Partly allowed

FPA-1/MDS/2011 of H. Haja Alaudeen v/s The Competent Authority, Chennai

ATFP1 Jun 2017FPA-1/MDS/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Appellate Tribunal set aside a forfeiture order, finding the show cause notice insufficient regarding the nexus between properties and illegal activities. While granting an option to pay a fine instead of forfeiture for the appellant, the tribunal also mentioned setting aside the order against the appellant's brother in related proceedings.

What did the court decide?

An option to pay a fine of Rs. 2.50 lakhs in lieu of forfeiture was granted to pay within four weeks

FPA-1/MDS/2011 of H. Haja Alaudeen v/s The Competent… — Banking and Recovery | ATFP (2017)

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APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY NEW DELHI

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Date of Decision 01^st June, 2017.

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MP-59/MDS/2012 (Stay)

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FPA-1/MDS/2011

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H. Haja Alaudeen … Appellant

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Versus

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The Competent Authority, Chennai … Respondent

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Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

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For the appellant : Shri. S. Selvathrumurgan,

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Advocate For the respondent : Shri Ashok Kumar Srivastava, Joint Commissioner, Shri Christopher Vasant, I.O

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CORAM JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH : CHAIRMAN SHRI KAUSHAL SRIVASTAVA : MEMBER SHRI ANAND KISHORE : MEMBER JUDGMENT

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FPA-1/MDS/2011

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This appeal is filed against the order dated 13.06.2011 passed by the Competent Authority, Madras under Section 7(1) of The Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA for short) forfeiting the property namely “50% of the land and building of the house property T.S. No. 1529, Sultan Colony, Melakottai Basal Road, Nagapattinam” of Shri H. Haja Allaudeen, the appellant, to the Central Government. The said order was passed in the proceedings initiated by the notice dated 27.09.2004 under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA issued to Shri H. Haja Allaudeen being an affected person (AP, for short) under Section 2(2)(b) of the said Act.

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This is the second round of adjudication in the case. Earlier the subject property had been forfeited vide the order dated 12.09.2005 passed by the

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Competent Authority which was appealed by the appellant before this Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated 19.05.2010 in FPA-35/MDS/2005 remanded the matter to the Competent Authority for fresh consideration/adjudication with an opportunity to the appellant to file a detailed reply alongwith the documents relied upon in support of his case. During the course of hearing of the said appeal before this Tribunal in the month of May 2010, the appellant was served with a copy of the reasons stated to have been recorded by the Competent Authority for the issuance of notice under Section 6(1) SAFEMA. After necessary opportunity to the appellant for hearing and on consideration of the pleas and contentions of the two sides and the documentary evidence filed, impugned order dated 13.06.2011 was passed by the Competent Authority forfeiting the subject property to the Central Government under Section 7 of SAFEMA. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant.

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In the present appeal against the impugned order dated 13.06.2011, it has been contended by/on behalf of the appellant that the show cause notice dated 27.09.2004 (Page No. 275 of Paper Book/typed set) did not contain the reasons for the belief that the properties are illegally acquired properties. Further, on perusal of the reasons recorded by the Competent Authority for the issuance of notice under Section 6(1) SAFEMA (Page No. 305 of Paper Book/typed set), copy of which was served on the appellant during the earlier round of appeal, would show that the same are very vague, unreasonable and not specific. It simply says that a detention order dated 29.11.1993 came to be issued against Haja Allaudeen, because of which he is an affected person (AP) under SAFEMA;, that he is in possession of two properties at Nagapattinam and the licit sources of earnings have also not come to light and based on his antecedents in smuggling activities, the Competent Authority had got reasons to believe that the said properties were acquired out of illegal earnings. These reasons are clearly vague, unreasonable, arbitrary and not specific. The

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competent authority ought to have disclosed specific facts and events in the show cause notice itself or at least in the reasons supplied thereafter.

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3.1 No doubt, Section 2(1) and Section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA clearly say that SAFEMA would apply to a person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under COFEPOSA 1974 and no doubt, as the revocation of detention order was issued only in terms of section 11 (1)(b) of COFEPOSA, the appellant could still be proceeded with under proviso (i) to Section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA, but the important question is that as to whether by merely relying upon the detention order dated 02.11.1993, and without any other single material available before the competent authority other than the order of detention, the competent authority could not have come to the conclusion that the properties in question are illegally acquired properties and hence issue of the notice under Section 6(1) of the Act was itself not as per law.

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For the above proposition, the appellant has relied on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court delivered in the matter of Chandra Kumar Jain vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 11 SCC 427, as follows

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“5. The preventive detention order is for the year 2003 for a period of one year. It expired by afflux of time. Chandra Kumar Jain had, in fact, been detained in custody for one full year under the abovementioned order.

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6. Confronted with the question as to the need to examine the correctness of the detention order today, the learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that proceedings under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter being referred to as "SAFEMA") have been initiated for forfeiture of certain properties on the ground that these properties are the ill-gotten wealth of deceased Appellant Chandra KumarJain . Such proceedings could be initiated only against a limited class of persons. One of the classes being persons who had been detained under the provisions of COFEPOSA Act (Under Section 2(2b) of the Act). If the detention order is held to be illegal, such proceedings under the SAFEMA cannot be continued and, therefore, this Court is required to examine the legality of the detention order.

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6. We are of the opinion that this appeal need not be examined because under the Scheme of the SAFEMA, properties of five classes of persons could be forfeited by the Government only after an appropriate inquiry contemplated under the provisions of the Act. The persons whose properties are liable for such forfeiture are:

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-----------.

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------------.

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7. The identification of the persons against whom SAFEMA could be invoked is only the first step under the scheme of the SAFEMA Act. After such a person is identified in a given case, the competent authority must be satisfied that the properties held by such a person are illegally acquired properties of such person having regard to the known sources of income, earnings or assets, or any other information or material available to the competent authority. Only then, proceedings could be initiated for

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forfeiture of such properties by issuing a notice Under Section 6¹ . Upon receipt of the said notice, it is open² to the recipient of the notice to place all relevant material before the competent authority to establish that the property which is the subject matter of the notice is not illegally acquired property. Such a course of action is open to the noticee notwithstanding the fact that he is a person to whom the Act is applicable.

