Allowed

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012 of C. Shankar @ Sekar v/s The Competent Authority, Chennai

ATFP9 Aug 2017FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Tribunal allowed the appeal, holding that attachment of property under Chapter VA of the NDPS Act must be released when criminal proceedings abate due to the accused's death before framing of charges. Citing Supreme Court precedent, it ruled the presumption of innocence triggers release even without explicit acquittal.

What did the court decide?

Impugned order dated 14.11.2011 set aside; all attached properties released forthwith under Section 68(Z) of the NDPS Act.

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012 of C. Shankar @ Sekar v/s The Competent… — Narcotics (NDPS) | ATFP (2017)

¶1

APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY NEW DELHI

¶2

Date of Decision: 09.08.2017

¶3

MP-ND-92/MDS/2014

¶4

¶5

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶6

C. Shankar @ Sekar … Appellant/Applicant Versus The Competent Authority, Chennai … Respondent

¶7

Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

¶8

For the appellant : Shri S. Selvathrumurgan, Advocate Shri P. Ezhil Nilavan, Advocate For the respondent : Shri Christopher Vasant, I.O CORAM JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH : CHAIRMAN SHRI ANAND KISHORE : MEMBER

¶9

JUDGEMENT

¶10

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶11

One C. Shanker @ Sekar had filed appeal against the order dated 14.11.2011 by the second respondent under section 68(O) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985. He was in custody at the time of filing the appeal.

¶12

During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died on 18.03.2013. At the time of his death, charges were not framed in criminal complaint against any accused including the deceased. His wife Smt.

¶13

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶14

Page 1 of 17

¶15

Usha, daughter and son Shri Vignesh Kumar were impleaded as legal heirs of the deceased in the present appeal.

¶16

3. Case of the Competent Authority

¶17

i) The case of the Prosecution against the appellant was based on the intelligence whereby the respondent on 21.09.2011 seized 35 speed post articles meant for USA and UK sent by one Sekar which contained branded strips of tablets/capsules and unbranded drugs believed to be psychotropic substances covered under NDPS Act.

¶18

As a follow up action on 26.09.2011, the petitioner‟s premises at 15A, Vijayan Street, Ramakrishna Nagar, Salamedu, Villupuram were searched and seized Fixed deposits receipts, bank pass-book, land documents etc., and 40 Speed post parcels returned undelivered by the Post office and 3 Nos., of cottons containing tablets and capsules under various branch names are believed to psychotropic substances. Subsequently on 27.09.2011, one Alex, a Russian National residence at Door No. 153, Divan Kanthappa Nagar, 3^rd Street, Periya Mudaliar Chavadi, Kattuppam Post, Villupuram District was searched, wherein certain incriminating documents were seized.

¶19

ii). During the course of investigation, it was revealed that he and his wife acquired certain properties which are in the name of his wife from the period 2007 onwards. The details of movable properties are mentioned in para 2 of the impugned order.

¶20

iii) The statements of the appellant under section 67 of NDPS Act were recorded and the said Alex independently. As per the statement the said Alex who deposed that the appellant was acting as an employee on commission basis to do a particular job. His role was to purchase the FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012 Page 2 of 17

¶21

Page 2 of 17

¶22

medicines at English Medicals and in Ayurvedha Medicals and to send the same to the address given by the said Alex for which he was paid commission.

¶23

Late Shri Shanker @ Sekar was charged as a person within meaning of Section 68-A-2(cc) of the NDPS Act, 1985 as amended by the impugned order dated 14^th November, 2011. His wife was treated as a person within the meaning of Section 68A(2)(d) of the Act. In exercise of powers u/s 68(F) 2 of the Act, the impugned order was passed under section 68(F)(I) in the nature of a provisional attachment pending outcome of the trial case.

¶24

The said order dated14.11.011 was challenged by Shri Shankar @ Sekar before this Tribunal upon filing of an appeal u/s 68(O) of the Act on 28.02.2011.

