Allowed

1.STATE of Goa v. M/S. Reshma Constructions

Bombay HC12 Apr 2007ARA/13/2005

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court clarified the definition of 'Court' under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court held that the principal civil court of original jurisdiction is the District Court, excluding subordinate courts like the Civil Judge, Senior Division.

What did the court decide?

It is held that for petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the competent court is the District Court and not the Civil Judge, Senior Division.

1.STATE of Goa Vs M/S. Reshma Constructions — Arbitration | Bombay HC (2007)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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 ARBITRATION APPEAL NO.14 OF 2005

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 M/s.Fountain Head Developers. .. Appellants
 Vs.
 Mrs.Maria Arcangela Sequeira
 (since deceased through LRs)
 and Others .. Respondents.

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 None for the appellant.
 Mr.Jaydeep S.Deo for respondent nos.1A, 1B, 2, 4 & 5.

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 WITH
 ARBITRATION APPEAL NO.13 OF 2005

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 The State of Goa .. Appellant.
 Vs.
 M/s.Reshma Constructions .. Respondents.

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 Mr.R.D’souza with Mr.S.G.Kantak, Advocate General
 (State of Goa)
 None for the respondent.

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 WITH

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 APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.1068 OF 2005

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 Karad Nagar Parishad, Karad
 Through Chief Officer,
 Shri Ajit Maruti Jadhav,
 Age 43 years, Occ.Service,
 R/o.C/o.Nagar Parishad Office .. Appellant.
 Budhwar Peth, Karad

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Vs.

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 Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran
 Behind Pankaj Hotel, Shaniwar
 Peth, Karad .. Respondent.

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 Mr.A.A.Kumbhakoni with Mr.A.M.Kulkarni for the

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 applicant.
 Mrs.Neeta Karnik for the respondent.

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 WITH
 APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.826 OF 2006

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 Union of India
 Represented by The Chief
 Engineer (Navy), Naval Base
 Post, Kochi, Through
 Commander Works, Engineers
 (Navy) Vasco-da-Gama .. Appellant.
 Vs.
 M/s.Consolidated Construction
 Company, Patel’s Bunglow,
 Near Electricity Department,
 Dacorlim, Goa .. Respondent.
 None for the appellant.
 None for the respondent.
 WITH
 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.100 OF 2004

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 1. Shri Vishnu Arjun Sapar
 age 66 years, Occ.Professional
 Artist, residing at Gokul Niwas,
 560/22, First Floor, Solapur
 Housing Society, South Sadar
 Bazar, Solapur ..
 2. Shri Jagannath Arjun Sapar
 Occ.Professional Artist
 residing at Sakar Apartment,
 Hotgi Road, Solapur ..
 3. Shri Vyanktesh Vishnu Sapar
 Age 35 years, Occ.Professional
 Artist, Residing at C/o.Shri
 Vishnu Arjun Sapar, Gokul Niwas,
 560/22, First Floor, Solapur
 Housing Society, South Sadar
 Bazar, Solapur .. Applicants.

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Vs.

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 Shri Bharat Arjunrao Sapar
 Age 62 years, Occ.Professional
 Artist, Residing at Gokul
 Niwas, 560/22, Solapur Housing
 Society, South Sadar Bazar,
 Solapur .. Respondent.
 Mr.P.M.Arjunwadkar i/b Mr.G.S.Godbole for the
 petitioner.
 None for the respondent.

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 WITH
 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.121 OF 2004

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 Western Maharashtra
 Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
 having its office at Shinde
 Residency, R.S.No.286,
 Plot No.1, Near Ruilkar Colony,
 Plot No.194, Kolhapur 416 005 .. Applicant

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 Vs.
 Kolhapur Municipal Corporation
 having their office at Post
 Box No.33, Kolhapur 416 002. .. Respondent.

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 Mr.N.V.Walawalkar, senior advocate with Mr.Amit
 B.Borkar for the appellant.
 None for the respondent.

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 CORAM : DR.S.RADHAKRISHNAN, D.B.BHOSALE &
V.K.TAHILRAMANI, JJJ.
DATED : 12TH APRIL, 2007.

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JUDGEMENT(PER D.B.BHOSALE, J.)