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8. The identification of Chandra Kumar as a person against whom the SAFEMA Act could be invoked is established by the order of the preventive detention against him.”

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3.2. It is further submitted by the appellant that the detention order could only be used to identify a person (the appellant in the present case) for purposes of action under SAFEMA and that this is only the first step and what is important is thereafter the Competent Authority must be satisfied that the properties held by the appellant are illegally acquired properties of such person(s) having regard to the known sources of income, earnings or assets, or any other information or material available to the Competent Authority. Only then, proceedings could be initiated for forfeiture of such properties by issuing a notice under Section 6(1) ibid .

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3.3 A mere perusal of the show cause notice dated 27/09/2004 under section 6(1) of the Act ( enclosed at Page No. 275 of the typed set), the reasons recorded by the Competent Authority supplied to the counsel in the year 2010 (Page No. 305 of the typed set) and the order of forfeiture dated 13.06.2011 (Page no. 322 of the typed set) would clearly reveal that there are no sufficient grounds to proceed against the appellant for forfeiting his property and also there is no allegation of any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the money alleged to have been acquired illegally by the appellant.

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3.3.1 The appellant has relied on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.P. Abdulla v. Competent Authority , reported in (2007) 2 SCC 510, wherein the confiscation orders passed against P.P. Abdulla, a person who was convicted under Customs Act, were set aside on the ground that in the show cause notice issued under Section 6(1) of the Act, no link or nexus between the properties sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally

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FPA-1/MDS/2011

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acquired money of the appellant therein was shown. The relevant portion of the

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judgment is extracted hereunder:-

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“6. Learned Counsel submitted that it has been expressly stated in Section 6(1) that the reason to believe of the competent authority must be recorded in writing. In the counter-affidavit it has also been stated in paragraph 8 that the reasons in the notice under Section 6(1) were recorded in writing. In our opinion this is not sufficient. Whenever the statute required reasons to be recorded in writing, then in our opinion it is incumbent on the respondents to produce the said reasons before the Court so that the same can be scrutinized in order to verify whether they are relevant and germane or not. This can be done either by annexing the copy of the reasons along with the counter- affidavit or by quoting the reasons somewhere in the counter-affidavit. Alternatively, if the notice itself contains the reason of belief, that notice can be annexed to the counter-affidavit or quoted in it. However, all that has not been done in this case.

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It must be stated that an order of confiscation is a very stringent order and hence a provision for confiscation has to be construed strictly, and the statute must be strictly complied with, otherwise the order becomes illegal.

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7. In our opinion, the facts of the case are covered by the decision of this Court in Fatima Mohd. Amina (dead) through LRs. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra). In the present case the contents of the notice, even if taken on face value, do not disclose any sufficient reason warranting the impugned action against the appellant as, in our opinion, the condition precedent for exercising the power under the Act did not exist. Hence, the impugned orders cannot be sustained.

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8. In the present case, in the notice dated 15.3.1988 issued to the appellant under Section 6(1) of the Act (copy of which is annexed as Annexure P1 to this appeal), it has not been alleged therein that there is any such link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally acquired money of the appellant. Hence, in view of the decision of this Court in Fatima Mohd. Amina's case (supra), the said notice dated 15.3.1988 has to be held to be illegal. Consequently the order passed in pursuance of the said notice is declared as null and void. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders of the High Court and the concerned Authorities are set aside. No costs.”

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3.3.2 The appellant have also relied on the full bench judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the matter of Fatima Mohd. Amin v. Union of India , reported in (2003) 7 SCC 436. In the operative portion of the judgment, it was

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held as follows-

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“8. The contents of the said notices, even if taken at their face value do not disclose any reason warranting action against the appellant. No allegation whatsoever has been made to this effect that there exists any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenu(s).

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9. As the condition precedent for initiation of the proceeding under SAFEMA did not exist, the impugned orders of forfeiture cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserves to be allowed. The order under challenge is set aside.”

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10. The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

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3.3.3 Another judgment referred by the appellant is that of the Hon‟ble

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Supreme Court of India in Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority ,

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reported in (2008) 14 SCC 186, the relevant portion of which is as follows:-

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“14. The relevant provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short "SAFEMA") and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) are in pari materia.

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15. Contentions were raised that the show cause notice shows complete nonapplication of mind on the part of the competent authority, as;

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FPA-1/MDS/2011

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(i) 28 unconnected properties including the property of Late Fatima Amin which formed part of the separate proceeding had been included.

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(ii) The properties mentioned therein had never been mentioned by the appellants in the previous proceedings, although they did not form part thereof

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. ISSUE

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16. The core question which, therefore, arises for consideration is what are the statutory requirements for initiating a valid proceeding.

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INTERPRETATION

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17. Chapter VA contains stringent provisions. It provides for forfeiture of property. Such property, however, as the heading of the Chapter shows, must be derived from or used in illicit traffic. Illegally acquired property in relation to any person to whom the chapter applies would mean only such property which was acquired wholly or partly out of or by means of any income attributable to the contravention of any provision of the Act or for a consideration wholly or partly traceable to any property referred to in Sub-clause (i) or the income or earning from property.

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18. It is, therefore, evident that the property which is sought to be forfeited must be the one which has a direct nexus with the income etc. derived by way of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any property acquired therefrom. What is meant by identification of such property having regard to the definition of `identifying' is, that the property was derived from or used in the illicit traffic.

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19. The property having regard to the said definition would include any of the properties described therein and deeds of instruments evidencing interest therein derived from or used in the illicit traffic.

