Allowed

Kurban Husein Tayabali and Co.and Ors. v. Bai Asamabai Moiz Matcheswala and Ors.

Bombay HC5 Aug 2004S/709/1984

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court held that a partnership of two partners dissolves upon the death of one, regardless of a clause saying otherwise, awarding the deceased's estate a 1/8 share under Muslim law and dismissing the suit seeking declaration of partnership firm assets.

What did the court decide?

Preliminary decree declaring estate shares (1/8 to widow, 1/4 each to daughters/heirs), appointing Court Receiver to sell estate, and dismissing Suit No.709 of 1984.

Kurban Husein Tayabali and Co.and Ors. Vs Bai… — Succession and Inheritance | Bombay HC (2004)

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

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 SUIT NO.603 OF 1981

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1. Bai Asmabai Moiz Matcheswala
 also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant
 residing at 157, Nagdevi Street,
 2nd Floor, Bombay-400 008.

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2. (1) Bai Khatija Yusuf Bastawala

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also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at 239, Nagdevi Street, 4th Floor, Darukhanawala Bldg, Bombay.

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3. (2) Bai Mariam Mohmed Hakim

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also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at 165, Vasi Building, 5th Floor, Nagdevi Street, Bombay ....Plaintiffs V/s.

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1. Bai kulsumbaiwidow of Kurbanhusein

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Chatriwala of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at Abbas Manzil, 4th Floor, Bhusari Moholla, Sarang Street, Bombay.

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1(a) Mrs.Fatimabai Abdeali Dohandwala also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at Abbas Manzil, 4th Floor, Bhusari Moholla, Sarang Street, Bombay-400 003.

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1(b) Bai Asmabai Moiz Matcheswala also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at 157, Nagdevi Street, 2nd Floor, Bombay-400 003. 1(c) Bai Khatija Yusufi Bastawala also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant residing at 239, Nagdevi Street, 4th Floor, Darukhanawala Bldg, Bombay.

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1(d) Bai Mariam Mohmed Hakim also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant

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 : 2 :

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 residing at 165, Vasi Building,
 5th Floor, Nagdevi Street,
 Bombay- 400 003.
 2. (1) Mrs.Fatimabai Abdeali Dahodwala
 also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant
 residing at Abbas Manzil,
 4th Floor, Bhusari Moholla,
 Sarang Street, Bombay-400 003.
 (2) Moiz Salehbhai,
 155 Husena House,
 Nagdevi Street, Mumbai-400 003
 (2A) Fatema Salehbai Matcheswala
 93 years old Indian Inhabitant
 residing at Swastik Chambers,
 N.B. Estate, Virar (West),
 401 303, District Thane ....Defendants

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 WITH

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 SUIT NO.709 OF 1984

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 1. Kurban Husein Tayabally & Co.
 a partnership firm duly
 registered under the provisions
 of the Indian Partnership Act
 carrying on business at 246,
 Janjikar Street, Near Jumma
 Masjid, Bombay- 400 003.

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 2. Kulsumbai w/o Kurban Husein
 Chatriwala

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 3. Abdeali F. Dahodwala

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4. Fakruddin Abdeali Dahodwala,

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 All of Bombay Indian Inhabitants,
 residing at Abbas Manzil,
 4th Floor, Bhusari Mohalla,
 Sarang Street, Bombay-400 003. ....Plaintiffs

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 V/s.

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 1. Bai Asmabai Moiz Matcheswala,

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 of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant,
 residing at 157, Nagdevi Street,
 2nd Floor, Bombay-400 003.

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2. Bai Khatija Yusufi Bistwala, also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant, residing at 239, Nagdevi Street, 4th Floor, Darukhanawala Building, Bombay-400 003.

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 3. Bai Marim Mohmed Hakim,
 also of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant,
 residing at 165, Vasi Building,
 5th Floor, Nagdevi Street,
 Bombay-400 003.

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 4. Bai Fatemabai Abdeali Dohadwala,
 of Bombay Muslim Inhabitant,
 residing at Abbas Manzil,
 4th Floor, Bhusari Mohalla,
 Sarang Street, Bombay-400 003.

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 5. The Court Receiver,
 High Court, Bombay. ....Defendants

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 Mr.H.J. Thakkar with Mr.A.S. Chandurwala and Mr.C.M.
 Gaonkar i/b Desai & Diwanji for the Plaintiffs in Suit
 No.603 of 1981 and for the Defendants in Suit No.709
 of 1984.

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 Mr.A.N. Maniyar for the Defendants in Suit No.603 of
 1981 and for the Plaintiffs in Suit No.709 of 1984.

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CORAM : S.J. VAZIFDAR, J.
DATED : 5TH/6TH AUGUST, 2004.

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ORAL JUDGMENT :

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 1. By consent of the parties, both the suits

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 will be disposed of by this common judgment.

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 2. At the out-set, it would be convenient to set

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 out the parties to the suit. I will first refer to
 the parties in Suit No.603 of 1981. One Kurbanhusein
 T. Chhatriwala (hereinafter referred to as the
 deceased) was the husband of original Defendant No.1
 and the father of original Plaintiff No.1, and
 Plaintiff Nos.2 Bai Khatija Yusuf Bastawala and Bai
 Mariam Mohmed Hakim and Defendant No.2 Fatema Salebhai
 Matcheswala.

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 3. I will now refer to the parties in Suit
 No.709 of 1984. Plaintiff No.2 is original Defendant
 No.1 in Suit No.603 of 1981. Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3
 are the husband and son of Defendant No.2 in Suit
 No.603 of 1981. Plaintiff No.1 is a firm of which the
 other Plaintiffs claim to be partners. Defendant
 Nos.1 to 4 are original Plaintiff No.1, Plaintiff
 Nos.2, 3 and original Plaintiff No.1 (a) in Suit
 No.603 of 1981. Defendant No.5 is the Court Receiver.

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 . The heirs of the deceased parties were
 brought on record. Some of the heirs also having
 expired their heirs were brought on record. There is
 however some error in the manner in which they were
 impleaded. This however need not detain me as
 ultimately I intend declaring the share of each branch
 only viz. the branches of the original parties to

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 Suit No.603 of 1981 as this suit is for the

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 administration of the estate of the deceased only. I
 may add here that counsel for all the parties stated
 that there are now neither any heirs of original
 Plaintiff No.1 nor any heirs of her heirs.

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 4. Suit No.603 of 1981 is filed for the

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 administration of the estate of the deceased; for
 ascertaining the shares of the parties in the estate
 of the deceased ; for a direction against Defendant
 No.2 to render to the Plaintiffs’ true and faithful
 accounts of the estate of the deceased on the footing
 of willful default ; for an order against the
 Defendants to forthwith disclose the whole estate of
 the deceased come to their hands and taken charge of
 by them and for all necessary directions.

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 5. Suit No.709 of 1984 is filed for a

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 declaration that the first Plaintiff firm and its
 properties and assets are the assets of Plaintiff
 Nos.2, 3 and 4 as the partners of the first Plaintiff
 firm and that the same do not form a part of the
 estate of the deceased ; for a declaration that the
 amounts lying to the credit of the Plaintiffs’ firm
 with Grindlays Bank belongs to the first Plaintiff and
 that the amount of Rs.93,494=96 ps. drawn by the

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 Court Receiver from the said account pursuant to the
 order of this Court also forms part of the assets of
 the first Plaintiff firm and that the Plaintiffs are
 entitled to the refund of the same and for a decree in
 the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- as damages.

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 6. The decision in Suit No.603 of 1981 will
 affect the decision in Suit No.709 of 1984. I will,
 in this judgment, refer to the parties as they are
 arrayed in Suit No.603 of 1981.

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 7. The Plaintiffs’ case is that the deceased -
 Kurbanhusein died intestate in Bombay on 5th August,
 1980 leaving his daughters, the Plaintiffs and
 original Defendant No.2 and his widow, original
 Defendant No.1, as his heirs and next-of-kin according
 to Shia Mohammedan Law ; that all the assets of the
 business and goodwill as also the personal properties
 of the deceased belong to the estate of the deceased
 and his heirs are entitled to the same in accordance
 with Shia Mohammedan Law by which the parties are
 governed. In Shia Mohammedan Law, original Defendant
 No.1 being the widow of the deceased, was entitled to
 a one eighth share in the estate of the deceased and
 his daughters were entitled to the balance equally.
 There is no dispute regarding the proportion of the

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 share of each of a parties in the estate of the
 deceased.

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 . The Plaintiffs’ case is that the deceased was
 carrying on the business of umbrellas in the name and
 style of M/s.Kurbanhusein Tyaballi as the sole
 proprietor thereof. In addition thereto, the deceased
 left an immovable property viz. "Karim Building",
 Mumbai, a bank balance in the account with the
 Grindlays Bank Ltd., Mumbai and the stock of the said
 firm. The Plaintiffs’ case is that the original first
 and second Defendants failed and neglected to divide
 the estate of the deceased and give them their
 respective shares therein inspite of their demands by
 their advocate’s letter dated 11th March, 1981. It is
 in these circumstances, that the Suit No.603 of 1981
 was filed.

