Dismissed

FPA-PMLA-529/LKW/2013 of Ashish Srivastava v. The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Lucknow & Ors.

ATFP2 Apr 2025FPA-PMLA-529/LKW/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal against the confirmation of provisional attachment of two Fixed Deposit Receipts totaling Rs. 2.02 crore. The court held that despite valid forfeiture under a private agreement, the funds constituted 'proceeds of crime' under PMLA and are liable to attachment irrespective of the holder's knowledge, overriding general contractual forfeiture rights.

What did the court decide?

The appeal was dismissed; the confirmation of provisional attachment of FDRs was upheld. Claims regarding the Bith upfront amount or refund to the bank were held not maintainable at this stage.

FPA-PMLA-529/LKW/2013 of Ashish Srivastava Vs. The Deputy… — Money Laundering | ATFP (2025)

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APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI

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MP-PMLA-693/LKW/2013 (Stay) FPA-PMLA-529/LKW/2013 Ashish Srivastava … Appellant Versus The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Lucknow & Ors. … Respondents

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Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

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For the Appellant : Mr. Vikas Mehta, Adv. Mr. Ankit Vashisth, Adv. For the Respondent (ED) : Ms. Anubha Bhardwaj, Adv. CORAM SHRI V. ANANDARAJAN : MEMBER

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FINAL ORDER 02.04.2025

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This is an appeal filed under section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA, 2002”) against the order of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) dated 26/09/2019, confirming the Provisional Attachment Order (“PAO”) dated 30.03.2013 in Original Complaint (“OC”) No. 194/2013, whereby the following properties of the Appellant herein were attached:

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(i) FDR bearing Acct. No. 7114437110000114 for Rs. 1.01 crore dated 11.02.2011

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(ii) FDR bearing Acct. No. 7114437110000115 for Rs. 1.01 crore dated 11.02.2011

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Facts in Brief:

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2. The relevant facts briefly are that the Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Lucknow Zonal Office (LZO), Lucknow registered ECIR No.

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FPA-PMLA-529/LKW/2013

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01/PMLA/LZO/2009 dt. 18.12.2009 under the provisions of the PMLA, 2002 based on the FIR No.RC.BD1/2009/E/0014 dated 20.08.2009 , filed by the CBI, Bank Securities & Fraud Cell, New Delhi on under section 120-B r/w 420 IPC, section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and substantive offences against Shri Hinish Ramchandani and other partners of M/s SRS Investment Company, having its office at 7/92, Tilak Nagar, Kanpur. They are alleged to have duped the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Kanpur of Rs.46.42 crore during the period June, 2008 to July, 2009 in connivance with certain officers of the branch by availing credit facilities without having sufficient funds in the account of M/s SRS Company and also by resorting to „kite-flying‟.

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3. Consequent upon the completion of investigation, the CBI filed Final Report under section 173 of Cr. P.C . before the Court of Hon'ble Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), CBI Cases, Lucknow on 31.03.2011 against Shri Sanjay Dixit, the then Deputy General Manager, five other senior Officers of State Bank of India, Main Branch, Kanpur, and Sh. Mr. Hinish Ramchandani, for causing loss of Rs.46 Crores to the bank, u/s 120-8 r/w 420 of IPC and Sections 7, 11, 12 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. They were also charged under Sections 120-B and Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. Sections 120-B and 420 of IPC and sections 7,11,12 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are Schedule Offences under the PMLA, 2002. Accordingly, action was initiated by ED under the said Act which resulted in provisional attachment of various properties vide PAO dated 30.03.2013 referred to in para-1 above. The properties attached vide the said PAO inter alia included the two FDRs of the present appellant.

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4. A complaint having been made to the Ld. Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) as per the requirement of Section 5(5), the Ld. AA confirmed the attachment of the aforesaid FDRs.

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5. Aggrieved by the said order of the Ld. AA, the appellant has filed the present appeal, challenging the impugned order on various grounds.

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The Appellant’s Case:

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6. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order dated 26.09.2013 to the extent it confirms the PAO dated 30.03.2013 in respect of two FDRs totalling Rs. 2.02 crores (Rs. 1.01 crore each) is erroneous in law and fact. In this regard, it is submitted that an Agreement to Sell dated 17.05.2009 was entered into between the Appellant and his mother, late Mrs. Manorama Devi (Vendors) and M/s SRS Developers through its Partner, viz., Hinish Ramchandani (Vendee) for the sale of property including the built-up structure (Kothi) with land attached forming part of Plot No. 25 situated in Block No. 6, Ranighat, Kanpur measuring 3189.3314 sq. metres. The total sale consideration was Rs. 8,47,64,635/-.

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7. It is mentioned in the Agreement that earnest money was being paid by way of two cheques of Rs. 51 lakh each in the respective names of the Appellant and his mother and another amount in cash of Rs. 50 lakh. Subsequently, another sum of Rs. 50 lakh was paid in cash towards earnest money against receipt dated 27.09.2009. As per Clause 4 of the said agreement, the sale deed was to be executed and registered by or upto 17.08.2009 by which date, the Vendee was to pay the entire balance sale consideration. Clause 8 provided that in case the Vendee did not pay or failed to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed

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and registered by or before 17.11.2009 the amount received as earnest money would stand forfeited. Further, Clause 13 provided that time would be of the essence of the agreement.

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8. It is submitted that the Appellant visited Kanpur on 07.11.2009 but the Vendee expressed its inability to arrange the funds. With a view to give a chance to the Vendee, the Appellant sent a letter dated 14.11.2009 suggesting that time could be extended upto 15.3.2010 subject to the sale consideration being increased and in case this was agreeable to the Vendee, the Vendee should send the same letter to the Vendors after countersigning the same. However, the Vendee did not send any reply.

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9. Accordingly, in terms of Clause 8 of the Agreement, the earnest money stood forfeited.

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10. Much later, a notice dated 04.09.2010 was received from the counsel for Hinish Ramchandani alleging that the balance sale consideration could not be paid by his client since an FIR had got registered against him and was being Investigated by CBI and the bank accounts had been frozen.

