Partly allowed

The State of Maharashtra v. Subhash Aba Bodke and Another.

Bombay HC15 Oct 2004APEAL/1074/1988

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against acquittal in a dowry death case where a woman and her child drowned in a well. The High Court found the trial court's acquittal perverse, holding the husband guilty under Sections 306 and 498A IPC. It confirmed the acquittal of the mother-in-law and the husband's acquittal under Section 304B. The husband was sentenced to imprisonment for abetment to suicide and cruelty.

What did the court decide?

Acquittal of accused 1 under Sections 306 and 498A IPC set aside. Sentenced to RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.5,000 for Section 306; RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.5,000 for Section 498A; sentences to run concurrently. Compensation of Rs.3,000 to be paid to PW-1 from fine. Acquittals of accused 2 and of accused 1 under Section 304B confirmed.

The State of Maharashtra Vs Subhash Aba Bodke and Another. — Dowry and Cruelty | Bombay HC (2004)

¶1

AJN

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

¶3

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

¶4

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1074 OF 1988

¶5

State of Maharashtra	) ... Appellant (Orig. Complainant)
Versus
1. Subhash Aba Bodke	)
age 28 years,	)
Occ. Agriculturist.	)
2. Kisabai Aba Bodke	)
age 45 years,
Occ. house-hold duties	)
both residing at Ashta, Tal. )
Islampur, Dist. Sangli.	) ... Respondents
	(Orig. Accused 1 & 2)

¶6

Ms. A.S. Pai, A.P.P. for the appellant-State.

¶7

Mr. N.V. Pradhan with Smt. S.D. Khot for respondents.

¶8

CORAM: SMT. RANJANA DESAI & A.S. OKA, JJ.

¶9

DATED: 15TH OCTOBER, 2004.

¶10

ORAL JUDGMENT :- ( Per Smt. Ranjana Desai, J. )

¶11

1.	The	respond	ents	(for	convenience,	"accused	1 and 2
respectively")	were	tried	in	t	he Court	of	Sessions Judge,
Sangli	at Sangli	in	Sess	ions	Case No.	128 of	1987 for the
offences	punishable		under	secti	ons 498A,	304B	and 306
read with	section	34	of	the	Indian	Penal	Code (for short,
"the	IPC").	By	the	judgm	ent and	order	dated 11/8/1988,

¶12

: 2 :

¶13

the	learned Se	ssions Judge acquitted	the	accused.	Being
aggrieved	by the	said judgment and	order	dated 1	1/8/1988,
the State	of Maharashtra has pref	erred this appeal
against ac	quittal.
2.	At the	trial, the case of the	prosec	ution was	as
follows.	The	complainant PW-1 Keshav	is	the residen	t of
Khandoba	chivadi from	Village Bhilavadi.	He	is the	father
of	deceased Bharati.	He has two sons	viz.	Prakash	and
Gajanan.	He	has two more daughters	viz.	Jijabai	and
Shalan.	Shalan	and Jijabai are m	arried.	Accused	1
Subhash	is the	husband of the decease	d.	Their	marriage
took	place on 29/	5/1985. Accused 2	Kisabai	is the	mother
of	accused 1	Subhash. After m	arriage,	the	deceased

¶14

started residing at the house of the accused, which is at

¶15

a distance of about two miles from Ashta.

¶16

3.	It	is t	he	ca	se		of	the	prose	cution tha	t	after
marriage,		the dec	eased		ha	d	come	to	her	father’s	place	in
Jestha	month.	She	ha	d		also	com	e t	o her	father’s	house	in
the	month	of	Asha	dha		and	then	at	the	time of		Divali
festival.		At	the	tim	e		of	Divali	festival	, she s	tayed	at
her	father’s	house	for	a	b	out	7	days	and	then she	went	to
the	house	of acc	used	1.			At	that	time,	her parents		gave
her	one	saree	and	one		bl	ouse.	Th	ey had	also give	n	her

¶17

: 3 :

¶18

some	sweetmeats.		Thereaf	ter,	she	ag	ain came	to		her
father’s	house	in	the	month	of	Pou	shya. At	that		time,
she	stayed there	for	about	one	month.		As per	the	case	of
the	prosecution,	at		that	time,	the	deceased	told		her
father	that	accused	2	Kisab	ai had		told her	that		the
clothes	which	were	given	to	her	at	the time	of		Divali
festival	were	of	inferior	qua	lity	and	the s	weetmeats		were

¶19

given to the cattle by her. She also told him that

¶20

accused 2 Kisabai was harassing her.

¶21

4.	The	decease	d	came	to	the		house o	f				her	fathe	r		during
Padva	festival.	S	he	stayed		there		for abo	u	t			8	to		10	days.
At that	time,	the		decease	d	told		her f	at	h	e	r		that		accused	1
used	to	tell	her	that	sh	e sh	o	uld bring				mo	ney	f	r	om	her
father	as	the		other		wives		were		br	i	ng	ing	fr	o	m	their
fathers.	She	also		told	him	tha	t	her	h	u	s	ba	nd	had		told	her
to	bring	Rs	.5,00	0/- f	rom	her		father		a	n	d		had		th	reatened
her	that in	cas	e	she	doe	s no	t	bring		th	e		a	mount,		he	would
not	maintain	her	.		The	n he	r	father					P	W-1		Com	plainant
Keshav	collecte	d		Rs.5,000/-		an	d	handed				ov	er	t	h	e	said
amount	to	the		deceased		for		giving it					to	a	c	cused	1.
Thereafter,	he		sent	back		the	d	eceased to				t	he	h	o	use	of
accused	1	with	his	son	P	W-2	P	rakash.		In			the		m	onth	of
Bhadrapada,	the	dece	ased	was		brough	t	to	h	is			h	ouse		by	PW-1
Keshav	for	del	ivery	.	He	had		sent his				s	on	PW-2			Prakash

¶22

: 4 :

¶23

and	his	wife	to	the	accused’s	house	for		that	purpose.
She	delivered	a	male	chil	d. For	the	nam	ing	ceremony	of
the	child,	accu	sed	2	Ki	sabai	a	nd	her	elder
daughter-in	-law	had	g	one	to the	house	of	P	W-1	Keshav.
They	had	broug	ht	one	gold locket.		The	child	was	named
Pramod.		Accu	sed	2	Kisabai	and	her	elde	r daug	hter-in-law
then	went	back	to	their	house.	At	the	time	of	Akshaya
Trutiya,	the		father-	in-law	of the	dece	ased	came	to	the

¶24

house of PW-1 Keshav and took the deceased and her child

¶25

to his house.

¶26

5.	At	the	time of	Pancha	mi festi	val, the		deceased	and
the child	were	brought	to his	hous	e by	PW-1	K	eshav.	They
stayed	there for	abou	t 8 to	10	days.	At	that	time,	the
deceased	told	him	that	her	monther-i	n-law	was		harassing
her and	that	they	should m	ake	some	ornaments		for her	son.
Thereupon,	PW-1	Ke	shav told	her	that	it	was	not	possible
for	him to	ma	ke the	orname	nts as	his	f	inancial	condition
was	poor.	Th	en PW-1	Keshav	purcha	sed so	me	clothes	for

¶27

his grandson and sent the deceased and her child with his

¶28

son PW-2 Prakash to the house of the accused.

