shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. Vide P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries [(1990) 2 SCC 378, 383-84 : (1990) 1 SCR 482, 488] , Mangilal v. Suganch and Rathi [(1964) 5 SCR 239 : AIR 1965 SC 101] , Sri Ram RamNarainMedhi v. State of Bombay [1959 Supp 1 SCR 489 : AIR 1959 SC 459] , Hira Devi (Smt) v. District Board, Shahjahanpur [1952 SCR 1122, 1131 : AIR 1952 SC 362] , NalinakhyaBysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [1953 SCR 533, 545 : AIR 1953 SC 148] , Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [(1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197 : (1980) 2 SCR 146] , G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam [(1972) 3 SCC 717 : (1973) 1 SCR 172, 182] , N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai [(1972) 2 SCC 594 : (1973) 1 SCR 886] , Union of India v. Sankal Chand HimatlalSheth [(1977) 4 SCC 193 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435 : (1978) 1 SCR 423] and CST v. Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad [(1986) 3 SCC 50, 55 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 449 : (1986) 2 SCR 430, 438] . Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme, will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts sometimes in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power. ”