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11. The Appellant replied by his lawyer's letter dated 11.09.2010 denying the allegations and mentioned that on account of default by the Vendee, the earnest money stood forfeited. Thus, it is the contention of the appellant that the said money stood vested in the Appellant and his mother. The Appellant's mother died on 09.08.2010 and, by her will, she bequeathed her portion of the property to the Appellant.

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12. In the meanwhile, the State Bank of India (Resp. No. 6 in the present appeal) filed recovery proceedings before the Debts Recover Tribunal

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against SRS Investments and its partners. Hinish Ramchandani filed an application seeking restraint orders in respect of the Appellant's Kanpur property. The DRT dismissed the application.

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13. Thereafter, the Resp. No. 6 (SBI) filed an application for impleading the appellant in the proceedings. The DRT, Allahabad, without hearing the Appellant by Order dated 3.11.2010 allowed the application. Furthermore, the DRT also injuncted the Appellant from transferring his house. The Appellant filed an Application for recall contending that the Resp. No. 6 had no right to recover the amount paid by SRS Developers as it stood forfeited. The DRT, vide Order dated 15.12.2011, dismissed the Application. The Appellant then filed an Appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The DRAT vide Order dated 13.4.2012 allowed the said Appeal holding that there was no liability on the part of the Appellant towards the Bank. Hinish Ramchandani filed an application for review which was dismissed by the DRAT on 09.05.2012. Against the said order of DRAT, Hinish Ramchandani filed Writ Petition No. 27025/2012 before the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed on 29.05.2012.

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14. On the above facts, the first contention of the appellant is that the impugned order is erroneous for the reason that there are no proceeds of crime in this case. The money was advanced by SRS Developers (Vendee) to the Appellant under an Agreement to Sell towards earnest money for purchase of the Appellant's Kanpur property. The Agreement clearly provided that in case of failure on the part of the Vendee to pay the balance sale consideration by or before 17.11.2009, the earnest money would stand forfeited. Furthermore, time was of the essence of the contract. Since the Vendee failed to comply with his obligations in making over the balance

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sale consideration by the stipulated date, the earnest money paid stood forfeited.

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15. Secondly, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has not appreciated the concept of earnest money and forfeiture. In a line of decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a consistent view on this subject. In the case of Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345 the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to several earlier decisions. It also referred to Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air Craft Ltd., (1969) 3 SCC 522 and reproduced there from the principles governing the matter as follows: -

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"9. This Court, considering the scope of the term "earnest", laid down certain principles, which are as follows:

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"21. From a review of the decisions cited above, the following principles emerge regarding 'earnest':

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(1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract is concluded. (2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, in other words, "earnest" is given to bind the contract.

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(3) It is part of the purchase price when that transaction is carried out.

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(4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser.

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(5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller is entitled to forfeit in the earnest."

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Again, in paras 15 to 17 it is held as under:

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"15. The Law is, therefore, clear that to justify the forfeiture of advance money being part of "earnest money" the terms of the contract should be clear and explicit. Earnest money is paid or given at the time when the contract is entered into, and, as a pledge for its due performance by the depositor to be forfeited in case of non-performance by the depositor. There can be converse situation also that if the seller fails to perform the contract the purchaser can also get double the amount, if it is so stipulated. It is also the law that part-payment of purchase price cannot be forfeited unless it is a guarantee for the due performance of the contract. In other words, if the payment is made only towards partpayment of consideration and not intended as earnest money then the forfeiture clause will not apply.

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16. When we examine the clauses in the instant case, it is amply clear that the clause extracted hereinabove was included in the contract at the moment at which the contract was entered Into. It represents the guarantee that the contract would be fulfilled. In other words, "earnest" is given to bind the contract, which is a part of the purchase

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price when the transaction is carried out and it will be forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser.

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There is no other clause that militates against the clauses extracted in the agreement dated 29-11-2011. 17. We are, therefore, of the view that the seller was justified in forfeiting the amount of Rs.7,00,000 as per the relevant clause, since the earnest money was primarily a security for the due performance of the agreement and, consequently, the seller is entitled to forfeit the entire deposit The High Court has therefore, committed an error in reversing the judgement of the trial court."

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16. It is contended that the aforesaid decision is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In fact, forfeiture in terms of Clause 8 of the Agreement was automatic without any reference to anything further to be done. Therefore, there is no money whatsoever, which can be said to be relatable to SRS Developers or Hinish Ramchandani on which any provisional order or final order of attachment could have been passed.

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17. Thirdly, it is contended that the case was covered by an earlier order. The Ld. Authority did not consider that a larger bench of three Members, in proceedings arising out of the first provisional order of attachment against Hinish Ramchandani and others had, vide Order dated 08.08.2012, allowed the plea of forfeiture raised by one Cinema Capital, a capital venture fund, since Hinish Ramchandani had failed to make the subsequent instalments. It held that upon forfeiture there was no property in existence as defined in S. 2(1) of the PMLA and, therefore, no order of attachment could be passed. The present bench, which had only one Member, was required to follow the order of Three-Member Bench in the earlier round of litigation.

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18. Fourthly, it is argued that the effect of findings in proceedings arising out of DRT were not considered. The Ld. Adjudicating Authority

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could not have altogether disregarded the crucial findings given by the DRAT and the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court as regards the non-liability of the Appellant herein to return the money which had been forfeited by him. Such findings given by judicial authorities having the competence over their respective subject-matter were relevant. It is settled principle of law that Courts/ Tribunals would look into findings given by other competent Courts/ Tribunals and give due respect to them and not ignore them. Otherwise, there would be inconsistent findings by separate fora on the same aspect. On the one hand, the Ld. DRAT/ Hon'ble High Court do not find any liability on the part of the Appellant but on the other, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has directed that the FDRs be attached on the specious premise that same are part of proceeds of crime.