¶29

6.	Abo	ut 2	to	3	weeks	there	after, PW-1	Keshav	had	gone
to	the	house	of	the	accus	ed.	At that	time,	the	deceased
told	him	that	her	hus	band	was	insisting for	a	locket	of

¶30

: 5 :

¶31

half	tola	of	gold	for	her	child	and a	locket	of two	tolas
of	gold	for	himself.		The	dec	eased also	told	him that	her
husband		had	to	ld	her	that	in case	these	ornaments	were
not	given	to	him,	he	woul	d no	t maintain	her.	PW-1	Keshav
told	the		deceased	that	he	was	not in	a pos	ition to	give

¶32

these ornaments on account of his poor financial

¶33

condition. He then returned to his house.

¶34

7.	Accordin	g	to the		prosecuti	on, abo	ut 10	to	12	days
thereafter	at	about		12	noon,	the	father	of	accused	1
Subhash	had	been	to	the	hous	e of	PW-1	Keshav	with	some
other	persons.		He	told	him	that	the	deceased	had	gone
away	with	her	child.		It	appears	that	the	fath	er-in-law
of	the	deceased	had		filed	a miss	ing	complaint	at	about

¶35

7.00 p.m. at the Ashta police station, which is at

¶36

Ex-22.

¶37

8.		PW-1	Keshav	th	en	went	to	Ashta	police	station	on
20/9/1987		at	about	10.00	a.m.		At	that	time,	one	person
came	to	the	police	station		and	told	him	that	his	daughter
Bharati		was	seen	lying	in	a	well.	He	then	lodged	a

¶38

complaint at the Ashta police station at about 10.00

¶39

a.m., which is at Ex-16.

¶40

Thereafter, PW-5 PHC Phadatare, who was attached to

¶41

: 6 :

¶42

Ashta	police	station	registered	Crime	No.96/1987	for	the
offences	punishable	under	sections	498A,	304B	and	306

¶43

read with section 34 of the IPC. On the basis of this

¶44

complaint, the investigation began.

¶45

PW-6 PSI Shinde visited the place of incident and body of deceased Bharati was taken out from the well. Her seven month old child was found tied to her body by a chaddar. The deceased and her child were then separated. Inquest panchnama was drawn. After investigation was

¶46

completed, the accused came to be charged as aforesaid.

¶47

11.		In s	upport	of		its	case,	the	prosecuti	on	examined
seven		witnesses.		The			prosecuti	on story	basica	lly	rests
on	the	evidence	of		th	e	father	of the	decease	d.	PW-1
Keshav,		who	had	lodg	ed		the	complaint.	The		prosecution
also		examined	PW-2	P	rak	ash,	the	brother	of	the	deceased.
Two		neighbours	PW-3	Pr	at	ap	and	PW-4	Vijaykumar	wer	e also
examined		to	prove	the		pr	osecution	case	of	cruelty	and
harassment,		meted	out		to		the	deceased.	The	details	of

¶48

investigation were given by PW-5 PHC Phadatare, PW-6 PHC

¶49

Shinde and PW-7 PSI Sayyed.

¶50

12.	The	defence	of	the	accused	was	one	of	denial.	The
accused	filed	their	w	ritten	stateme	nt,	which		is at	Ex-26.

¶51

: 7 :

¶52

According to	the accused, on the day of	the	incident,
deceased Bharati	and her mother-in-law w	ere cooking	food
in the kitchen.	At that time, the child	of Bharati	was
crying. Therefor	e, accused 2 Kisabai told	her to	feed
the child first.	Hence, she went to the	padavi with	her
child. Accused	2 Kisabai continued cooking	the food	in
the kitchen.	She thought that Bharati must	be in	the
padavi feeding the	child. Within a short	time, accused	1
Subhash came to	the house. He then	asked accused	2
Kisabai about	Bharati. She told him th	at Bharati	is
sitting in the	padavi with her son. Accu	sed 1 did	not
see Bharati in	the padavi. So he	enquired in	the
neighbouring areas.	However, he could	not find	Bharati.
Thereafter, the	father of accused 1 came	to the	house.
He was also	informed about the fact that	Bharati was	not
found in the house.	He told them that he	would go to	the
house of Bhar	ati at Ashta to see whether	she had	gone
there. He	then went to the house of	Bharati’s	sister
but, Bharati was n	ot there. Then he went	to the house	of
PW-1 Keshav	to make enquiry. However,	Bharati was	not
found there also	. Then he went to Pad	valwadi to	the
house of the	other sister of Bharati.	There	also,
Bharati was	not found. Thereafter, father	of	Bharati
informed the police.	In short, the accused	claimed to	be

¶53

innocent. The accused, however, led no defence evidence.

¶54

: 8 :

¶55

13.	After	perusing the evidence on record,	the	trial
court	came to	the conclusion that the pros	ecution had	not
proved its the accused.	case beyond rea Hence, this ap	sonable doubt and, acquitted peal.
14.	We	have heard, at considerable length,	the	learned
counsel app have gone t	earing for both hrough the recor	sides and with their help, we d of the case.
15.	Ms.	Pai, learned A.P.P. appearing	for the	State
contended	that	the trial court erred in	acquitting	the
accused.		She submitted that the prosecut	ion has	clearly
made	out	a case under sections 498A, 304B	and 306	read
with	section	34 of the IPC. She submit	ted that	the
evidence	of	PW-1 Keshav inspires confidence.	It	is
clearly	establis	hed by the evidence of PW-1	Keshav	that
the	deceased	was ill-treated in the house	of the	accused
and	several	demands were made on her to	bring	gold,
money,	lockets,	etc. from her father.	The	learned
counsel	contended	that the trial court has	not	considered
the	effect	of presumptions under sections 113A	and B	of
the	Evidence	Act. Relying on the judgment	of the	Kerala
High	Court	in State of Kerala v. Rajayya	n and	others,
1995	Cri.L.J.	989 , the learned A.P.P.	contended	that

¶56

: 9 :

¶57

the cruel	ty towards the wife or harassm	ent of a	lady	are
generally	committed in the privacy of	residential		homes
and in	secrecy and, therefore, independ	ent and		direct
evidence	may not be easily produced	before th	e	court.
She submit	ted that the evidence in this	case	may	be
appreciated	keeping this aspect in mind	. Re	lying	on
State of	Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ra	m and oth	ers,	AIR
1996 SC	67 , she submitted that even if	the d	emand	for
money or	property is made long after	the marri	age,	the
same cou	ld constitute dowry. The lea	rned A.P.P.		also
urged that	an offence under section 306	of the	IPC	is
made ou	t as there is clear indication	in the	evidenc	e of
PW-1 Kes	hav that on his last visit to	the house	of	the
deceased	she had told him that her	husband	was	insisting
for a	locket of half tola of gold for	the child	and	a
locket of	two tolas of gold for himself	and that	he	had
also told	her that in case these ornam	ents were	not	given
to him,	he would not maintain her.	The	incident	in

¶58

question took place about 10 to 12 days thereafter.

¶59

Therefore, section 306 of the IPC is clearly attracted.

