Allowed

B Radhakrishnan and Anr. v. M/S Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr.

Bombay HC10 Apr 2012WP/37/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court held that an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act occurred in Chennai where the cheque was drawn and presentation occurred. Consequently, the Court ruled that only the Chennai Court had territorial jurisdiction, quashing the orders that issued process against the petitioners in the Ahmednagar cases.

What did the court decide?

The rule is made absolute, and the orders of issuance of process against the petitioners in all three cases are set aside.

B Radhakrishnan and Anr. Vs M/S Videocon Industries Ltd. and… — Cheque Dishonour | Bombay HC (2012)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD

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Criminal Writ Petition NO. 37 OF 2012

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Mr. B. Radhakrishnan, Age : Major, Occupation : Business, R/o M/s. Thai F.A.C. No. 59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 550 021 Tamil Nadu

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M/s Tai F.A.C., A proprietary firm carrying on business at No.59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 550 021, Tamil Nadu.

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Petitioners

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V E R S U S

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M/s. Videocon Indusries Ltd., A company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and having its office at, Gangapur Gin Compound, Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist : Ahmednagar, Maharashtra Through its Power of Attorney Holder, Shri Jayant Eknath Jadhav, Age : 46 years, Occupation : Service, Resident of Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar, Maharashtra.

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The State of Maharashtra.

Respondents

WITH

Criminal Writ Petition NO. 38 OF 2012

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Mr. B. Radhakrishnan, Age : Major, Occupation : Business, R/o M/s. Thai F.A.C. No. 59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 600 021 Tamil Nadu.

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M/s Tai F.A.C., A proprietary firm carrying on business at No.59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 600 021, Tamil Nadu.

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Petitioners

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V E R S U S

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M/s. Videocon Indusries Ltd., A company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and having its office at, Gangapur Gin Compound, Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist : Ahmednagar, Maharashtra Through its Power of Attorney Holder, Shri Jayant Eknath Jadhav, Age : 46 years, Occupation : Service, Resident of Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar, Maharashtra.

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The State of Maharashtra.

Respondents

WITH

Criminal Writ Petition NO. 40 OF 2012

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Mr. B. Radhakrishnan, Age : Major, Occupation : Business, R/o M/s. Thai F.A.C. No. 59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 580 021 Tamil Nadu.

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M/s Tai F.A.C., A proprietary firm carrying on business at No.59, Mannappa Mudali Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 580 021, Tamil Nadu.

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Petitioners

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V E R S U S

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M/s. Videocon Industries Ltd., A company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and having its office at, Gangapur Gin Compound, Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist : Ahmednagar, Maharashtra Through its Power of Attorney Holder, Shri Jayant Eknath Jadhav, Age : 46 years, Occupation : Service, Resident of Station Road, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar, Maharashtra.

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The State of Maharashtra.

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Respondents

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Mr. A.D. Ostwal with Mr. G.P. Shinde, Advocate for the petitioners

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Mr. L.B. Pallod, advocate for the respondent no.1.

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Mr. G.R. Ingole, APP for the respondent no.2 /State

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CORAM : A.V.NIRGUDE, J. DATE : 10th April, 2012

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent of the learned counsel for the parties, all three Criminal Writ Petitions are taken up for final disposal. 2. These Petitions are challenging the orders issuing process against the petitioners in all the cases for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The respondent no.1 is the complainant. The respondent no.1 alleged that it is a company having registered office at Aurangabad and branch offices at Chennai and Ahmednagar and elsewhere also. The complainant alleged that in order to pay price of goods sold and delivered to the petitioners, the petitioners handed over as many as six cheques to their representative at Chennai. The cheques were issued on a bank at Chennai. The respondent deposited these cheques in the account of the respondent company at Ahmednagar. All the cheques bounced. The respondent then sent a legal notice from Ahmednagar to the petitioners and demanded the amount and specifically mentioned that the petitioners should pay the amount at Ahmednagar. The petitioners sent a reply and denied liability etc and thus, did not pay the dues arising from the cheques in question. The respondent then filed three complaint in Ahmednagar criminal court. The only issue

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between the parties at this stage is that whether the respondent could have file the complaint in Ahmednagar Court?

