ..Respondent.

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WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 27 OF 2011

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IN ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 4 OF 2009

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Mr. Atul S. Rajadhyaksha, Sr. Counsel with AGP Ms. S.V. Sonawane, for the Petitioners.

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Mr. R.S. Apte, Sr. Counsel with Mr. A.A. Garge, for Respondents.

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CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

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DATE : APRIL 01, 2013.

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ORAL JUDGMENT:

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1 By these appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the appellant seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 4^th November, 2008 delivered by the learned District Judge-2, Sangli thereby allowing the part of these appeals by allowing the claim nos.2 and 3 and upholding claim nos.1A to 1E awarded by the learned arbitrator.

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2 The relevant facts for the purposes of deciding these two appeals are as under:

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a) On 4.3.1999, the respondents-contractor entered into an agreement with the appellant for construction of major bridge across river Krishna on Miraj-Kolhapur (Maharashtra State High Way-3) at K.M. 181/400 near village

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Ankali which approaches with prior financing collecting toll rates on build, operate and transfer (for short 'BOT') basis. The appellant issued work order on

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4.3.1999 in favour of the respondents. The work awarded to the respondents was

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to be completed within a period of two years from the date of issuance of work order i.e. on or before 3.3.2001. It is not in dispute that on 22.2.2000, the respondents completed the work. Provisional completion certificate was issued by the appellant. The dispute arose in respect of extra items/additional work carried out by the respondents which necessitated making the additional claim by the respondents. State Government issued notification on 28.2.2000 for commencement of collecting toll.

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b) The clause 3.4.17 of the Contract provides for settlement of disputes and for mechanism for making the claims and decision thereon by the executive engineer, superintending engineer and chief engineer. The said clause of the Contract is extracted as under:

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“ The contract does not contemplate that the decision of the executive engineer shall be final, though every claim had to be made to the executive engineer as required under clause 3.4.17 of the contract document, the decision on the claim is to be given by the superintending engineer of the circle as stated in the said clause. Superintending engineer has to give his orders on the claim within 45 days on the receipt of the claim by the engineer failing which, the claim is to be directly submitted to the chief engineer. If the claim is rejected or any adverse order is passed by the superintending engineer then an appeal to the chief engineer is also provided in this clause. If the entrepreneur is not satisfied with the

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decision of the chief engineer, or chief engineer fails to give his decision, the the arbitration will have to be resorted. These being the scheme of the redressal machinery, the limitation would start only if the superintending engineer or, on appeal, chief engineer has given a final decision. We find that in respect of all the claims no final decision was communicated to the entrepreneur either by the superintending engineer or by the chief engineer. On the contrary claims were said to be under their consideration and even during the hearing of these arbitral proceedings claims were partially accepted by the respondent government. Thus, there is no merit in the contention that all the claims submitted by the claimant and referred to the arbitral tribunal are barred by the law of limitation.”

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c) On 17.10.2000, the respondents confirmed part of the extra costs worked out by the appellant in respect of such extra work. By letter dated 23.10.2000, the executive engineer informed the superintending engineer about the acceptance by the respondents valuation of extra work amounting to Rs.91.83 lacs instead of claim of Rs.107 lacs made by the respondents. On 3.3.2001, the stipulated period of completion of the work awarded to the respondents expired. On 15.2.2003, the superintending engineer informed the respondents that the legitimate claim of the respondents have already been submitted to the chief engineer, PWD, Region-Pune vide letter dated 29.10.2002.

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d) The respondents by letter dated 2.1.2004 to the chief engineer after referring to the letter addressed by the superintending engineer on 15.2.2003 informing the respondents that their legitimate claim had already been submitted to the chief engineer, requested the chief engineer to give his decision towards legitimate claims of the respondents within 30 days from the date of receipt of the said letter in terms of clause 3.4.17. By letter dated 27.1.2004, the chief engineer informed the respondents that their request for variation as per clause 3.4.17 is under consideration and as such provisions of clause 3.4.17 did not attract to the said issue.