¶60

16.	The	learned	A.P.P	.	also	contended	that the	trial
court	has	recorded	the	concess	ion ma	de by	the	learned
public	prosec	utor that	off	ence	under	section	304B is	not
made	out.	She	drew	our	attention	to the	judgment	of

¶61

: 10 :

¶62

division bench	of	this	court to	which one of us (Smt.
Ranjana Desai,	J.)	is	a party,	in Criminal Appeal No.363
of 1988 deliv	ered	on	6th &	7th July, 2004 , where a
similar conces	sion	was	made by	the public prosecutor and
this court	has	obse	rved that	when the evidence was led
before the	trial	cou	rt, the tria	l court ought to have
considered the	entir	e	evidence on	record and not simply
gone by	the	con	cession made	by the public prosecutor
unless the	learned	j	udge himself	was satisfied that the
concessions	made	by	the pu	blic prosecutor were correctly
made. She	sub	mitted	that the	concession in this case is
wrongly made	and,	the	refore, this	court should ignore the
concession and		convict	the	accused. She further
submitted that	c	ase	against accus	ed 1 and 2 is clearly
made out from	the	e	vidence of	PW-1 Keshav and, therefore,

¶63

order of acquittal be set aside and the accused be

¶64

punished in accordance with law.

¶65

17.		Mr.		Pradhan,	the le	arned		counsel appear	ing for	the
accused		reminded		us	that we	are		dealing with	an	appeal
against		acquittal.		He	contended	th	at	unless	the j	udgment
of	the	trial	court	is	perverse,	it		is not	permissible	for
us	to	interfere	with	it.	In	th	is	connection,	the	learned
counsel		relied u	pon	the	judgments	of		the Supreme	Court	in
Sheo		Swarup	and	others,	v.	King		Emperor, AIR	1934	Privy

¶66

: 11 :

¶67

Council	227	(2), Surajpal	S	ingh and	others v.	The	State,
AIR	(39)	1952 SC	52,	Shivaji	Sahabrao Bobade	and	another
v.	State	of Maharash	tra,	(1973)	2 SCC 793, G	anesh	Bhavan
Patel	and	another v.		State of	Maharashtra, AIR	1979	, SC
135,	Ajit	Singh Thak	ur	Singh and	another v.	State	of
Gujarat,	(19	81) 1	SCC	495, C	handra Kanta De	bnath	and
others	v.	State of	Tripu	ra, (1986)	1 SCC 549,	Tota	Singh
and	another	v. State	of	Punjab,	AIR 1987 SC	1083,	Ramesh

¶68

Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 and

¶69

Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2000) 9 SCC 455 .

¶70

18.	Mr.Pradhan further submitted	that the evid	ence	of
PW-1	Keshav does not give any	particulars	about	the
alleged	ill-treatment or harassment	or wilful	conduc	t of
the	accused, which was likely to	drive Bharati	to	commit
suicide.	He submitted that his	evidence	is	totally
vague.	It is not stated by PW-1	Keshav that	the	deceased
was	beaten up and that she was	not given	food	and
clothes.	He submitted that there	is no perce	ptible	nexus
between	the alleged cruelty and	the death of		Bharati.
The	learned counsel urged that	the prosecution		should
have	examined independent witnesse	s like some		neighbours
of	the complainant to establish its	case of crue	lty.	He
submitted	that though their state	ments were		recorded,
they	were not examined by the	prosecution which	casts	a

¶71

: 12 :

¶72

shadow of doubt on the prosecution story.	He		further
submitted that the other evidence i.e. the	evide	nce	of
the son and the neighbours of the complainant	is	also	not
sufficient to establish the allegations of	cruelty		and
has been rightly discarded by the trial	court.		The
learned counsel heavily relied on the judgm	ents	of	the
Supreme Court in Satvir Singh and others v.		State	of
Punjab and another, (2001) 8 SCC 633	and	Mun	geshwar
Prasad Chaurasia and another v. State of	Bihar,		(2002)
10 SCC 163 . The learned counsel also	placed	reliance	on
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanju	alias		Sanjay
Singh Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh,	(2002)	5	SCC
371 to contend that offence under section 306	is	also	not
made out because there is a gap between the	last	visit	of
the father to the house of the deceased and	the	date	of
the incident within which the lady could	have		thought
over and reflected. The suicide by the	deceased	was	not
proximate to the last incident. Hence,	the		accused
cannot be convicted under section 306 of the	IPC.		The
learned counsel further contended that, in	any	event,	no

¶73

offence is made out against accused 2 Kisabai and, hence,

¶74

her acquittal should be confirmed.

¶75

We are mindful of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal against acquittal. We have gone through

¶76

: 13 :

¶77

several	judg	ments to which	our attention has been	drawn
by Mr.		Pradhan, the learne	d counsel for the accused.	We
will	only	refer to three	of them because the p	rinciples
are	well	settled. In	Sheo Swarup’s case (supra)	the
Privy	Council	has held	that "in an appeal	against
acquittal,	the	High Court	has full power to review	at
large	the	evidence upon	which the order of acquittal	was
founded,	and	to reach	the conclusion that upon	that
evidence	the	order of acqu	ittal should be reversed.	No
limitation	should	be placed	upon that power, unless it	be
found	express	ly stated in	the Code. But in ex	ercising
the	power	conferred by the	Code and before reaching	its
conclusions	u	pon fact, the	High Court should and	will
always	give	proper weig	ht and consideration to	such
matters	as	(1) the views	of the trial judge as to	the
credibility	of	the witnesses	; (2) the presumption	of
innocence	in	favour of	the accused, a pres	umption
certainly	not	weakened by	the fact that he has	been
acquitted	at	his trial;	(3) the right of the accused	to
the	benefit	of any doubt	and (4) the slowness of	an
appellate	co	urt in disturbing	a finding of fact	arrived

¶78

at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses".

¶79

In subsequent judgments, the Supreme Court has

¶80

: 14 :

¶81

consistently	follo	wed the above	observat	ions	of	the	Privy
Council.	In	Ganesh Bhavan	Patel’	s c	ase	(supra) ,	the
Supreme	Cou	rt has further	added	t	hat	"where	two
reasonable	con	clusions can be	drawn	on	the	evidence	on
record,	the	High Court should,	as	a	matter	of	judicial
caution,	refrain	from interfering	with		the	order	of
acquittal	recor	ded by the court	below.		In	other	words,
if	the	main grounds on which	the	court	belo	w has	based
its	order	acquitting the ac	cused,	are		reasonable	and
plausible, dislodged o disturb the a	and r demolished, cquittal".	cannot be the High Court should not	entire	ly	an	d	effectively
21.	In	Tota Singh’s case	(supra) ,	the	Su	preme C	ourt has
further	added	that "where two	views	are	pos	sible on	an
appraisal	of	the evidence adduced	in	the	case	and	the
court	below	has taken a view	which	is	a	plausible	one,
the	appellate	court cannot	legally	inte	rfere	with	an
order	of	acquittal even if it	is o	f	the	opinion	that the

¶82

view taken by the court below on its consideration of the

¶83

evidence is erroneous."

¶84

Keeping these principles in mind, we will appreciate

¶85

the evidence.