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19. Fifthly , it is contended that the ED's submission that Appellant had voluntarily agreed to attachment of funds is erroneous ED has relied upon the statement given by the Appellant under S. 50(2) & (3) of PMLA on 19.4.2012 when he was called by them to contend that the Appellant himself volunteered for the attachment. This is not true. A perusal of the statement would reveal that the Appellant had only agreed not to transfer the funds available with him to the tune of Rs. 2.02 crores without intimation to the Department and furthermore, that he had now come to know that the ED had powers to attach tainted money. He had agreed to abide by legal orders and deal with money lying with him, as per legal requirements. It only means that the Appellant would not transfer the funds without intimation and that he had been made aware (by ED) that they had power to attach tainted money under the PMLA and according to them this money was tainted. It is obvious that the statement was got written on the „say‟ of the ED. In the earlier part of the statement, it is

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clearly mentioned by the Appellant that the earnest money had stood forfeited upon failure of the Vendee to comply with its part of the obligations. Therefore, there was no money available that could have been attached.

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20. Sixthly , it is also contended that some money (Rs. 7 lakh) was spent by the Appellant from the amount of Rs. 2.02 crores. Thereafter, he had put in his own money and made FDRs of Rs. 2.02 crores as investment. This money cannot be attached as it belonged to the Appellant.

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21. Seventhly , it is also argued that PMLA does not have retrospective operation. About Rs. 1.51 crores were received by the Appellant in May, 2009. Subsequently, on 01.06.2009, by an amendment Sections 120-B & 420 IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act were added into the Schedule to the PMLA. Thus, in any event, on the date on which the money came into the hands of the Appellant, there was no offence within the meaning of the PMLA. It is settled law that an offence cannot be made retrospectively. Any such attempt would be in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution.

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22. Based on the above arguments and contentions, it is prayed by the appellant that impugned order and the attachment of the subject properties be set aside.

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Arguments on behalf of the Respondent (ED)

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23. Respondent No.1 (ED) has strongly opposed the arguments and contentions put forward on behalf of the appellant.

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24. The claim of the appellant that the advance amount of Rs 2.02 crore, received from M/s SRS Developers, through Mr. Hinish Ramchandani had been forfeited by him on 17/11/2009, i.e., prior to issuance of Provisional Attachment Order, is challenged by the Directorate. It is contended that the letter/notice dated 14/11/2009 (erroneously mentioned as 14/09/2009) on the strength of which this claim is made, suffers from various contradictions. The letter is claimed to have been issued on 14/11/2009 wherein it was mentioned that the amount will be forfeited if the sale was not completed on 17/11/2009 (i.e., within 03 days). This letter was issued from Delhi and it has been claimed that the same was sent to Mr Hinish Ramchandani, Kanpur for acceptance. The said notice-cum-proposal letter has neither been countersigned by the second party nor the appellant has mentioned the mode of service of this letter. Thus, there is no evidence whether this letter was actually issued and/or served upon Shri Hinish Ramchandani. Further, during investigation, Mr. Hinish Ramchandani was examined and his statements were recorded on 30/11/2011 with regard to this transaction of Rs.2.02 Crores with the Appellant, Mr. Ashish Srivastava wherein he provided flow of proceeds of crime to Mr. Ashish Srivastava and his mother. In his statement dated 30/11/2011 or even in his various other statements, Mr. Hinish Ramchandani never stated that the said amount of Rs 2.02 Crores has been forfeited by the appellant. He did not even inform about receipt of any such letter/notice dated 14/11/2009, purportedly issued by the Appellant. In view of this fact, the Directorate has questioned the authenticity of the said letter and submits that the same appears to have been created to lay claim over proceeds of crime.

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25. It is further pointed out that in para 2(a) to (h) of the letter, the appellant has given various options to the purchaser to complete the transactions by 15/03/2010 and in para-F it is again mentioned that if the balance sale consideration is not paid by 15/03/2010 the earnest money of Rs.2.02 Crores shall be forfeited. The above facts indicate that the appellant could not have forfeited the amount on 17/11/2009 instead at the most can claim to have given a notice to the purchaser that if the balance amount is not paid by 17/11/2009 or by 15/03/2010 the amount shall be forfeited. It clearly indicates that the amount was not forfeited by the appellant on 17/11/2009 (as claimed in the appeal), rather an opportunity was given to the purchaser for payment of balance amount.

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26. Further, in terms of para 2(g) & (h) of this letter, the appellant has provided that after the given date, he will start negotiation with other buyers and the shortfall in the price shall be deducted from the earnest money of Rs.2.02 Crores. This is also is against the appellant's claim of forfeiture. On one hand the appellant has claimed forfeiture of amount on 17/11/2009, while on the other hand, through this letter, he has given time to the buyer upto 15/03/2010 and has also mentioned that if there is any shortfall in the price received from other buyer, he will deduct the same from the earnest money.

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27. It further submitted that it was gathered in the course of proceedings before the Ld. AA that the appellant has already sold the said land in question at a higher price to the other buyer. In view this even in terms of the said letter dated 14/11/2009, the appellant would have no claim over the subject amount. It is contended that the fact that the property was sold by the appellant to another buyer at a higher price appears to have been

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not only suppressed by the appellant before the Ld. AA but also before this Appellate Tribunal. The appellant has not suffered a loss in any manner and his claim over the proceeds of crime of Rs 2.02 Crores shows his intention to grab the crime money. The facts clearly show that neither the appellant intended to forfeit the advance money of Rs.2.02 Crores nor had he forfeited the same on 17/11/2009 and the claim of forfeiture appears to be an afterthought to grab the proceeds of crime. The action of forfeiture cannot be taken unilaterally by one party without giving any opportunity to the other side. In the said letter dated 14/11/2009, the appellant has given some proposal and has claimed to have sent the same to the buyer but neither the buyer Mr. Hinish Ramchandani put his signature on this letter as a token of acceptance nor had replied to this letter Therefore, the said letter dated 14/11/2009 is not even a legally enforceable document.