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 1. In view of a divergence of the views in two
 judgments of learned Single Judges of this Court, the
 first being in Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. Vs.
Sharad Shetkari Soot Girni Niyamit 2000 (3) Mh.L.J.

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96 and the second in Omni Bus Industrial Development
Corporation of Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli
Ltd. Vs. M.N.Dhanani (Arbitration Appeal No.1 of
2000) decided on 17th December, 2002, a reference was
 made to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by another
 learned Single Judge in the appeal under Arbitration
 Act No.3 of 2004 (New Arbitration Appeal No.14 of
 2005) by the order dated 23rd March, 2004 alongwith a
 request to refer the matter to a larger bench. This
 Full Bench has been, accordingly, constituted by the
 Hon’ble the Chief Justice.

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 2. In Omni Bus Industrial Development

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Corporation, the learned Judge while dealing with the
 definition of "Court", under section 2(e) of the
 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the
 "Act of 1996"), has taken a view that the Court of
 Civil Judge, Senior Division, Goa being the Principal
 Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction, would be
 entitled to hear an appeal under section 34 of the
 Act of 1996, while in Cotton Corporation of India
Ltd., another learned Single Judge has taken a view
 that the District Judge of a District and not the
 Civil Judge, Senior Division, would be the Principal
 Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction. This view was
 taken with reference to the provisions of section 8
 of the Act of 1996. It is against this backdrop we

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 have formulated the following question of law that is
 required to be addressed by us in this judgment:

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. "Whether it is the Civil Judge, Senior
Division or the District Court which should be
construed as being the Principal Court of Original
Jurisdiction for the purpose of a petition under
section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996."

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 3. We do not propose to make a reference to the
 factual matrix in detail and deal with the merits of
 each case, in this group of matters. However, it
 would be approriate to state the background against
 which Arbitration Appeal No.14 of 2004 (i.e. Appeal
 under Arbitration Act No.3 of 2004) came to be filed
 in this Court. In this appeal the appellants had
 filed an application under section 9 of the Act of
 1996 in the Court of the First Additional District
 Judge, North Goa at Panaji. The First Additional
 District Judge had granted ad-interim relief in
 favour of the appellants and issued notice to the
 respondents. The respondents upon being served with
 a notice filed their reply, inter alia, objecting to
 the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble District Judge in
 view of the judgment of this Court in Omni Bus
Industrial Development Corporation. The learned
 Judge vide his judgment and order dated 9th March,

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 2004 upheld the objection and directed to return the
 application to the appellants for its presentation to
 an appropriate court having juridiction to entertain
 the said application. Feeling aggreived by the order
 of the District Court dated 9.3.2004 the appellants
 filed appeal before this Court in which the present
 reference was made by the learned Single Judge vide
 order dated 24.3.2004. It appears that in view of
 the reference made by the learned Single Judge in
 Appeal under Arbitration Act No.3 of 2004, in other
 matters also similar orders were passed by the
 learned Single Judges and that is how this group has
 been placed before us for answering the reference.

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 4. We have heard all the learned counsel

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 appearing for the parties only on the aforesaid
 question formulated by us. Almost all the learned
 counsel appearing in all the matters except Mr.Deo,
 learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents
 in Arbitration Appeal No.14 of 2005, addressed the
 Court in support of the view taken by the learned
 Single Judge in Cotton Corporation of India. The
 leading arguments were advanced by Mr.N.V.Walawalkar,
 learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
 in Civil Revision Application No.121 of 2004. We
 also heard Mr.Kumbhakoni, learned counsel for the
 appellant in Appeal from Order No.1068 of 2005 at

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 considerable length. Both the learned counsel took
 us through the judgments of the High Court in Cotton
Corporation of India Ltd. and Omni Bus Industrial
Development Corporation as also various provisions in
 the Act of 1996, the , Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869,
 Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act, 1965, Code of
 Civil Procedure as also the judgments of other High
 Courts. The judgment of other High Courts relied
 upon by the learned counsel are in M/s.I.T.I. Ltd.
Allahabad Vs. District Judge, Allahabad and Others
AIR 1988 Allahabad 313., Surat Singh Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and Anr. 2004 (1) R.A.J. 382 (HP),
Globsyn Technologies Ltd., Calcutta Vs. Eskaaycee
Infosys, Visakhapatnam 2004 (1) R.A.J. 671 (A.P.) as
also the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.B.P. &

