matter raised at the appellate stage, the appellate
Court is normally expected to be slow in interfering
with the exercise of discretion solely on the ground
that if it had considered the matter at the trial
stage, it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If
the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court
reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate Court would have taken a different view may
not justify interference with the trial Court’s
discretion. If it appears to the appellate Court that
in exercising its discretion, the trial Court has acted
unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant
facts, then it is open for the appellate Court to
interfere with the trial Court’s order. Having
examined the impugned order challenged in this order,
we are of the considered view that the view taken by
the learned Single Judge is a reasonable and possible
view. The discretion has been properly exercised. In
that view of the matter, no interference is called for.