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 8. The original Defendants filed a common
 written statement. In addition to certain formal
 grounds, their case therein was that the deceased was
 carrying on the business in partnership with defendant
 No.1 under a Deed of Partnership dated 11th January,
 1980. Upon the death of the deceased, Defendant No.1,
 in accordance with clause 8 of the Deed of Partnership
 dated 11th January, 1980, became the sole proprietor

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 of the business and was accordingly entitled to
 continue the same. The Defendants’ case was that the
 estate is entitled to Rs.71,500/- being the amount due
 to the deceased as a partner of the firm. The
 Defendants admitted that the deceased left "Karim
 Building". It is admitted that the deceased died
 intestate. The Defendants further stated that upon
 the death of the deceased, Defendant No.1 observed
 Iddat (Seclusion) for a period of four and a half
 months. Upon coming out of the Iddat in January,
 1981, the heirs decided to sell the immovable property
 and the sale thereof was entrusted to the husband of
 Plaintiff No.3. The Defendants’ case is that it was
 agreed between all the heirs that after disposing of
 the immovable property viz. "Karim Building", the
 sale proceeds would be added to Rs.71,500/- being the
 amount of the share of the deceased and the same would
 be distributed amongst the heirs according to law.

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 9. Thus far, it will be noticed that there are
 five facts admitted by all the parties. Firstly, the
 deceased was the husband of original Defendant No.1
 and the father of the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.2.
 Secondly, during his life time and upto 10th January,
 1980 at least, the deceased carried on the business of
 umbrellas in the name and style of M/s.Kurbanhusein

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 Tyaballi as the sole proprietor thereof. Thirdly, the
 deceased died intestate. Fourthly, the parties are
 governed by Shia Mohammedan Law under which the
 original Defendant No.1, widow of the deceased, was
 entitled to a one eighth share in the estate of the
 deceased and the Plaintiffs and defendant No.2 were
 entitled to an equal share in the remaining estate of
 the deceased. Lastly, the deceased was a tenant of
 the premises 246, Janjikar Street, Crawford Market,
 (near Jumma Masjid) Mumbai from where he carried on
 the said business.

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 10. Thus, declaring the shares of the parties in
 the estate of the deceased poses no difficulty. It is
 in fact admitted. Three critical questions common in
 both the suits are :

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 i) Whether in fact the deceased and original
 Defendant No.1 entered into a partnership
 business on the terms and conditions
 contained in and as evidenced by a Deed
 of Partnership dated 11th January, 1980.

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 ii) Assuming that the answer to the first

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 question is in the affirmative, whether the
 said premises was brought into the alleged

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 partnership firm by the deceased, and

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 iii) The effect of the death of the deceased on
 the alleged firm qua the rights of the estate
 of the deceased therein. The answer to this

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 question will depend upon the
 construction to be placed on Clauses 8 and 9
 of the Deed of Partnership dated 11th

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 January, 1980.

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 11. D.K. Deshmukh, J. settled the following

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 issues :-

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 . Issues in Suit No.603 of 1981 :

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 1) Whether the suit as filed lacks cause of
 action alleged in para 1 of the written

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 statement ?

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 2) Whether the suit is not properly valued as

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 alleged in para 2 of the written statement ?

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 3) Whether the firm of M/s.Kurbanhusain Tyaballi

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 and Co. was a genuine partnership firm
 constituted under a deed of partnership

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 dated 11.1.1980 and consisting of the
 deceased Kurbanhusain and the deceased
 defendant No.1 as alleged in para 3 of the
 written statement ?

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 4) Whether the deceased Kurbanhusain carried on
 business till his death as a sole proprietor
 of M/s.Kurbanhusain Tyaballi and Co. in a
 shop at 246, Janjikar Street, Near Juma
 Masjid, Bombay as alleged in para 1 of the
 plaint ?

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 5) Whether the decease Kurbanhusain had left a
 bank account with large balance in Grindlays
 Bank Ltd., Princess Street Branch as alleged
 in para 5 of the plaint ?

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 6) What share each of the Plaintiffs and the
 Defendants are entitled to in the estate of

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 deceased Kurbanhusain ?

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 7) What reliefs ?

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 12. Smt.K.K. Baam, J. settled the following

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 issues :-

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 . Issues in Suit No.709 of 1984 :

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 1) Whether the suit is not maintainable and

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 liable to be dismissed with compensatory
 costs as alleged in paras 20 and 23 of the
 written statement ?

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 2) Whether the Defendants prove that the

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 deceased was lying ill under Mazzul - Maut

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 for nearly one year prior to his death as
 alleged in paras 1 and 14 of written
 statement ?

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 3) Whether the said deceased took the Plaintiff

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 No.2 as his partner in his business of
 Umbrellas and entered into Deed of
 Partnership as alleged in para 2 of the

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 Plaint ?

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 4) Whether the business of M/s.Kurban Husain
 Tayaballi was continued after the death of
 Kurban Husain by the Plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 as
 partners as alleged in para 9 of the Plaint ?

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 5) Whether the first Plaintiff firm and its
 properties and assets do not form part of the

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 estate of the said deceased as alleged in
 para 13 of the Plaint ?

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 6) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to claim
 damages to the extent of Rs.1,50,000/- from
 the Defendants as alleged in para 14 of the
 Plaint ?

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 Issue No.2 is recast today. (17.2.2003)

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 7) Whether the alleged Partnership Deeds dated

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 11.1.1980 and 10.1.1981 relied upon by the
 Plaintiffs and Defendant No.4 are not valid
 and binding upon the Defendant Nos.1 to 3 for
 the reasons alleged in para 1 and 14 of the
 Written Statement ?

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 8) Whether the Deed of Partnership dated 10th

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 January, 1981 was bogus and got up by the
 Plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 in an attempt to
 deprive the Defendants of their share in the
 business of the deceased as his heirs as
 alleged in paras 7, 8, 12, 14, 15 and 16 of

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 the Written Statement ?

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 9) Whether the deceased left a large bank

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 balance in his account with Grindlays Bank at
 Princess Street Branch and stock of umbrellas
 of the business of Kurbanhusain Tayaballi and
 Co. as alleged in para 2 of the Written
 Statement ?

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 10) Whether the Mama Traders has been allowed to

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 carry on business in half the portion on
 ground floor of the premises as licensees and
 failed to pay royalty amount at the rate of
 Rs.4000/- per year for the last six years
 and became trespassers as alleged in para 13
 of the Written Statement ?

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 11) What orders ?

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 13. J.A. Patil, J. (as he then was) recorded in

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 the notes of evidence of 17th February, 2003, that the
 parties had agreed that the evidence recorded in each
 suit, may be read as evidence recorded in the other.

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Issue Nos.3 and 4 in Suit No.603 of 1981 and

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2, 3, 7 and 8 in Suit No.709 of 1984 :

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 14. The main question is whether the Deed of
 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 was entered into

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 between the deceased and original Defendant No.1.
 After the death of the deceased, it is alleged that
 Plaintiff Nos.2, 3 and 4 in Suit No.709 of 1984
 constituted a fresh partnership under a Deed of
 Partnership dated 10th January, 1981 and carried on
 the business in the name and style of Plaintiff No.1.
 The Plaintiffs in suit No.603 of 1981 are not
 concerned in any manner with the Deed of Partnership
 dated 10th January, 1981. The same cannot, therefore,
 affect the rights of the Plaintiffs in Suit No.603 of
 1981 in any manner whatsoever. This is even assuming
 that the Deed of Partnership dated 10th January, 1981
 is not bogus or a got up document. The main
 controversy between the parties is whether the
 business premises of which the deceased was a tenant,
 was brought into the stock of the partnership
 constituted between himself and his wife. If the
 answer to that question is in the negative, the Deed
 of Partnership dated 10th January, 1981 can confer no
 rights in respect of the said premises in favour of
 the Plaintiffs in Suit No.709 of 1984 in any manner
 and to any extent, for the Plaintiffs in Suit No.603
 of 1981 were not parties therein nor acquiesced
 thereto.

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 15. The main question, therefore, is whether the

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 deceased and Defendant No.1 constituted themselves as
 partners on the terms and conditions contained in and
 evidenced by the Deed of Partnership dated 11th
 January, 1980.

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 16. In the first instance, Mr.Maniyar, the
 learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendants
 in Suit No.603 of 1981 and on behalf of the Plaintiffs
 in Suit No.709 of 1984 relied upon an extract from the
 Registrar of Firms. It has been marked in evidence as
 Exhibit 14. I invited the attention of both the
 counsel to the provisions of Sections 58 and 59 of the
 Indian Partnership Act, 1934 as well as the judgment
 in the case of - Firm Het Ram Padam Chand versus Firm
Subhag Chand Rikhab Das and others, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh
376 where it was held as under :-

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 "It was strongly argued that the
 certificate of registration is of
 no evidentiary value because it is
 not proved that the application for
 registration bore Het Ram’s
 signature. But we see no reason to
 reject the view taken by the
 District Judge on this point that
 the registration of a firm raises a
 presumption that the parties
 shown as members of the firm and
 registered as such are actually
 members of it. The presumption is
 no doubt rebuttable, but the
 appellant made no attempt to rebut
 it. If in fact Padam Chand was not
 Het Ram’s partner, there might have
 been some indication of this in Het

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 Ram’s private accounts, but those
 accounts were not produced.
 Section 58, Partnership Act,
 provides that for the registration
 of a firm an application must be
 made to the Registrar in a certain
 form giving certain particulars,
 and the statement must be signed by
 all the partners, or their agents
 specially authorized in this
 behalf. Each person signing the
 statement must verify it in the
 manner prescribed. Section 59
 provides that when the Registrar is
 satisfied that the provisions of
 S.58 have been duly complied with,
 he shall record an entry of the
 statement in a register called the
 register of firms, and shall file
 the statement. Section 68 provides
 that a certified copy of an entry
 relating to a firm in the register
 of firms may be produced in proof
 of the fact of the registration of
 such firms, and of the contents of
 any statement, intimation or notice
 recorded or noted therein. We have
 given full consideration to the
 argument advanced by the learned
 counsel for the appellants that
 nevertheless it was necessary for
 the respondents to prove that the
 application for registration bore
 Het Ram’s signature, but we are
 unable to accept it. In our
 opinion no further proof was
 necessary in the absence of any
 evidence to the contrary."