¶86

: 15 :

¶87

23. Before we deal with the		eviden	ce, we	must refer	to
the inquest panchnama and pos	t	mortem	notes.	The	inquest
panchanama (Ex-8) notes that	d	eceased	Pramod	was	tied
with a chadar to the stomach		of	deceased	Bharati;	that
the police took out both the		dead	bodies	from the	well
and that both the bodies		were	separat	ed. It	is
specifically stated that blood had		come	out	from the	left
eye to left ear of deceased		Bharati	due	to nibbling	by
aquatic animals but, there were		no	other	suspected	marks.
Her private parts were found to		be	intact.	It is	further
noted that the eyebrows of both		eye	s of	deceased	Pramod
were nibbled by aquatic animals		but,	there	were no	other
suspected marks on his perso	n.		Post-morte	m notes	of
deceased Bharati are at Ex-12.			The	post-mortem	notes
mention that there was small		abra	sion on	left	eyebrow.
It is clearly stated that there		wer	e no	other	surface
injuries. The cause of death		is	given as	death due	to
asphyxia due to drowning.		Post-m	ortem	notes of	deceased
Pramod are at Ex-13. It i	s		stated	that there	was
abrasion over both eyebrows.		It	is	clarified that	there

¶88

were no other injuries on his person. The cause of death

¶89

is given as death due to asphyxia due to drowning.

¶90

24.	The	important	witness of	the	prosecution	is	PW-1
Keshav.	He	has	stated that	the	marriage of	the	deceased

¶91

: 16 :

¶92

and	accused	1	took place in	Jestha	month. About	7	days
after	marriage,	as	per custom	the	deceased was	brought	to
his	house	by	his son PW-2	Pra	kash. She staye	d there	for
about	5	to	7 days. She	then	went back to the	house	of
her	husband.	S	he had again	come	to his house	in A	shadha.
She	was	sent	back about 5	to	7 days thereafter.	She	was
again	brought	to	his house by	his	son PW-2 Prak	ash at	the
time	of	Div	ali festival.	She	stayed at his	house	for
about	7	days	i.e. till t	he fe	stival was over.	Then	she
was	sent	to	the house of	accus	ed 1 with his	son	PW-2
Prakash.		At	that time, h	e had	given a saree,	a	blouse
and	sweet	meats	to the deceas	ed.	Then she was	brought	to
his	house	in	the month of	Poush	ya. At that	time,	she
stayed	in	his	house for abou	t one	month. At	that	time,
the	deceased	told	him that	her	mother-in-law had	told	her
that	the	clothes	which were	given	to her at the	time	of
Divali	were		of inferior	quali	ty and the	swe	etmeats
brought	by	her	were given by	her	to the cattle.	She	also
told	him	tha	t her mother-in	-law	was harassing he	r.	PW-1
Keshav	to	ld	her that eve	rything	will be alr	ight	after

¶93

some days. Then, she was sent back to the house of her

¶94

husband after Poushya month.

¶95

Then his son went to the house of the accused and brought the deceased to his house for Padva festival. At

¶96

: 17 :

¶97

that		time,		she	stayed	at	his		h	ouse	for	about 8 to	10
days.		A	t	that	time,	she	told			him	that	her husband	used
to sa	y	that		she	should	bring		mo	ne	y	from	her father	as the
other		wive	s	were	bringin	g	from			their	fath	ers. She	told
him		that		her	husband	had	to	ld		h	er to	bring	Rs.5,000/-
from		her		father.	She	als	o	to	ld		him	that her husba	nd had
told		her		that in	case	she	doe	s		not	brin	g the amount,	he
would		not		maint	ain her.		Acc	or	di	ng	to	PW-1 Keshav,	he
then		collected		Rs.5,0	00/-	and	ha	nd	ed		over	the said	amount
to		the d	e	ceased	for giv	ing	it	to		a	ccused	1 and then	she

¶98

was sent back to the house of accused 1 with his son PW-2

¶99

Prakash.

¶100

26.	Thereafter,	in	the		month	of	Bh	adrapada,	the	deceased
was	brought	back	to	his	hous	e for	deli	very,	by his	son
PW-2	Prakash	and	his	wife.		She	then	delivered	a	male
child.	For	the	naming	ce	remony	of	the	child,	accused	2
Kisabai	and	her	elder	da	ughter-i	n-law	had	come	to	his
house.	They	had	broug	ht	one	gold	locket	.	The child	was
named	Pramod.		Acc	used	2	and	her	elder	daugh	ter-in-law
went	back to	the	ir	house.		At	the	time	of	Akshaya
Trutiya,	the	father	-in-law		of	the	dec	eased	took	the
deceased	and	her	child	to	his	house.		At the	time	of
Panchami	festival,	t	he	dece	ased	and		her	child	were
brought	back	to	his	house	by	PW-1	Kes	hav.	They	stayed

¶101

: 18 :

¶102

there for	about	8 to	10 days.		At	that	time,	she	told	him
that her		mother-in-	law was	hara	ssing	her	and	th	at	he
should	make	some	ornaments	for	her	child.		Ther	eupon,	he
told her		that it	was not	possible	for	him	to	ma	ke	the
ornaments	as	his	financial co	ndition	was	poor.		He		then
purchased	som	e cloth	es for	his	grandson	and		handed		them
over to	the	deceased.	Then,	he	sent	the	de	ceased	and	her

¶103

son with his son PW-2 Prakash to the house of the

¶104

accused.

¶105

27.	A	bout	2	to 3 weeks	thereafter, he	had gone to	the
house	of		the	accused. At	that time,	the deceased	told
him	that	her	hus	band was insist	ing for a	locket of	half
tola	of	gold	for	her son and	a locket of	two tolas	of
gold	for	himself.		She also tol	d him that	her husband	had
told	her	that	in	case these	ornaments were	not given	to
him,	he	would	not	maintain her.	He told	her that he	was
not	in	a	positio	n to give	those	ornaments as	his
financial	c	ondition	w	as poor.	Ten	to twelve	days
thereafter,	at	abo	ut	12 noon, the	father of	accused 1	had
come	to	his h	ouse	along with s	ome other p	ersons. He	told
PW-1	Kes	hav	that	the deceased	had gone	away with	her
child.		He	then	searched for	the decease	d and her	child.
As	they	could	not	be found, he	went to th	e house of	the
accused		and	inform	ed them acco	rdingly. O	n the next	day,

¶106

: 19 :

¶107

at	about	10.00	a.m.,		he had	gone	to	Ashta	police	station.
At	that	time,	one		person came	to	the	police	station	and
told	him	that		the	deceased	was	seen	lying in	a	well.

¶108

Thereafter, his complaint was recorded by the police,

¶109

which is at Ex-16.

¶110

28.		Evidence of this	witness indica	tes that	the
ill-treatment		and harassment to	which the	deceased	was
subjected		was a persistent and	gradual process.	In	the
month	of	Poushya the decea	sed was taunted	for	having
brought		clothes and sweetmeats	of inferior	quality	from
her	fathe	r. At the time	of Padva festival,	she tol	d her
father	that	her husband used	to ask her to	bring	money
from	her	father like other	women and	that he	had
threatened		her that if she d	id not bring	Rs.5000/-	he
would		not maintain her.	Somehow, he	collected	Rs.5000/-
and	gave	her. In Bhadrapada,	she delivered	a child.	At
the	time	of Panchami festival,	she told her	father	that
her	mother-	in-law was harassing	her and	that	some
ornaments	sho	uld be made for her	son. On	account of	poor
financial	con	dition, he could not	fulfill the	demand.	He
could	only	manage to give her	some clothes	for the	child.
About	2	to 3 weeks thereafter,	he had gone	to her	house.
At tha	t t	ime, she told him	that her husban	d was	insisting
that	she	should bring a locket	of half tola	of gold	for

¶111

: 20 :

¶112

the child and a locket of two tolas of gold for himself and he had threatened that if these lockets were not given, he would not maintain her. This demand also cold not be fulfilled by him as he had no money. About 10 to 12 days thereafter, Bharati committed suicide.