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Company Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr.
2006(1) Bom.C.R. 585. In support of their
 contentions, both Mr.Walawalkar and Mr.Kumbhakoni
 strenuously urged, that the term "Court" under
 section 2(e) of the Act of 1996 will have to be
 construed to mean the District Court. They both
 rendered valuable assistance to us in deciding the
 issue involved in this reference. The reasons
 recorded by us in this judgment are based on their
 submissions and, therefore, we avoid to make specific
 reference to all the submissions advanced by them.
 The other learned counsel appearing in these matters

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 adopted the submissions advanced by Mr.Walawalkar and
 Mr.Kumbhakoni and in addition they also made brief
 submissions in support thereof. A reference to the
 submissions of Mr.Deo, will be made at appropriate
 stage in the judgment.

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 5. Section 34 (1) of the Act of 1996 provides a
 remedy to an aggrieved party to take recourse to a
 Court against an arbitral award. Under this
 provision such party can make an application for
 setting aside such award in accordance with
 sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) thereof.
 Sub-section (2) provides for the grounds on which the
 court can set aside an arbitral award, whereas
 sub-section (3) provides for limitation within which
 such application could be filed. The term "Court"
 used in section 34 and as defined under section 2(e),
 therefore, needs to be interpreted to find out
 whether it is the District Court, or the Civil Judge,
 Senior Division for the purpose of a petition under
 this section.

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 6. To address the question formulated by us and
 for better appreciation of contentions urged by the
 learned counsel for the parties it would advantageous
 to reproduce the provisions of section 2(e) of the
 Act of 1996 defining the term "Court", as also the

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 definition of "Court" under section 2(c) of
 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 (for short the
 "Act of 1940"). The definition of "Court" in the Act
 of 1996 reads thus:

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 "2(e) "Court" means the principal Civil
 Court of original jurisdiction in a district,
 and includes the High Court in exercise of
 its ordinary original civil jurisdiction,
 having jurisdiction to decide the questions
 forming the subject-matter of the arbitration
 if the same had been the subject-matter of a
 suit, but does not include any civil court to
 a grade inferior to such principal Civil
 Court, or any Court of Small Causes".

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 . The definition of "Court" in the Act of 1940

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 reads thus:

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 "2(c) "Court" means a Civil Court having
 jurisdiction to decide the questions forming
 the subject-matter of the reference if the
 same had been the subject-matter of a suit,
 but does not, except for the purpose of
 arbitration proceedings under section 21
 include a Small Cause Court."

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 7. The definition of "Court" under section 2(e)

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 could be divided in the following manner: (i) The
 principal Civil Courtof original jurisdiction in a
 district, and includesthe High Court in exercise of

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 its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; (ii)
 having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming
 the subject-matter of the Arbitrationif the same had

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 been the subject-matter of a suit; and (iii) it does
not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to
 such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small

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 Causes. A careful glance at the definition of
 "Court" in the Act of 1996 and at the definition of
 "Court", occurring in the Act of 1940 would
 manifestly and very clearly demonstrate that in the
 Act of 1940 "Court" was defined to mean any Civil
 Court having Jurisdiction to decide the questions
 forming the subject-matter of the reference as if the
 same had been the subject-matter of a suit. While
 under the Act of 1996, the meaning of the term
 "Court", was, however, narrowed down and confined to
 be "the principal Civil Court of the original
 jurisdiction in a District" and includes the High
 Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil
 jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the
 subject matter of the arbitration if the same had
 been the subject matter of a suit, but does not
 include any civil court of a grade inferior to such
 Principal Civil Court or any Small Causes Court. The
 term "Court" has been used in sections 9, 14(2), 34,
 36, 37, 39, 42 and 43 of part one of the Act of 1996.