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 17. I am in respectful agreement with the ratio
 of this case. There is no provision in the Indian
 Partnership Act to the effect that the certificate of
 registration is conclusive proof of the particulars
 stated therein. The provisions of the said Act do not

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 warrant such a conclusion by necessary intendment
 either. In fact the procedure for registration
 clearly establishes that the presumption as to the
 correctness of what is stated in the certificate of
 registration is rebuttable. There is every
 possibility of a person furnishing incorrect
 information to the Registrar of Firms. The procedure
 prescribed for registration does not prescribe
 adequate, much less an absolute, safeguard against
 such registration especially qua third parties. The
 provisions of Section 68 clearly support this view.
 Section 68 reads as under :-

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 "68. Rules of evidence. - Any
 statement, intimation or notice
 recorded or noted in the Register of
 Firms shall, as against any person
 by whom or on whose behalf such
 statement, intimation or notice was
 signed, be conclusive proof of any
 fact therein stated.

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 (2) A certified copy of an entry
 relating to a firm in the Register
 of Firms may be produced in proof of
 the fact of the registration of such
 firm, and of the contents of any
 statement, intimation or notice
 recorded or noted therein."

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 . Thus under sub section (1) once it is

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 established that a person had signed a statement,
 intimation or notice which was recorded or noted on

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 the Register of Firms the contents thereof constitute
 "conclusive proof" against such person and not against
 third parties. This is clearer from the fact that on
 the other hand under sub section (2) such contents of
 the said documents are not conclusive proof. Had it
 been otherwise the language of sub section (2) would
 have been different. In the circumstances, it follows
 that the presumption as to the correctness of the
 contents of the certificate of registration under the
 Indian Partnership Act is rebuttable.

¶139

 18. The position therefore is that there is a
 presumption in favour of the Defendants that a
 partnership as contained in the Deed of Partnership
 dated 11th January, 1980 was entered into. The
 presumption is however rebuttable. In that case,
 however, it is clear that the parties made no attempt
 to rebut the presumption and there was a clear finding
 that there was absence of any evidence to the
 contrary. For that reason, the Division Bench sought
 no reason to reject the view taken by the District
 Judge on the point that the registration of the firm
 raised a presumption that the parties shown as the
 members of the firm and registered as such were
 actually the members of it.

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 . It is necessary therefore, to see whether in
 the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
 presumption has been rebutted by evidence to the
 contrary. I have come to the conclusion that it has.

¶142

 19. On behalf of the Defendants, Fakhruddin
 Abdeali Dohadwalla (Plaintiff No.4 in Suit No.709 of
 1984) was examined. Fakhruddin filed four affidavits
 by way of examination-in-chief dated 23rd September,
 2002, 24th February, 2003, 4th March, 2003 and 28th
 November, 2003. In paragraph 1 of his affidavit dated
 23rd November, 2002, he stated that the deceased was
 carrying an umbrellas business under the name and
 style of Messrs Kurbanhusen Tayaballi from the said
 premises. In paragraph 2, he stated that on 11th
 January, 1980, the deceased entered into a partnership
 agreement with Defendant No.1 and that they continued
 to carry on the business of umbrellas in partnership
 from the said premises till the death of the deceased.
 He produced the original Deed of Partnership dated
 11th January, 1980 from the custody of the Court
 Receiver and stated that the context thereof are true
 and correct. He stated : "I identify the thumb
 impression of the said deceased and the signature of
 Kulsumbai - original Defendant No.1 on the said
 partnership agreement dated 11th January, 1980". On

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¶144

 this statement, the learned Judge who recorded the
 evidence admitted the Deed of Partnership and marked
 it as Exhibit-8 in evidence.

¶145

 20. It did not take much for Mr.Thakkar, the
 learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
 Plaintiffs in Suit No.603 of 1981 and on behalf of the
 Defendants in Suit No.709 of 1984, to destroy this
 testimony. In paragraph 3 of the cross-examination,
 Fakhruddin admitted that he was neither a party nor a
 witness to the Deed of Partnership dated 11th January,
 1980. He admitted that he was not present when the
 document was executed. He admitted that the thumb
 impression appearing thereon was not put in his
 presence. He admitted that he had not studied the
 science of finger prints. Nor was he in a position to
 identify the thumb impression of the deceased. Thus
 it was conclusively established that Fakhruddin had no
 personal knowledge whatsoever of the execution of the
 Deed of Partnership dated 11th March, 1980. The
 statement in his examination-in-chief identifying the
 thumb impression of the deceased was not correct.

¶146

 21. Faced with this cross-examination, Fakhruddin
 alleged for the first time in the cross-examination
 that the deceased had informed him that he had put his

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¶148

 thumb impression on the document. He then admitted
 that this was the only basis on which he had stated
 that the Deed of Partnership bears the signature of
 the deceased. Considering all the surrounding
 circumstances of the case, to which I shall refer, it
 is difficult to accept Fakhruddin’s evidence that the
 deceased told him that he had put his thumb impression
 on the Deed of Partnership. This was not stated in
 his examination-in-chief. He does not even state in
 what circumstances and for what reason the deceased
 informed him that he had put his thumb impression on
 the Deed of Partnership.

¶149

 22. In cross-examination, Fakhruddin stated that
 the deceased did not know English and that he used to
 sign all the documents in connection with his business
 and banks in Gujarathi. This cross-examination is
 extremely important. If according to Fakhruddin, the
 deceased signed all the documents in connection with
 his business and banks in Gujarathi, surely some
 explanation was called for as to why his thumb
 impression was placed on a document as important and
 formal as a Deed of Partnership. There is none.

¶150

 23. Mr.Thakkar did not leave his
 cross-examination at that. He gave the witness an

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¶152

 opportunity to explain why the deceased placed his
 thumb impression on the Deed of Partnership. To this
 question, the answer was he did not ask the deceased
 as to why he put his thumb impression instead of his
 signature on the Deed of Partnership.

¶153

 24. Further it is extremely important to note

¶154

 that Fakhruddin stated that the Deed of Partnership
 was executed in the office of the advocate. He was
 not present in the office of the advocate when the
 document was allegedly executed. He stated that
 Defendant No.1 and the deceased had gone to the office
 of the advocate. In these circumstances and
 considering the fact that the Defendants were aware of
 the denial of execution of the Deed of Partnership,
 the least that was expected was for the Defendants to
 have led the evidence of a finger print expert and to
 have examined the advocate. They did neither.

¶155

 25. The Defendants relied upon a document,
 Exhibit 12. It is a letter allegedly addressed by the
 deceased to the Police Commissioner and the Municipal
 Commissioner for Greater Bombay. It is alleged to
 contain the left hand thumb impression of the
 deceased. I am not for a moment suggesting at this
 stage that it is established that Exhibit 12 bears

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 left hand thumb impression of the deceased. It is the
 Defendants’ uncorroborated case that it does. In
 these circumstances, the Defendants ought to have led
 the evidence of a finger prints expert to establish at
 least that the two thumb impressions are the same.
 There is no explanation why this was not done. It is
 however obvious that this too would not have carried
 the Defendant’s case further as it was not established
 that even this thumb impression was that of the
 deceased.

¶158

 26. Further Exhibit 12 is a curious document. It
 purports to be the original. There is no explanation
 how the Defendants obtained the original document if
 in fact it was addressed to the Police Commissioner
 and the Municipal Commissioner for Greater Bombay.
 Neither of those parties was summoned to produce the
 document. In his further examination-in-chief,
 Fakhruddin stated : "I now produce the original reply
 dated 22.1.1980 given by Kurbanhusein (deceased) to
 the Police Commissioner and the Municipal Commissioner
 for Greater Bombay. This letter bears the thumb
 impression of Kurbanhusein". On the basis of this
 evidence, the document was marked in evidence as
 Exhibit 12. Firstly, as stated above, the witness’
 statement that the document bears the thumb impression

¶159

 : 25 :

¶160

 of the deceased is not correct, to say the least. He

¶161

 is in fact, as noted earlier, not in a position to
 identify the thumb impression. He does not state how
 he obtained possession of this original document, if
 the same was addressed to the Police Commissioner and
 the Municipal Commissioner Greater Bombay. He relied
 upon Exhibit ‘12’ to indicate that there was another
 document which the deceased executed by affixing his
 thumb impression instead of by signing the same. The
 reliance is totally unfounded. The execution of the
 document has not been proved. Indeed, the
 circumstances in which the Defendants obtained the
 document has, to say the least, not been proved. It
 would, in this connection be useful to recollect that
 in cross-examination, the witness admitted : "He
 (deceased) used to sign all the documents in
 connection with his business and banks in Gujarathi."
 Exhibit 12 was addressed to the Police Commissioner
 and the Municipal Commissioner for Greater Bombay
 granting his no objection to their giving one of his
 tenant’s permission to use his premises as a guest
 house on certain conditions. This was certainly a
 business document. There is no explanation why it was
 executed by affixing the thumb impression. The
 reliance upon Exhibit 12 dated 22.1.1980 on the basis
 that it is a document contemporaneous to the Deed of

¶162

 : 26 :

¶163

 Partnership dated 11.1.1980 is therefore of no
 assistance to the Defendants.