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The acts committed by the parties for completing the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are: drawing of the cheque, presentation of such cheques to the bank, returning the cheques unpaid by the drawee bank, giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheques demanding the amount represented by the cheques and lastly the failure of the drawer to make the payment within 15 days from the receipt of the notice.

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In this case, out of the five acts mentioned above, the only one act was done at Ahmednagar and that was issuing of the notice. Still the respondent asserts that they would successfully maintain the cases at Ahmednagar. The respondent placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of "K. Bhaskaran V. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr" reported in "1999(7)SCC 510" to assert that out of the five acts mentioned above, even if one act is done at Ahmednagar, the respondent had an ample opportunity to initiate the criminal case in that Court. The Supreme Court in that judgment observed as follows :-

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“16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities, any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which

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any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act.”

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These words of the Supreme Court thus laid down a law on this subject. The Supreme Court has clearly mentioned that the complainant has wide scope in choosing his Forum. So far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, he is at liberty to choose any of the Courts in which any one of the acts mentioned above has been done. The Supreme Court suggested that the exercise of raising question of jurisdiction is thus almost futile. 6. But in the judgment of " M/s Harman Electronics (P) Ltd., & Anr. V/s M/s. National Panasonic India Ltd.," reported in "2009 All M.R. (Cri) 280(S.C.)", the Supreme Court considered the facts of that case and held that the Court in which the complaint was lodged was not competent to try the same. The fact situation in Harman's case is as under :

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The parties entered into business transaction. The accused was resident of Chandigarh. He carried out business in Chandigarh. He issued the cheque in question at Chandigarh. The complainant company also had a branch office at Chandigarh though its head office was at Delhi. The cheque was presented at Chandigarh (it was in dispute as to whether the cheque was sent for collection for Delhi), the cheque was dishonoured at Chandigarh, but the complainant issued a notice to the accused from New Delhi. He demanded that the payments should be made in Delhi. The notice was served on the accused at Chandigarh. The accused did not honour the demand and so the complaint was filed not at Chandigarh but at Delhi.

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The Supreme Court in this facts situation observed as follows :-

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"13. The complaint petitioner does not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi. It is absolutely silent in that regard. The facility for collection of the cheque admittedly was available at Chandigrh and the said facility was availed of. The certificate dated 24.06.2003, which was not produced before the learned Court taking cognizance, even if taken into consideration does not show that the cheque was presented at the Delhi Branch of the City Bank. We, therefore, have no other option but to presume that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh. Indisputably, the dishonour of the cheque was took place at Chandigarh. The only question, therefore, which arises for consideration is that as to whether sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

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It is one thing so say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the accused had committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in the main provision. The proviso appended thereto, however, imposes certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in the provisos (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended to be applied in favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would.

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Indisputably all statutes deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles therefor cannot be lost sight of. A Court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within his jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence and commission of a part of the offence. While issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and

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failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an completes. Giving of notice, therefore, cannot have any precedence over the service. It is only from that view of the matter in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. Vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., { (2001) 6 SCC 463} emphasis has been laid on service of notice.

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25.We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact a banking institution holding several cheques signed by the same borrower can not only present the cheque for its encashment at four different places but also may serve notices from four different place so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four different places. This only causes grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-a-vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

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The ratio of this judgment specially spelt out in paragraph nos. 24 and 25, in my view would apply to the facts of the present case. In this case, the petitioner/accused is resident of Chennai, carries on business at Chennai, he received the goods from respondent/complainant at Chennai, for payment of price of goods so received, he issued cheque at Chennai. The petitioner/accused had all throughout business contacts at Chennai branch of respondent/complainant, and therefore, the cheques in question, which he handed over to the respondent/complainant were made payable at Chennai. The cheques however were not deposited in the account of the respondent/complainant's account in a bank at Chennai. For the reasons best known to the respondent/complainant, the cheques were brought to Ahmednagar where the respondent/complainant has a branch office. Admittedly, this branch office had no concern with the business transaction

