Dismissed

FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018 of Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj v. The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Patna

ATFP14 Nov 2024FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Appeal challenging a confirmed Provisional Attachment Order was dismissed. The Tribunal held that Section 8(3)(a) of the PMLA requires completion of investigation within 90 days without mandating a complaint against the property holder specifically. Since a prosecution complaint was filed before the confirmation order, the attachment did not lapse, citing Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary.

What did the court decide?

The Appeal filed by the Appellant challenging the Attachment Order was dismissed.

FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018 of Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj Vs. The Deputy… — Money Laundering | ATFP (2024)

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APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI

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MP-PMLA-4798/PTN/2018 (Stay) MP-PMLA-4799/PTN/2018 (Exem.) FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018

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Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj … Appellant Versus The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Patna … Respondent

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… Respondent

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Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

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For the Appellant : Mr. Aditya Aggarwal, Adv. Ms. Muskan Aggarwal, Adv. For the Respondent (ED) : Ms. Anubha Bhardwaj, Adv. Mr. Mohit Kumar, Adv. Mr. Astik Dubey, Adv. CORAM SHRI G.C. MISHRA : MEMBER SHRI BALESH KUMAR : MEMBER

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FINAL ORDER

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14.11.2024

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This Order disposes of the Appeal No. FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018 filed by Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj. The Appeal was filed challenging the Order dated 20.07.2018 of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in OC No.894/2018. The said Original Complaint (OC No.894/2018) was filed by Patna Zonal Office of the Respondent Directorate as a result of passing of Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) No.02/2018 dated 01.02.2018. The impugned Order dated 20.07.2018 confirmed the PAO No.02/2018. Vide the said PAO the following properties in the name of M/s Shivam Agency and in the name of its proprietor Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj had been provisionally attached:

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(i) Balance lying in the bank account number 627905500301 in the name of M/s Shivam Agency held with ICICI Bank, Kalakar Street, Kolkata on which debit freeze has been imposed: =Rs 72,61,512. 94/-

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FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018

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(ii) Balance lying in the bank account number 35070641748 in the name of M/s Shivam Agency held with State Bank of India, Nimtala Branch, Kolkata =Rs. 5,40,123.75

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(iii) Balance lying in the bank account no 02192560015701 in the name of M/s Shivam Agency held with HDFC Bank, Buna Bazar, Kolkata = Rs. 22,62,536.79

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(iv) Balance lying in the bank account no. 02191000117567 in the name of Shyam Sunder Bajaj, held with HDFC Bank Burra Bazar, Kolkata = Rs1755.05/-

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(v) Vacant Land measuring One Cottah 12 Chittacks comprised in R.S./L.R. Dag Nos. 2118, 2119 & 2120 under LR Khatian Nos. 924, 2865, 2645 & 3287 lying and situated at MouzaGopalpur, J L No 2, Touzi No. 2998, Re. Sa. No 140, Touzi No 2998, Hal Touzi No 10, Pargana- Kalikata, P.S. Airport, A.D.S.R.O. Bidhannagar, Salt Lake City within the local limit of Rajarhat Gopalpur Municipality, in ward No 7(New Jhilma Park, Kolkata 700136) in District North 24 Parganas, West Bengal acquired through Deed Number 1-01364 of 2013 dated 29.04.2013;

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Registered Value of the land = Rs. 6,00,000/-

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(vi) Share of Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj in Office Premises situated at 55/1B Strand Road, Kolkata 700006 acquired from Gaylord Estates Pvt Ltd, vide agreement of transfer dated 05.06.1998. = Rs. 2,24,000/TOTAL = Rs. 72,61,512.94/+ Rs.5,40,123.75/+ Rs.22,62,536.79/+ Rs1755.05/-+ Rs.6,00,000/-+ Rs.2,24,000/- = Rs. 1,08,89,928.53/-

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The PAO was issued in view of the FIRs lodged by the Economic Offences Unit (EOU) of Bihar Police on the basis of complaints filed by Shri FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018 Page 2 of 16

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Shashi Kumar and Shri Rajesh Kumar that their accounts with Bank of India, GB Road, Gaya were mis-utilized in connivance with the bank officials, in as much as, huge amount of cash was deposited and transferred to other accounts without their knowledge and consents, immediately after the demonetization of currency of Rs.500/- and Rs.1000/-. Investigation revealed that total cash deposit in 17 bank accounts and in 5 bank accounts of the complainants and their relatives amounted to Rs.39,87,49,250/- during the period July, 2016 to December, 2016. On further investigations it was revealed that Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj had received Rs.181 Lakhs in his bank account no.627905500301 held with ICICI Bank, Burra Bazar, Kolkata in the name of his proprietorship firm M/s Shivam Agency. Since these receipts were not for any business transaction, and in contravention of Scheduled Offences the Respondent Directorate issued the aforementioned PAO.