¶113

29. The	evidence of PW-1 Keshav	is	straight	forward	and
clear. It	reflects honesty. In	unambi	guous	and	clear
words he	has narrated the events,	by	referrin	g to	months
by their Marath	i names. The narration	is	con	sistent.	No
omissions have	been brought out in his	evide	nce.	We	have
carefully perused	Ex-19, the FIR lodged	by	him	and	we
find that	it is consistent with his	ev	idence	in	the
court. His	evidence establishes a c	ase	of	mental	torture
and harassment.	It is definitely a	form	of	cruelty	and
it led	Bharati to commit suicide.	Whi	le	accepting	the
evidence of this	witness, we must keep	in	mind	that	he is
a 70 years	old rustic person. He	is a	far	mer stayi	ng in
a small village.	He had lost his	daughter	an	d seven	year
old grandson.	Despite his bereavemen	t he	has	not	lost
his balance.	He has not involved	the	fathe	r-in-law	and
the other	members of the accused’s	family.		This	conduct
assures us	of the truthfulness of	his	evide	nce.	His
evidence provides	a chain of events	which	led	to	the
suicide. His	evidence is natural and		free	from	any

¶114

: 21 :

¶115

exaggeration. There is no challenge to his evidence in

¶116

the cross-examination. We have no hesitation in relying

¶117

on this witness.

¶118

30. We ar	e no	t	impresse	d by Mr.		Pradhan’s argument	that
because PW-1	Kes	hav	ha	s not given		instances of	any
beating or	depriv	ing	the	deceased of	f	ood and clothes	by
the accused,	the	re	is	no harassment		or ill-treatment	or
cruelty.	Harass	ment	or	ill-treatment or		cruelty has	no
particular form.		It	differs	from case to		case. In	our
opinion, taunting	the		decease	d, asking her		to bring	money
and gold from she does not bring it she w certainly amount to mental	he ould not cruelty.	r be mai	father ntained,	and threatening would		her that in	case
31. That	takes	us	to	the evidence of		PW-2 Prakash,	who
is the	brother	of	dece	ased Bharati.	P	W-2 Prakash	has
also given	the	same	seq	uence of events		which his	father
PW-1 Keshav		had	given	except that he		has only	narrated
the facts	upto	Panc	hami	festival. We d	o	not find	any
inconsistency in		the	evide	nce of PW-1	K	eshav and	PW-2
Prakash so	far	as	these	instances are		concerned. In	the
cross-examination	of	this	wi	tness, it is		suggested to	him
that he ha	d no	t	stated	in his statemen	t	that at the	time

¶119

: 22 :

¶120

of	Panchami festival when his sister had come to	their
house,	she had told them that her mother-in-law	was
harassing	her. His attention was not drawn sp	ecifically
to	his statement. However, PW-6 PHC Shinde, who	has
recorded	the statement of PW-2 Prakash has clearly	stated
in	his cross-examination that in his statement	PW-2
Prakash	has stated that at the time of Panchami	festival
when	his sister had come to their house, she had	told
them	that her mother-in-law was harassing her.	Another
omission	is sought to be proved in the cross-ex	amination
of	PW-6 Shinde that this witness has not stated in	his
statement	that at the time when deceased Bharati had	come
to h	er father’s house for delivery, she had told him	that
her	husband and mother-in-law were harassing her	on
account	of money and ornaments. However, the	attention
of	this witness has not been drawn to the	alleged
omission	in his police statement. Even assuming	that
PW-2	Prakash has omitted to say the above facts, we	do
not	attach much significance to this fact.	These
omissions	do not appear to us to be major omissions.	It
is	true that PW-2 Prakash has not deposed about the	last
incident.	But, on that count, we are not inclined	to
discard	his evidence as regards events upto the	Panchami
festival evidence	as there is no inconsistency between and his father’s evidence about those	his events.

¶121

: 23 :

¶122

It is also significant to note that there is no challenge

¶123

to his evidence in the cross-examination.

¶124

32.		That	tak	es us	to the evidence of two witnesses,	who
are		neighbour	s.	One	is PW-4 Vijaykumar, who has	stated
that		whenever	the	deceas	ed used to come to the house	of
her		father,	she	used t	o meet him. She had told him	that
her		husband	used	to	demand money and ornaments and	that
her		mother	-in-law	was	harassing her. PW-3 Pratap	Shinde
is	also	a	neighbo	ur.	He has stated that the deceased	had
come		to t	he	house	of her father in the month of	Poushya.
At	that	time,	sh	e had	told him that her mother-in-law	had
told		her	that	she	was given clothes of inferior	quality
and		that	her	mother-	in-law was harassing her. He	has
further		stated		that she	had come again at the time	of
Padva		festival	.	At	that time, she had told him that	her
husband		had	de	manded	money. Thereafter, she had come	to
the	house	of	her	father	at the time of delivery. At	that
time,	she	had	tol	d him	that she was harassed in the	house
of	th	e acc	used.	She	had also told him that her	husband
and		mother-i	n-law	used	to harass her on account of	money
and		ornaments.		It	appears that this witness had	not
stated		in	the	police	statement that at the time when	the
deceased		had	come	to	her father’s house for delivery,	she
had		told	him	th	at her husband and mother-in-law	were

¶125

: 24 :

¶126

harassing her on account of money and ornaments. But

¶127

this omission does not discredit his evidence.

¶128

33.	It was	argued very veheme	ntly by			Mr.	Pra	dhan that
the pro	secution	ought to have	examined			some	ne	ighbours of
the	accused	to prove its	case			of har	ass	ment or
ill-treatment.	It	is common	knowledge			that		in such
matters	the	neighbours of th	e accused			are		weary of
getting	involved.	It is diffic	ult to			get	suc	h witnesses.
We,	therefore,	do not feel that	this is			a lacuna		in the
prosecution	case.	In such case	s, it		is	possible		that a
woman	may	confide certain facts	in		th	e neighb	ours	of her
father,	who	may be known to	her fr	o	m	her c	hild	hood and
they	may per	haps depose about	those f	a	cts	. T	he	learned
judge,	however,	has discarded	their			evidence		on the
ground	that	their evidence	does n	o	t	inspire		confidence
because	these	witnesses have	no	p	ers	onal k	now	ledge about
the	ill-treatment.	We wonder	what			personal		knowledge

¶129

these witnesses can have because, such ill-treatment is

¶130

always meted out in the house of the husband of a woman.

¶131

34.	But	in	our	o	pinion, ev	en	if	this	evide	nce is
obliterated	and	kept		out	of	co	nsideratio	n,	the	conviction
could	be	based	on	the	evidence	of	PW-1	Keshav	and	PW-2
Prakash.	At	some		stage,	pointing	out	to	the	panchn	ama of

¶132

: 25 :

¶133

scene of offence, it was suggested that it could be a case of accident as the well was not constructed. We have no hesitation in rejecting this submission. The deceased had tied her seven month old child with a chaddar to herself. Accidents do not happen in this manner. The fact that deceased Bharati was found in the

¶134

well with her child tied to her body indicates that it is

¶135

a clear case of suicide.