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that took place between the respondent/complainant and the petitioner/accused. Strangly, the respondent/complainant decided to deposit these cheques in their bank at Ahmednagar. (It is a Nationalised Bank having branches all over and the cheques deposited in one branch is payable at par at any branch). The cheques were admittedly sent for collection to Chennai where the accused bank account is situated. The bank of the accused issued memo of failure the cheques at Chennai. This memo then was received by the respondent/complainant's bank at Ahmedangar. Thereafter, the respondent/complainant instructed their Advocate of Ahmednagar to issue a demand notice. Such demand notice was issued from Ahmednagar, but it was served on the petitioner/accused at Chennai. The petitioners/accused sent a reply disputing liability from Chennai and thus, he did not pay the amount of the cheques in question. The only difference in facts of this case and the facts of Harman's case is that the cheques in question were deposited in respondent's bank account at Ahmednagar. However, this act on the part of a payee is not much of consequences because as said above, the cheques in questions were payable at par of any branch of the bank. These cheques thus could have been encashed at par at Chennai, or at Ahmednagar. What is necessary and crucial is the encashment of the cheques. If the cheque gets encashed, no offence is committed. If the payment is not made

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then the cause of action arises for giving notice of demand. From where the notice is issued action is not material, because the service of notice on the accused is crucial. If he does not pay within stipulated period despite of service then he commits the offence and thereafter a complaint could be lodged. At what place the petitioner could have made payment? Of course at Chennai as he had all infrastructure there. He was not under obligation to effect the payment at the place mentioned in the notice i.e. Ahmednagar. He could have made the payment obviously/preferably at his place of business. In any case he would have issued the cheque/s at Chennai. Issuing the cheque/s thus would amount to making payment. Failure to make payment was the incriminating circumstance which occurred at Chennai. It can easily be said that the respondent purposely deposited the cheques at Ahmednagar and arranged to issue notices from Ahmednagar. As said above they had no right to demand at Ahmednagar. This demand in the notice was clearly uncalled for over assertiveness. These rather unusual steps taken by the respondent thus appear intentional and designed to chose court/forum which would be very inconvenient to the petitioner and attending the cases at Ahmednagar would amount to harassment. If we read Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it clearly mentions that an offence should ordinarily be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it is committed.

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On facts situation discussed above, I have no doubt to hold that, the offence in question is committed at Chennai and no where else. There is no uncertainty about it. In this case, the offence is committed only at Chennai and therefore, the Court at Chennai alone would have territorial jurisdiction.

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The learned counsel for the respondent - complainant placed reliance on the judgment of Devision Bench of this Court in the case of "Preetha S. Babu, Ernakulum V/s Voltas Ltd., Chochin and another" reported in "2010(3) Mh.L.J. 234". The ratio of this judgment mainly flows from the facts of the case. Number of acts that completed commission of offence had taken place at Mumbai and so the Court held that the Court at Mumbai would have jurisdiction to try the offence.

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In the above discussion, I have purposely avoided phrase Cause of Action' because one has to go by the provisions of Section 177 Cr.P.C., which does not use the said phrase. It only uses a phrase Commission of offence'. As discussed above, the offence is complete only with the connectedness of a number of acts viz., drawing of the cheque, presentation of the cheque to the bank, returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If we carefully apply these steps to the facts of this

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case, it becomes clear that all the acts took place at Chennai and so the ratio of judgment of K. Bhaskar's is also being followed in this case. The Criminal Writ Petitions thus would succeed.

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Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses `c'. The order of issuance of process issued in all cases, stand set aside.

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( A.V.NIRGUDE, J. )

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SGA/

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B Radhakrishnan and Anr. v. M/S Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr.

Case brief

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B Radhakrishnan and Anr. v. M/S Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr.

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