“14. So far as passing of the judgment after a period of three years is concerned, at the outset I was inclined to favourably consider this aspect, however, I note that the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Kunwar Singh and Ors. Vs. Sri Thakurji Maharaj 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 125 has allowed the appeal because of delay in passing the judgment leaving the question open whether only because of delay in passing of the judgment the same can be set aside on that count itself. In the judgment relied upon on behalf of the appellant in the case of Kanhaiyalal and Ors. Vs. Anupkumar and Ors. AIR 2003 SC 689 the judgment of the court below was set aside no doubt because it was passed with delay, but more importantly because of the fact that judgment was passed in a second appeal and the judgment was passed without formulating the necessary questions of law which are required to be framed as per Section 100 of CPC. Even the judgment in the case of Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani & Ors. Vs. HPA International & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 13 does not lay down a general proposition that a judgment passed with delay is to be set aside only on the count of delay in passing of the same. Therefore, the facts of the cases cited on behalf of the appellant are different and they cannot be applied more so because I put it to the counsel for the appellant that what is the argument or the issue which the appellant wanted for the first appellate court to consider but the appellate court had not considered that argument/issue and which has resulted in prejudice to the appellant. Counsel for the appellant could not show me any ground urged in this Regular Second Appeal as to which specific ground the appellant had urged before the first appellate court and which was not considered by the first appellate court. The only ground which is urged before this court is the ground contained in para 10 of the present appeal, and which ground is really ground on merits that the first appellate court has wrongly decided the issue. Therefore, it is not the case of the appellant that any ground urged before the first appellate court has not been decided by the first appellate court or how is the appellant in any manner prejudiced by the long delay. I have already observed above that this litigation has gone on for about 10 years although right at the outset the suit should have been forthwith decreed and which is one aspect which further persuades me not to unnecessarily remand the case back for a fresh judgment by the first appellate court on account of the judgment having been passed with delay.