¶136

35.	I	t is n	ow necessary to	see	wha	t	offe	n	c	e	the	accused
could	be	said	to have committed.		It	is	true				that	all
along	it	is stated	by PW-1 Ke	shav	and		PW-2			Prak	ash	that
the	deceased	used	to tell them	tha	t	h	er		m	other-	in-law	was
harassing		her.	But, the pr	oximate	ca	us	e f	o	r		the	suicide
appears	to	be the	demand made	by a	ccused		1	f	o	r	a	locket
of	half	tola of	gold for the	child	and		a l	o	c	ket	of	two
tolas	of	gold	for himself and	the	thr	eat	s gi	v	e	n	by	her
husband	th	at if	these lockets	were	not		given,			he		would
not	maintain	her.	This demand	was	made		about			10	to	12
days	prior	to h	er death. Thi	s was	to	ld	to			PW-1		Keshav
when	he	had gone	to her just 1	0 to	12		days			prior	to	the
incident.		Prior to	that, even	when	the		decea	s	e	d	had	come
to	the	house	of her father	for	Padva		festiv	a	l,		she	had
told	him	that her	husband used	to	ask		her		to		bring	money
from	her	father	as the other	wives	we	re				bringi	ng	from

¶137

: 26 :

¶138

their	fathers.		She	told	him t	hat	her	husband had	told
her to	bring	Rs.5,0	00/-	from	her	father	or	else, he	would
not	maintain	her.		PW-1	Keshav	had	to	somehow	arrange
Rs.5,000/-	and	give	it	to	the d	eceased	for	giving it	to
accused	1.		Therefore	, i	n our	opi	nion,	though it	appears
that the	mother-in	-law	i.e.		accused	2	Kisa	bai was on	and
off	passing		cert	ain	com	ments,		that	would
not	amount	to	cruelty	wi	thin the	m	eaning	of section	498A
of t	he IPC.		The	wilful	conduct,	wh	ich	drove Bharati	to

¶139

commit suicide could only be attributed to accused 1

¶140

Subhash.

¶141

36.	Now	the questio	n is	wh	at offen	ces acc	used	1 co	uld be
said	to	have committ	ed.	It	is tr	ue, as	cont	ended	by the
learned	A.P	.P., that	after	the	amendm	ent of		the	Dowry
Prohibition	Act	there i	s ad	dition	of	the	words	"any	time"
before	the	expression	"aft	er	the	m	arriage"	in	the
definition		of the	term	"do	wry" a	nd, the	refore,	even	if
the de	mand	is made	long	after	the	marriage	the	same	could
constitute		dowry, if	it	has	conne	ction	with	the	marriage
of	the	parties.	Theref	ore,	merely	because	a	demand	is
made	long	after the	marriag	e,	it may	not	be	outside	the
ambit	of	dowry.	Our	atten	tion has	been	drawn	by	Mr.
Pradhan		to Satvir	Singh’s	c	ase (su	pra)	where	the	Supreme

¶142

: 27 :

¶143

Court has taken a similar view but has added a rider. We

¶144

may quote the relevant paragraph.

¶145

"Thus	there are three occasions related to
dowry.	One is before the marriage, second
is at	the time of marriage and the third is
"at a	ny time" after the marriage. The
third	occasion may appear to be unending
period.	But the crucial words are "in
connection	with the marriage of the said
parties".	This means that giving or
agreeing	to give any property or valuable
security	on any of the above three stages
should	have been in connection with the
marriage	of the parties. There can be many
other	instances for payment of money or
giving	property as between the spouses.
For	example, some customary payments in
connection	with birth of a child or other
ceremonies	are prevalent in different
societies.	Such payments are not enveloped
within	the ambit of "dowry". Hence, the
dowry	mentioned in section 304-B should be
any	property or valuable security given or

¶146

: 28 :

¶147

agreed to be given in connection with the

¶148

marriage."

¶149

37.	In	the fa	cts of	this	case,	the	locket	s for	whic	h	a
demand	was	made	were	meant	for	the	Javal	cerem	ony	of	the
child.	It	is	possib	le to	view	it	in th	e facts	of		this
case	as	a	customary	paymen	t on	the	birth	of	a		child.
Therefore,		we ca	nnot	describe	it	as	a	property	agr	eed	to
be	given	in	connect	ion with	the		marri	age.		The	refore,
section	304B	of	the	IPC, in	our	opi	nion,	would	not		be
attracted	in	this	case	. In	view	of	this,	it	is		not
necessary	for	us	to	refer	to	the	ar	guments	on		the

¶150

concession made by the learned Public Prosecutor before

¶151

the Sessions Court.

¶152

38.	We	are, how	ever,	of	the	opi	nion	that in	this	case,
an	offence	under sec	tion	306	of	the	IPC	is c	learly	made
out.	We	have	alread	y	referred	to	the	evidence	of	PW-1
Keshav.	W	e have	alrea	dy	noted		that	his ev	idence	inspires
confidence.		From	the	evid	ence	of	PW-1	Keshav	and	PW-2
Prakash,	it	is clear	that		accused	1	is	guilty	of	cruelty.
There	is	no dispute	abo	ut	the	fact	that	Bharati	died	in
suspicious	ci	rcumstances	wi	thin	s	even		years	of	her
marriage.	O	nce it	is		held		that	the	deceased	was
subjected	to	cruelty		by	her	hu	sband,	the	pr	esumption

¶153

: 29 :

¶154

under section 113A of the Evidence Act would come into

¶155

play. It reads thus:

¶156

"113A.	Presumption as to	abetment	of
suicide	by a married woman. -	When	the
question	is whether the	commission	of
suicide	by a woman had been	abetted by	her
husband	or any relative of he	r husband	and
it	is shown that she had	committed	suicide
within	a period of seven years	from	the
date	of her marriage and that	her	husband
or su	ch relative of her	husband	had
subjected	her to cruelty, the	Court	may
presume,	having regard to all	the	other
circumstanc	es of the case,	that	such
suicide had	been abetted by her husband or
by such rela	tive of her husband."

¶157

It is surprising that this presumption should not cross the mind of the learned Sessions Judge. He has not even referred to it. This presumption has not been rebutted by the accused by leading any evidence. 39. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh

¶158

: 30 :

¶159

and others, AIR 1991 SC 1532 . In that	case	a	woman	had
set herself and her three children		ablaze	at	the
residence of her husband. Before putting	an	end	to	her
and her children’s lives, she addressed	a	letter	to	the
Deputy Commissioner of Police stating	ther	ein	the	demand
for money made by her husband and	ill-t	reatmen	t give	n to
her. The trial court convicted the acc	used		i.e.	the
husband, the mother and the sister under	s	ection	306	of
the IPC. The High Court, however, acq	uitted	them	.	The
Supreme Court set aside the order of	ac	quittal.		While
disapproving the High Court’s approach,	the	Su	preme	Court
noted the legislative changes introduced	in		the	Penal
Code to combat crimes against women.	The	Supr	eme	Court
referred to sections 304B, 306 and 498A	of	the	IPC	and

¶160

sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act and observed :

¶161

"The	legislative	intent is c	lear t	o curb
the	menace	of dowry deaths,	etc.,	with a
firm	hand.	We must keep	in	mind this
legislative	inte	nt. It must	be	remembered
that	since	such crimes	are	generally
committed	in	the privacy	of	residential
homes	and	in secrecy,	indepen	dent and
direct	evidence	is not easy to	get.	This
is	why the	legislature has	by	introducing

¶162

: 31 :

¶163

Ss.113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried
to strengthen the prosecution hands by
permitting a presumption to be raised if
certain foundational facts are established
and the unfortunate event has taken place
within seven years of marriage. This
period of seven years is considered to be
the turbulent one after which the
legislature assumes that the couple would
have settled down in life. If a married
woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment

¶164

by her husband or his family members S.