¶164

 27. The other obvious and most important evidence
 that the Defendants were expected to lead was the
 evidence of the advocate in whose office the deceased
 and Defendant No.1 allegedly executed the Deed of
 Partnership. It is significant that the advocate was
 not examined. There is no explanation why the
 Defendants failed to examine the advocate. Mr.Maniyar
 sought to tender an extremely curious explanation
 during the course of argument. He stated that the
 advocate was not examined as he had expired. He
 submitted that I ought to take judicial notice of this
 fact. He however did not state on what basis I should
 take "judicial notice" of this fact. He did not even
 state the date on which the advocate had expired. He
 did not even care to produce the advocate’s roll
 assuming that would have been sufficient. He did
 nothing to establish either that the advocate had
 expired or the date on which he allegedly expired.

¶165

 28. I must therefore draw an adverse inference
 against the Defendants to the effect that had they led
 the evidence of a finger prints expert and had they
 examined the advocate their evidence would not only

¶166

 : 27 :

¶167

 not have supported the Defendants’ case but would have
 militated against their case.

¶168

 29. Mr.Maniyar then relied upon a letter dated
 22nd May, 1981 addressed by the Grindlays Bank Ltd.
 to the Plaintiffs’ advocate in reply to their letter
 dated 14th May, 1981. The bank states in the letter
 that the account which the deceased maintained with
 them was not his sole account but was of the
 partnership account and that Defendant No.1 was the
 only other partner. Thereafter the bank stated as
 follows :-

¶169

 "In terms of the Partnership Deed dated

¶170

 11.1.1980 signed by the parties, it was
 provided that the death of a partner would
 not dissolve the partnership but the shares
 of the deceased therein would be taken over
 by the surviving partner. Accordingly on the
 death of Mr.Kurbanhusain Taiyebali on 5th
 August, 1980, the surviving partner
 Mrs.Kulsumbai Kurbanhusain took over the
 assets of the firm and she is now operating
 the firm’s account with us with 2 other
 partners".

¶171

 : 28 :

¶172

 30. The letter does not support the Defendants’
 case. The Defendants did not examine any officer of
 the bank. The Defendants did not even call upon the
 bank to produce the documents/record of the account in
 its possession. In any event, the letter of the bank
 cannot by any stretch of imagination establish the
 execution of the Deed of Partnership of the deceased
 in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the
 facts and circumstances of the present case,
 considering the preponderance of probabilities, I am
 not inclined to hold that the execution of the Deed of
 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 is established by
 this document.

¶173

 31. Mr.Maniyar then relied upon Exhibit-AA which
 comprises of 35 bills. The bills are on the
 letterheads of third parties. The bills issued by
 such third parties are allegedly to "M/s.Kurbanhusein
 Tyaballi & Co." in respect of umbrellas sold and
 delivered by them. I use the word "allegedly" because
 admittedly the witness added the words ‘& Co.’ in his
 handwriting. Fakhruddin in his cross-examination
 conducted on 28th November, 2003 admitted that in some
 of the bills he added the words "& Co." in his
 handwriting. It was suggested by him that the words
 "& Co." were added by him to show that the business

¶174

 : 29 :

¶175

 was carried on by the alleged partnership firm and not
 by the deceased as a sole proprietor. This he ought
 never to have done. I stop short of stating that the
 documents were tampered with for it is not clear when
 he altered them. They are unreliable to establish the
 partnership.

¶176

 32. I do not see how these bills advance the

¶177

 Defendants’ case regarding the Deed of Partnership
 dated 11th January, 1980 in any manner. The mere fact
 that they addressed the bills to M/s.Kurbanhusein
 Tyaballi & Co. at the same premises is of no
 consequence. The deceased carried on the business
 even as a sole proprietor under the same firm name and
 style though without the words "& Co.". The
 Respondents have not produced any letterheads or bills
 used by the sole proprietary concern of the deceased.
 In fact production of these bills and the absence of
 any bills on the letter heads of the alleged
 partnership firm and of the sole proprietary firm is a
 fact against the Defendants. They have not produced
 any documents by way of letter heads, bills, vouchers,
 challans or correspondence pertaining to the alleged
 partnership firm of 11th January, 1980 and the sole
 proprietary firm. The absence of such documents is a
 strong indication against the Defendants’ case.

¶178

 : 30 :

¶179

 33. In his affidavit dated 28th November, 2003,
 by which he sought to prove Exhibit-AA, Fakhruddin
 stated that he was conducting the business of the
 deceased during his life time along with him ; that
 he was fully acquainted with the business of the
 deceased ; that he had personal knowledge of all the
 transactions of his business ; that he was therefore
 in a position to prove all the documents by stating
 that the contents thereof were true and correct and by
 identifying the contents thereof as he had personal
 knowledge of the transactions referred to therein. If
 this witness was deeply involved in the business of
 the deceased, one wonders why he did not produce any
 documents of the nature I have referred to above.

¶180

 34. Mr.Maniyar then relied upon Exhibit-S which
 is an entry in the alleged books of account of the
 partnership firm. It is agreed between the counsel
 that the entry is made on the credit side ("Jama") on
 10th March, 1980 and that it indicates a credit of
 Rs.35,000/- in the name of Defendant No.1. (Actual
 name in the books is Kursanbai which is not the
 name/spelling of the first Defendant’s name but
 Mr.Thakkar fairly agrees to proceed on the basis that
 it refers to original Defendant No.1). Mr.Maniyar,

¶181

 : 31 :

¶182

 relying upon this entry, stated that it pertains to
 the capital brought by original Defendant No.1 into
 the partnership firm, constituted under the Deed of
 Partnership Dated 11th January, 1980. I am unable to
 accept this submission for several reasons.

¶183

 35. The entry appears in the cash book and not in
 the ledger. The entry does not indicate the purpose
 for which the amount was allegedly paid by original
 Defendant No.1 to the partnership firm. In fact the
 books of account themselves do not establish that they
 pertain to the alleged partnership firm. The ledger
 has not been produced. The amount could have been
 paid for any reason such as a loan or repayment of a
 loan or even a deposit. In the absence of any other
 evidence, it is impossible to arrive at conclusion as
 to on what account the same was paid. The Defendants
 did not produce the records of the bank to show the
 deposit of the amount which is alleged to have been
 made by cheque. The defendants have not produced the
 pay in slip book pertaining to this entry. Fakhruddin
 himself in paragraph 26 of the cross-examination does
 not offer any explanation on what account the money
 was paid by original Defendant No.1 to the partnership
 firm.

¶184

 : 32 :

¶185

 36. The entry could appropriately have been
 explained by the witnesses’ father Abedeali. He is
 Plaintiff No.3 in Suit No.709 of 1984. The witness in
 his cross-examination admitted that the entry
 Exhibit-S was made by Abedeali, who was the manager of
 the firm. In fact all the entries had been made by
 Abedeali. There is no explanation why Abedeali was
 not examined. The witness admitted in the
 cross-examination that Abedeali is a partner of the
 new firm constituted by a Deed of Partnership dated

¶186

 10th January, 1981 and that he is alive. The
 Defendants having failed to examine Abedeali,
 justifies an adverse inference that he did not examine
 himself as a witness as his evidence would have been
 detrimental to the Defendants’ case.

¶187

 37. Mr.Thakkar submitted that the books of

¶188

 account were in fact not proved. He relied upon
 Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act in support of
 his case. Section 34 of the Evidence Act reads thus:-

¶189

 "34. Entries in books of account
when relevant. - Entries in books
 of account regularly kept in the
 course of business, are relevant
 whenever they refer to a matter
 into which the Court has to
 inquire, but such statements shall
 not alone be sufficient evidence
 to charge any person with

¶190

 : 33 :

¶191

 liability."

¶192

 . I do not for a moment suggest that there is
 no force in the submission. However, in view of the
 fact that the books of account have been admitted in
 evidence, this argument is not open to him. The
 Plaintiffs’ remedy, assuming that the submission is
 well founded, is to challenge it in appeal.

¶193

 38. However, I am inclined to accept Mr.Thakkar’s
 submission that the books of account are not reliable
 and do not advance the Defendants’ case in the
 present proceedings.