¶25

In 2012, the complaint, for the offences u/s 8 (c ) read with section 22, 23, 25, 27A, 28 & 29 was filed against him and other accused person. His wife Usha was not made an accused in the complaint.

¶26

In the appeal, C. Shankar had submitted that he was acting as an agent for salary with Alex Vyukhin and as such the property earned by him could not be seized. He also pleaded that he was not given sufficient opportunity to substantiate his stand. He disputed the observation of the Competent Authority that between January 2007 and his arrest on 28.9.2011, Shri Shankar did not have any income earning activities and he acquired the said assets only out of earning. He claimed that the Competent Authority failed to observe the differences between salary income earned as income and through legal means. He claimed that FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012 Page 3 of 17

¶27

immovable properties were acquired by his wife's sources and his hard work. He claimed that movable property car was acquired under hypothecation. The investments were not made only by the appellant, but from the funds of wife also.

¶28

After the death of late C. Shankar and impleadment Ms. Usha has also filed an affidavit on 18.07.2013 in which it was deposed that her husband committed suicide in custody. Her husband was acting as an employee on commission basis and the property was purchased in her name from the money received from her mother out of sale of property which was belonging to her and her sister. Her daughter is an unmarried girl and she is duty bound to get her married and the third appellant i.e. her son is studying B.Tec., second year in S.R.M. University. These attached immovable properties, movable properties and Bank accounts and deposits were for children‟s marriage and future studies. Before framing of charge by the trial court her husband lost his life. The other co accused in this case were granted bail by the Hon‟ble High Court of Madras. Infact, during the pendency of his bail application filed by her husband, he died.

¶29

Her old jewels were used for purchase and construction of immovable properties and for acquisition of movable properties. With regard to the car bearing Registration No. TN 32H 2732, has been purchased with 100% hypothecation. As far as the fixed deposits are concerned, it has been invested out of her husband‟s savings from his earlier medical business. After that on 14.11.2011 the second respondent herein passed a confirmation order under section 68F(2) of NDPS Act vide F.No. OCA/MDS/4/2011-NDPS against which her Late husband/Appellant preferred an appeal before this Tribunal which is FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012 Page 4 of 17

¶30

pending on the file of this Hon‟ble Tribunal in FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012. She pleaded that with the demise of the accused Shankar, her husband, the prosecution proceedings against him abated and that the provisions of Section 68Z were attracted.

¶31

Smt. Usha, W/o Shankar claimed that her husband Shankar was acting as an employee on commission basis and the properties in her name were purchased from the money received from her mother out of sale of property belonging to her and her sister. Her old jewellery was used for purchase and construction of immovable properties and for acquiring movable properties.

¶32

It is argued on behalf of the respondent that Shri Shankar was a “person”, in his capacity as an associate who managed the affairs of the business of illicit drug trafficking, carried on with Shri Alex. The prosecution proceedings against Shri Alex are still pending. In case Alex gets convicted, as a logical corollary, late Shankar continues to remain a person, being an Associate of Alex as envisaged under Section 68B(b)(ii) and thus the death or non prosecution of Shankar will not alter the character of the freezed assets, being illegally acquired property, arising out of illicit trafficking in drugs, which Chapter VA of the NDPS Act aims to forfeit.

¶33

It is submitted on behalf of respondent that the properties, under freezing order as confirmed by the Competent Authority, are all clearly acquired out of income derived from Illicit Trafficking in Drugs. A careful analysis of the transactions as recorded in the bank accounts of the late Shankar, his wife Smt. Usha reveals that the sources of funds to the date of acquisition of assets, establishes the nexus between the sources of

¶34

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶35

Page 5 of 17

¶36

funds arising out of illicit trafficking and the acquisition of assets. The sources of funds credited to the bank account of Shankar originates out of remittances from the bank account of Shri Alex Vyukhin with whose participation Shri Shankar carried on the illicit trafficking in drugs.

¶37

Smt. Usha is the wife of Shanker and hence she is also attracted as a

¶38

person within the meaning of Section 68 A (2)(d) NDPS Act.