¶165

498A, I.P.C. would be attracted."

¶166

The Supreme Court then specifically referred to

¶167

section 306 of the IPC and observed :

¶168

"Then	we have a situation where the	husband
or	his relative by his wilful	conduct
creates	a situation which he knows	will
drive	the woman to commit suicide and	she
actually	does so, the case would	squarely
fall	within the ambit of S.306, I.P.C.	In
such	a case the conduct of the person	would
tantamou	nt to inciting or provoking	or

¶169

: 32 :

¶170

virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which

¶171

would compel her to put an end to her

¶172

miseries by committing suicide."

¶173

	After	referring to	the cruelty meted	out	to	the
deceased,	the	Supreme	Court concluded	that	the	husband
had	been	responsible	in creating	circum	stances	which
would prov	oke or force	the woman into takin	g the only

¶174

alternative left open to her namely, suicide.

¶175

40.	We draw	support from the above	observati	ons of	the
Supreme	Court.	In the circumstances of	the	case,	the
straightforwar	d and h	onest testimony of the	fat	her can	be
safely	relied upon	to bring home guilt	to	accused	1.
Crimes	against w	omen are committed in	the	privacy	of
residential	homes a	nd in secrecy. How	ca	n one	get
independent	evidence	to establish them?	If	indep	endent
evidence	is in	sisted upon, there can	be n	o conv	ictions
even	in cases	where the accused deserv	e to	be con	victed.
Apart	from the	testimony of the father,	the	manner	in
which	the lady	jumped in the well	itself	suggests	that
the	cruelty had	reached such intolerable	level	that	the
deceased	wanted to	end her life with her	nine	month	old
son tied	to her	body with a chaddar.	T	here is	no

¶176

: 33 :

¶177

evidence	led	to s	uggest	that	t	he	deceased	was	a
sohizoprenic.		What	else	woul	d drive	her	to	take	such
extreme	step	but	the	wilful	conduct	of	her	husband	of
causing	mental	to	rture	to he	r and	peste	ring her	to	get
gold	lockets	from	he	r fath	er?	The	presum	ption	under
section	113A	of t	he	Evidence	Act	to	which	even	a
reference	is not	made	by	the	trial	court	comes	to the	aid
of the	prosecuti	on.	We	have	not	the	slightest	doubt	that

¶178

accused 1 is guilty of the offence under section 306 of

¶179

the IPC.

¶180

41.	Relian	ce	was	plac	ed by	Mr.	Prad	han on	Sanju	’s case
(supra) .		In	that	ca	se a	quarrel	had	taken	place	between
the	appellant		and	the	decea	sed on	25/7	/1998,	wherein	it
was	alleged		that	the	appe	llant had	u	sed a	busive	language
and told	the	d	eceased	"to	go	and die"	.	The	Supreme	Court
was	of the		view	that	in t	he facts	of	that c	ase the	words
"to	go	an	d die"	d	id not	constitute	the	i	ngredients	of
instigation.		The	Sup	reme	Cour	t also	came	to	a	conclusion
that the	alleg	ed	abus	ive	words	were	used	on	25/7/198	8 and
the	deceased		was	found	han	ging on	27/7	/1988.		Therefore
the s	uicide		by	the	deceas	ed was n	ot	proximate	to	the
abusive	langua	ge	us	ed	by th	e appellant.		Mr.		Pradhan
urged	that		similarl	y	in	the presen	t c	ase	the	alleged
demand	of		gold	lo	cket c	annot be	calle	d	the	proximate

¶181

: 34 :

¶182

cause of suicide and, hence, the accused cannot be

¶183

convicted under section 306 of the IPC.

¶184

42. We	are unable to agree with Mr. Pradhan. In
Sanju’s case	(supra) , the Supreme Court after reading the
suicide note	came to a conclusion that the deceased was
in great	stress and depressed. The suicide note was not
the handiwork	of a man with sound mind and sense.
Moreover,	the deceased was given to excessive drinking.
It was furth	er observed that the deceased was a victim of
his own	conduct unconnected with the quarrel that had
ensued on 2	5/7/1988. It is against the backdrop of these
facts that	the Supreme Court observed that the quarrel
was not the	proximate cause of suicide. Such are not the
facts here	. PW-1 Keshav’s evidence clearly establishes
the persiste	nt demands of money and gold lockets made on
the deceased	. Just 10 to 13 days prior to the incident,
PW-1 Keshav	was told by the deceased that her husband had
told her to	get a locket of half tola of gold for her son
and a loc	ket of two tolas of gold for himself and he had
further threat	ened her that if she did not bring the
lockets, he	would not maintain her. PW-1 Keshav had
expressed	her inability to fulfill this demand obviously
because he	had no money. Within a short time thereafter
the deceased	was found lying in a well with her nine

¶185

: 35 :

¶186

month old son tied to her body with a chaddar. There cannot be a better case where the prosecution can be said

¶187

to have established abetment to commit suicide than the present case.

¶188

43.	In	this	conn	ection	we	may	refer	to	Satvir	Singh’s
case	(supra)	on	which	Mr.		Pradhan	has		placed	reliance.
In	that ca	se, t	he	victim	att	empted	to	com	mit suicide	but
did	not	succeed.		The	atte	mpt res	ulted	in	maiming	her.
The	Supreme	Court		held	that	section	306		of the	IPC
renders	the	per	son	who	abets	the	comm	ission	of	suicide
punishable	for		which		the	condition	prece	dent	is	that
suicide	should		necess	arily	have	been	comm	itted	. It	is
possible	to	abet	the	commi	ssion	of	suicide.		But	nobody

¶189

would abet a mere attempt to commit suicide. But while

¶190

so holding, the Supreme Court observed:

¶191

"Section	306	IPC	whe	n read with Section
113A	of	the Evide	nce	Act has only enabled
the	court	to pun	ish	a husband or his
relative	w	ho subject	ed	a woman to cruelty
(as	envisaged	in Se	ction	498-A IPC) if such
woman	co	mmitted su	icide	within 7 years of
her	marriage.	It	is	immaterial for Section
306	IPC	whether	the	cruelty or harassment

¶192

: 36 :

¶193

was caused "soon before her death" or

¶194

earlier."

¶195

These observations would be clearly applicable

¶196

to the present case.

¶197

44.	In	our	opinion,	the	prosecution	has	clear	ly m	ade	out
its	case	against	accused	1.	Assuming		there	are		certain
variations		and	infirmitie	s i	n the		evi	dence,		the
prosecution	c	ase	cannot	be	thrown	ove	rboard	on		that
ground	if	it	is consi	stent	as regards	its	core.		In	this
connection,		we	may	usefully	refer to		the	observati	ons	of
the	Supreme	Cour	t in	Shardul	Singh v.		State	of	H	aryana,

¶198

(2002) 8 SCC 372 . The following are the material

¶199

observations of the Supreme Court.