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28. It is also contended that Section 71 of PMLA, 2002 provides overriding effect over other laws for the time being in force. Hence, the proceedings u/s 5 of the PMLA, 2002 shall take precedence over the claim of forfeiture, even if true, made by the appellant.

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29. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent that the contention of appellant that he had spent Rs 7 lakhs out of cash of Rs.50 lakhs was not supported by any evidence. Acceptance of cash amount on two occasions, Rs.50 Lakhs each in a total sum of Rs 1 crore itself shows the mens rea of the appellant. Further, even if, it has been spent on the property, it has added value to the property under the control and title of the appellant and hence, the appellant cannot lay claim over both the amount as well as the value added to the property by spending the same amount. The expenses out of cash receipt cannot be justified and hence it

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was not considered in course of investigation. Further, the appellant himself has stated in his statement that the said proceeds of crime of Rs. 2.02 crore is available with him in the form of FDRs.

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30. The amount of Rs.2.02 Crores was proceeds of crime in terms of section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002 and was attached under section 5 of the Act. This amount was the crime money placed with the appellant in the guise of advance against proposed purchase of property. The act of forfeiture adopted by the appellant is nothing but to grab the proceeds of crime lying with him. In this regard section 71 of the Act may also be referred to.

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31. As regards decisions of DRT, DRAT etc. cited by the appellant, it is contended that the same were with regard to the recovery proceedings of the bank, which were civil in nature, while the action by the Directorate of Enforcement was under the provisions of a Special Act. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which provides overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force under Section 71. The flow of funds as elaborated in the flow charts enclosed with the Complaint has clearly established that the funds lying with the Appellant was nothing but the proceeds of crime. For the same reason, the submission of the appellant that the bank in the proceedings before DRT Allahabad, DRAT and the Hon‟ble Allahabad High Court had taken the stand that the money paid by SRS Developers through Respondent No. 2 (Sh. Hinish Ramchandani) is a debt and liable to be returned by the appellant, is incorrect. Moreover, the bank itself had the lodged criminal complaint/FIR before the CBI with the allegation that cheating and wrongful loss was committed by Mr. Hinish Ramchandani and his company for offences punishable under section 120-

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B r/w 420 of IPC 13(2) r/w 13(1) (d) of P.C. Act. The Bank cannot claim before any authority or before the CBI Trial Court that the FIR lodged by them was false.

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32. It is reiterated that the funds in the form of FDRs have clear link with the crime money, defrauded from the bank. The Flow Charts, enclosed with the Provisional Attachment Order and Original Complaint has established that the amount of Rs. 2.02 crore has clear and direct link with the crime money. The proceeds of crime were kept by the appellant in form of FDRs made out of proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs.2.02 Crores paid by the main accused Mr. Hinish Ramchandani. The appellant was aware that a CBI case has been registered against Mr. Hinish Ramchandani. Mr. Ashish Srivastava, in his statement dt 19/04/12, recorded u/s 50 of the PML Act has admitted this fact. Relevant portion of his statement is cited as below:

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"I undertake that this fund of Rs. 2.02 crores received from Shri Hinish Ramchandani is lying with me and will not transfer this amount to anyone without your intimation. I have come to know that Shri. Hinish Ramchandani has allegedly defrauded the State Bank of India Kanpur for which CBI has filed charge-sheet in the court and the matter is subjudice I had been summoned in the year 2010 and examined by the officials of CBI, BS&FC, Yashwant Place, New Delhi in connection with this case and since then, I knew about this fraud."

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33. With regard to the reliance of the appellant on the findings of the Ld. AA in the matter of Cinema Capital Venture it is submitted that the said case was different, as in that case the Finance Company claimed that the funds lying with them stood forfeited by them as per the terms and condition, before issue of Provisional Attachment Order and they also explained the deductions and expenses made therein out of proceeds of crime invested by the investor defendant. However, the said decision has

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also been challenged before this Appellate Tribunal by the Department in Appeal No. FPA/I/403/2012. The challenge of appellant not to consider FDRs as proceeds of crime is not sustainable as the fund has direct link with the funds defrauded from the bank by Mr. Hinish Ramchandani, The Ld. Adjudicating Authority has rightly observed that the facts and circumstances of the case of M/s Cinema Capital were not akin to this case.

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34. As regards the contentions that the appellant in his statement dt. 19.04.2012 at Lucknow had clearly stated that as per the terms of the agreement to sell, and by subsequent letter dt.14.09.2009 he had the right to forfeit the earnest money of Rs. 2.02 Cr. and the appellant had never offered the amount to the respondent directorate in his statement, it is submitted that from the portion of statement of the Appellant quoted in this para itself it is clear that the contention of forfeiture by the appellant is an afterthought. The Appellant has stated before the IO in his statements that the amount is lying with him in the form of FDR and he will abide by the law. The agreement dated 17/5/2009 was made during the offence period and hence its attachment in 2013 will not change the nature of the crime money. The claim of appellant about forfeiture has been found to be an afterthought to grab the proceeds of crime. It is reiterated that section 71 of the PMLA provides overriding effect to the other law for the time being in force.

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35. With regard to the contention that section 120-B r/w 420 of IPC and S. 13 of the PC Act were not Schedule Offences during the relevant period of offence, it is submitted that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority at page 53 & 54 of the Order dt. 26.09.13 has elaborately discussed the ratio of

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judgments, viz., Judgment dated 06/08/2010 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand in W.P. (Cr) no. 325/2010 in the case of Hari Narayan Rai Vs UOI , judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Punjab [1964 SCR (4) 630) , which clearly indicate that the stand taken in these paras are irrelevant.