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e) By letter dated 31.1.2004, the respondents requested the chief engineer to convey his decision within 15 days from the date of receipt of said letter regarding variation and increase in concession period. The respondents also made it clear that the respondents reserved their rights to refer the disputes to the arbitrator after 15 days’ time i.e. on 15.2.2004.

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f) By letter dated 20.4.2004 to the executive engineer, the respondents invoked arbitration as per clause 3.4.17 (III) of the contract and appointed Mr. M.G. Bharat retired secretary of the PWD as arbitrator and called upon the appellants to appoint joint arbitrator within period of 30 days.

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g) It is pertinent to note that by letter dated 3.3.2004 addressed by the chief engineer of the appellants to the respondents stated that as per clause 3.4.17 of the contract the chief engineer was suppose to give his decision on the points of disputes raised within 30 days, however as the chief engineer has to follow certain departmental procedure and seek approval of the competent authority before issuing such decision. Such process for obtaining such approval was already started and same shall be completed on top priority and on receipt of such decision from the chief engineer, the respondents could decide to go for an arbitration as per clause 3.4.17 of the contract, if they so desire. Appellants also informed that that stage asking for arbitration would be premature as the abitral tribunal would not be in a position to decide the issue at that stage. The appellants contended that if at all the respondents insisted to start the arbitration proceedings at that stage, the appellants would suggest the name of its nominee arbitrator and arbitration process could be started.

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h) The respondents vide letter dated 22.3.2004 to the chief engineer placed on record that the respondents had already invoked the arbitration proceedings in terms of clause 3.4.17(III) and requested the appellants to appoint its arbitrator as requested earlier. Both the parties thereafter nominated their arbitrator who in turn appointed the presiding arbitrator.

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i) Before the arbitral tribunal, the appellants raised a plea of limitation. The arbitral tribunal made an award on 7.3.2006 allowing the claim no.1A to 1E made by the respondents and rejected claim nos.2 and 3. The arbitral tribunal rendered the findings of fact in para-16 of the impugned award after considering clause 3.4.17 of the contract document that limitation would start only if the superintending engineer or the chief engineer gives a final decision. The arbitral tribunal have held that in respect of all the claims however there was no final decision communicated to the respondents either by the superintending engineer or by the chief engineer. On the contrary claims were stated to be under their consideration and even during the hearing of their arbitral proceedings claims were partially accepted by the appellants. The arbitral tribunal negated the general plea of limitation raised by the appellants having found no merits in the said contention.

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j) Being aggrieved by the said award, the appellants filed arbitration application (Misc.Application No.151/2007) under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliating Act, 1996 in the court of District Judge-2, Sangli. The respondents also filed separate arbitration application (Misc.Applicatin No.163/2006) under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliating Act, 1996 and impugned therein the rejection of two claims by the arbitral tribunal.

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k) By order and judgment dated 4.11.2008, the learned District Judge2, Sangli upheld and confirmed the award of claim nos.1A to 1E granted by the arbitral tribunal. The learned District Judge however set aside the claim nos.2 and 3. The learned District Judge while setting aside the claim nos.2 and 3 held that the respondents would be entitled to receive commensurate reliefs in respect of those two claims on the condition that the arbitral tribunal shall decide the quantum and corresponding concession period against claim nos.2 and 3 on the basis of joint survey conducted by the parties as on the record.

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l) Being aggrieved by the said order and judgment dated 4.11.2008,

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the appellants herein have filed these two appeals under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.