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In the aforementioned context, the word "person" also assumes importance which leads to determining the nature, source, disposition, movement, title or ownership of the property. Direction to forfeiture of a property is in two parts. Firstly, it has to be identified in terms of Section 68F of the Act. For the said purpose, a satisfaction must be arrived at by the authority specified therein to the effect that the person concerned had been holding any illegally acquired property. Secondly, on the basis of such information, he is entitled to take steps for tracing and identifying the property. The Authority is also entitled to seize or freeze such a property.

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20. Before, however, the actual order of forfeiture of such illegally acquired property is passed, issuance of a notice to show cause is essential so as to fulfill the requirements of natural justice.

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Such a notice is to be issued by the Authority having regard to:

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(i) The value of the property held by the person concerned,

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(ii) His known source of income, earning or assets,

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(iii) Any other information or material made available as a result of a report from any officer making an investigation under Section 68E of the Act or otherwise.

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21. When the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, the competent authority would be entitled to issue a show cause notice, if he has reason to believe, wherefore reasons are to be recorded in writing that the properties are illegally acquired properties.

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22. Once the notice to show cause is found to be satisfying the statutory requirements which are condition precedent therefor, a valid proceeding can be said to have been initiated for forfeiture of the property. Only in a case where a valid proceeding has been initiated, the burden of proof that any property specified in the notice is not illegally acquired property, would be on the `person' affected.

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23. Before, however, an order of forfeiture can be passed, the Competent Authority must not only comply with the principles of natural justice, he is also required to apply his mind on the materials brought before him. It is also necessary that a finding that all or any of the properties in question were illegally acquired properties is recorded

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24. The competent authority has a vast power as is provided under Section 68R of the Act. He is not bound by any finding of any officer or authority under any other law as the same would not be conclusive for the purpose of any proceeding under the said chapter.

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Analysis of the aforementioned provisions clearly establish that a link must be found between the property sought to be forfeited and the income or assets or properties which were illegally acquired by the person concerned.

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25. We may, however, at this juncture also notice that during the course of the proceedings, the learned advocate of the appellants by a letter dated 19.2.2000 requested the competent authority to supply the reasons for issuing the notice. In

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response thereto, the prescribed authority by a letter dated 23.2.2000, stated that the reasons had been incorporated in the respective show cause notices. Evidently, therefore, no other reason was available for being supplied.

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26. We may also notice some observations made in the proceeding sheet of the Competent Authority dated 29.12.2000 which is in the following terms:

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On going through the certificate in respect of SP/Satara it may be seen that they have simply informed details of the ownership in re present and past only. Nowhere they have mentioned in clear words whether nexus between the present holder and sh. Iqbal mirchi is there nor are properties claimed by sh. Iqbal mirchi and his family members mentioned in Show Cause Notice dated 17/11. as per (illegible) association/ nexus of present holder of properties between iqbal mirchi can't be established as still they are silent on the issue. However, the matter shall be decided on merits by C.A. during the course of proceedings. Put up for instructions.

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It shows that till the said date, no material had been brought on record to show that any nexus or a link between the properties sought to be forfeited and thus in case of `Mirchi' it was merely a perception of the competent authority alone.

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27. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Raju Ramchandran, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that only because a large number of properties had been mentioned in the show cause notice, the same by itself is demonstration of complete non-application of mind on the part of the competent authority. Identification of such a property although might have been made in an inquiry made by the officer in-charge of a Police Station; however, when the proceeding was initiated, the question as to whether such properties were illegally acquired properties or not, was required to be ultimately determined by the competent authority alone.

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28. It is, however, beyond any doubt or dispute that a proper application of mind on the part of the competent authority is imperative before a show cause notice is issued.

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Section 68H of the Act provides for two statutory requirements on the part of the authority viz: (i) he has to form an opinion in regard to his `reason to believe'; and (ii) he must record reasons therefor.

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Both the statutory elements, namely, reason to believe' and recording of reasons' must be premised on the materials produced before him. Such materials must have been gathered during the investigation carried out in terms of Section 68E or otherwise. Indisputably therefore, he must have some materials before him. If no such material had been placed before him, he cannot initiate a proceeding. He cannot issue a show cause notice on his own ipse dixit. A roving enquiry is not contemplated under the said Act as properties sought to be forfeited must have a direct nexus with the properties illegally acquired.

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29. It is now a trite law that whenever a statute provides for `reason to believe', either the reasons should appear on the face of the notice or they must be available on the materials which had been placed before him.

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We have noticed hereinbefore that when the authority was called upon to disclose the reasons, it was stated that all the reasons were contained in the show cause notices themselves. They, however, in our opinion, do not contain any reason so as to satisfy the requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 68H of the Act.

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A Constitution Bench of this Court in Attorney General for India and Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors. MANU/SC/0774/1994 while considering the validity of the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, opined:

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44...The relatives and associates are brought in only for the purpose of ensuring that the illegally acquired properties of the convict or detenu, acquired or kept in their names, do not escape the net of the Act. It is a well-known fact that persons indulging in illegal activities screen the properties acquired from such illegal activity in the names of their relatives and associates. Sometimes they transfer such properties to them, may be, with an intent to transfer the ownership and title. In fact, it is immaterial how such relative or associate holds the properties of convict/detenuwhether as a benami or as a mere name-lender or as a bona fide transferee for value or in any other manner. He cannot claim those properties and must surrender them to the State under the Act. Since he is a relative or associate, as defined by the Act, he cannot put forward any defence once it is proved that that property was acquired by the detenu- whether in his own name or in the name of his relatives and associates.... Holding that such provisions had been enacted to counteract several devices that may be adopted by the persons concerned, it was stated:

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By way of illustration, take a case where a convict/detenu purchases a property in the name of his relative or associate-it does not matter whether he intends such a person to be a mere name lender or whether he really intends that such person shall be the real owner and/or possessor thereofor gifts away or otherwise transfers his properties in favour of any of his relatives or associates, or purports to sell them to any of his relatives or associates-in all such cases, all the said transactions will be ignored and the properties forfeited unless the convict/detenu or his relative/associate, as the case may be, establishes that such property or properties are not "illegally acquired properties" within the meaning of Section 3(c). In this view of the matter, there is no basis for the apprehension that the independently acquired properties of such relatives and associates will also be forfeited even if they are in no way connected with the convict/detenu. So far as the holders (not being relatives and associates) mentioned in Section 2(2)(e) are concerned, they are dealt with on a separate footing. If such person proves that he is a transferee in good faith for consideration, his property-even though purchased from a convict/detenu-is not liable to be forfeited. It is equally necessary to reiterate that the burden of establishing that the properties mentioned in the show-cause notice issued under Section 6, and which are held on that date by a relative or an associate of the convict/detenu, are not the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenu, lies upon such relative/associate. He must establish that the said property has not been acquired with the monies or assets provided by the detenu/convict or that they in fact did not or do not belong to such detenu/convict.