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36. With regard to the submission of the appellant that in the similar case of one Smt. Preeti Sewani and Nandani Ramchandani amounts of Rs.30,90,113/- and Rs.10,47,034.92/- given as loans by the accused firm M/s Rajiv Motors, has been excluded from action under section 5(1), it is submitted by the directorate that the contentions made in these paras are incorrect. The case of funds (amounting to Rs 41 37 Lakhs approx.) of Smt. Preeti Sewani and Smt. Nandani Ramchandani, not being attached, is different from the case of appellant. The amount of loan given by M/s Rajiv Motors to Smt. Nandani Ramchandani and Smt. Preeti Sewani were not covered under attachment as no property of corresponding value could be found lying with M/s Rajiv Motors during investigation. Further the attachment of properties of M/s Rajiv Motors were to the extent of proceeds of crime invested in the business. The amount of loan given to these individuals were considered to have been utilized in the group business or in acquisition of properties while issuing the Provisional Attachment Order, as investments made by these individuals in the group business and properties were also attached. The contention of appellant that he had spent Rs.7 lakhs out of cash of Rs 50 lakhs was not supported by any evidence. Acceptance of cash amount on two occasions, Rs.50 Lakhs each in a total sum of Rs. 1 crore itself shows the mens rea of the appellant. Further, even if, it has been spent on the property, it has added value to the property under the control and title of the appellant and hence, the

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appellant cannot lay claim over both the amount as well as the value added to the property by spending the same amount. The expenses out of cash receipt cannot be justified and hence it was not considered in course of investigation. Further, the appellant himself has stated in his statement that the said proceeds of crime of Rs. 2.02 crore is available with him in the form of FDRs.

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37. With regard to the contentions that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority erred in relying upon written submissions filed by the E.D. which were not made available to the Appellant, and the same were filed behind the back of the Appellant, that the procedure adopted was in violation of principles of natural justice, and hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside, that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority failed to appreciate that the Agreement of the Appellant and his mother was with SRS Developers which was not a party before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority and no provisional Order of attachment had been passed against it, that neither SRS Investment Company nor respondent No.2 himself were parties to the said agreement and that the earnest money received by the appellant and his mother was from SRS Developers and / or on its behalf and therefore, it could not be said that appellant is holding any proceeds of crime, the respondent contends that the written submissions were submitted by them before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority as per directions. Further, the written submissions do not contain any new facts. The written submissions were the reply/counter reply to the written submissions submitted by the appellant before the Adjudicating Authority. Hence, this ground is not sustainable. Investigation has established that the crime money flew from the bank accounts of M/s SRS Investment Co. to the account of M/s SRS Developers, hence is incorrect to say that the money received by him were

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not proceeds of crime. Hence, the attachment of proceeds of crime of Rs

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2.02 Crores and as confirmation is proper.

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38. In view of facts mentioned hereinabove it is prayed by respondent no.1 that this Appellate Tribunal may be pleased to dismiss the instant appeal.

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Arguments on behalf of the Respondent No. 6 (SBI)

¶110

39. Respondent No.6, i.e., SBI, Main Branch, Kanpur has filed a reply during the course of the proceedings. It is submitted by them that the Respondent No.2 (Hinish Ramchandani) had submitted before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad as well as before the Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad in the Writ Petition filed by him that he has paid Rs.4.02 Crores to the appellant as advance for the purpose of purchasing the immovable property bearing Plot No.25 Block-6, Rani Ghat, Kanpur measuring 3314 sq. mt. and not 2.02 Cr. as alleged in the appeal.

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40. As per version of the Respondent No.2 he had paid about 50% of the sale consideration in advance, and therefore, even if, due to the action taken by the Enforcement Directorate, the balance sale consideration could not be paid and sale deed could not be executed, the appellant is bound to return the said amount of Rs.4.02 Crores along with interest paid by the Respondent No.2 to the appellant by way of part of the sale consideration for the purpose of purchasing the aforesaid property. It was further submitted that the amount paid to the appellant was by way of an advance and/or part payment of the sale consideration can be considered as proceeds, therefore, the appellant is bound to return the amount paid by the Respondent No.2 to the Answering Respondent Bank, as the said

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amount was withdrawn from the account maintained in the name of M/s SRS Investment Company with the answering Respondent.

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41. It is submitted that the amount of earnest money constituted proceeds of crime in the hands of Respondent No. 2 before it was paid to the appellant and as such no right of forfeiture over such proceeds of crime can be claimed by the applicant.

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42. It is further stated that the appellant has not filed the copy of the appeal in support of the averments that his mother had bequeathed her share of the property to the appellant by a will dt. 27.11.2007.

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43. It is contended on behalf of the respondent bank that it has initiated recovery proceedings under Section 19 of Recovery of Debts Due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI Act) by filing an Original Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad which was registered as O.A.No.10 of 2010, State Bank of India Versus M/s. S.R.S. Investment Company and others.

¶118

44. The Hon'ble Presiding Officer of the DRT Allahabad passed appropriate orders keeping in view the facts and evidence on record at that time. The order dated 15.12.2011 passed by DRT Allahabad was perfectly legal and justified and is binding on the parties.

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45. The appellant had filed an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal Allahabad but the said appeal was erroneously allowed vide order dated 13.4.2012 without giving any opportunity of hearing to the respondent bank. The bank has challenged the said order dated 13.4.2012

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by filing a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.15545 of 2013, State Bank of India versus the Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals and others. The Writ Petition is still pending for disposal before the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad. The Answering Respondent was not heard on the Review Petition filed by the Respondent No.2 before the Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. However, in accordance with the provisions of PMLA, 2002 the appellant cannot be allowed and/or entitled to forfeit the amount of advance taken from the Respondent No. 2. Further, the entire amount of Rs. 4.02 Crores constituted as proceeds of crime.

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46. Respondent No.2 has filed the Writ Petition challenging the order passed on the review application. The Respondent No.2 has not challenged the validity of the order dated 13.4.2012 by means of which the appeal was allowed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. As such the order passed in Writ Petition No. 27025/2012 by the Hon'ble High Court Allahabad, has no relevance in the present facts and circumstances of the case.

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47. It is also contended that the amount paid by the Respondent No.2 to the Appellant was not the earnest money rather the same was part payment the sale consideration. Further, it is relevant to mention here that appellant has not included the interest component in the FDR made by him on the instructions of the Respondent No. 1.