¶22

Ld. Counsel for the Appellant during the course of final arguments emphasized only on the fact that the Prosecution Complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) was filed by the Respondent Directorate after 90 days of the confirmation of the PAO. He pointed out that PAO No.02/2018 was issued on 01.02.2018. It was confirmed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority on 20.07.2018 in OC No.894/2018. Ld. Counsel stated that the Prosecution Complaint No.02/2018 was filed by the Respondent Directorate before the Special Court, PMLA, Patna on 18.07.2018. However, in the said Prosecution Complaint the Appellant was not named as an Accused. Ld. Counsel pointed out that a Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No.11/2018 was filed on 17.12.2018. It was in the said Supplementary Prosecution Complaint that the Appellant was made an Accused. Ld. Counsel contended that 90 days period in filling of the Prosecution Complaint after passing of the Confirmation Order (impugned Order) expired on 18.10.2018. In this regard he pointed out that Section 8 (3) of PMLA was

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FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018

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amended to introduce with effect from 19.04.2018 a period of 90 days for completion of investigation from the date of passing of the Confirmation Order of the attachment. He stated that further amendment to Section 8(3) of PMLA came into effect from 21.02.2019 whereby the period to complete investigation was made 365 days from the date of confirmation of Provisional Attachment Order. Since during the relevant period the Prosecution Complaint against the Appellant had to be lodged within 90 days of passing of the impugned Order on 20.07.2018 and which could not be lodged by the Respondent Directorate, the PAO No.02/2018 lapsed.

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Ld. Counsel for the Appellant cited the judgment dated 31.01.2024 of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in WP(C) 10993/2023 & CM APPL. 42616/2023 in the matter of Mr. Mahender Kumar Khandelwal Versus Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. He drew attention to paragraphs 35 & 52 of the judgment which are as follows:

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“ 35. From the combined reading of the above provisions of the Act, it is evident that the powers of attachment, seizure and freezing of the properties and records becomes final on the order passed by the Special Court in relation thereto. The words 'proceedings relating to any offence under this Act' appearing in Section 8(3)(a) of the Act, therefore, has to be read in light of the above provisions to mean only a proceeding that is pending before a Special Court in relation to the property or records that are so attached or seized or frozen or with the respect to the person from whom such property was seized or recovered. The provisions of the Act have to be reasonably read and in a harmonious manner with other provisions. It is also to be remembered that the power of attachment, seizure, and freezing of the properties and records, is a draconian provision that has to be strictly construed. Reference in this regard is placed on Radha Krishnan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 6 SCC 771.

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Therefore, the natural consequence of the investigation for a period beyond three hundred and sixty five days not resulting in any proceedings

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relating to any offence under the Act, in terms of Section 8(3) of the Act, is that such seizure lapses and the property so seized must be returned to the person from whom it was so seized.”

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Ld. Counsel for the Appellant therefore prayed to allow the Appeal on this sole ground that the Prosecution Complaint naming the Appellant was not filed within the period stipulated under the law as in force during the relevant time. He clarified that this is the only ground which is being pressed and no other point is being put forward in spite of having been offered such opportunity.

¶33

Ld. Counsel for the Respondent stated that the judgment cited afore by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has been stayed on 22.02.2024 by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in LPA No.148/2024 in the matter of Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. v. Mr. Mahender Kumar Khandelwal. She further pointed out that this Tribunal has repeatedly held that the wordings of Section 8(3)(a) of PMLA only require completion of investigation within the period stipulated in the statute without the necessity to file a Prosecution Complaint under PMLA against the person whose property has been either attached or seized. She referred to the judgments of this Tribunal in FPA-PMLA-4358/KOL/2021 in the matter of Ayush Kejriwal v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Kolkata (dated 01.05.2024); in FPA-PMLA-3207/KOL/2019 in the matter of Kokila Purshottamdas Sanghvi v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Kolkata (dated 24.07.2024); & in FPA-PMLA-45994600/DLI/2022 in the matter of Mr. Irfan Ahmed Siddique & Al Mehmood Education Society v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi (dated 24.09.2024). She therefore prayed that the Appeal may be dismissed.