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The relevant portion of the summary of the said judgment reads as under:

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(4) The definition of "illegally acquired properties" in Clause (c) of Section 3 of SAFEMA is not invalid or ineffective.

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(5) The application of SAFEMA to the relatives and associates [in Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 2(2)] is equally valid and effective inasmuch as the purpose and object of bringing such persons within the net of SAFEMA is to reach the properties of the detenu or convict, as the case may be, wherever they are, howsoever they are held and by whomsoever they are held. They are not conceived with a view to forfeit the independent properties of such relatives and associates as explained in this judgment. The position of `holders' dealt with by Clause (e) of Section 2(2) is different as explained in the body of the judgment.

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30. A similar question again came up before a Three Judges' Bench of this Court in Fatima Mohd. Amin (Smt.) (Dead) Through LRs. v. Union of India and Anr. MANU/SC/0291/2003: 2003(85)ECC723 , wherein relying upon Amratlal Prajivandas (supra), it was held;

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7. ...We do not find any averments to the effect that the property acquired by the appellant is a benami property of her son or the same was illegally acquired from her son.

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8. The contents of the said notices, even if taken at their face value do not disclose any reason warranting action against the appellant. No allegation whatsoever has been made to this effect that there exists any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenu(s).

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9. As the condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under SAFEMA did not exist, the impugned orders of forfeiture cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed. The order under challenge is set aside.

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31. Our attention, however, has been drawn to a decision of a two Judge Bench of this Court in Kesar Devi (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0528/2003: wherein Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) was distinguished by a Bench of this Court, inter alia, opining that no nexus or link between the money of the debt and property sought to be forfeited is required to be established under the Scheme of the Act, stating;

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10...The condition precedent for issuing a notice by the competent authority under Section 6(1) is that he should have reason to believe that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties and the reasons for such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of the section does not show that there is any requirement of mentioning any link or nexus between the convict or detenu and the property ostensibly standing in the name of the person to whom the notice has been issued.... 13. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that under the scheme of the Act, there is no requirement on the part of the competent authority to mention or establish any nexus or link between the money of the convict or

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detenu and the property sought to be forfeited. In fact, if such a condition is imposed, the very purpose of enacting SAFEMA would be frustrated, as in many cases it would be almost impossible to show that the property was purchased or acquired from the money provided by the convict or detenu. In the present case, the appellant is the wife of the detenu and she has failed to establish that she had any income of her own to acquire the three properties. In such circumstances, no other inference was possible except that it was done so with the money provided by her husband.

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32. We, with utmost respect to the learned Judges express our inability to agree to the said observations. The necessity of establishing link or nexus in our opinion is writ large on the face of the statutory provision as would appear from the definition of `illegally acquired property' as also that of 'property'. The purport and object for which the Act was enacted point out to the same effect.

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33. Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) was followed by a Bench of this Court in P.P. Abdulla v. Competent Authority MANU/SC/8782/2006: wherein it was observed:

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7. Learned Counsel submitted that it has been expressly stated in Section 6(1) that the reason to believe of the competent authority must be recorded in writing. In the counter-affidavit it has also been stated in para 8 that the reasons in the notice under Section 6(1) were recorded in writing. In our opinion this is not sufficient. Whenever the statute requires reasons to be recorded in writing, then in our opinion it is incumbent on the respondents to produce the said reasons before the court so that the same can be scrutinised in order to verify whether they are relevant and germane or not. This can be done either by annexing the copy of the reasons along with the counter-affidavit or by quoting the reasons somewhere in the counter-affidavit. Alternatively, if the notice itself contains the reason of belief, that notice can be annexed to the counteraffidavit or quoted in it. However, all that has not been done in this case. 8. It must be stated that an order of confiscation is a very stringent order and hence a provision for confiscation has to be construed strictly, and the statute must be strictly complied with, otherwise the order becomes illegal.

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It was also observed:

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10. In the present case, in the notice dated 15-3-1988 issued to the appellant under Section 6(1) of the Act (copy of which is annexed as Annexure P-1 to this appeal), it has not been alleged therein that there is any such link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally acquired money of the appellant.”

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34. In the final order, the rule of evidence as envisaged under Section 68-I read with Section 68-J of the Act must be applied. A person affected would be called upon to discharge his burden provided a link or nexus is traced between the holder of the property proceeded against and an illegal activity of the detenu. Such a formation of belief is essential.”

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It was submitted that in view of the law laid down in the above mentioned judgments and on the facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned earlier, the impugned order of forfeiture is liable to be set aside.

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3.4 It is further submitted that neither the notice under Section 6(1), SAFEMA nor the order of the Competent Authority indicates the period during which the Petitioner is alleged to have indulged in illegal activities. The absence of this detail renders the notice vague and lacking in material particulars. The very object of the SAFEMA is to ensure that the properties acquired through income from illegal activities should not be allowed to be FPA-1/MDS/2011 Page 9 of 24

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retained by the person indulging in such illegal activities. There has to be shown to exist a nexus between the earnings from the illegal activities and the properties acquired. For this nexus to be established, it would have to be shown that the properties in question were acquired around the time when the detenu indulged in illegal activities that provided the income for the acquisition of the properties.