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48. The amount of Rs.2.02 Crores lying the shape of the FDR which has been provisionally attached by the Respondent No.1 and subsequently

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confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 26.9.2013 is required to be refunded to the Bank along with interest accrued thereon.

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49. The appellant is not entitled for the amount lying in the shape of the FDRs. Rather, the said amount is required to be refunded to the Respondent bank towards the liquidation of part of the outstanding dues lying in the account of M/s. SRS Investment Company as the said amount had withdrawn from the account maintained with the Answering Respondent.

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50. That the appeal is entirely misconceived and abuse of the process of law. In fact, the appellant be directed to refund the entire amount of Rs.4.02 Crores along with accrued interest thereon. The amount so deposited by the appellant is required to be paid to the answering respondent as the same had been withdrawn from the account maintained with the answering respondent.

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51. Appellant instead of making the FDRs of 2.02 Crores is also required to increase the amount by including the amount of interest which he had earned during the period when the same amount was in his pocket in the shape of the FDRs.

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52. The appellant has sold the aforesaid property to M/s. Hotel Citypride International Private Limited having its registered office at 7/71-A Tilak Nagar Kanpur in pursuance of a registered sale dated 31.1.2013 and the said purchaser is making construction in the shape of a multi storied flats on the aforesaid land. Since the proceeds of crime is involved in the said property on account of the transaction which took place between the

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Appellant and Respondent No. 2 therefore, the said property is liable to be attached till the controversy regarding the amount of advance taken by the Appellant is finally adjudicated. At least the M/s Hotel Citypride International Private Limited be restrained from making any constructions of the aforesaid Plot No. 25, Block 6 Ranighat, Kanpur pertaining to which an agreement to sell was executed and the proceeds of crime was exchanged. Further, the appellant has purposely concealed the said facts regarding receipt of the actual amount of sale consideration and has subsequently sold the aforesaid property on a sale consideration of Rs 11.40 Crores to the aforesaid purchaser and thereby earned more than 3 Crores, more than the amount on which it was agreed to be sold to the Respondent No.2.

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53. Based on the facts and circumstances stated above the present appeal is liable to be rejected as it devoid the merits.

¶137

54. It may be mentioned here that Respondent No. 12 (M/s Volkswagen Finance Pvt Ltd.) have also filed a reply to the appeal. However, the same are in relation to the property at SI. No 8 (Audi car bearing Regn. No. DL-1T AJ-6677) in the name of Smt. Nandani Ramchandani (Respondent No. 3 in the instant appeal). As such, the submissions made in the reply are not relevant to the matters under contention in the present appeal are not discussed at length in this order.

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Analysis and Findings

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55. I have given careful consideration to the facts on record and the rival contentions of the parties. The agreement to sell in this case was executed on 17.05.2009. The total sale consideration was 8 Cr. and as per the record, out of the total sale consideration, 2.02 Cr. was paid as earnest

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money. The basic contention of the appellant is that the aforesaid agreement contained a forfeiture clause, namely, Clause 8 thereof. In view of the said clause, the amount already stood forfeited by the appellant before the attachment of the same by Respondent No.1 (ED). The claim of the appellant is challenged by the Directorate.

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56. In this context, I have perused the relevant documents on record, especially the aforesaid Agreement to Sell. It is seen that as per the said Clause 8 of the Agreement, the authenticity of which has not been seriously questioned by the respondent, the earnest money amount was to stand forfeited in case the Vendee does not pay or fails to pay the balance sale consideration to the Vendor and get the sale deed executed and registered before 17.11.2009. No doubt, a letter dt. 14.11.2009 was addressed jointly by the appellant and his mother (the Vendors) to M/s SRS Developers (the Vendee) for the attention of Sh. Hinish Ramchandani, in which the option of an extended timeline was offered to the Vendee to conclude the purchase transaction even by 15.03.2010, by providing an enhanced sale consideration of Rs.9,00,00,000/-The two parties to the agreement would have been well within their rights to agree to the revised deadline against payment of an enhanced consideration as proposed in the letter. However, there is nothing on record to indicate that the Vendee consented to the revised proposal, nor the said revised deadline for payment of the balance consideration proposed in the letter was met by the Vendee. Therefore, the original agreement between the parties remained unmodified by the revised proposal and the earnest money amount stood forfeited upon the failure of the Vendee to pay the balance sale consideration to the Vendors and get sale deed executed and registered before 17.11.2009. As against this, the PAO in this case was passed on

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30.03.2013, well after the said date and well after even the last of the dates proposed by the Vendors in their letter dated 14.11.2009. As such, I find merit in the argument of the appellant that as at the date of the passing of the PAO, the earnest money already stood forfeited as per the mutual agreement executed between the Vendor and the Vendee.

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57. In this regard, I have also perused the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Satish Batra vs. Sudhir Rawal (supra) and find that the said judgment supports the contention of the appellant in this regard.

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58. I have also perused the judgement of the Hon‟ble Pritam Kaur vs. Deputy Director, ED, FPA-PMLA-936/CHD/2015, order dt. 20.12.2017 cited by the appellant, but find that the same is distinguishable on facts . In that case, the agreement specified that the date of execution of the sale deed will not be extended. There was a considerable lapse of time between the last date agreed upon for the execution and registration of the sale deed (01.12.2006), and the passing of the Provisional Attachment Order (31.12.2014). There was also a clear finding that in the meantime, the amount forfeited had been utilised by the Vendor by investing a part of the amount in the development of the land, giving a part thereof to relatives as financial assistance, paying a substantial amount of Rs.95 lacs to settle the ongoing litigation with the brother of the appellant‟s husband in order to buy peace etc. As such, the ratio of that case, in my view, would not squarely apply to the present case where facts are different.