¶39

Counsel for the appellant argued that the property seized by the Competent Authority stood released u/s 68(Z) of the Act after the death of C. Shanker as no charges were framed against him by the Special Court. Thus counsel submits that under the operation of Law, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside by lifting the orders of attachment. Thus, going into the merit of the case is not required.

¶40

Admittedly, on 18.03.2013, Shri Shankar committed suicide when he was detained in the Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai in connection with the main case in CC No. 15 of 2012 pending trial on the file of the I Addl. Special Court for NDPS court at Chennai.

¶41

Admittedly the respondents had lodged a complaint on 20.03.2012 being CC No. 15/12 before the Learned Special Judge 1^st Additional Special Court under Narcotics Act Chennai 600104 against the appellant late Shanker, Alexander VYUKHIN @ Alex and 5 others.

¶42

When the appellant Shanker was alive, provisional attachment has been made for the following properties namely:

¶43

(i) house properties in the name of Usha the wife of Late Shanker

¶44

(ii) fixed deposits in the name of both Shanker and Usha

¶45

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶46

Page 6 of 17

¶47

The said property along with the fixed deposit were attached under chapter 69A of the NDPS Act. The provisional attachment had been made based on the arrest of for the alleged offences involving commercial quantity under NDPS Act and also on the ground that Shanker was an associate of the 2^nd Accused Alexander a Russian national.

¶48

The said complaint would clearly reveal the fact that the wife of the appellant late Shanker had not been arrayed as one of the accused in the criminal case. The appellant late Shanker died on 18.03.2013.

¶49

When the above criminal case came up for hearing before the court (The Special Judge) on 4.6.2013, the following order was passed

¶50

“A 1 died, death Certificate filed. Special public prosecutor certified the death of A1. Death of A1 recorded and the charge against A1 abated. A2 produced. A3 absent. Petition under Section 317 CRPC filed and allowed. A4 to A6 present. NBW pending against A7, on 18.6.13”

¶51

Admittedly the wife of the appellant C. Shanker and her two children were brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased. It is argued on their behalf that the provisional attachment had become infructuous and the same is liable to be lifted since appellant Shanker died even before charges were framed against him in the criminal court. The competent Criminal court had passed an order on 4-6-2013 recording the death of the appellant and categorically ordered that the charge against A1 abated. Thus, under section 68(Z) of NDPS, all the proceedings against the C. Shanker and seized or frozen of his and relative properties stand released.

¶52

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶53

Page 7 of 17

¶54

The extract section 68 Z of the NDPS Act at this juncture

¶55

68Z. Release of property in certain cases

¶56

(1) Where the detention order of a detenu is set aside or withdrawn, properties seized or frozen under this Chapter shall stand released

¶57

(2) Where any person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of section 68A has been acquitted or discharged from the charges under this Act or any other corresponding law of any other country and the acquittal was not appealed against or when appealed against, the appeal was disposed of as a consequence of which such property could not be forfeited or warrant of arrest or authorisation of arrest issued against such person has been withdrawn, then, property seized or frozen under this Chapter shall stand released.

¶58

In the order of confirmation u/s 68 F(2) passed on 14.11.2011 although it was observed that Ms. Usha, the wife, is a relative person within the meaning of Section -68-A(2) (d) of the NDPS Act still no complaint against her was filed. She was never made an accused in the complaint.

¶59

There is specific finding of the competent authority that Usha does not have any independent legal source of income and that the movable and immovable properties in her name are also linked with the income of Shanker earned from illicit trafficking in psychotropic substances. Hence the competent authority in the exercise of powers under Section 68 F (2) NDPS Act had confirmed the freezing order made by the 1^st respondent dated 17-10-2011 and further ordered that the properties mentioned in the impugned order shall also remain frozen. It was also stated by the Competent Authority that the late Shanker had purchased properties in the name of his wife Usha.

¶60

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶61

Page 8 of 17

¶62

It is argued on behalf of Competent Authority that C. Shanker was never acquitted or discharged from the charges and thus no benefit of his death could be derived by his wife and children under Section 68(Z) of the Act.