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3.4.1 Significantly, in the instant case the properties in question which formed the subject matter of forfeiture under the SAFEMA were admittedly purchased or acquired between 1988 to 1991. The Competent Authority was required to be satisfied that these properties were acquired from the income earned by Haja Alaudeen from illegal activities during this period. There is nothing in the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA or in the „reasons to believe‟ or in the impugned order of the Competent Authority that demonstrates this nexus. In other words, there is no determination by the competent authority that during the time when the property was acquired during 1988 to 1991, Haja Alaudeen had indulged in any illegal activity and that these properties were acquired with the earnings from such illegal activity. Therefore, both the notice under Section 6(1), SAFEMA and the consequential order under Section 7 of SAFEMA are unsustainable in law.

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3.4.2 In this regard, the appellant placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Delhi Court in Mohinder Kaur vs. Union of India reported in CDJ 2011 DHC 2289, the relevant portion of which is as follows

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13. Neither the notice under Section 6(1) SAFEMA nor the order of the CA indicates the period during which the Petitioner's late husband Shri Sohan Singh is alleged to have indulged in illegal activities. The absence of this detail renders the notice vague and lacking in material particulars. The very object of the SAFEMA is to ensure that the properties acquired through income from illegal activities should not be allowed to be retained by the person indulging in such illegal activities. There has to be shown to exist a nexus between the earnings from the illegal activities and the properties acquired. For this nexus to be established, it would have to be shown that the properties in question were acquired around the time

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when the detenu indulged in illegal activities that provided the income for the acquisition of the properties. Significantly, in the instant case the properties in question which formed the subject matter of forfeiture under the SAFEMA were admittedly purchased or acquired between 1957 and 1967. The CA was required be satisfied that these properties were acquired 13-04-2017 (Page 3 of 5 ) www.manupatra.com Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property from the income earned by Shri Sohan Singh from illegal activities during this period. There is nothing in the notice under Section 6(1) SAFEMA or in the order of the CA that demonstrates this nexus. In other words there is no determination by the CA that during the time when these properties were acquired, i.e., between 1957 and 1967, Shri Sohan Singh had indulged in any illegal activity and that these properties were acquired with the earnings from such illegal activity. This therefore renders both the notice under Section 6(1) SAFEMA and the consequential order dated 4th February 1992 passed by the CA unsustainable in law.

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16. This Court finds that the impugned order dated 4th February 1992 of the CA in its dealing with the explanation offered by the Petitioner regarding her source of income reads more like an assessment order in proceedings under the Income Tax Act. The CA failed to appreciate that establishment of the nexus between the income from the alleged illegal activities of the Petitioner's husband and the purchase or acquisition of the properties in question was essential in order to legally sustain the proceedings under Section 6 SAFEMA. The imperative need to establish such nexus has been explained in several decisions including PP Abdulla v. Competent Authority MANU/SC/8782/2006 : (2007) 2 SCC 510, Shri Gian Chand Garg v. Union of India [decision dated 14th September 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4581 of 1996] and Shanti Devi v. Union of India MANU/DE/1317/1998 : 73 (1998) DLT 477.

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3.5 It has been further submitted that the expression “ reason to believe ” has been interpreted by the Courts to mean that even though formation of opinion may be subjective but it must be based on material on the record. It cannot be arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. On the date of issuance of the 6(1) Notice, the only material before the competent authority was the preventive detention order alone. The judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the matter of Sheo Nath Singh vs. Appellate CIT, reported in (1972) 3 SCC 234 has been referred in this context, the relevant portion of which is as follows:-

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“9. It is abundantly clear that the two reasons which have been given for the belief which was formed by the Income Tax Officer hopelessly fail to satisfy the requirements of the statute. In a recent case-Chhugamal Rajpal v. S. P. Chaliha and Ors. MANU/SC/0241/1971 : [1971]79ITR603(SC) which came up before this Court, a similar situation had arisen and under the directions of the Court, the Department produced the records to show that the Income Tax Officer had complied with the conditions laid down in the statute for issuing a notice relating to escapement of income. There also, the report submitted by the Officer to the Commissioner and the latter's orders thereon were produced. In his report, the Income Tax Officer referred to some communications received by him from the Commissioner of Income-

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tax, Bihar and Orissa from which it appeared that certain creditors of the assessee were mere name-lenders and the loan transactions were bogus and, therefore, proper investigation regarding the loans was necessary. It was observed that the Income Tax Officer had not set out any reason for coming to the conclusion that it was a fit case for issuing a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The material that he had before him for issuing notice had not been mentioned. The facts contained in the communications which had been received were only referred to vaguely and all that had been said was that from those communications it appeared that the alleged creditors were name-lenders and the transactions were bogus. It was held that from 'the report submitted by the Income Tax Officer to the Commissioner it was clear that he could not have had reasons to believe that on account of assessee's omission to disclose fully and truly all material facts, income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.

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10. In our judgment, the law laid down by this Court in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. There can be no manner of doubt that the words "reason to believe" suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the Income Tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. The Income Tax Officer would be acting without jurisdiction if the reason for his belief that the conditions are satisfied does not exist or is not material or relevant to the belief required by the Section. The court can always examine this aspect though the declaration or sufficiency of the reasons for the belief cannot be investigated by the court.

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11. There is no material or fact which has been stated in the reasons for starting proceedings in the present case on which any belief could be founded of the nature contemplated by Section 34 (1-A). The so-called reasons are stated to be beliefs thus leading to an obvious selfcontradiction. We are satisfied that the requirements of Section 34 (1-A) were not satisfied and, therefore, the notices which had been issued were wholly illegal and invalid.”

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3.5.1 To the same effect is the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. Vs. State of A.P., (1994) 6 SCC 205

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3.5.2 “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of mind. Joti Parshad V. State of Haryana, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 497: 1993 SCC (Cri) 691: AIR 1993 SC 1167.