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59. Similarly, I find that the decision of this Appellate Tribunal in the case of Joint Director, ED vs. Cinema Capital Venture Fund (supra) is also distinguishable on facts. In that case, the appellant was a venture capital

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fund in which Sh. Hinish Ramchandani (Partner of the Vendee company in the present case), had invested an amount of Rs.6.25 lacs. Article 5 of the Contribution Agreement of the Fund, which related to Defaulting Contributory, provided that upon default, the entire contribution already contributed shall be forfeited by the trustees on behalf of the venture fund and such forfeited portion shall be credited pro-rata to the non-defaulting contributors in accordance with their respective contributions. Before forfeiting the amount, Draw Down Notices, a Final Caution Notice, Final Extension etc., were issued. None of these facts exist in the present case, and therefore, the ratio of the said case would also not be applicable squarely to the present case. However, in para 56 (supra), I have already come to the conclusion based on a detailed discussion, that the amount of earnest money in the present case too, stood forfeited already as at the date of its attachment by the respondent directorate.

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60. The issue that arises for consideration, however, is whether or not the amount could still be validly attached by the directorate in view of the overriding effect given to the provisions of PMLA, 2002, notwithstanding the fact that the amount already stood forfeited by the appellant. Section 71 of the Act provides as follows:

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“71. Act to have overriding effect.— The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.”

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61. Referring to the above provision, the Hon‟ble Karnataka High Court in Dyani Antony Paul and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. [MANU/KA/4442/2020] has held as follows:

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“ The PML Act is a special enactment having been enacted to deal with ever increasing menace of money laundering. The provisions of the PML

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Act have over-riding effect over provisions in other statutes or in other words, the provisions of PMLA prevail over anything inconsistent contained in any other law.”

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62. Considering the above legal position, I am of the view that there is little room for any doubt that the provisions of the Act, including those relating to attachment of properties under Section 5, would definitely prevail over the agreement signed by the parties in exercise of the general law provisions. This position would prevail even where the party holding the property (the FDs) in question was otherwise neither found to be involved nor complicit in the commission of the scheduled offence in any manner and was not even aware of the tainted nature of the property. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4634 of 2014] has categorically held that the sweep of Section 5(1) is not limited to the accused named in the scheduled offence. It was further held by the Apex Court in that case that the objective of enacting the Act was the attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime which is the quintessence, so as to combat the evil of money-laundering, by reaching the proceeds of crime in whosoever‟s name they are kept or by whosoever they are held. Therefore, so long as there is material to indicate that the source of the money was „proceeds of crime‟ as defined by the Act, it can be validly attached by the Directorate in exercise of powers under the Act, regardless of whether the current holder of the property (the appellant herein) himself stood charged of any offence or not or even knew about its tainted nature.

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63. In the present case, the material on record clearly indicates that Shri Hinish Ramchandani and other partners of M/s SRS Investment Company, having duped the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Kanpur of Rs.46.42

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crore in connivance with certain officers of the branch by availing credit facilities and also by resorting to the practice of „kite-flying‟ without having sufficient funds in the account of the said company. There are valid reasons to believe that the funds passed on by the company to the present appellant as earnest money was out of the said proceeds of crime obtained by duping the bank, though this fact may have been unknown to the present appellant while entering into the agreement for the sale of the property. As such, the amount clearly answers to the description of „proceeds of crime‟ as defined under section 2(1)(u). Funds for the investment were arranged first through transfer to the account of M/s SRS Investment Company, Kanpur in IndusInd Bank by Sh. Hinish Ramchandani out of the funds defrauded from the bank account of M/s SRS Investment Company, Kanpur and, thereafter, the amount was transferred to his own Savings Bank account with IndusInd Bank. Further payment was made by making cash transaction out of cash withdrawn from the accounts of M/s SRS Investment Company, Kanpur or the group firms. During this period, account of M/s SRS Developers, Kanpur was continuously holding funds of M/s SRS Investment Company, Kanpur and thus, the investment of Rs. 2.02 crore was relatable to proceeds of crime.

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64. A contention has been raised by the appellant that a part of the money (Rs. 7 lacs) out of the earnest money was spent by the Appellant out of the amount of Rs. 2.02 crores. Thereafter, he had put in his own money and made FDRs of Rs. 2.02 crores as investment. Therefore, this money cannot be attached as it belongs to the Appellant. In this regard, I find that although a contention has been raised, there is nothing on record to prove the authenticity of the claim. Moreover, once it has been held that the appellant had received an amount of Rs. 2.02 crores out of the proceeds of

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crime generated by the company, even if it was without knowledge of its tainted nature, the fact that he had utilized a part of the amount and made good the same by adding his own funds would not make the amount immune from attachment under the Act since the definition of „proceeds of crime‟ under the Act expressly includes the „value‟ of such property.

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65. The next contention is that PMLA does not have retrospective operation. About Rs. 1.51 crores were received by the Appellant in May, 2009 and Sections 120-B & 420 IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were added into the Schedule of the PMLA, 2002 on 01.06.2009 through an amendment. Thus, in any event, on the date on which the said amount came into the hands of the Appellant, there was no offence within the meaning of the PMLA, 2002.

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66. Having considered the above submission, I do not find any merit in the same. It is by now well-settled that the issue of retrospectivity or otherwise insofar as the offence of money laundering is concerned, has to be examined with reference to the time of commission of the act which constitutes „money laundering‟ under Act and not with reference to the time of commission of the act which constituted the scheduled offence. In other words, regardless of whether the predicate offence was committed before or after it was added to the Schedule to the PMLA, the commission of the offence of money laundering has to be reckoned with reference to the date or dates on which any of the actions which constitute „money laundering‟ were committed. This would include concealment/ possession/ acquisition/ use/ projecting or claiming of proceeds of crime to be untainted property. If any of these actions take place after the offence from

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which the proceeds were derived was added to the Schedule, the offence of money laundering would be committed.