¶194

 39. In Dadarao versus The State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1974 Supreme Court 388, relied upon by
 Mr.Thakkar, the Appellant was an accused before the
 Judicial Magistrate being tried under Section 408 of
 the Indian Penal Code on the charge of breach of
 trust in respect of a sum of Rs.7000/-. The
 Appellant was a manager of a Samiti, that had offices
 at two locations. The amounts received at one
 location used to be carried to the head office by an
 employee. In the daily cash book maintained at one
 location, an entry used to be made showing the amount
 despatched to the head office and mentioning the name

¶195

 : 34 :

¶196

 of the person through whom the amount was sent. The

¶197

 head office would normally send the receipt to the
 branch office the next day and then the branch office
 would give the number to the said receipts serially.
 In the course of these transactions, it was alleged
 that the Appellant misappropriated a sum of
 Rs.7,000/-. There was no direct evidence for
 entrustment to the Appellant. The Respondent further
 produced the books of account of the head of the
 office and the branch office. The books of the
 branch office contained a debit entry, showing that a
 sum of Rs.7,000/- was given to the Appellant for
 being taken to the head office. The Supreme Court
 however, held that a mere entry, in support of any
 oral evidence cannot prove entrustment. The Supreme
 Court held as under :-

¶198

 "5. The High Court has rightly
 observed that there is no direct
 evidence of entrustment to the
 appellant. We have gone through the
 record in order to find whether
 there is any in-direct evidence of
 entrustment but we see none. All
 that the prosecution did was to
 produce the books of account of the
 Chikhli head office and of the
 Buldana branch. There is a debit
 entry in the books of the Buldana
 branch showing that a sum of
 Rs.7000/- was given to the appellant
 on November 10, 1965 for being taken
 to the head office but the mere

¶199

 : 35 :

¶200

 entry, unsupported by any oral
 evidence cannot prove entrustment.
 Section 34 of the Evidence Act says
 that entries in books of account,
 regularly kept in the course of
 business are relevant but such
 statements shall not alone be
 sufficient evidence to charge any
 person with liability. The
 prosecution did not examine anyone
 even to show that the books of
 account were regularly kept in the
 course of business nor indeed was
 any attempt made to lead evidence
 apart from the production of books
 of account to prove the entrustment
 of the amount to the appellant."

¶201

 40. Mr.Thakkar then relied upon the judgment in -
Smt. Chandrakantaben J. Modi and Narendra Jayantilal
Modi versus Vadilal Bapalal Modi and others, AIR 1989
Supreme Court, 1269. The Supreme Court held as
 under:-

¶202

 "14. It is apparent from the
 evidence that nobody takes the
 responsibility of supporting the
 correctness of the entries in the
 account books. When they were
 produced in Court the plaintiff
 filed his objection as per his
 purshis, Ext.172 (page 368 of the
 paper book), Many of the documents
 produced by the defendant No.1 were
 accepted, but the account books
 which were serial Nos.123-75 to
 123-97 of the list Ext.123 were in
 express terms not admitted. The
 plaintiff said that they might be
 exhibited, but subject to his
 objection. The defendant No.6 also
 filed her objection as per the
 purshis Ext.275. The plaintiff did
 not make any statement supporting

¶203

 : 36 :

¶204

 the books in his examination in
 chief and only in reply to the
 question of the cross-examining
 lawyer of the defendant No.1, he
 stated as mentioned earlier. It is
 significant to note that by saying
 that he had written as per the
 instructions of the defendant No.1.
 he made it clear that he could not
 vouchsafe for their reliability. In
 spite of this situation, the
 defendant No.1 could not summon
 courage to support them either
 personally or through any witness.
 No reason has been suggested at all
 on his behalf as to why he did not
 produce the other important
 documents in his possession which
 would have supported the account
 books and the joint case of the
 parties resisting the appellants’
 claim. In view of all these
 circumstances we have no hesitation
 in rejecting the account books as
 not reliable."

¶205

 41. The judgment supports Mr.Thakkar’s
 submission. In the present case also, the entries
 have not been supported with any oral evidence. The
 persons who made the entries, namely the witness’
 father, was a partner in the new firm and a party to
 the present proceedings. Despite the same, he was not
 examined. The witness who claims to have been
 involved in the business during the life time of the
 deceased, has given no satisfactory explanation for
 the entries. In the circumstances, I am unable to
 read the entries in the manner in which Mr.Maniyar has
 invited me to do so.

¶206

 : 37 :

¶207

 42. Thus far therefore the evidence relied upon

¶208

 by the Defendants to prove the execution of the Deed
 of Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 is not only
 unsatisfactory but in fact militates against the
 Defendants’ case. However, in addition thereto, there
 are compelling reasons to discard the Defendants’ case
 in this regard altogether.

¶209

 43. Mr.Thakkar submitted, with considerable
 force, that there was no explanation why the Deed of
 Partnership was executed by the deceased by affixing
 his left hand thumb impression. This argument finds
 greater force in the fact, as admitted by Fakhruddin,
 that the witness signed all the documents in
 connection with his business and banks in Gujarathi.
 Further Fakhruddin in his cross-examination admitted
 that the deceased did not know English. There is no
 evidence whatsoever either in the Deed of Partnership
 or otherwise which even remotely suggest that the Deed
 of Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 which is in
 English was translated.

¶210

 44. The Defendants examined original Defendant
 No.1 in support of their case. Before I deal with her
 evidence, I must state that Mr.Maniyar fairly conceded

¶211

 : 38 :

¶212

 that if her deposition is to be accepted, it destroys
 the Defendants’ case entirely. It most certainly
 does. The only question is whether I ought to rely
 upon her evidence at all. Mr.Maniyar submitted that
 his own clients’ evidence sought to be discarded
 entirely as she expired on 8th May, 1988 before her
 examination-in-chief was completed. I do not agree.

¶213

 45. It is necessary to set out the entire
 examination-in-chief of original Defendant No.1 as it
 destroys the Defendants case comprehensively.

¶214

 "I do not remember the exact date of
 my marriage. I say that I was
 married about 40 years back from
 today. After my marriage I was
 residing at Khokha Bazar, Bombay.
 At Khokha Bazar I was residing with
 my husband. Out of this marriage I
 had five daughters in all. Out of
 which one is dead. The name of the
 eldest daughter is Fatimabai. The
 name of my second daughter is
 Asmabai, and the names of the other
 two daughters are Khatijabai and
 Mariambai respectively. Asmabai is
 married, so also Khatijabai and
 Mariambai. After the marriage of
 the three daughters they started
 residing with their husband. My
 eldest daughter Fatimabai is also
 married.Fatimabai married to
 Abedealli. After the marriage of
 Fatimabai she continued to reside
 with me. Abedealli has only one son
 and his name is Fakhruddin.
 Fakhruddin is married. Fakhruddin
 has a daughter and a son.
 Fakhruddin his wife and two children

¶215

 : 39 :

¶216

 residing with me at Khokha Bazar,
 Bombay.

¶217

 . Asmabai, Khatijabai and
 Mariambai have filed the Suit
 against me in this Court.

¶218

 . My husband was carrying on
 the business of Umbrella. He was
 carrying on the above business at
 Jumma Masjid, Bombay. This business
 was being carried on form a Shop.
 It was a good shop. The shop had a
 mazzine floor. The mazzine floor
 consisted of two rooms. My husband
 was doing this business since my
 marriage. My husband was carrying
 on business of Umbrella for about
 three to four months in a year.
 Witness further adds that her
 husband was carrying on the business
 of Umbrellas for the whole year.

¶219

 Q. Who else is carrying on
 business from the Shop ?

¶220

 . (Mr.Shah objects on the
 ground that this is a leading
 question with itself suggests the
 answer and therefore the same cannot
 be asked.)

¶221

 A. I do not remember.

¶222

 . Since the time of the
 business the shop belonged to my
 husband. My husband was paying the
 rent of the said shop during his
 life time. The electricity charges
 were being paid out of the income of
 the shop by my husband.

¶223

 Q. Were you in any way
 connected with your
 husband’s business ?

¶224

 A. I used to have a business of
 greetings cards during the
 Diwali Festival.

¶225

 Q. Were you doing the business

¶226

 : 40 :

¶227

 of Umbrellas also with your
 husband ?

¶228

 (Mr.Shah objects on the
 ground that it is a leading
 question.)

¶229

 A. I was not doing Umbrellas
 business with my husband.

¶230

 Q. Was any document executed
 with your husband by you in
 respect of business ?

¶231

 A. No.

¶232

 . At the request of Mr.Maniar,
 Advocate for the Defendants matter
 adjourned to Wednesday the 20th
 April, 1988 at 5.30 P.M. to enable
 him to produce the document from the
 custody of the Court receiver.)"

¶233

 46. There is no gainsaying that her evidence not
 only does not support the Defendants case but
 completely destroys it. Her answer to the last three
 questions establishes that she was not doing any
 business with the deceased and that she had not
 executed any document with the deceased.

¶234

 47. Mr.Maniyar, however, submitted that the Court
 ought not to consider the evidence of original
 Defendant No.1. as she expired even before her
 examination-in-chief could be concluded. The
 Defendants were deprived a very valuable right of
 having her declared hostile. This situation requires

¶235

 : 41 :

¶236

 consideration of an important question viz. the

¶237

 effect of evidence of a party, who expires before the
 examination-in-chief is concluded.

¶238

 48. The counsel were unable to invite my
 attention to any authorities on the point. There is
 no authority to suggest however that the evidence of a
 witness, who expires before his evidence concludes can
 in no circumstances be considered by the Court. The
 adverse party would certainly be entitled to contend
 that the evidence ought not to be accepted because,
 the witness having expired he is deprived of the
 opportunity of cross-examination. This too does not
 appear to be an absolute or inflexible rule. As it
 does not arise for consideration in this case, I
 refrain from expressing a final opinion on it.
 However, a party who produces the witness in support
 of his case, is not easily entitled to have the
 evidence erased altogether in all circumstances.

¶239

 . Had the cross-examination even begun, the
 matter could have posed no difficulty at all. The
 cross-examiner could have stated that he did not wish
 to cross-examine the witness. In such a case, he
 would have been entitled to rely upon the evidence of
 the witness in examination-in-chief in support of his

¶240

 : 42 :

¶241

 case if in fact, the evidence supported the adverse
 parties case. In this case, the complication arises
 by virtue of the fact that even the
 examination-in-chief was not concluded.