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 8. The Act of 1996 is essentially based on
 United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law
 (for short "UNCITRAL") and various International
 Commercial Arbitration concepts. UNCITRAL Model Laws
 on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted
 in 1985 with a view to bring uniformity of the law of

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 arbitral procedures and the specific needs of
 International Commercial Arbitration practise. The
 Law of Arbitration in India was earlier substantially
 contained in three enactments, namely, the Act of
 1940, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1973
 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)
 Act, 1961. It was widely felt that the Act of 1940,
 which contains the General Law of Arbitration, has
 become outdated and it is against this backdrop and
 in view of UNCITRAL Model Laws, the Act of 1996 was
 introduced. This Act repeals the Act of 1940. One
 of the objectives of enactment of the Act of 1996 was
 to minimise supervisory role of the courts in an
 arbitral process. This object will have to be borne
 in mind while interpreting the term "Court" under
 section 2(e) of the Act of 1996. A reference to the
 statement of objects and reasons in the process of
 interpretation of a Statute is held permissible by a
 catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. Even the
 preamble of a Statute is equally an important part
 and can be pressed into service to aid the
 construction thereof.

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 9. It is against this backdrop, we now proceed
 to consider the definition of "Court" in the Act of
 1996. The intendment of the Parliament is clearly
 reflected in the language employed in defining the

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 term "Court" under section 2(e) of the Act of 1996.
 The Parliament intended to have only one Court as the
 forum for arbitral proceedings, that is, the
 "principal court of original jurisdiction" in a
 district. In this group of matters we are not
 concerned with inclusive definition as occurring in
 section 2(e) of the Act of 1996 relating to the
 jurisdiction of the High Court also being the court
 of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The
 principal court of original jurisdiction in a
 district does not include any civil court to a grade
 inferior to such principal civil court or any court
 of Small Causes. In other words, it categorically
 excludes civil courts of "a grade inferior to such
 principal civil court". The Parliament has, clearly,
 narrowed down the definition of the term "Court".
 The only condition contemplated in the definition of
 "Court" is that it should have jurisdiction to decide
 the questions forming the subject matter of the
 arbitration if the same had been the subject matter
 of a suit. In our opinion, the definition of "Court"
 in the Act of 1996, does not contemplate that such
 court should have jurisdiction over the subject
 matter of the dispute. What it means is the
 jurisdiction to decide "the question forming the
 subject matter of the arbitration" if the same had
 been the subject-matter of a suit. The pecuniary

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 jurisdiction of a court, therefore, has no
 significance for the purposes of the Act of 1996.
 The Court, however, must have a territorial
 jurisdiction. The expression "subject matter of the
 arbitration", therefore, cannot be read to mean a
 court where the suit can be filed in respect of that
 cause of action and would, therefore, cover all the
 provisions from sections 16 to 20 of the Code of
 Civil Procedure. In other words, the pecuniary
 jurisdiction is no longer a material for deciding the
 jurisdiction of a court being the principal court of
 original jurisdiction for the purpose of a petition
 under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
 Act.

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 10. That takes us to consider what the expression
 "the principal civil court of original jurisdiction
 in a district" exactly means, whether it is the Civil
 Judge, Senior Division or the District Court. By
 using the words "means" and "includes" and the
 expression "does not include" as occurring in the
 definition of "Court" it makes the intendment of the
 Parliament clear. By using these words the
 Parliament has made the meaning of the term "Court"
 explicitly clear. The Supreme Court in (P)
Kasilingam and Others Vs. P.S.G. College of
Technology and Others AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1395

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 while dealing with the similar definition and word

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 ‘means’ occurring therein observed that "the use of
 word ‘means’ indicates that definition is a hard and
 fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned

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 to the expression that is put down in the
 definition". Similarly the Supreme Court in

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Mahalaxmi Oil Mills Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
1989 Supreme Court 335, while interpreting the
 definition of "Tobacco", wherein all the aforesaid
 three words/expressions, as occurring in the
 definition of "Court" are there, has stated the word
 "means" is a term of restriction, while the word
 "includes" is a term of enlargement. When both these
 words are used together to define a thing, the
 intendment of the Parliament is to supply restricted
 meaning to the terms. The expression "does not

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include any civil courts of a grade inferior to such
 principal civil court or any court of small causes"
 occurring in section 2(e), further restricts the
 meaning of the term "Court" defined therein. It
 clearly excludes the courts inferior to the principal
 court of original jurisdiction. The Allahabad High
 Court in M/s.I.T.I. Ltd. (supra) had an occasion to
 deal with the very same section and while so doing
 has taken a similar view.