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3 Mr.Rajadhyaksha, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the claim nos.1A to 1E were barred by law of limitation. It is submitted that in respect of the claim no.1A the proposal of the respondents was accepted on 6.1.1998. The respondents had made claims to the executive engineer on 30.7.1999. The executive engineer had recommended approval of Rs.16 lacs. It is submitted that the respondents have invoked the arbitration clause only on 22.3.2004 when the arbitration proceedings

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commenced under section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and thus arbitration clause having invoked after three years from the date of commencement of cause of action, the claims were barred by law of limitation. The learned senior counsel submits that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not extend period of limitation. In respect of claim no.1A, the learned senior counsel submits that in view of clause 3.6.6 of the contract, in case of any dispute about suitable rate or price, at the first instance such suitable rates or price was to be agreed between the superintending engineer and the respondents for items not covered in the District schedule rate (DSR). It is submitted that in the event of any disagreement, the chief engineer only was empowered to fix such rates and price as in his opinion to be reasonable and proper. The learned senior counsel submits that there was no agreement about the suitable rates or price in respect of claim no.1A between the superintending engineer and the respondents. It is submitted that thus in case of such disagreement, the chief engineer only could fix rates and price as was reasonable and proper. The learned senior counsel submits that even though the arbitral tribunal came to the conclusion that the respondents-contractor was entitled to claim additional amount under clause 3.6.6, the arbitral tribunal itself could not have decided suitable rate or price for such additional work but ought to have directed the chief engineer to decide such rates in terms of clause 3.6.6 of the contract.

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4 The learned senior counsel submits that the contract being a lumpsum contract, the arbitral tribunal ought to have followed the provision of the contract and ought to have applied DSR rates or in the alternative ought to have referred the issue of price fixation to the engineer. The learned senior counsel submits that the learned arbitral tribunal however taken average for deciding the rates which was contrary to the terms of the contract.

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5 The learned senior counsel submits that though the plea of limitation was not specifically raised in the written statement in detail in view of section 3 of the Limitation Act, it was duty of the arbitral tribunal to consider such objection made across the bar and ought to have rejected time-barred claim. The learned senior counsel submits that there is no waiver of plea of limitation. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court in case of Ajab EnterprisesVs. Jayant Vegoiles and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1991 Bombay 35 and particularly para-7 thereof which thus reads:

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“ The next question that arises for determination is about the waiver of limitation by the defendants and estoppel. As a matter of fact, the plaintiffs have to again fall back only on the consent terms. On behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Shah very strenuously tried to contend that the plaintiffs have averred in the plaint that there is a waiver on the part of the defendants and as there is no written statement filed by the defendants, the said fact must be held to be

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established and it would not be permissible to hold that there is no waiver as such. The said contention also, really speaking is not totally correct. The plaintiffs in para 13 of the plaint have stated as under in this respect:-

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“The plaintiffs therefore submit that the claim of the plaintiffs is within time. The plaintiffs further submit that all objections by the defendants to the claim of the plaintiffs on the ground of limitation have been given up or are deemed to be given up by the defendants at the time of when the said consent terms were filed filed in the said appeal and when the defendants submitted to the said consent order dated 10.10.1986 in the said appeal no.838 of 1986. the plaintiffs further say that the said consent order dated 10.10.1986 has been further acted upon by the defendants by depositing the sum of Rs.20,000/- in this Hon'ble court on 25.11.1986 within the time extended by the said appeal order dated 10.10.1986.”

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The plaintiffs have also averred in the beginning of para 13 as under:

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“The plaintiffs submit that although the defendants urged the plea of limitation for the first time in the said appeal no.838 of 1986, the defendants have condoned and waived the said plea by admitting and acknowledging the liability to pay the aforesaid amount to the plaintiffs and by entering into consent terms and submitting to a consent order in the said appeal whereby time to file the suit by the plaintiffs pursuant to the order dated 30.7.1986 was extended by a period of 10 weeks from 10.10.1986.”

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Reading the said contention raised in para 13 of the plaint, it is clear that the said plea of waiver is based on the consent terms dated 10.10.1986 on the basis of which the consent order confirming the Original Court's order came to be passed. I have already reproduced the consent terms earlier and by no stretch of imagination it could be considered to be a waiver of the ground of limitation. By consent term only the order passed by the lower Court was agreed to be confirmed. Similarly, the time which was granted earlier by the Trial Court for the depositing of the amount specified in the order and filing of the suit was extended. This also by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a waiver of ground of limitation on the basis of which the suit for recovery of the debts due to the plaintiffs could be said to have been barred by

