regard to the scope of O.23, R. 3. If the stage after the sale of the hypotheca and before the passing of the decree under O. 34, R. 6 is a stage when one part of the plaintiff's claim, viz. that relating to the personal decree, is awaiting adjudication, it must prima facie be open to the parties to settle it between themselves and have a compromise decree in respect of it passed under O. 23, R. 3. In such a case, it is this compromise decree that will be the decree for further execution. There is no justification for saying that such a course is precluded by R. 4 of O. 23. Comparing the terms of O.23, R.3, with O.21, R. 2, one difference is noteworthy; under the former the Court may not merely order the agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, but also pass a decree in accordance therewith, whereas under O. 21, R. 2, the Court can only record the adjustment. A Court acting under O. 21, R. 2, cannot pass a fresh executable decree on the agreement of parties, but further proceedings, if any, in execution, as for instance, when part satisfaction has been recorded, can only take place on foot of the original decree. It will thus be clear that a settlement between the parties fixing the liability of the defendant under the ' personal relief' claim can appropriately be dealt with only under O. 23, R. 3 and not under O. 21, Rule 2. Again, Cl. 3 of O. 21, R. 2 provides that a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree. These words can relate only to an adjustment of the decree 'under execution' and not to an agreement in respect of a claim which remains to be investigated by the