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67. The Hon‟ble Karnataka High Court in Dyani Antony Paul & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. MANU/KA/4442/2020, money laundering is a continuing offence and, as such, the issue of retrospective effect does not arise. It is well-settled that a continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. A continuing offence occurs and re-occurs, and each time, an offence is committed. It was so held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi (1972 SCC 890) . The decision of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in Prakash Industries Limited (WP (C) 14999/2021 (Order dated 19.07.2022) may also be referred to in this context, wherein, it was held that the PMLA, 2002 penalizes the act of money laundering. It does not penalize the scheduled offence. That offence merely constitutes the substratum on which charge of money laundering is being raised. Further, in the landmark case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the Apex Court held that the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence under PMLA, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as a scheduled offence, such person may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under PMLA.

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68. The legal position being thus, I do not find any merit in this argument of retrospectivity advanced by the appellant.

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69. The next set contentions put forward by the appellant relate to the orders of the DRT/DRAT. These contentions of the appellant do not merit any detailed discussion in my view as they act in a different sphere. The DRAT‟s order recorded a finding that the DRT had allowed the application for impleadment of the appellant even without issuing a notice to him. It further held that there is no liability of the appellant to pay the amount to the Bank for which application could be initiated against the appellant under Section 19(2) of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. These findings do not have any relevance to attachment of properties under the PMLA, 2002 based on a finding that the same constituted „proceeds of crime‟ as defined under section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002.

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70. Finally, the appellant has also contested the claim of the respondent directorate that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to the attachment of the funds. This issue does not warrant much deliberation either. Needless to say, the subject matter of attachment under PMLA, 2002 is only property that constitutes „proceeds of crime‟. If there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the property falls within the definition of the term as provided u/s 2(1)(u), the same can be attached, irrespective of the appellant‟s agreement or otherwise. Similarly, if there is nothing on record to conclude that property constitutes „proceeds of crime‟ as defined by the Act, no amount of consent by the appellant could have bestowed the power on the ED to attach the same under the Act. In the present case, a finding has been recorded that the funds in question were derived by M/s SRS Developers from fraudulently duping the bank and the same flowed to the present appellant in the form of earnest money payment for a property transaction. As such, the same was clearly amenable for attachment under

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the Act even though the appellant himself may have been unaware of its tainted nature.

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71. I have also perused the submissions made on behalf of Respondent No. 6, i.e., the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Lucknow. I do not find anything on record to support the claim of the Bank that the amount of earnest money paid by the company was Rs. 4.02 crores and not Rs. 2.02. No doubt, a claim to this effect has been made in the letter dated 04.09.2010 written by the Advocate representing Sh. Hinish Ramchandani to the appellant. However, the same is just a bland averment in writing without any supporting material. The amount mentioned in the impugned order is Rs. 2.02 crores only, which is the subject matter of attachment and therefore, the subject matter of this appeal.

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72. I have already held, based on detailed reasoning, that the amount was validly forfeited by the appellant under the Agreement with M/s SRS Developers. Therefore, there is no merit in the appellant is bound to return the amount paid by the Respondent No.2 to the Bank since the said amount was withdrawn from the account maintained in the name of M/s SRS Investment Company with the answering Respondent.

¶185

73. It is also submitted that the amount of earnest money constituted proceeds of crime in the hands of Respondent No. 2 before it was paid to the appellant and as such no right of forfeiture over such proceeds of crime can be claimed by the applicant. I have already held that the property has been validly attached.

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74. It is further stated that the appellant has not filed the copy of the appeal in support of the averments that his mother had bequeathed her share of the property to the appellant by a will dated 27.11.2007. I find that the ownership position of the property after the demise of the appellant‟s mother is not a matter of dispute in the present appeal. There are no findings to the contrary from the authorities below, nor any material is available on record to indicate towards a different position in this regard.

¶189

75. The impact of DRT/DRAT decisions or rather the lack of any impact thereof on the current proceedings under the PMLA, 2002, has already been dealt with in the forgoing paragraphs and do not warrant further discussion.

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76. In view of the discussions in paragraphs 56 and 57 (supra), there is little merit in the contention that the amount paid was not earnest money.

¶191

77. As regards the claim that the amount of Rs.2.02 Crores lying the shape of the FDR which has been provisionally attached by the Respondent No.1 and, subsequently, confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 26.9.2013, is required to be refunded to the Bank along with interest accrued thereon, the same cannot be entertained by this Appellate Tribunal at this stage of the proceedings. The appellant would, no doubt be at liberty to approach the Ld. Special Court under Sections 8(5) to 8(8), including under the Second Proviso to Section 8(8), either upon the conclusion of the trial or even during the trial as provided by the law.

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78. It is also submitted by the Bank that the appellant has sold the aforesaid property to M/s. Hotel Citypride International Private Limited

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having its registered office at 7/71-A Tilak Nagar Kanpur in pursuance of a registered sale dated 31.1.2013 and the said purchaser is making construction in the shape of a multi storied flats on the aforesaid land. Since the proceeds of crime is involved in the said property on account of the transaction which took place between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2, therefore, the said property is liable to be attached till the controversy regarding the amount of advance taken by the Appellant is finally adjudicated. At least, M/s Hotel Citypride International Private Limited should be restrained from making any constructions of the aforesaid Plot No. 25, Block 6 Ranighat, Kanpur pertaining to which an agreement to sell was executed and the proceeds of crime was exchanged. Further, the appellant has purposely concealed the said facts regarding receipt of the actual amount of sale consideration and has subsequently sold the aforesaid property on a sale consideration of Rs 11.40 Crores to the aforesaid purchaser and thereby earned more than 3 Crores, more than the amount on which it was agreed to be sold to the Respondent No.2.

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79. The issues averred in these contentions are outside the mandate of this Tribunal, nor do they arise out of the impugned order. Needless to say, the property attached by the directorate was the amount of Rs. 2.02 crores lying in the form of FDRs which has been challenged in this appeal. The immovable property referred to has not been attached and the manner in which the appellant, as its owner, has dealt with it, is not before this Appellate Tribunal. As such, these issues do not merit any consideration in the present appeal and are dismissed.

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80. In light of the above discussions, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.

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81. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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82. No order as to costs.

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(V. Anandarajan) Member