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 11. We would also like to consider two more

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 expression/words in the definition of "Court", that
 is, "grade inferior" and "principal". According to
 Black’s Law Dictionary "inferior" means "one who, in
 relation to another, has less power and is below him;
 one who is bound to obey another". The word "grade"
 used in section 2(e) is suggestive of status and
 importance and it does not refer to a class or
 particular class. Keeping a literal meaning of the
 words "inferior" and "grade" in view, if the
 expression "but does not include any civil court of a
 grade inferior to such principal court" is read, in
 our opinion, it means no court subordinate/inferior
 to the principal civil court of ordinary original
 civil jurisdiction in a district, would be covered
 within the meaning of "Court" as defined under
 section 2(e) of the Act of 1996. Similarly, insofar
 as the word "principal" is concerned, according to
 Black’s Law Dictionary, it means chief; leading;
 most important or considerable; primary; original,
 Highest in rank, authority, character, importance or
 degree. In Law Lexicon the word "principal" is
 described to mean highest in rank, authority,
 character, importance, or degree; most considerable
 or important; chief; main (as) the principal
 officers of a government, the principal men of a
 State; the principal productions of a country,
 principal arguments in a case. The word "principal",

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 thus, clearly indicate only one court being the
 highest in rank or chief.

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 12. In our opinion, a plain and literal reading
 of all the aforesaid words/expressions/terms employed
 in section 2(e) clearly demonstrate the exact meaning
 of the term "court". It means the district court is
 the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in
 a district and not a civil court of a grade inferior
 to such principal civil court. The court of Civil
 Judge, Senior Division may also be a civil court of
 original jurisdiction, but in any case it could not
 be termed as the principal civil court of original
 jurisdiction in a district.

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 13. The Parliament, in the Act of 1996, has
 intendedly used the term "Court" and not the

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 "District Court" as we usually find in various other
 enactments. From a plain and literal reading of the
 definition of "Court" it is apparent that the
 definition is inclusive. It specifically includes
 the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original
 civil jurisdiction. Under section 3(17) of the
 General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 3(15) of the
 Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 the term "District
 Judge" means the Judge of a principal civil court of
 original jurisdiction. The High Court in exercise of

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 its ordinary original jurisdiction is not included in
 these definitions. To get out of these definitions
 and with a view to include the High Court, the
 Parliament in the Act of 1996 has not used the term
 "District Court" and has used only "Court" to mean
 and include the High Court in exercise of its
 ordinary original jurisdiction.

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 14. Thus, from the language of the definition of
 "Court" under section 2(e) of the Act of 1996 the
 Parliament apparently intended to confer the power on
 the highest judicial authority in a district. It
 must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the
 object to be achieved while framing the definition of
 the term "Court". Besides, it intended to minimise
 supervisory role of the courts in arbitral process,
 it also intended to add the greatest credibility to
 this process. We find support for the view in the
 judgments of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
 while dealing with the provisions of section 11 of
 the Act of 1996, in S.B.P. & Company (supra) in
 paragraph 12 of the judgment has observed that "the
 court is defined in the Act to be the principal Civil
 Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district
 and includes the High Court in exercise of its
 ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The principal
 Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction is

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 normally the District Court. The High Courts in
 India exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction
 are not too many. So in most of the States the
 concerned court would be the District Court".
 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Garhwal Mandal Vs.
M/s.Krishna Travel Agency in Special Leave Petition
(Civil) Nos.18344 of 2004 decided on 24.1.2007, while
 dealing with the question whether it could entertain
 all objections to the award and holding that even if
 the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by High
 Court or the Supreme Court, the principal civil court
 of original jurisdiction remains the same as
 contemplated under section 2(e) of the Act of 1996,
 has observed that the principal civil court of
 original jurisdiction remains the "District Court"
 even if the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by
 the High Court. It is thus clear that the
 Legislature clearly circumscribed and specifically
 narrowed down the definition of "Court" to mean only
 the Court of principal civil original jurisdiction in
 a district and it is only the court of "District
 Judge" in a district which is such a "Court" of
 principal civil jurisdiction.