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limitation. Apart from this, there is catena of decision on the basis of which it could be said that there can be no waiver of ground of limitation even if it is assumed that in fact the said consent terms could be considered as waiver. Under section 3 of the Limitation Act it is the duty of the court to also consider as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not even if no such defence is taken by the defendants in a suit. Therefore, there cannot be such waiver against the provisions of limitation. Reliance could be placed on the ruling reported in AIR 1920 PC 139 which has been followed in (1968) AIR ILR 47 Pat. 262. In view of this, there also cannot be any estoppel which could be pleaded by the plaintiffs successfully. The defendants cannot be said to be estopped from pleading that the suit is barred by limitation when in fact the claim of the plaintiffs clearly appears to be barred by limitation taking into consideration Article 15 of the Limitation Act.”

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6 The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of this court in case of Nagorao Narayan Diwane Vs. Narayan Awadutrao Dighe reported in (2000) 2 Mh.L.J. 273 and in particularly paragraphs 26 and 27 in support of the plea that plea of limitation can be allowed to be raised by the court even at the second appeal stage. Para 26 and 27 of the said judgment thus read as

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under:

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“2 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that appellant is not permitted to raise a plea of limitation as in the lower courts no such plea was raised by the defendant. I do not think that there is any substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. In this connection learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1991 Kerala 83 and AIR 1991 Bombay 35. Section 34 of Limitation Act, 1963 makes it clear which reads as under:

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Bar of Limitation sub-section (i) – subject to the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

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27. In the case reported in AIR 1991 Kerala 83 the question that

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fell for consideration was the same as to bar of limitation to the suit filed by plaintiff. It was urged that defendant has not raised any contention or plea of limitation, High Court observed:

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“what section 3 of Limitation Act says is that every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as defence. It is the duty of plaintiff to convince the court that his suit is within time. If it is out of time and the plaintiff relies on any acknowledgment or acknowledgments in order to save limitation, he must plead that and prove if denied. The provision in section 3 is absolute and mandatory. The court can claim no choice except to obey it in full. It is the duty of the court to dismiss a suit which on the fact of it is barred by time even at the appellate stage despite the fact that issue was not at all raised.”

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7 The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of this court delivered on 6.2.2013 by the learned Single Judge in case of Godavari Marathwada Irrigation Development Corporation Vs. M/s Pawar and Company (Engineers and Contractors in arbitration appeal no.06 of 2011 in support of the plea that the correspondence exchanged between the parties do not extend the period of limitation. The reliance is placed on paragraphs 22 and 23 of the said judgment which thus read:

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“ 22. On the other hand the letter by no stretch of imagination indicates that it amounted to acknowledgment of time barred claim. The definition of promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law is mentioned in Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, it reads as under:

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“25. Agreement without consideration, void, uncles it is in writing and registered, or is a promise to compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law. An agreement made without consideration is void, unless

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(1) it is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force for the registration of 1*[documents], and is made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a, near relation to each other ; or unless

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(2) it is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do ; or unless

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(3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits. In any of these cases, such an agreement is a contract.”

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Subclause (3) of this Section is relevant for the preset discussion. It is clear from this definition that a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation would become agreement in the eye of Law only if such promise is made in writing, is signed by the debtor or his agent promising to pay whole or part of a debt. The letter, referred to above, is no doubt a writing. It is signed by an officer of the debtor, but there is no promise to pay any sum to the contractor. It only indicates that the Corporation would consider his case. Promise to give consideration to the demand is not promise to pay. After considering the pros and cons and merits of the demand, the Corporation could have either agreed to pay certain amount or would have refused to pay. This possibility is not ruled out by the letter. So, this letter is not a document which gets the case of the contractor back in limitation.

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After the above letter whatever happened between the officers of the Corporation and the Contractor was unfortunate. But these activities did not amount to an agreement to pay a time barred debt.