¶63

It is submitted on behalf of respondent that acquittal refers to the deliverance and setting free of a person from the suspicion or guilt of an offence. It refers to the certification that an accused person is not guilty of the charged offence. Such certification of Shri Shankar, being not guilty of the charged offence, has not been issued by any court. Therefore, the deceased can neither be considered acquitted nor discharged as trial has not reached any finality. Therefore, under Section 68Z of NDPS Act, no benefit can be derived by the legal representative as the said provision does not apply to the facts of the applicant‟s case.

¶64

The law on the point has been decided by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in its recent judgement delivered in the matter of U. Subhadramma V/s. State of A.P., reported in (2016) 7 SCC 797. The relevant portion of the judgement are extracted hereunder:

¶65

“8. Section 13 requires the Government to inform the District Judge about the status of the criminal proceedings. It requires the Government to furnish the District Judge with a copy of the judgment or order of the trial court and with copies of the judgment or orders, if any, of the appellate or Revisional Court thereon. Subsection (2) mandates that the District Judge shall forthwith withdraw any orders of attachment of property made in connection with the offence if (a) cognizance of alleged scheduled offence has not been taken, or (b) where the final judgment and orders of the criminal court is one of acquittal. While this section is clear that the orders of attachment must be withdrawn if cognizance of the offence has not been taken or there has been an acquittal; the section is silent as to the effect of abatement of prosecution. It is due to this silence that it is contended by the State Government in this case

¶66

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶67

Page 9 of 17

¶68

that the orders of attachment could not only have been continued but could also have been confirmed. It is not possible for us to accept the submission. If the law requires that the orders of attachment should be withdrawn upon acquittal it stands to reason that such orders must be withdrawn when the prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of the accused, whose property is attached. Concept of abatement of a trial could be subsumed in the section where the final judgment and order of the criminal court is one of acquittal. In this context, the presumption of innocence of an accused till he is convicted must be borne in mind and there is no reason to consider this presumption to have vaporised upon the death of an accused. It may be noted that this Court has time and again reiterated the presumption of innocence of an accused till he is convicted.

¶69

9. As far as the circumstances of this case are concerned, we find that there has been a gross miscarriage of justice at several steps. In the first place, the finding of the trial court that Ramachandraiah was alone responsible for the offences is completely vitiated as null and void since Ramachandraiah had admittedly died on the date this finding was rendered. It is too well settled that a prosecution cannot continue against a dead person. A fortiori a criminal court cannot continue proceedings against a dead person and find him guilty. Such proceedings and the findings are contrary to the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence. In such a case the accused does not exist and cannot be convicted. Consequently, the learned District Judge committed a gross error of law in acting upon such a finding and treating Ramachandraiah as guilty of such offences while making the order of attachment and while confirming the said order of attachment of properties.

¶70

10. In such circumstance, the courts below erred in recording the finding that Appellant 1 had committed the offence as alleged by the prosecution. Further, finding recorded by the learned Single Judge of the High Court that Appellant 1 alone had committed the offence and not Appellant 2, must be taken to have misappropriated the said amount is perverse:

¶71

“A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged... In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the

¶72

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶73

Page 10 of 17

¶74

evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witness⁴ -."

¶75

11. The facts involved herein did not warrant presumption of commission of offence by Appellant 1 and thus the findings recorded by the courts below are not tenable.

¶76

12. In fact, we find that the learned District Judge could not have proceeded with the attachment proceedings at all since the attachment proceedings were initiated by the State against Ramachandraiah under Section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, who was actually dead. Section 3 contemplates that such an application must be made to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, in respect of property which the State Government believes the said person to have procured by means-of the offences. It is incomprehensible, therefore, that such an application could have been made in regard to a dead person who obviously cannot be said to be ordinarily resident or carrying on business anywhere. There is no legal provision which enables continuance of prosecution upon death of the accused. We must record that the proceedings and the decisions of the courts below are disturbing, to say the least. In the first place, though the accused had died, the trial court proceeded with the trial and recorded a conviction two years after his death. Then, this null and void conviction was used as a basis for making an attachment of his properties before the Sessions Court. Astonishingly, all applications succeeded, the attachment was made absolute and over and above all, the High Court upheld the attachment.