¶34

We have considered the rival submissions and the material on record. It is not disputed that the first Prosecution Complaint under PMLA was

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filed by the Respondent Directorate on 18.07.2018 that is even before the impugned Order dated 20.07.2018 which confirmed the PAO dated 01.02.2018 was passed. It is also not disputed that the Appellant was made an accused in the Supplementary Prosecution Complaint under PMLA which was filed on 17.12.2018. The provision of the statute viz. Section 8(3) (a) of PMLA required investigation to be completed within 90 days of the confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Order. It is therefore on record that the Prosecution Complaint was filed even before the confirmation of Provisional Attachment Order. However, Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the Appellant was made an accused only on 17.12.2018 when the Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed and hence the Attachment Order lapsed on 18.10.2018 when the period of 90 days from the passing of the impugned Order had expired.

¶38

The provisions of Section 8(3) of PMLA as it stood during the relevant period was as follows:

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“ Section 8 (3). Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under subsection (2) that any property is involved in money laundering he shall by an order in writing confirm the attachment of the property made under subsection (1) of section or retention of property or record seized or frozen under Section17 or Section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall

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a) continue during investigation for a period not exceeding ninety days or the pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under this Act before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India, as the case may be; and

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b) become final after an order of confiscation is passed under subsection (5) or sub-section (7) of section 8 or section 58B or subsection (2A) of section 60 by the Special Court.”

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On reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is obvious that while the investigations had to be completed within 90 days of the confirmation of the Provisional Order, there is no such requirement as to the investigations per se the person whose property has been attached was to be completed within the said 90 days. In fact, it is on record that the investigations were completed and the Prosecution Complaint under PMLA was lodged on 18.07.2018, even before the passing of the impugned Order on 20.07.2018.

¶45

In this regard the final order dated 24.09.2024 of this Tribunal in FPA-PMLA-4599-4600/DLI/2022 in the matters of Mr. Irfan Ahmed Siddique & Al Mehmood Education Society v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi. is quoted at some length as below:

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“The bare perusal of the provision quoted above would reveal that if any interim order has been passed then period aforesaid is to be excluded from the total period of 365 days. Section 8(3)(a) of the Act provides for the currency to the order of attachment during the investigation to be completed within 365 days or the pendency of the proceeding in a court relating to any offences under the Act of 2002. The period of interim order precluded the respondents to file the prosecution complaint cannot be taken to the benefit of the appellant and thereby we are unable to accept the arguments of the appellant regarding lapse of the order of provisional attachment or as to its confirmation. The explanation to Section 8(3) of the Act, 2002 has been ignored by the appellant which excludes the period of an interim order of the court from the period of 365 days.

¶47

The argument is that prosecution complaint has not been filed against the appellant after investigation. Section 8(3)(a) does not postulate investigation against the person whose property has been attached or even the criminal proceedings against such person, rather what has been provided is for continuance of the attachment till completion of investigation within 365 days or during the pendency of the proceedings for the offence under the Act of 2002. The pendency of the proceedings again does not postulate against the

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person whose property has been attached. The reason for it seems to be that after commission of the predicate offence and the offence of money laundering, accused may park 'proceeds of crime' with third person having no connection with the crime. The person in possession of the proceeds of crime' can be subjected to attachment and in that case since FIR is not registered against him so as the ECIR, the question of investigation against him so as the criminal proceedings would not arise. The attachment or seizure is permissible even in the hands of a person not arrayed as an accused. The reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal

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Chaudhary and Others v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2022)

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SCC Online 929 is relevant. Para 65 of the said judgment is quoted thus:

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"65. As aforesaid, in this backdrop the amendment Act 2 of 2013 came into being. Considering the purport of the amended provisions and the experience of implementing/enforcement agencies, further changes became necessary to strengthen the mechanism regarding prevention of money- laundering. It is not right in assuming that the attachment of property (provisional) under the second proviso, as amended, has no link with the scheduled offence. Inasmuch as section 5(1) envisages that such an action can be initiated only on the basis of material in possession of the authorised officer indicative of any person being in possession of proceeds of crime. The precondition for being proceeds of crime is that the property has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The sweep of section 5(1) is not limited to the accused named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It would apply to any person (not necessarily being accused in the scheduled offence), if he is involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such a person besides facing the consequence of provisional attachment order, may end up in being named as accused in the complaint to be

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filed by the authorised officer concerning offence under section 3 of the 2002 Act."