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23 The Supreme Court in the case of Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. D.D.A. ( AIR 1988 SC 1007) discussed such a question. The ratio laid down in this judgment is in my view applicable to this case and I place reliance on it to support my view. The Court said in paragraph No.4 as under:

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“The question is for the present case when did such dispute

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arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and, therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under Article 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under Section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on February 28, 1983 and there was nonpayment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, February 28, 1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders. But where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 or a reference under Section 20 of the Act.”

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8 As far as the claim nos.2 and 3 are concerned, the learned senior

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counsel submits that though these claims were rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the learned District Judge however while exercising the jurisdiction under section 34 of the Act has not only set aside those claims but has also held that the respondents therein would be legitimate to make those claims and has given certain directions to the arbitral tribunal to decide the rates. The learned senior counsel submits that under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitral tribunal cannot correct an award, but can only set aside the award or uphold the award. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this court delivered on 24.9.2012 in case of IMC Limited Vs.

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INEOS ABS (India) Limited and particularly in paragraphs-18 and 19 thereof. This court has applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Mcdermott Internationl Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd & Ors. [(2006) 11 SCC 181] and has held that the court has no power to grant any relief which has been rejected by the arbitrator under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court also held that the court has no power to enhance the claim which is rejected by the arbitral tribunal. This court has held that since the portion of the impugned award is conflict with public policy, the parties are free to begin the arbitration if it is desired.

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9 Mr. Apte, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents on

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the other hand submits that insofar as the claim nos.1A is concerned, there were meetings held between the parties in which the rates were discussed by and between the parties. The executive engineer of the appellant had recommended certain amount to his superior authority which was not agreed by the respondentcontractor. These documents were produced before the arbitral tribunal. After considering those documents, the arbitral tribunal had recorded findings that variations were approved by the executive engineer and his superior and during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, the appellants had agreed to pay and compensate the respondents by payment of Rs.27.4 lacs for additional work executed by them. It is held by the arbitral tribunal that the letter and spirit of the approval in writing have been approved which was a sufficient compliance of the

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requirement of clause 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 of the contract. It is not in dispute that both the parties held various meetings to discuss the rates in respect of the said claim and on the basis of such discussion the appellants had agreed to pay certain additional amount. In my view after considering the documents placed on record by both parties, the arbitral tribunal has recorded finding of facts that the compliance of the provisions of the contract was made by both the parties and thus no interference with such finding of fact was rightly made by the learned District Judge. In my view, the learned District Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that there was compliance of the provisions of the contract by both the parties and did not find any fault with the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal.

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10 Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, perusal of the record indicates that no plea of limitation was raised either in the written statement or in the application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned District Judge by the appellants. Though no such plea was raised, the arbitral tribunal appears to have permitted the appellants to raise such plea across the bar and after considering the provisions of the contract and the documents have rendered a finding that claims made by the respondentcontractor were pending for approval before the superintending engineer and thereafter before the chief engineer, there was no communication rejecting the claims made by the respondents by the chief engineer or by the superintending

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engineer and thus only if such decision could have been conveyed to the respondent-contractor, the cause of action would have commenced.

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11 On perusal of the correspondence exchanged between the parties, it is clear that by letter dated 17.10.2000, the respondents had confirmed the extra costs cut down by the appellants. The executive engineer hd informed the superintending engineer on 23.10.2000 regarding valuation of extra work amounting to Rs.91.83 lacs instead of claim of Rs.107 lacs as claimed by the respondents. The respondent-contractor was thereafter pursuing the said claim and was waiting for approval of the superintending engineer. By letter dated 15.2.2003, the superintending engineer informed the respondent-contractor that the legitimate claim of the respondents had already been submitted to the chief engineer vide letter dated 29.10.2002. Since the respondents did not receive any further communication about the outcome of such claim from the superintending engineer, the respondents approached the chief engineer in terms of clause 3.4.17 by letter dated 2.1.2004. Since there was no communication from the chief engineer regarding such claim, the respondents by letter dated 20.2.2004 invoked the arbitration clause in terms of clause 3.4.17. In response to the said letter, the chief engineer vide letter dated 3.3.2004 took a stand that the chief engineer has to follow certain departmental procedure and to seek approval of the competent authority before issuing any decision as per clause 3.4.17 which process for such approval was already started and same was being completed on top priority. The

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chief engineer further conveyed that on receipt of the said decision, the respondents could decide whether to go for an arbitration as per clause 3.4.17 of the contract, if respondents so desired. The chief engineer further conveyed that asking for arbitration would be premature as the arbitral tribunal would not be in a position to decide the issue at that stage. At the same time it was also communicated that if the respondents insisted for appointment of an arbitrator, the appellants would also suggest name of their arbitrator.