¶77

13. The orders of the criminal court vis-a-vis Ramachandraiah are illegal and liable to be set aside. We also find that the impugned judgment in appeal is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. The orders of the courts below are accordingly set aside. The appeal succeeds.”

¶78

The presumption of innocence is available to the accused until he is convicted. The presumption of innocence itself is a human right after the death of late Shanker (particularly before framing charges) and it is not open to the Competent Authority to proceed against his property under NDPS Act. It is not legally permissible.

¶79

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶80

Page 11 of 17

¶81

In view of the judgment of Supreme Court, the present case is totally covered. The attached property under the operation of law i.e. Section 68(Z) stand released. It is pertinent to mention here that now after expiring of three years after the death of Shri C. Shankar and passing the order of abatement, the subsequent proceeding against Usha u/s 68(b)(b) (vii) of the NDPS Act were initiated by passing the order dated 13.04.2016 by the Competent Authority when it was declared that Smt. Usha wife of late Shri C. Shanker as an associate of Shri Alexander. Prior to that date, all the proceedings against the C. Shanker @ Sekar were already abated by the order of the Special Court.

¶82

No complaint was filed earlier against her when he was alive. Once the proceedings after his death are terminate. The subsequent action against the wife for same properties appears to be after thought as the wife of the deceased was never declared as associate person. Her husband died on 18.3.2013. No complaint filed in the year 2012, she was not made an accused in the matter till he was alive. The said order once the provision 68(Z) was attracted in the matter. No charges were framed against her husband and accused person. Therefore, the court has rightly passed the order of abatement on 4.6.2013 as per law.

¶83

It is settled provision of law that every person is presumed innocent which is the bedrock of our criminal jurisprudence. Unless a person is tried and convicted, the presumption of innocence would apply. Presumption of innocence is also a human right as per the judgement reported, in 2004 SCC Crl 1893, 2001 (1) SCC691. Unless presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted, the Court can treat the

¶84

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶85

Page 12 of 17

¶86

presumption as tantamounting to proof as reported in JT 2003 (9) SC 119.

¶87

Therefore, in the absence of framing charges and trial the presumption of innocence will apply and it would amount to discharge as no charges have been brought against him.

¶88

Learned Counsel appearing on the Competent Authority has admitted before us that the order of associate person was passed after the death of her husband. It is also not denied by him that no complaint was filed against her. He submits that she was not arrayed as accused party in the complaint and she was not declared as associate person earlier as the Competent Authority never thought that her husband would die before framing of charges otherwise, she would have implicated earlier prior to his death.

¶89

However, the Competent Authority in the present case had adopted a new device that after 5 years of the arrest of appellant Shanker, by passing an order on 13-4-2016 in which he had chosen to address the wife of the deceased Shanker as an associate of Alexander.

¶90

The reasons recorded in the order dated 13.03.2016 which are relied upon by the respondent prima facie do not help the case of the respondent. The said steps are contrary to law once the language of section 68(Z) is clear that if a person is discharged from the case or acquitted then the properties seized or frozen under this chapter shall stand released. The moment appellant Shanker died on 18-3-2013, by which time no charges were framed against him for the any offence

¶91

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶92

Page 13 of 17

¶93

under the Act, the properties attached stand released automatically. The property was no longer available for the respondent to deal with. Therefore seeking to issue a fresh order 3 years after the death is not legal in the facts and circumstances of the case. We are of the view that the said order 13.04.2016 which was passed with malafide intention at the risk and costs of the Competent Authority.

¶94

Nothing prevented the respondent from terming the wife of late Shanker as an associate at that point itself. They had not done it since they had the knowledge of the fact that the wife of late Shanker had nothing to do with the alleged offences committed by late Shanker and Alexander and others and that is why the competent officer had not made the wife of late Shanker as one of the accused in the criminal case. The explanation given by the I.O was that the Competent Authority that he never thought that C. Shanker would expire before framing of charges. The said explanation is wholly mis-conceived and cannot be accepted in the eyes of law.