¶242

 49. Mr.Maniyar’s contention is that he appeared
 for both the Defendants. It was always open for him,
 on behalf of Defendant No.2, to disassociate her from
 Defendant No.1 and to have had her declared hostile.
 He relies upon Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act,
 1872, which reads as under :-

¶243

"Question by party to his own
witness - The Court may, in its
 discretion, permit the person who
 calls a witness to put any
 questions to him which might be
 put in cross-examination by the
 adverse party".

¶244

 50. As a general proposition of law, Mr.Maniyar’s
 submission is not incorrect. There could be a
 situation where Defendants supporting each other
 initially, may find it necessary to discontinue
 supporting each other for a variety of reasons. For
 instance one of the parties may decide to collude
 with the adverse party dishonestly harming the party
 whom he was thus far supporting. In such a case, it
 may be possible for a party to withdraw his support

¶245

 : 43 :

¶246

 to such party and make an application under Section
 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, to have him declared
 hostile and cross-examine him.

¶247

 51. However, in the facts and circumstances of
 this case, this argument is not available to
 Mr.Maniyar. Original Defendant No.1 and Defendant
 No.2 filed a common written statement. They were
 represented by a common advocate. Their interests
 were the same at least upto the date on which
 original defendant No.1 was examined i.e. 12.4.1988.
 It is pertinent to note that thereafter not one of
 the parties has ever stated in any pleadings, in any
 affidavit or in any part of the evidence that
 original Defendant No.1 deposed falsely in her
 examination-in-chief. Nor have they stated that on
 that date she was not capable of giving evidence.
 Nor have they stated that her evidence is unreliable
 for any reason. It is further pertinent to note that
 even after original Defendant No.1 expired on 8th
 May, 1988, Fakhruddin filed affidavits by way of
 examination-in-chief on 23rd September, 2002, 24th
 February, 2003, 4th March, 2003 and 28th November,
 2003. Not once has he stated anything to the above
 effect.

¶248

 : 44 :

¶249

 52. Fakhruddin in paragraph 2 of his
 cross-examination, merely stated that original
 Defendant No.1 was 82-83 years old when her evidence
 was partly recorded. He did not suggest even at that
 stage that original Defendant No.1 was incapable of
 giving evidence for any reason whatsoever. Nor did
 he state that she had turned hostile or that she had
 made any false statement. Indeed, this was never the
 Defendant’s case. It was merely argued by Mr.Maniyar
 across the bar.

¶250

 53. Further, if this was the Defendants’ case,
 they ought to have examined the witnesses’ mother
 Defendant No.2 to indicate the reasons for the
 alleged hostility. Defendant No.2 i.e. Fakhruddin’s
 mother was not examined. The reason given in that
 she was 75 years old. But nobody has said that she
 was incapable of giving evidence. Nobody has said
 that she was incapable of giving evidence on
 commission. Her mother, original Defendant No.1 was
 however, examined. Failure to examine her, itself
 leads to an adverse inference that if she had
 examined herself, her evidence would have been
 detrimental to the Defendants’ case.

¶251

 54. Original Defendant No.1 further stated that

¶252

 : 45 :

¶253

 her husband carried on the business and paid all
 expenses in relation thereto. There is nothing in
 her evidence that suggests that she is incapable of
 giving evidence effectively. She has stated in fact
 that she had her own business of greeting cards
 during the Diwali festival. Mr.Maniyar submitted
 that merely because original Defendant No.1 stated in
 her evidence that the deceased was paying the rent of
 the shop during his life time and that electricity
 charges were being paid out of the income of the shop
 by the deceased, it could not be inferred that, she
 was not her husband’s partner in the firm. He based
 this submission on the premise that in India a woman
 can’t be expected to engage in any business, or pay
 electricity bills. None of his clients have said so.
 None of his witnesses have said so. I am unable to
 understand on what basis Mr.Maniyar has developed
 this theory and on what basis he expects the Court to
 accept it. This rather unfortunate submission
 requires no further consideration.

¶254

 55. In these circumstances, I am not inclined to
 disregard the evidence of original Defendant No.1.
 It virtually concludes the Defendants’ case as
 regards the alleged execution of the Deed of
 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980.

¶255

 : 46 :

¶256

 56. Mr.Maniyar sought to rely upon the alleged
 estate duty forms. He is however not entitled to do
 so as the same were not marked in evidence. They are
 marked only for identification.

¶257

 57. Mr.Maniyar then relied upon a second

¶258

 affidavit of Fakhruddin by way of his

¶259

 examination-in-chief in Suit No.709 of 1984 and

¶260

 submitted that he had furnished a cogent reason for
 the formation of the partnership only a few months
 before he expired. He stated that the deceased had
 become very old and that the Plaintiffs in suit
 No.603 of 1981 were against the deceased and his
 wife. He further stated that as the deceased was

¶261

 worried about his wife and fear that the Plaintiffs
 would not allow her to live in peace he took her as
 his partner in the said business. Apart from bare
 allegations, there are no particulars whatsoever
 which entitle me to hold that the same is sufficient
 evidence to prove execution of the Deed of
 Partnership.

¶262

 58. Mr.Maniyar was however correct in contending

¶263

 that the evidence of Khatija Yusufji Bastawala -
 Plaintiff No.1, by itself would not disprove the

¶264

 : 47 :

¶265

 partnership deed for she admitted in paragraphs 11
 and 14 of her cross-examination that she was not
 aware about the same. She had not even taken
 inspection of the partnership deed. However, it was
 not necessary for Mr.Thakkar to rely upon the
 evidence of Plaintiff No.1 in view of what I have
 held above.

¶266

 59. Mr.Thakkar did not press issue No.2 in Suit
 No.709 of 1984.

¶267

 60. The Defendants’ difficulties, however, do not
 end here. Mr.Thakkar submitted with considerable
 force that there was a total absence of any evidence
 to prove that the tenancy rights were in fact brought
 into the partnership stock. Thus even assuming that
 on 11th January, 1980 , a Deed of Partnership was
 executed, that by itself would not advance the
 Defendants’ case regarding the question whether the
 tenancy rights of the deceased in the shop were
 brought into the partnership. Mr.Maniyar conceded
 that the only basis on which the Defendants’ case
 rests in this regard is the wording of clause 9 of
 the Deed of Partnership. It would be convenient
 therefore at this stage to consider the Deed of
 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980.

¶268

 : 48 :

¶269

 61. The recital to the Deed of Partnership states

¶270

 that in the said premises, the deceased carried on
 business as a sole proprietor in the firm name and
 style of M/s.Kurbanhusein Tyaballi and that he had
 agreed to take his wife as his partner on the terms
 and conditions mentioned therein. Clause 1 provides
 that the business shall be carried on in the name and
 style of M/s.Kurbanhusein Tyaballi & Co. The shares
 of the parties in the profit and/or loss of the
 partnership business shall be equal. Clauses 2, 8
 and 9 read as under :-

¶271

 "2. That the Partnership
 business will be that of dealing in
 Umbrellas and manufacturing thereof
 and the same shall be carried on in
 the shop premises on the ground
 floor at 246, Janjikar Street, Near
 Juma Masjid, Bombay-400 002. The
 parties hereto may also carry on
 business at any other place or
 places as the parties may mutually
 decide and agree upon the same.

¶272

 8. It has been agreed that
 death of any one of the partners
 herein shall not dissolve the
 Partnership but the share of such
 deceased partner shall be taken over
 by the surviving partner.

¶273

 9. On dissolution of the
 Partnership each partner will have
 equal share in the assets,
 paraphernalias and goodwill of the
 said business, including the
 benefits of the tenancy rights of

¶274

 : 49 :

¶275

 the said premises."

¶276

 62. The mere fact that the deceased agreed that
 the business of the partnership shall be carried on in
 the said premises, did not make the premises or any
 right therein a property of the firm. The document
 does not expressly transfer the right of the deceased
 in the said premises to the partnership firm.

¶277

 63. There is no presumption in law that a
 partner’s individual property is the property of the
 firm merely because the firm uses the same.
 Mr.Thakkar relied upon the judgment in Arjun Kanoji
Tankar versus Santaram Kanoji Tankar, 1969 (3) Supreme
Court Cases, 555. The Supreme Court in paragraph 13
 held thus :-

¶278

 "13. Counsel for the defendant
 contends that in any event by
 virtue of Section 14 of the
 Partnership Act, 1932, all the
 assets with aid of which the
 business was carried on by the
 plaintiff must be deemed in law to
 have become partnership assets,
 under the deed of partnership,
 dated March 16, 1953. Section 14
 of the Partnership Act, 1932
 provides :

¶279

 "Subject to contract
 between the partners, the
 property of the firm
 includes all property and

¶280

 : 50 :

¶281

 rights and interests in
 property originally brought
 into the stock of the firm,
 or acquired, by purchase or
 otherwise, by or for the
 firm, or for the purposes
 and in the course of the
 business of the firm, and
 includes also the goodwill
 of the business."

¶282

 Property belonging to a person, in
 the absence of an agreement to the
 contrary, does not, on the person
 entering into a partnership with
 others, become the property of the
 partnership merely because it is
 used for the business of the
 partnership. It will become
 property of the partnership only if
 there is an - agreement express or
 impliedth - at the property was,
 under the agreement of partnership,
 to be treated as the property of
 the partnership.

¶283

 In Lindley on Partnership, 12th
 Edn., it is stated at p. 365 :

¶284

 "Again, it by no means
 follows that property used
 by all the partners for
 partnership purposes is
 partnership property. For
 example, the house and land
 in and upon which the
 partnership business is
 carried on often belongs to
 one of the partners only,
 either subject to lease to
 the firm, or without any
 lease at all.