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12 On perusal of the correspondence exchanged between the parties on record, it is clear that the appellants had not communicated their decision in respect of the claim and had informed the respondents that the decision at the level of the chief engineer was pending. The respondents were also informed that the demand for an appointment of the arbitrator was premature. In view of these facts, in my view, the plea raised by the appellants that the claims made by the respondents were time barred is inconsistent and contrary to their own stand raised in their letter dated 3.3.2004. Respondents were asked by the appellants to wait till decision was taken by the chief engineer.

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13 It is not in dispute that there was no plea of limitation raised in the written statement or in the application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the appellants. In my view, the plea of limitation being a mixed question of fact and law has to be raised with details in the

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pleadings before the arbitral tribunal so as to give an opportunity to the other side to meet with such plea. If such plea of limitation would have beem raised by the appellants before the arbitral tribunal, the respondents could have even led oral evidence to prove that the claims were within time and were not barred by law of limitation.

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14 In my view, plea of limitation touches the issue of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and being a mixed question of facts and law has to be raised by the parties before the arbitral tribunal itself and cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

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15 Though the plea of limitation is raised by the appellants in the present proceedings, in my view since the said plea was not raised by the appellants in the application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as well as before the arbitral tribunal, the said plea cannot be allowed to be raised in the proceedings filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the first time. In my view, the judgment of this court relied upon by the learned senior counsel by which it was held that even at the second appeal stage plea of limitation can be raised is of no assistance to the appellants.

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16 I am therefore of the view that the appellants cannot be allowed to raise the issue of limitation for the first time in proceedings under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. My view is supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Babulal Agarwal reported in (2004) 2 SCC 712 and particularly para-12 thereof which thus reads:

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“12. In connection with this objectionn regarding limitation, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that no such plea was ever raised by the defendant nor any facts or reasons were indicated as to in what manner the suit was barred by limitation. No issue was framed on the question of limitation. That point was not raised even in the High Court nor in this Court too. It is only in the list of dates/synopsis it is vaguely stated that the suit was time barred. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant, however, relying upon section 3 of the Limitation Act submits that it was the duty of the court to see as to whether the suit was within limitation or not. A suit filed beyond limitation is liable to be dismissed even though limitation may not be set up as a defence. The above position as provided under the law cannot be disputed nor it has been disputed before us. But in all fairness it is always desirable that if the defendant would like to raise such an issue, he would better raise it in the pleadings so that the other party may also note the basis and the facts by reason of which suit is sought to be dismissed as barred by time. It is true that the Court may have to check at the threshold as to whether the suit is within limitation or not. There is always an office report on the limitation at the time of filing of the suit. But in case the court does not prima facie find it to be beyond time at that stage, it would not be necessary to record any such finding on the point much less a detailed one. In such a situation at least at the appellate stage, if not earlier, it would be desired of the defendant to raise such a plea regarding limitation. In the present case except for making a passing reference in the list of dates/synopsis no such ground or question has been raised or framed on the point of limitation. It is quite often that question of limitation involves question of facts as well which are supposed to be raised and indicated by the defendant. The objecting party is not supposed to conveniently keep quiet till the matter reaches the Apex Court and

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wake up in a non-serious manner to argue that the court failed in its duty in not dismissing the suit as barred by time. The trial court may not find the suit to be barred by time and proceed with the case but in that event the court would not be required to record any such finding unless any plea is raised by the defendant. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon a decision reported in MANU/SC/0260/1963:[1964 1 SCR 495], Ittavira Mathai V Varkey Varkey and anr. Wherein it has been held that if it is a mixed question of fact and law, a party would not be allowed to raise it later on, in case such an objection was not raised at the earliest. We, however, find that the period of limitation would be three years as the matter would be covered by Article 55 of the Limitation Act as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent. Article 55 reads as under:

¶148

Description of suit	Period of Limitation	Time from which period begins to run
55 for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not	three years	When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of
herein specially provided for		which the suit is, instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.