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 15. We further find support for the view from the
 language of the provisions contained in section 8 of
 the Act of 1996. This provision confers power to

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 refer the parties to arbitration where there is an
 arbitration agreement. Such power, under this
 provisions, can be exercised by a judicial authority.
 The Parliament in this section has not used the term
 "Court". The expression "Judicial Authority" is a
 term of wider import and does not restrict itself to
 the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in
 a district. It has intendedly used different terms,
 namely, "Court" and "Judicial Authority" as we find
 in different sections such as section 8 and 34 of the
 Act of 1996. The Parliament intended to confer
 powers on all the judicial authorities to refer the
 parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration
 agreement and not only on the principal civil court
 of original jurisdiction. The judicial authority, as
 has been rightly observed by the learned Single Judge
 in Cotton Corporation of India (supra) means "all
 authorities which can be described as judicial
 authorities, in the sense that they administer
 justice." And in that context it was held that Civil
 Judge, Senior Division can be described as "judicial
 authority" for the purpose of Arbitration Act. In
 this judgment the learned Single Judge has, however,
 clearly observed that the Court, as defined under
 section 2(e) for the purpose of the Act of 1996 means
 the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in
 a district and according to the provisions of the

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 Bombay Civil Courts Act, the District Court in each
 district is the principal civil court of original
 jurisdiction and not the Civil Judge, Senior
 Division. We are in agreement with the conclusion
 drawn by the learned Single Judge. However, we would
 like to take survey of the provisions contained in
 the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869.

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 16. Section 5 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act
 defines "District Judges" to mean that there shall be
 in each district a District Court presided over by a
 Judge to be called the District Judge. Section 7
 says that the District Court shall be the principal
 court of original civil jurisdiction in the district,
 within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Section 9 confers the powers on the District Judge of
 general control over all civil courts and their
 establishment within the District and its inspection.
 Section 16 deals with original jurisdiction of
 "Additional District Judge". Under this provision
 the District Judge has a power to refer to any
Additional District Judge subordinate to him any
original suits and proceedings of a civil nature,
 applications or reference under the special Acts and
 miscellaneous applications. The Additional District
 Judge shall have jurisdiction to try such suits and
 to dispose of such applications or references. It

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 further provides that where the Additional District

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 Judge decrees and orders in such cases are
 appealable, the appeal shall lie to the District
 Judge or to the High Court according to amount or
 value of the subject matter. Section 16, thus, says
 that the District Judge can refer any original suit
 and proceedings of civil nature to any Additional
 District Judge, who shall have jurisdiction to try
 such suit. Section 21 provides for number of
 subordinate civil courts. It says that there shall
 be in each district so many Civil Courts subordinate
 to the District Court as the State Government shall
 from time to time direct, Provided that for special
 reasons it shall be lawful for the State Government
 at any time to close temporarily any such Subordinate
 Court. Section 24 provides for Classes of the Civil
 Judges. It says the Civil Judge shall be of two
 classes. The jurisdiction of a Civil Judge, Senior
 Division extends to all the original suits and
 proceedings of a civil nature. The other class is of
 Civil Judge, Junior Division to which we are not
 concerned in the present case. It is thus clear that
 the Civil Judge, Senior Division is inferior in grade
 to the District Court and is subject to its
 administration control. Even the provisions of Goa,
 Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act, 1965 are similar and
 they do not make any material distinction so as to

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 have any effect on the view taken by us in these
 matters. From bare perusal of all the relevant
 provisions in these two statutes, we have no
 hesitation to hold that the District Judge in a
 district alone is the principal court of original
 civil jurisdiction and does not include any other
 Judge subordinate to him.