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3.5.3 The expression “reason to believe” is not synonymous with subjective satisfaction of the Officer. The belief must be held in good faith, it cannot merely be a pretence. It is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the

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formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the Section. Partap Singh (Dr) V. Director of Enforcement , (1985) 3 SCC 72: 1985 SCC (Cri) 312: AIR 1985 SC 989: (1985).

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3.5.4 The words “reason to believe” means a belief which a reasonable person would entertain on facts before him. Jai Shanker V. State of H.P., (1973) 3 SCC 83: 1973 SCC (Cri) 145: AIR 1972 SC 2267:

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3.5.5 The word “reason to believe” suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable ground and that the Income Tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence, but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. Sheo Nath V. Appellate CIT , (1972) 3 SCC 234:

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3.5.6 The expression “reason to believe” in S. 34 of the Income Tax Act does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income Tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith: it cannot be merely a pretence. To put in differently it is open to the court to examine to question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. S. Narayanappa V. CIT, AIR 1967 SC 523: ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das , (1976) 3 SCC 757.

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3.5.7. Both the show cause notice dated 27.09.2004 as well as the reasons for belief supplied on 04.05.2010 does not even whisper anything regarding smuggling or any other illegal activities of the appellant specifically except mentioning the word smuggling activities. Hence the show cause notice itself is not in accordance with law.

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3.6 Apart from the above legal grounds, the impugned order was also contested on the ground of inordinate delay in initiating action. It was

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submitted that in the instant case, the property was acquired as early as in the year 1988 and construction was completed in 1991 and the detention order against AP was passed in 1993. However, in the show cause notice dated 27.09.2004, the only reason assigned by the Competent Authority for delay is that the respondent was unable to secure the presence of the appellant. It was submitted that the said reason could not be a ground for not initiating action in time. In this context, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Tribunal in the case of Md. Golam Rasul Mia reported in Income Tax Reports, Volume – 181, Page no. 206.

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3.7 He also submitted that during the proceedings before the Competent Authority the appellant had provided the detailed sources of acquisition of the property in question alongwith the documentary evidence thereof but these have not been accepted on account of presumptions and assumptions. It was submitted that the plot of land in question was first acquired by the appellant‟s brother Haja Sarabudeen in February, 1988 and 50% share in the land had been acquired by the appellant from his brother Haja Sarabudeen by virtue of sale deed dated 19.09.1988 for a sale consideration of Rs. 12,500/only. The construction in the plot was commenced from February, 1988 and was completed in March, 1991. 50% of the cost of land and construction of house property belonging to the appellants share (i.e. 50%)has been admitted as Rs. 2,89,575/-. The sources claimed for the same have been explained as under:

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i. Accumulation of agricultural income from 01.04.1979 to 31.03.1991-	Rs. 55,250/-
ii. Savings from salary from 01.04.1979 to 31.03.1984-	Rs. 6,000/-
iii. Foreign Remittances from 01.04.1979 to 31.03.1990	Rs. 40,850/-
iv. Income offered for income tax assessment as income. For which no proof available from 1.04.87 to 31.03.91	Rs. 95,800/-
v. Loans (banks, wife and others)	Rs. 1,08,420/-

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Various details alongwith documentary evidences have been submitted in support of each of the sources as above but these have not been accepted by the Competent Authority on account of presumptions and assumptions. According to the appellant, the legal sources of acquisition of the property ind question have been fully explained and the property ought to be released.

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In response to the appellants submissions regarding the alleged delay in issue of the notice under Section 6(1) of the Act in 2004 when the detention order against the appellant was issued in 1993, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the intimation regarding issue of detention order dated 02.11.1993 in respect of the AP was received by the Competent Authority from the concerned authority only in 1999. Thereafter, and as the appellant was not available in the country, some time was taken in the investigation. In these circumstances, the time taken in issue of Show Cause Notice to the AP on 27.09.2004 which is about five years after receipt of the intimation regarding the issue of the detention order against the AP in 1999, could not be said to be unreasonable. Further, SAFEMA does not contain any provision laying down the period within which the Show Cause Notice is to be issued. The case cited by the appellant, supra , in this regard was distinguishable as in the said case there was long delay of more than 14 years from the period of purchase of the property and issue of Show Cause Notice and there was no explanation for the delay in issuing the related show cause notice and the order of forfeiture. As against the above, in the present case the period of five years from receipt of the intimation regarding issue of detention order in respect of AP by the Competent Authority in 1999 to the issue of show cause notice on 27.09.2004 was explainable particularly because the appellant was absconding from the country and did not respond to the department‟s summons and therefore, the investigations took time. The time taken in issue of the show cause notice was therefore, not inordinate.

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4.1 As regards the appellant‟s contentions with respect to the “reasons to believe” for issue of show cause notice under section 6(1) of the Act, these had been recorded by the Competent Authority prior to issue of the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA to H. Haja Allaudeen (i.e. the appellant) who was the AP in the case and against whom a Detention order under COFEPOSA, 1974 had been issued by the competent authority. The reasons as recorded by the Competent Authority in this regard are as under:

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“1. A detention order in F.No. 673/87/93-CUS. VIII dated 29.11.1993 under the provisions oof COFEPOSA Act, 1974 was made against Shri H. Haja Allaudeen, No. 9, Yahussain Palli Street, Nagapattinam for his illegal activities of smuggling foreign currencies. Therefore, he is attracted as a „person‟ in terms of Section 2(2)(b) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Project) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

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2. Shri H. Haja Allaudeen has been declared as a proclaimed offender. Investigations reveal that he is in possession of two properties at Nagapattinam. It is also reported that he is in Singapore and hence not offering himself before the Authorities in obedience to due process of law. Details regarding the licit sources of earnings have also not come to light. In these circumstances preponderance of facts point that the properties possessed by him has been earned out of income generated by way of smuggling foreign currencies.