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The argument has been made in ignorance of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (supra). Section 8(3)(a), does not mandate filing of complaint against the person whose property has been attached or seized. It does not mandate even investigation against the person whose property has been attached or seized and pendency of the proceedings against him in a Court of law rather what is required is the investigation and pendency of proceedings relating to 'any offence' under this Act. Further, section 5(1) refers to 'any person', which would include even those who have not been charged for an offense, however, are in possession of the proceeds of crime. The interpretation of 'any person' under section 5 cannot be kept limited to the 'accused' who has been charged with an offence. It is wide enough to include persons who are in possession of the proceeds of crime, irrespective of whether they are accused or not. The plain reading of section 5(1) read with section 8(3)(a) supports the finding. For better elucidation, we are reproducing the section 5(1) herein below:

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"Section 5(1). Attachment of property involved in money-laundering.(1)Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that-

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(a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed:

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Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country:

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Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money- laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non- attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act:

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Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted."

¶65

The provision quoted above has been framed with the object sought to be achieved. The attachment of the property can be if any person is in possession of the property as given under Section 5(1)(a) and as per Section 8(3)(a), the continuation of the attachment during the period of investigation for a period of 365 days or pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under the Act. Section 8(3)(a) again does not refer to the investigation against the person whose property has been attached so as the criminal proceedings. Attachment of property from third party can be when the accused involved in predicate offence has

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parked it with such person or it was arranged in such a manner where proceeds of crime may not remain in the hands of the accused so as to be attached but to be kept with other person not involved in the crime. Since the emphasis is to attach the proceeds of crime, it is not necessary it to be from the accused but wherever it exists, the attachment can be made.

¶69

In view of the above, bare reading of the provision does not support the argument raised by the appellant. The judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) has otherwise clarified that attachment and seizure of the property and document can be from a person other than an accused and if that is so where would be a question of investigation against such person not named as accused or any proceeding in the court relating to the offence under the Act.

¶70

When there is no necessity that property attached or seized should be from the accused, the question of completion of investigation within 365 days against a person other than accused would not arise. If the argument raised by the appellant is accepted, then virtually we would be re-writing the provision of section 8(3)(a) to insert the word for continuance of the investigation against the 'accused' and continuance of proceeding in the court against the 'accused'. The word 'accused' has not been inserted under the provision aforesaid and therefore only the Apex Court has held that attachment of the property in the hands of someone not an accused can also take place and if that is so, then there would no question of any investigation or proceeding against person who is not arrayed as an accused. The reason is very simple and can be given by illustration:

¶71

Assuming predicate offence of robbery take place and FIR is registered followed by an ECIR against the accused. The proceeds of crime is parked by the accused with third person who may then

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purchase the property after that or keep the money parked with him. The respondents would be within their right to attach or seize the property in the hands of third person though he is not an accused. This is to protect the property obtained out of the crime. If the argument of the appellant is accepted, then despite the proceeds of crime in the hands of a person other than the accused, it can not be attached or seized and if at all it is attached or seized, the investigation has to be completed against such person within 365 days. This would be nothing but showing requirement to complete the investigation against a person who is not even an accused and need not to be. The seizure or attachment is because the property or related document may be with a person other than an accused. The issue was elaborately discussed by this Tribunal in the case of Ayush Kejriwal vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Kolkata , FPA-PMLA-4358/KOL/2021. The relevant para of the said judgment is quoted herein:

¶75

"23. It is submitted that the appellant is not an accused in the FIR or ECIR thus the documents belonging to him could not have been subjected to seizure. The argument aforesaid has been raised in ignorance of the judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) . While dealing with the issue in reference to the definition of 'proceeds of crime', it was categorically held that the second proviso addresses the broad object of the Act of 2002 to reach the proceeds of crime in whosoever name they are kept or by whosoever they are holding it. Reference of the judgment in the case of Attorney General for India & Ors. vs. Amratlal Prajivandas

¶76

& Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 54 has been given. In this regard, Paras 65, 68 and 69 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) are quoted hereunder: "65. As aforesaid, in this backdrop the amendment Act 2 of 2013 came into being. Considering the purport of the amended provisions

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and the experience of implementing/enforcement agencies, further changes became necessary to strengthen the mechanism regarding prevention of money laundering. It is not right in assuming that the attachment of property (provisional) under the second proviso, as amended, has no link with the scheduled offence. Inasmuch as section 5(1) envisages that such an action can be initiated only on the basis of material in possession of the authorised officer indicative of any person being in possession of proceeds of crime. The precondition for being proceeds of crime is that the property has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The sweep of section 5(1) is not limited to the accused named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It would apply to any person (not necessarily being accused in the scheduled offence), if he is involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such a person besides facing the consequence of provisional attachment order, may end up in being named as accused in the complaint to be filed by the authorised officer concerning offence under section 3 of the 2002 Act.