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 17. We would also now like to consider the
 provisions of section 37 and more particularly
 sub-section (3) thereof which provides that no second
 appeal shall lie from the order passed in the appeal
 under this section, but nothing in this section shall
 affect or take away any right to appeal in the
 Supreme Court. Mr.Deo, learned counsel submitted
 that the question of filing second appeal would arise
 only if a Civil Judge, Senior Division is held to be
 the principal civil court of original civil
 jurisdiction in a district and not otherwise. In
 other words, he submitted that it is only against the
 order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, the appeal
 contemplated under section 37 would be maintainable
 before the District Court and against that order the
 second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil
 Procedure would lie to the High Court and that is the
 reason why the Legislature has specifically curtailed
 the remedy of second appeal. We are unable to agree

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 with this submission made by Mr.Deo for more than one
 reason. It is true that section 37(3) expressly
 prohibits a "second appeal" from an order passed in
 appeal under section 37(1) and 37(2) except an appeal
 to the Supreme Court. However, there is clear
 indication inherent in sub-section (3) that the
 expression "second appeal" does not mean an appeal
 under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with
 section 39(2) of the Act of 1940 in Union of India
Vs. Mohinder Supply Company AIR 1962 Supreme Court
256. The provisions contained in section 39(2) in
 the Act of 1940 are pari-materia with section 37(3)
 of the Act of 1996. The Supreme Court in this
 judgment has held that the expression "second appeal"
 used in section 39(2) of the Act of 1940 means a
 further appeal from an order passed in appeal under
 section 39(1) and not an appeal under section 100 of
 the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has
 further proceeded to observe that if the expression
 ‘second appeal’ includes an appeal under the Letters
 Patent, it would be impossible to hold that
 notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal
 under the Letters Patent from an order passed in
 appeal under sub-section(1), of section 39 of the Act
 of 1940, is competent. It is thus clear that no
 Letters Patent appeal would lie from an order in an

¶103

:24:

¶104

 appeal filed under section 37 of the Act of 1996.
 The second appeal contemplated under sub-section (3)
 of section 37 of the Act of 1996 means an appeal
 under the Letters Patent and since there is expressed
 prohibition to file such appeal no letters patent
 would lie. Merely because the expression "second
 appeal" is used in this section does not mean an
 appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil
 Procedure. This provision is consistent with the
 statement of objects and reasons which clearly states
 that enactment of the Act of 1996 is to minimise

¶105

 supervisory role of the courts in an arbitral
 process. The submission of Mr.Deo, therefore, must
 be rejected. His further submissions that the later
 part of the definition of "Court" under section 2(e)
 would be material and controlling factor for the
 definition, which is to the effect that having
 jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the
 subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had
 been subject matter of a suit also deserves to be
 rejected in view of the discussion in the foregoing
 paragraphs of the judgment.

¶106

 18. We, accordingly, answer the question
 formulated by us in paragraph 2 of the judgment as
 follows: The principal civil court of original
 jurisdiction in a district for the purpose of a

¶107

:25:

¶108

 petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 is a
 District Court and does not include any other court
 inferior to the District Court.

¶109

 19. We direct to place all the matters before the
 appropriate learned Single Judges for their disposal
 in the light of this judgment disposing of the
 references.

¶110

 (DR.S.RADHAKRISHNAN, J.)

¶111

 (D.B.BHOSALE, J.)

¶112

 (SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI, J.)

¶113

:26:

¶114

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

¶115

ARBITRATION APPEAL NOS.14 OF 2005 & 13/2005, WITH APPEAL FROM
ORDER NOS.1068 OF 2005 & 826/2006, WITH CIVIL REVISION
APPLICATION NOS.100 OF 2004 & 121/2004.

¶116

 Date of Judgment:
 12th APRIL,2007.

¶117

For approval and signature

¶118

THE HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE S.RADHAKRISHNAN.

¶119

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.B.BHOSALE.

¶120

THE HON’BLE SMT.JUSTICE V.K.TAHILRAMANI.

¶121

 1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be
 allowed to see the judgment?

¶122

 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?

¶123

 3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the
 fair copy of the Judgment?

¶124

 4. Whether this case involves a substantial
 question of law as to the interpretation of
 the Constitution of India, 1950 or
 any Order made thereunder?

¶125

 5. Whether it is to be circulated
 to the Civil Judges?

¶126

 6. Whether the case involves an important
 question of law and whether a copy of
 the judgment should be sent to Nagpur
 Aurangabad or Goa offices?

1.STATE of Goa v. M/S. Reshma Constructions

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1.STATE of Goa v. M/S. Reshma Constructions

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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