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3. In view of the above and the said Shri H. Haja Allaudeen being declared as a proclaimed offender and hence not offering himself before the designated authorities and based on the antecedents relating to his smuggling activities, I have reason to believe that the following properties owned by the said H. Haja Allaudeen were acquired out of his illegal earnings and has to be put on notice for forfeiture. I am independently satisfied that this is a fit case for the issue of notice under section 6(1) of the SAFEM (FOP) Act, 1976 to H. Haja Allaudeen in respect of the properties described in the schedule below.

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Schedule of property:

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i) Property at No. 9 Yahussain Pally St., Nagapattinam Q.M. District H.Haja Allaudeen.

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ii) Property – 50% of the land and building of the house property at TS No. 1529„ Sultan Colony‟, Kottavasalpadi, Nagapattinam. H. Haja Allaudeen.”

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It was clarified that the proceedings in respect of the property at S. No (i) above namely at 9, Yahussain Pally St., Nagapattinam Q.M. District were dropped by the order dated 12.09.2005 being the ancestral property. The present appeal is in relation to the property at serial no. ii). 50% share of Shri Haja Allaudeen in the property at Sultan Colony, Kottavasalpadi, Nagapattinam.

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4.2 It was further submitted that the involvement of Sh. H. Haja Allaudeen in smuggling of foreign currency was indicated from the reasons recorded by the concerned authority which issued the detention order dated 29.11.1993 under COFEPOSA, 1974 in respect of the appellant which was also available to the Competent Authority. From the reasons for issue of the said detention order, it was clear that the appellant had been involved in smuggling of foreign currency by active collaboration with one Abdul Samat from whose house a large amount of Foreign Currency was recovered during the search on 15.07.1993.

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The statement given by Abdul Samat had elaborately brought out the involvement of the appellant in the smuggling of foreign currency and consequently, detention order dated 29.11.1993 came to be issued against him (H. Haja Allaudeen) under the provisions of COFEPOSA 1974 by the concerned authority. From the investigation conducted by the office of the respondent Competent Authority revealed that H. Haja Allaudeen was in possession of two properties at Nagapattinam. He also did not present himself to the authorities for the due process of law and investigation and was reportedly away from the country for a long time and in Singapore. Details regarding the licit source of his earning were also not forthcoming. Based on these facts and circumstances and the involvement of the AP in the smuggling of foreign currency, the Competent Authority had reasons to believe that the subject properties were illegally acquired property in terms of the SAFEMA and hence the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued to the appellant.

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4.3 As regards the source of acquisition of the subject property, the findings as given in the impugned order in respect of each source of acquisition were reiterated and it was argued that in the absence of legal sources of acquisition of the property having been explained by the appellant, the property was rightly forfeited.

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We have considered the rival contentions and gone through the case record. The first challenge of the appellant to the impugned order is that the show cause notice dated 27.09.2004 under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA was itself not sustainable as it was based only on the detention order issued in respect of the appellant under the provision of COFEPOSA, 1973. The appellant has argued that while the issue of the detention order against a person could serve as a starting point to identify the person for action under SAFEMA, the detention order alone, and in the absence of any supporting material, could not be the basis for the issue of the show cause notice under Section 6(1) ibid . It is further argued that neither the show cause notice nor the „reasons to believe‟ brought out the allegation that the subject properties were acquired by the appellant from out of the sources generated out of his illegal activities or that there was a nexus between such illegal activities and the property in question. It is also contended that the „reasons to believe‟ did not meet the test as laid down in various judgments cited by the appellant in this regard.

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5.1. On the aspect of the detention order being the only material available to the Competent Authority for issuing the Notice under Section 6(1) of the Act, we find that alongwith the detention order, the reasons for issue of the detention order as recorded by the concerned authority which issued the detention order was also available to the Competent Authority while considering the matter. The said grounds for detention clearly bring out the involvement of the appellant/AP in the smuggling of foreign currency in active collaboration with a person called Abdul Samat. The involvement of the appellant in these activities for more than 3/4 months was brought out in the statement of the said Abdul Samat recorded after the recovery of a large quantity of foreign currency from the residential premises of the said Abdul Samat on 15.07.1993. The statement also brings out that the appellant was known to him for a long period from the college days. Further, the appellant was not available in the country at that time and also did not participate in the investigation by the respondent authority. It appeared that the appellant was FPA-1/MDS/2011 Page 18 of 24

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not in the country from the early 1980‟s and. The period of acquisition of the subject property and its construction by the appellant/AP is in the period 1988 to 1991 which falls within the above period. From the accompanying facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the appellant that the detention order was the only basis for issue of the show cause notice under section 6(1) of the Act or that the material available with the Competent Authority did not show that there was nexus of the subject property with funds acquired by him from his illegal activities of smuggling of foreign currency.

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5.1 As regards the various judgments cited by the appellant in the cases of Fatima Mohd. Amin v. Union of India, P.P. Abdulla v. Competent Authority, Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority and Chandra Kumar Jain vs. Union of India, supra, while the ratio of these decisions is clear that a proceeding under section 6 of SAFEMA for forfeiture of property is not sustainable unless it is alleged in the Show Cause Notice and upheld in the order that there is a link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegal activities of the detenu, the ratio is to be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. In our view, and for the reason as discussed above in the present case, there was material before the competent authority to have reason to believe that the subject properties had been acquired from the money generated from the illegal activities of the AP and necessary allegation were made in the related show cause notice and “reasons” in support of the issue of the show cause notice . We therefore find that the said case laws are not applicable to the present case. For the same reason, the decision cited with regard to “reason to believe” being base on objective material are also not applicable to the present case.

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The next contention of the appellant is that the present proceedings were not maintainable on account of the alleged inordinate delay in issue of the show cause notice in the case on 25.09.2004 when the detention order against FPA-1/MDS/2011 Page 19 of 24

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the accused was issued in 1993. In this respect, the respondent have argued that in the present case, the intimation from the concerned authority regarding issue of detention order against the affected person was received by the Competent Authority viz. respondent in 1999. Thereafter, the investigations were conducted by the respondent office and considering that the appellant was not available in the country and did not present himself before the investigating agency for the inquiry, time was taken in completing the investigation and issuing the show cause notice to the AP on 25.09.2004. Further, it is also pointed out by the respondent that there is no specific provision in the act laying down the time limit within which the show cause notice under Section 6(1) could be issued.