¶80

68. It was also urged before us that the attachment of property must be equivalent in value of the proceeds of crime only if the proceeds of crime are situated outside India. This argument, in our opinion, is tenuous, For, the definition of "proceeds of crime" is wide enough to not only refer to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also of the value of any such property. If the property is taken or held outside the country, even in such a case, the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad can be proceeded with. The definition of "property" as in Section 2(1)(v) is equally wide enough to encompass the value of the property of proceeds of crime. Such interpretation would further the legislative intent in recovery of the proceeds of crime

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and vesting it in the Central Government for effective prevention of money- laundering.

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69. We find force in the stand taken by the Union of India that the objective of enacting the 2002 Act was the attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime which is the quintessence so as to combat the evil of money laundering. The second proviso, therefore, addresses the broad objective of the 2002 Act to reach the proceeds of crime in whosoever name they are kept or by whosoever they are held. To buttress this argument, reliance has been placed on the dictum in Attorney General of India (supra) and Raman Tech. and process Engg. Co. vs. Solanki Traders".

¶85

The object of the Act is to freeze proceeds of crime and as discussed in the preceding paras, the property gifted to the appellant would fall within the realm of proceeds of crime. The use of the terms "any person" in Section 5(1)(a) read with "such proceeds of crime" in subclause (b) of Section 5(1) includes any person not necessarily an accused. In case, the argument of the appellant is to be accepted, the same would render to defeat intention of the legislature and frustrate the object of the Act. In light of the above, the argument that the appellant has not been named as an accused in the FIR or ECIR would not be of any consequence as ultimately what is relevant is the property that was seized being 'proceeds of crime'. An example in reference to it has been given in preceding paras. If the argument of the appellant is accepted, then it would become very convenient for the accused to park the proceeds of crime" with third person not involved in the crime and in that case, the third person being not accused would always raise a plea that property with him could not have been subjected to attachment. In the instant case, the accused Nirmal Kumar Kejriwal knowing it well that property with him may become subject matter of attachment or seizure gifted it to his grandson much after the registration of FIR and ECIR. The aforesaid

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cannot be considered to be bonafide rather designed to circumvent the provisions of law and the case registered against the accused. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the last argument raised by counsel for the appellant."

¶89

The perusal of the para quoted above reveals that even as per the judgment of the apex court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) it is not necessary that the attachment can be of the property only of the accused rather it is of the proceeds of crime whether in the hands of the accused or with the other person or it can be for value equivalent. Thus, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the argument of the appellant. In the light of the discussion made above, we do not find any merit in the arguments of the appellant.”

¶90

Perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (Supra) clearly brings out that the objective of the Act is to immobilize the proceed of crime, irrespective of it being in the hands of the accused or any other person, till it’s confiscation. The provisions of Section 8(3) (a) while providing for confirmation of either the attachment or seizure of the proceed of crime till the completion of investigation within the period stipulated therein, does not have the requirement of filing the Prosecution Complaint under PMLA against every person whose property has been either attached or seized. In the facts of the present Appeal the Prosecution Complaint was filed even before the passing of the impugned Order confirming the attachment. The bank accounts of the Appellant and of his proprietorship firm provided for the ‘parking place’ for the proceed of crime. The filing of the Supplementary Prosecution Complaint on 17.12.2018 in which the Appellant came to be named for the first time, does not impinge in any manner on the requirement of the provisions of Section 8 (3) (a) of PMLA to complete the investigation and file the Prosecution Complaint within the stipulated period of time, since the Prosecution Complaint in the matter had already been filed on 18.07.2018. Thus, in the present appeal

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that requirement was met with the filing of the Prosecution Complaint before the passing of the impugned Order.

¶94

In view of the aforementioned discussions, we do not find that the argument of the Appellant has any merit. Therefore, the Appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.

¶95

(Balesh Kumar) (G.C. Mishra) Member Member

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New Delhi, 14th November, 2024

¶97

‘PS’

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FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018

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FPA-PMLA-2466/PTN/2018 of Shri Shyam Sunder Bajaj v. The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Patna

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