¶95

It appears to us that in view of the interpretation of Section 68(Z) given by the Supreme Court in the case of U. Subhadramma & V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh (Supra) (2016) 7 SCC 797 at 801 charges were not framed against her husband.

¶96

“8. Section 13 requires the Government to inform the District Judge about the status of the criminal proceedings. It requires the Government to furnish the District Judge with a copy of the judgment or order of the trial court and with copies of the judgment or orders, if any, of the appellate or Revisional Court thereon. Sub-section (2) mandates that the District Judge shall forthwith withdraw any orders of attachment of property made in connection with the offence if (a) cognizance of

¶97

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶98

Page 14 of 17

¶99

alleged scheduled offence has not been taken, or (b) where the final judgment and orders of the criminal court is one of acquittal. While this section is clear that the orders of attachment must be withdrawn if cognizance of the offence has not been taken or there has been an acquittal; the section is silent as to the effect of abatement of prosecution. It is due to this silence that it is contended by the State Government in this case that the orders of attachment could not only have been continued but could also have been confirmed. It is not possible for us to accept the submission. If the law requires that the orders of attachment should be withdrawn upon acquittal it stands to reason that such orders must be withdrawn when the prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of the accused, whose property is attached. Concept of abatement of a trial could be subsumed in the section where the final judgment and order of the criminal court is one of acquittal. In this context, the presumption of innocence of an accused till he is convicted must be borne in mind and there is no reason to consider this presumption to have vaporised upon the death of an accused. It may be noted that this Court has time and again reiterated the presumption of innocence of an accused till he is convicted.”

¶100

It appears from the material available that the wife of late Shanker had nothing to do with the alleged offences committed by late Shanker, Alexander and others. And only because of the same the competent authority had termed the wife of late Shanker as a person holding the property of late Shanker, The Competent Authority cannot be permitted to proceed with such theory. If they still wishes to proceed with the same, they would follow the consequences in accordance with law.

¶101

The Competent Authority purposely had taken a stand now that the wife of late Shanker is an associate of Alexander. It seems that the competent authority has taken the stand which is shocking as it was their fault when the competent authority did not declare her as associate person before the abatement of proceedings against her husband.

¶102

It is the duty of the Competent Authority to respect the statue. In the present case, the Competent Authority is trying to circumvent the

¶103

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶104

Page 15 of 17

¶105

beneficial provision under section 68Z of the Act and trying to order the attachment which could not be done as per law.

¶106

The right to property is a constitutional right. There can never be a forfeiture of property unless a person is punished. Forfeiture is also a punishment under Indian penal code. Late Shanker died before charges were framed against him and he could never be dealt as a person under chapter V (A) of the Act.

¶107

The reasoning in the order dated 13.04.2016 given by the Competent Authority that Shanker (late) was never brought to trial when he was alive or even charged with the crime under the Act, was an associate of another person involved in the Act cannot be accepted as there can be no reason as to why the respondent Competent Authority has passed the said order in the month of April 2016. It is done to prejudice the case of appellant and the disposal of the present appeal on merits and to deny the wife of deceased Shanker and his children to get the benefit of Section 68Z of the Act.

¶108

For the above referred fact and law and in view of peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the properties seized or frozen under this chapter shall stand released as the charges against late C. Shanker had abated on 4-6-2013 as per the order of the learned and special judge under NDPS Act Chennai. As it is settled law that the Act must be strictly construed as per the judgement reported in 2008 (14) SCC 186 and as the said Shanker died even before charges were framed, the criminal proceedings against him stood abated.

¶109

FPA-ND-1/MDS/2012

¶110

Page 16 of 17

¶111

In view of these circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.11.2011 is set-aside. All the properties are ordered to be released u/s 68(Z) of the Act forthwith.

¶112