¶285

 If, however, a partner
 brings such property into
 the common stock as part of
 his capital it becomes
 partnership property, and
 any increase in its value
 will belong to the firm.

¶286

 : 51 :

¶287

 the only true method of
 determining as between the
 partners themselves what
 belongs to the firm, and
 what not, is to ascertain
 what agreement has been
 come to upon the subject.
 But this is by no means
 always an easy matter."

¶288

 We are unable to agree with counsel
 for the defendant that whenever
 there is a partnership and the
 assets which originally belonged to
 one of the partners are used for
 the purposes of the partnership,
 they must be presumed to have
 become partnership assets. In
Miles v. Clarke the defendant
 started the business of a
 photographer and then admitted the
 plaintiff - a successful free lance
 photographer - as a partner. The
 leasehold premises, furniture and
 studio equipment belonged to the
 defendant. It was intended to
 record the terms of partnership
 into a formal agreement, but no
 terms were ever settled, except
 that the partners were to share the
 profits equally. On dissolution of
 the partnership it was held that no
 terms ought to be implied except
 such as were essential to business
 efficacy and that only the
 consumable items of stock-in-trade
 were to be regarded as assets of
 the partnership, and the lease of
 the property, equipment and
 personal goodwill were to be
 treated as being the property of
 the partners who brought them into
 the business."

¶289

 . Mr.Thakkar reliance upon the above judgment
 is well founded.

¶290

 : 52 :

¶291

 64. Mr.Maniyar, however, submits that clause 9
 implies that the rights of the deceased in the said
 premises stood transferred to the firm for otherwise
 there was no need for the parties to provide that each
 partner would have an equal right in the tenancy
 rights of the said premises. I do not suggest for a
 moment that Mr.Maniyar’s submission is totally
 unfounded. The words "said premises" would indicate
 the premises referred to earlier in the document. In
 clause 2, there is a reference to the suit premises.
 But that does not by itself indicate an intention on
 the part of the deceased to have brought the tenancy
 rights into the partnership with an intention of
 divesting himself of all right, title and interest
 therein. Original Defendant No.1 has not even
 suggested in her evidence that the right of the
 deceased in the premises was brought into the
 partnership firm.

¶292

 65. Mr.Thakker submitted that the tenancy rights
 by themselves could not have been brought into the
 partnership firm in view of the provision of Section
 15 of the Bombay Rent Act. Under the notification
 dated 24th September, 1998, the tenancy rights could
 be transferred or assigned only as under :-

¶293

 : 53 :

¶294

 . "The Government of Bombay
 has permitted in all areas to which
 Part II of this Act extends all
 transfers and assignments by
 lessees of their interests in
 leasehold premises as, and to the
 extent, specified in the Schedule
 as under :-

¶295

 (2). Transfer or assignment
 incidental to the sale of a
 business as a going concern
 together with the stock-in-trade
 and the goodwill thereof, provided
 that the transfer or assignment is
 of the entire interest of the
 transferor or assignor in such
 leasehold premises together with
 the business and the stock-in-trade
 and goodwill thereof."

¶296

 . It is a moot point whether I can hold the
 transfer as void assuming that it has not been in
 accordance with the circular not at the instance of
 the landlord but at the instance of a third party. As
 I have not had the benefit of the assistance from the
 counsel on this point, I refrain from deciding it.
 This is more so as it is a question of law of general
 importance. Moreover, it is not necessary for me to
 decide this issue as in any event I have held that
 there was no transfer of tenancy rights by the
 deceased to the alleged partnership firm.

¶297

 66. In the circumstances, it must be held that
 the alleged Deed of Partnership dated 11th January,

¶298

 : 54 :

¶299

 1980 was not executed. Even assuming that it was
 executed, the deceased did not transfer his tenancy
 rights in the suit property to the partnership firm.

¶300

ISSUE NOS.4 AND 5 IN SUIT NO.709 OF 1984 :

¶301

 67. The question to be considered here is the

¶302

 effect of the death of the deceased on the partnership
 firm constituted under the Deed of Partnership dated
 11th January, 1980 assuming it was entered into.
 Admittedly on the date of the death of the deceased,
 there were only two partners in the firm.

¶303

 68. Mr.Maniyar submitted that as per clause 8 of

¶304

 the Deed of Partnership, upon the death of the
 deceased, the firm did not stand dissolved but that
 original Defendant No.1 as a surviving partner, took
 over the share of the deceased. Thereafter Plaintiff
 Nos.2, 3 and 4 in Suit No.709 of 1984, carried on
 business in the name and style of Plaintiff No.1 in
 the suit premises. Founding himself on the basis that
 the tenancy rights of the deceased were transferred to
 the partnership firm constituted on 11th January, 1980
 and on the basis that upon the death of the deceased,
 his share in that firm including the said tenancy
 rights in the said premises stood transferred he

¶305

 : 55 :

¶306

 submitted that the tenancy rights were taken over by
 original Defendant No.1. He submitted that original
 Defendant No.1 was entitled to deal with the same in
 any manner that she desired. Accordingly, he
 submitted that original Defendant No.1 transferred her
 rights in the said premises to the new firm i.e.
 Plaintiff No.1 in Suit No.709 of 1984 constituted
 under the Deed of Partnership dated 10th January, 1981
 (Exhibit - 9).

¶307

 69. In fact a perusal of Exhibit-9 does not
 indicate that original Defendant No.1 transferred her
 alleged right in the said premises to Plaintiff No.1
 in Suit No.709 of 1984.

¶308

 70. Clause 8 of the Deed of Partnership dated
 11th January, 1980 contemplates a situation where a
 partnership firm does not stand dissolved. It does
 not deal with a situation where the firm stands
 dissolved. Such a situation is contemplated only by
 clause 9. This is the only way in which the two
 clauses can be read harmoniously. In the present case
 it is clause 9 that will govern the rights of the
 parties. This is for the reason that by virtue of the
 provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the
 partnership firm constituted under the Deed of

¶309

 : 56 :

¶310

 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 stood dissolved
 on the death of the deceased. It stood dissolved by
 virtue of the fact that upon the death of the
 deceased, original Defendant No.1 was the sole
 surviving partner. A partnership predicates at least
 two parties to constitute it.

¶311

 71. Mr.Maniyar, to rebutt this position, relied
 upon the provisions of Section 42 (c) of the Indian
 Partnership Act, which reads as under :-

¶312

 "Dissolution on the happening of
certain contingencies. -

¶313

 Subject to contract between the
 partners a firm is dissolved, -

¶314

 (a) ...............

¶315

 (b) ...............

¶316

 (c) by the death of a partners ;
 and"

¶317

 72. It is true that clause 8 of the Deed of

¶318

 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 is a contract to
 the contrary and therefore, the death of a partner
 would not dissolve the firm. That, however, is
 provided there were at least two partners even after
 the death of one of the partners. In the present
 case, clause 8 of the Deed of Partnership dated 11th

¶319

 : 57 :

¶320

 January, 1980 and Section 42(c) of the Indian
 Partnership Act would not keep the partnership firm
 for being dissolved. This is clear from the judgment
 of the Supreme Court in the case of - Commr. of
Income-tax Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhandara, Nagpur
(In both the appeals) versus Seth Govindram Sugar
Mills (In both the Appeals), AIR 1966 Supreme Court
24. In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 the Supreme Court held
 thus :

¶321

 "7. There is a fallacy in this
 argument. Partnership, under S. 4
 of the Partnership Act, is the
 relation between persons who have
 agreed to share the profits of a
 business carried on by all or any of
 them acting for all. Section 5 of
 the said Act says that the relation
 of partnership arises from contract
 and not from status. The
 fundamental principle of
 partnership, therefore, is that the
 relation of partnership arises out
 of contract and not out of status.
 To accept the argument of the
 learned counsel is to negative the
 basic principle of law of
 partnership. Section 42 can be
 interpreted without doing violence
 either to the language used or to
 the said basic principle. Section
 42 (c) of the Partnership Act can
 appropriately be applied to a
 partnership where there are more
 than two partners. If one of them
 dies, the firm is dissolved but if
 there is a contract to the contrary,
 the surviving partners will continue
 the firm. On the other hand,if one
 of the two partners of a firm dies,
 the firm automatically comes to an

¶322

 : 58 :

¶323

 end and, thereafter there is no
 partnership for a third party to be
 introduced therein and, therefore,
 there is no scope for applying cl.
 (c) of S. 42 to such a situation.
 It may be that pursuant to the
 wishes or the directions of the
 deceased partner the surviving
 partner may enter into a new
 partnership with the heir of the
 deceased partner, but that would
 constitute a new partnership. In
 this light S. 31 of the Partnership
 Act falls in line with S. 42
 thereof.That section only recognizes
 the validity of a contract between
 the partners to introduce a third
 party without the consent of all the
 existing partners; it presupposes
 the subsistence of a partnership ;
 it does not apply to a partnership
 of two partners which is dissolved
 by the death of one of them, for in
 that event there is no partnership
 at all for any new partner to be
 inducted into it without the consent
 of others.