¶149

In the case in hand, as indicated above, the notice terminating the contract is dated 26.9.1988 saying that “we are going to vacate your above plinths by October 10, 1988”. The plaintiff replied to the notice saying that the defendant could not vacate the premises before 23.1.1990. However, the defendant vacated the premises on 10.10.1998. This is the date when the contract was broken and cause of action also accrued. The suit had been filed on 4.10.1991 i.e. within three years of vacating the premises. In view of the position indicated above, we do not find any merit in the argument raised on behalf of the appellant that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time. In the result, we find no substance in the appeal preferred by the Food Corporation of India.”

¶150

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¶151

23 ara.3-2009

¶152

17 The Supreme Court has held that the plea of limitation is mixed question of fact and law and parties cannot be allowed to raise it later on in case of such objection not having been raised earlier.

¶153

18 The Division bench of this court in case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Essar Shipping Ltd. reported in (2009) 3 R.A.J. 143 (Bom.) and particularly in para-5 thereof has held that if the negotiations between the parties was admittedly going on and issue was pending, only when the rejection was conveyed, cause of action would commence. It is not in dispute that the claims made by the respondents in compliance with the agreed procedure under clause 3.4.17 was pending for consideration before the superintending engineer and thereafter before the chief engineer. The appellants themselves had conveyed that the said claims were pending for consideration and request of the respondents to demand arbitration was premature. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is not possible to hold that claim of the respondents were barred by limitation.

¶154

19 As far as the claim nos.2 and 3 are concerned, it is not in dispute that these claims were rejected by the arbitral tribunal. However, the learned District Judge while setting aside these two claims has held that the respondentcontractor was entitled to be awarded these claims subject to arbitral tribunal deciding the rates and issued certain directions in that regard. In my view, the

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District Judge while deciding the application filed under 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could not have granted such claims which were rejected by the arbitral tribunal. This court in case of IMC Limited Vs. INEOS ABS (India) Limited (supra) after following the judgment of the Supreme Court has held that the court cannot correct an error of the arbitrator and cannot allow the claims rejected by the arbitrator in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

¶159

20 In my view, the decision of the learned District Judge in respect of claim nos.2 and 3 is thus patently illegal and is without jurisdiction. That part of the order passed by the learned District Judge thus deserves to be set aside. I therefore pass the following order:

¶160

i) The award passed by the arbitral tribunal in respect of claim nos.1A to 1E with interest thereon is upheld and confirmed;

¶161

ii) Award in respect of claim nos.2 and 3 and interest thereon

¶162

and cost is set aside and is remitted back to the same arbitral tribunal for decision afresh in accordance with law.

¶163

iii) It is made clear that if same arbitral tribunal is not available

¶164

for any reasons, parties would be at liberty to invoke the arbitration clause again. If the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the tribunal is requested to dispose of the proceedings expeditiously and preferably within a period of six months from the date of first

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meeting.

iv) It is made clear that the arbitral tribunal shall not be influenced by any reasons recorded by the earlier arbitral tribunal while rejecting the claim nos.2 and 3 and also observations made by the learned District Judge and shall decide the same in accordance with law.

¶170

22 Both appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No order as to

¶171

costs.

¶172

23 In view of disposal of these two appeals, the civil application does

¶173

not survive and the same is disposed of.

¶174

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The State of Maharashtra v. M/S. Ashoka Buildcon Ltd.

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The State of Maharashtra v. M/S. Ashoka Buildcon Ltd.

Case brief

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