¶200

"There		cannot be	a prosecution case	with a
cast-iron		perfection	in all respects	and it
is	obli	gatory	for the courts to	analyse,
sift	and	assess	the evidence on	record,
with		particular	reference	to its
trustworthin	ess	and	truthfulness,	by a
process		of	dispassionate judicial	scrutiny
adopting		an	objective and	reasonable
appreciation		of	the same, without	being

¶201

: 37 :

¶202

	obsessed by an air of total suspicion	of
	the case of the prosecution. What is	to be
	insisted upon is not implicit proof.	It
	has often been said that evidenc	e of
	interested witnesses should be	scrutinized
	more carefully to find out whether it	has a
	ring of truth and if found acceptable	and
	seems to inspire confidence, too, in	the
	mind of the court, the same cann	ot be
	discarded totally merely on account	of
	certain variations or infirmities	pointed
	or even additions and emb	ellishments
	noticed, unless they are of such nat	ure as
	to undermine the substratum of the	evidence
	and found to be tainted to the	core.
	Courts have a duty to undertake a	complete
	and comprehensive appreciation of all	vital
	features of the case and the	entire
	evidence with reference to the broad	and
	reasonable probabilities of the case	also
	in their attempt to find out proof beyond reasonable doubt."
45.	There can be no doubt that offences	against	women
need	firm handling by the courts. It	is true	that

¶203

: 38 :

¶204

innocent	person should not be	sentenced	but that do	es not
mean	that the guilty should	be allowed	to go scot-f	ree by
finding	trivial defects in	the inve	stigation and	minor
variations	in the evidence.	The stupe	ndous rise in	crime
against	women can only be	checked by	adopting a	pragmatic
approach.	The courts have	to be	sensitive to the	plight
of a	women trapped in	the alien	atmosphere o	f the
husband’s	house. The c	ourts	cannot insist	on
extraordina	ry standard of proof	. Quite	often there	are
rustic	witnesses who get	flustered	in the	court.
Evaluation	of their evidence	will have	to be done	by
keeping	their background in	mind.	Without doing	violence
to	the basic principles	of criminal	jurisprudence	the
courts	will have to acquire	a not too	rigid approach	to

¶205

get at the truth so that justice can be secured to women

¶206

who are victims of grave crimes.

¶207

46. We	feel	that	the imp	ugned judgment must	be
characterised	as	perv	erse. The	learned judge has	not
considered	the	effect	of section	113A of the	Evidence
Act. No	acce	ptable	reasons ha	ve been given by	the
learned	judge	to	discard the	truthful version given	by
the father	of the	de	ceased. On	the contrary, the	learned
judge has	observed	that	"From the	evidence adduced b	y the
prosecution	it	is	clear that	the witnesses examined	have

¶208

: 39 :

¶209

no	personal	know	ledge	abo	ut	the	harassm	ent or	demand	made
by	the	accused.		Their	k	nowled	ge is	from	deceased	Bharati
only".		We	fail	to	unde	rstand	what	other	evidence	could
have	been	led	in	a	case	of	this	type.	Knowledge	of
harassm	ent	would	obviousl	y	be	from	the	deceased.	We	feel

¶210

that the learned judge has dealt with this serious case

¶211

very lightly.

¶212

47.		Surprisingl	y, the learned judge has held that	there
is	nothing	on	record to show that deceased Bharati	had
told	her	husban	d, namely, accused 1 Subhash that	her
father	was	not	in a position to give the ornaments	to
them.	W	e w	onder what difference it would have made	if
deceased	Bhara	ti had	told her husband that her father	was
poor	and	not in	a position to give the ornaments.	It is
true	that	in	an appeal against acquittal, if the	view
taken	by	the	trial court is found to be a r	easonable
possible	v	iew,	this court should not interfere with	it
and if	two	views	are possible, the one which is in	favour
of	the	accused	should be preferred and merely	because
this	court	is	of the opinion that some other view	is
possible	it	cannot	take that view. But in our	opinion,
the	view	taken	by the trial court could never have	been
taken	by	it on	the facts, which were before it. W	e are,
therefore,	o	f	the view that the acquittal of accused	1

¶213

: 40 :

¶214

under sections 306 and 498A of IPC needs to be

¶215

overturned.

¶216

48.	Now	the question is whether acquittal order	coul	d be
interfered	with	after 18 years. In this connec	tion,	we
may	usefully	refer to the judgment of the Supre	me	Court
in	State of	U.P., v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash M	ittal,	AIR
1992	SC 2045 .	In that case, the accused was	acquitte	d as
far	back in	October, 1977. The appeal was taken	up	for
hearing	after	14 years. The Supreme Court	observed	that
if	the i	mpugned judgment of acquittal reversing	the	well
reasoned	judgm	ent of the trial court, conv	icting	the
respondent	is	affirmed, it will be nothing but	a	mockery
of	justice	and will also amount to perpetration	of	gross
and	irreparable	injustice. Moreover, when a	j	udgment
appealed	again	st suffers from illegality or		manifest
error	or	perversity, warranting an interference	at	the
hands	of an	appellate court in the interest of	justice	on
substantial	and	compelling reasons, the mere delay	in	the
disposal	of	the said appeal will never serve as	a	ground
for n	on-interferenc	e and on the other hand,	the	appellate

¶217

court is duty bound to set at naught the miscarriage of

¶218

justice.

¶219

In view of this, we have no hesitation in reversing

¶220

: 41 :

¶221

the order of acquittal of accused 1 Subhash so far as it

¶222

relates to sections 306 and 498A of the IPC is concerned.

¶223

Hence, the following order:

¶224

O R D E R

¶225

The	impugn	ed judg	ment	and order	dated
11/8/1988	pa	ssed by	t	he Sessions	Judge,
Sangli	so	far as	it	acquits accused	2
Kisabai	Aba	Bodke	is	concerned, it	is
confirmed.		So far	as	accused 1	Subhash
Aba	Bodke	is	concer	ned, his	acquittal
under	section	304B	of	the IPC	is
confirmed.		Howe	ver,	his acquittal	under
sections	306	and	498A	of the IPC	is
quashed	and	set asi	de.	For the	offence
under	section	498A	of	the IPC, accu	sed 1
Subhash	Aba	Bodke	is	sentenced to	suffer
RI	for three	years	and	to pay a fine	of
Rs.5,000/-	and	in	de	fault to suffer	RI
for	six mon	ths.	For	the offences	under
section	306 of	the	IPC,	accused 1	Subhash
Aba	Bodke	is sente	nced	to suffer RI	for
five	years	and to		pay a fine	of
Rs.5,000/-	and	in	de	fault to suffer	RI

¶226

: 42 :

¶227

	for six months. Out	of	the	fine	amount,
	a sum of Rs.3,000/-	be		paid,	as
	compensation, to PW-1 Keshav Nivrutti
	Shinde and, if he is dead, to his heirs.
(b)	The substantive sentences shall run concurrently.
(c)	Accused 1 Subhash Aba	Bodke	is	on	bail.
	His bail bond stands cancelled. He is
	given eight weeks time to surrender.

¶228

(SMT. RANJANA DESAI, J.)

¶229

(A.S. OKA, J.)

The State of Maharashtra v. Subhash Aba Bodke and Another.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

The State of Maharashtra v. Subhash Aba Bodke and Another.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Shri Vijay Vishnu Gangurde and Another Vs the State of Maharashtra

Baban Shekha Bidgar Vs the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

The State of Maharashtra Vs Kisan Mariti Jadhav and Others

The State of Maharashtra Vs Shri Shivaram S/O. Parasharam Mang

Popat Anna Nil Vs the State of Maharashtra

State vs. Mohd. Makbul Mod. Ismile Vs Mahamad Makbul Mahamad Ismile.