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6.1 On consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to agree with the contention of the respondent that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the time taken in issue of the show cause notice cannot be said to be unreasonable. We have also gone through the decision cited by the appellant in this regard namely, Md. Golam Rasul Mia, supra Income Tax Reports, Volume – 181, Page no. 206 and find that the facts of the two cases are not comparable. In the cited case in the cited case the properties in question were acquired in 1973 or 1974. After getting a report from the jurisdictional ITO in 1980, the competent authority took more than 7 years in forming the reasons to believe to issue a show cause notice under Section 6(1) which was issued in 1987 and there was no justifiable explanation for the delay. As against the above in the present case, the show cause notice was issued within five years of the receipt of the report regarding issue of the detention order against the AP and considering the facts and circumstances as discussed above, the time taken would not be said to be unreasonable. This ground therefore cannot be a ground for setting aside the show cause notice in question and the consequent proceedings.

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Coming to the sources of funding from which the subject property was acquired, we find that in respect of the two major sources as claimed, firstly by way of loans from banks, wife and others amounting to Rs. 1,08,420/-, absolutely no evidence has been produced by the appellant either before the Competent Authority or during the present appeal to substantiate their contention regarding the said source. Similarly, the second major source is for an amount of Rs. 95, 800/- which is claimed to be the income offered for income tax in the year 1991 for the period 01.04.1987 to 31.03.1991. As per the appellant‟s own admission, no proof is available in respect of this income. It is observed that the mere fact that such amount was declared as income for the period of 1987 to 1991 and income tax was paid thereon cannot make the said income as income from legal sources specially in the context of the present proceedings where the onus to show the licit acquisition of the property from legal sources is on the appellant/person concerned. As regards the claim of foreign remittances amounting to Rs. 40, 850/-during the period 01.04.1979 to 31.03.90, we observe that this amount is the sum total of the remittances of foreign currency made during the related period. While these details show that certain amounts were received from abroad in the related period in the appellant‟s name, this itself cannot not be accepted as evidence to show that funds to this extent out of foreign remittances were utilized in the acquisition of the property at a much later period (1988-1991). The three items mentioned above together make up for approximately Rs. 2.45 lakhs of the overall expenditure of Rs. 2.89 lakhs for the acquisition of the subject property i.e. about 85 percent of the overall funds for acquisition of the property. We concur with the finding of the Competent Authority that the appellant has not been able to show that the amounts from these three heads are from legal sources.

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7.1 The remaining two heads are accumulation of agricultural income from 01.04.1979 to 31.03.1991 amounting to Rupees 55,250 and savings from salary from 01.04.1979 to 31.03.1984 amounting to Rs. 6000. In respect of the

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agricultural income head, the Competent Authority in the impugned order has accepted an amount of Rs. 30,000/- as legal. However, no reasons have been assigned in the order why the claimed amount of Rs. 55,250/- under this head has been reduced to Rs 30,000/-. As no reasons have been assigned in the impugned order while reducing the amount under the agricultural income head, we are inclined to consider the full amount of Rs. 55,250/- has claimed under the agricultural income head as amount spent for the acquisition of the property from legal source. As far as amount of Rupees 6,000 under salary head is concerned, the same is already accepted by the Competent Authority as from legal source. Thus, an aggregate of Rs. 61,250 ( which works out to approximately 15% of the total amount spent for acquisition of the property) is accepted as legitimate. The Competent Authority has held that as the extent of amount spent for acquisition of the property shown as legal is less than 50% of the total cost of acquisition of the property, section 9 of the Act which provides for a fine in lieu of forfeiture is not attracted. While this finding is legally correct, we are of the view that a specific condition and attribute relating to the property involved in the present case, is also relevant in this context, which we discuss in the following Para.

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7.2 It is observed that the property involved in the present appeal is the appellant‟s 50% share of the land and building of the house property T.S. No. 1529, Sultan Colony, Melakottai Basal Road, Nagapattinam. The remaining 50% share in the said land and building is owned by H. Haja Sarabudeen, the brother of the appellant and in respect of whom separate proceedings for forfeiture of his 50% share in the said property were also taken by the Competent Authority. The said share was also forfeited by the Competent Authority vide order dated 03.10.2011. Shri H. Haja Sarabudeen had separately challenged the order dated 03.10.2011 by way of an appeal. In a separate order passed today in the said appeal namely, FPA No9/MDS/2011, we have held that the show cause notice issued to him (H. Haja Sarabudeen)

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relating to his 50% share of the land and building in the said property was unsustainable as per the provisions of SAFEMA and so also the related order of the Competent Authority forfeiting the said property. The property involved in the said case (of H. Haja Sarabudeen) and the present case each comprise of 50% share of the land and building in the said property. In other words, the shares of the two brothers together comprise one undivided property of land and building in question. As the forfeiture order in relation to 50% of the property has been set aside with relief to the concerned owner viz. H. Haja Sarabudeen, we consider it appropriate that in the interest of bringing to an end the litigation in the matter, an option to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture is given to the present appellant in respect of his 50% share covered under the present appeal.

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In the facts and circumstances of the case and the discussion above, the impugned order is modified by giving the appellant an option to pay a fine amounting to Rs. 2.50 lakhs in lieu of forfeiture of the appellant‟s 50% share of the subject property. The option as above should be exercised within four weeks of the receipt of this order failing which the option shall stand withdrawn and property shall stand forfeited to the central government free from all encumbrances. Miscellaneous application is also disposed of in above terms.

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No order as to costs.

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(Justice Manmohan Singh) Chairman

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(Kaushal Srivastava)

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Member

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(Anand Kishore) Member

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