¶324

 8. There is a conflict of
 judicial decisions on this question.
 The decision of the Allahabad High
 Court in Ram Kumar v. Kishori Lal,
AIR 1946 All 259, is not of any
 practical help to decide the present
 case. There, from the conduct of
 the surviving partner and the heirs
 of the deceased partner after the
 death of the said partner, the
 contract between the original
 partners that the partnership should
 not dissolved on the death of any of
 them was inferred. Though the
 partnership there was only between
 two partners, the question of the
 inapplicability of S.42 (c) of the
 Partnership Act to such a
 partnership was neither raised nor
 decided therein. The same criticism
 applies to the decision of the
 Nagpur High Court in Chainkaran
Sidhakaran v. Radhakisan

¶325

 : 59 :

¶326

Vishwanath, AIR 1956 Nag. 46. This
 question was directly raised and
 clearly answered by a Division Bench
 of the Allahabad High Court in
Mt.Sughra v. Babu, AIR 1952 All 506
at p.507 against the legality of
 such a term of a contract of
 partnership consisting of only two
 partners. Agarwala, J., neatly
 stated the principle thus ;

¶327

 . "In the case of a
 partnership consisting of only two
 partners, no partnership remains on
 the death of one of them and,
 therefore, it is a contradiction in
 terms to say that there can be a
 contract between two partners to the
 effect that on the death of one of
 them the partnership will not be
 dissolved but will continue .......
 Partnership is not a matter of
 status, it is a matter of contract.
 No heir can be said to become a
 partner with another person without
 his own consent express or implied."

¶328

 This view accords with that
 expressed by us earlier. In
Narayanan v. Umaval, AIR 1959
Mad.283 at p. 284, Ramchandra Iyer,
 J., as he then was, said much to the
 same effect when he observed thus :-

¶329

 "...... if one of the partners
 died, there will not be any
 partnership existing to which the
 legal representatives of the
 deceased partner could be taken in.
 In such a case the partnership would
 come to an end by the death of one
 of the two partners, and if the
 legal representatives of the
 deceased partner joins in the
 business later, it should be
 referable to a new partnership
 between them."

¶330

 But Chatterjee, J., in Hansraj Manot
v. Gorak Nath Pandey, 66 Cal. WN
262 at p. 264, struck a different

¶331

 : 60 :

¶332

 note. His reasons for the contrary
 view are expressed thus :-

¶333

 "Here the contract that has been
 referred to is the contract between
 the two partners Gorak Nath and
 Champalala ............. Therefore,
 it cannot be said that the contract
 ceased to have effect because a
 partner died. The contract was
 there. There was no new contract
 with the heirs and there was no
 question of a new contract with the
 heirs because of the original
 contract, and by virtue of the
 original contract the heirs become
 partners as soon as one of the
 partners died....................
 As soon as there is the death, the
 heirs become the partners
 automatically without any agreement
 between the original partners by
 virtue of the original agreement
 between the partners while they were
 surviving. There is no question of
 interregnum. As soon as the death
 occurs the right of somebody else
 occurs. The question of interregnum
 does not arise. The heirs become
 partners not because of a contract
 between the heirs on the one hand
 and the other partners on the other
 but because of the contract between
 the original partners of the firm."
 With great respect to the learned
 Judge, we find it difficult to
 appreciate the said reasons. The
 learned Judge seems to suggest that
 by reason of the contract between
 the original partners, the heirs of
 the deceased partner enter the field
 simultaneously with the removal by
 death of the other partner from the
 partnership. This implies that
 personality of the deceased partner
 projects into that of his heirs,
 with the result that there is a
 continuity of the partnership
 without any interregnum. There is
 no support either on authority or on
 principle for such a legal position.

¶334

 : 61 :

¶335

 In law and in fact there is an
 interregnum between the death of one
 and the succession to him. We
 accept the view of the Allahabad and
 Madras High Courts and reject the
 view expressed by Nagpur and
 Calcutta High Courts.

¶336

 9. The result of the discussion
 is that the partnership between
 Nandlal and Bachhulal came to an end
 on the death of Nandlal on December
 9, 1945."

¶337

 73. In the result, even assuming that the Deed of
 Partnership dated 11th January, 1980 was admittedly
 entered into and that the deceased brought his rights
 in respect of the said premises into the partnership,
 upon his death his estate would be entitled under
 clause 9 of the Deed of Partnership to a 50% share in
 the assets of the firm including the benefits of
 tenancy rights in respect of the said premises.

¶338

ISSUE NO.5 IN SUIT NO.603 OF 1981 AND ISSUE

¶339

NO.9 OF SUIT NO.709 OF 1984 :

¶340

 74. There is no evidence to substantiate these
 issues. They are accordingly answered in the
 negative.

¶341

ISSUE NO.1 IN SUIT NO.603 OF 1981 :

¶342

 : 62 :

¶343

 75. Mr.Maniyar submitted that the suit lacks a
 cause of action. This he submitted on the basis that
 there was a full and final settlement upon the death
 of the deceased between the members of the family.
 There is no issue on the question of full and final
 settlement between the parties. In any event, there
 is no cogent evidence to substantiate the case of a
 full and final settlement. Fakhruddin in his
 examination-in-chief alleged that a full and final
 settlement by which a sum of Rs.71,000/- in addition
 to the value of "Karim Building" would constitute the
 estate of the deceased was entered into. There are no
 particulars whatsoever of this alleged agreement.
 There are no details of when it was arrived at. There
 are no details of any sort including the persons who
 are the parties to the said settlement. The issue is
 therefore, answered in the negative.

¶344

ISSUE NO.2 IN SUIT NO.603 OF 1981 :

¶345

 76. This issue is not pressed.

¶346

ISSUE NO.1 IN SUIT NO.709 OF 1984 :

¶347

 77. Not necessary to be decided in view of the
 finding on the other issues.

¶348

 : 63 :

¶349

ISSUE NO.6 IN SUIT NO.709 OF 1984 :

¶350

 78. Mr.Maniyar fairly conceded that there was no
 evidence in support of the claim for damages. The

¶351

 issue is therefore, answered in the negative.

¶352

ISSUE NO.6 IN SUIT NO.603 OF 1981 :

¶353

 79. The shares of the parties in the estate of the

¶354

 deceased are determined as under :-

¶355

 i). The estate of original Defendnat No.1 is

¶356

 entitled to a one eighth share.

¶357

 ii). The original Plaintiffs are entitled to share

¶358

 the remaining estate equally.

¶359

ISSUE NO.7 IN SUIT NO.603 OF 1981 AND ISSUE
NO.11 IN SUIT NO.709 OF 1984 :

¶360

 80. As per the preliminary decree.

¶361

 81. None of the assets of the deceased form a part

¶362

 of the first Plaintiff firm.

¶363

 : 64 :

¶364

 82. In the circumstances, the following

¶365

 preliminary administration decree is passed -

¶366

 i). Decree in terms of prayers (a) to (c) and (i).
 The preliminary decree shall incorporate and
 be drawn up in accordance with the provisions
 of Order XXI Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
 Procedure.

¶367

 ii). It is declared that the branch of original
 Defendant No.1 is entitled to a 1/8th share in

¶368

 the estate of the deceased.

¶369

 iii). It is declared that the branches of the
 original Plaintiffs and of original Defendant
 No.2 are entitled to or equal share of 25%

¶370

 each in the remaining estate of the deceased.

¶371

 iv). It is declared that "Karim Building" referred
 to in paragraph 4 of the plaint forms part of
 the estate of the deceased.

¶372

 v). It is declared that all the assets including
 the goodwill of the business that the deceased

¶373

 carried on in the name and style of

¶374

 M/s.Kurbanhusein Tyaballi including the

¶375

 : 65 :

¶376

 tenancy rights in the said premises viz. shop
 No.246 Janjikar Street, Crawford Market, (near
 Jumma Masjid) Mumbai form part of the assets
 of the deceased.

¶377

 vi). The Commissioner for taking accounts shall
 proceed to ascertain the estate of the
 deceased and quantify the shares of the
 branches of the parties mentioned below.

¶378

 vii). The Court Receiver of this Court is appointed
 as Receiver of the estate of the deceased.
 The Receiver shall sell the estate of the
 deceased by public auction. Liberty to the
 parties to bid.

¶379

 viii). Liberty to the Court Receiver and to the
 parties to apply for directions for payment of
 the dues of the estate if any before the final
 decree.

¶380

 ix). After all properties of the estate of the
 deceased have been sold, the Receiver and the
 Commissioner for taking accounts shall submit
 a report ascertaining the shares of the
 aforesaid branches. The report shall take

¶381

 : 66 :

¶382

 into account all amounts that may be found due
 to the estate including from the

¶383

 parties/original parties to the two suits.

¶384

 x). The costs of the parties shall be decided at
 the stage of hearing/the final decree.

¶385

 xi). Liberty to the parties to apply.

¶386

 83. Suit No.709 of 1984 is dismissed with costs.

¶387

 . Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this
 order duly authenticated by the Associate/Court
 Stenographer of this Court.

¶388

 : 67 :

¶389

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

¶390

 SUIT NO.603 OF 1981
 WITH
 SUIT NO.709 OF 1984

¶391

DATE OF DECISION : 5TH/6TH AUGUST 2004.

¶392

 For Approval and Signature :

¶393

HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE S.J. VAZIFDAR.

¶394

 1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers )
 may be allowed to see the judgement ? )

¶395

 2. To be referred to the Reporter or )
 not ? )

Kurban Husein Tayabali and Co.and Ors. v. Bai Asamabai Moiz Matcheswala and Ors.

Case brief

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Kurban Husein Tayabali and Co.and Ors. v. Bai Asamabai Moiz Matcheswala and Ors.

Case brief

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