Dismissed

D Pothu Raju v. Director General of Central Reserve Police (Crpf)

Andhra Pradesh HC10 Sept 2026WP/3712/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A writ petition filed by a constable against his termination by the CRPF was dismissed. The single judge held that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh lacked territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action had arisen within its territory despite the petitioner's residence there.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction; no order as to costs.

D Pothu Raju Vs Director General of Central… — Service and Employment | Andhra Pradesh HC (2026)

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[3330]

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APHC010060802020

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction)

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FRIDAY, THE 11^th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

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WRIT PETITION No.3712 of 2020

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Between :

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D POTHU RAJU, S/O RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, CONSTABLE NO.145141581 RT CT/GD 04 BN. CRPF (UNDER TERMINATION) R/O PAMULALANKA, THOTLAVALLURU (POST), KRISHNA DISTRICT 521 163 ANDHRA PRADESH. ...PETITIONER

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AND

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1. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE CRPF, BLOCK NO.1, C.G.O. COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI 110 003

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INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, , SOUTHERN SECTOR, CRPF. ROAD NO.10-C, NEW MLA/MP COLONY, GAYATHRI HILLS, JUBILEE HILLS, HYDERABAD 500 033

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THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, RAJASTHAN SECTOR, CRPF, KENDRIYA SADAN, BLOCK-B, SECTOR-10, VIDHYADHAR NAGAR, JAIPUR, RAJASTHAN.

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DY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, (CR AND VIG.) CRPF, BLOCK NO.1, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI

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COMMANDANT, , GC-II, CRPF, FOY SAGAR ROAD, AJMER, RAJASTHAN

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...RESPONDENT(S):

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Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner vide Office Order No. D-11-1/2017-EC-6, dated 10-1-2017 issued by Commandant, GC.II, CRPF, Ajmer and rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the termination order vide Office Order No.D.V.I/2017-EC-5,

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dated 12-7-2017 issued by the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, CRPF. Jaipur (Rajasthan), order bearing No. D.V.1/2019-EC.5, dated 26.8.2019 issued by Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, CRPF. Jaipur and Order No. R.XIII-120/19-Vig (L), dated 27.8.2019 issued by Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR and Vig.), CRPF, New Delhi rejecting the representation of the petitioner, dated 10.8.2019 for his reinstatement into service as wholly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled to be continued in service as Police Constable with all consequential benefits by disposing of his representation, dated 10-8-2019.

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Counsel for the Petitioner:

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1.KIRTHI TEJA KONDAVEETI

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1.JUPUDI V K YAGNADUTT(CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

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COUNSEL)

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The Court made the following:

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO WRIT PETITION No.3712 of 2020

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ORDER:

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The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief:

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"….to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner vide Office Order No.D-11-1/2017-EC-6, dated 10.01.2017 issued by Commandant, GC.II, CRPF, Ajmer and rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the termination order vide Office Order No.D.V.I/2017-EC-5, dated 12.07.2017 issued by the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, CRPF, Jaipur (Rajasthan), order bearing No.D.V.1/2019-EC.5 dated 26.08.2019 issued by Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, CRPF, Jaipur and Order No.R.XIII120/19-Vig (L), dated 27.08.2019 issued by Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR & Vig.), CRPF, New Delhi rejecting the representation of the petitioner, dated 10.08.2019 for his reinstatement into service as wholly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled to be continued in service as Police Constable with all consequential benefits by

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disposing of his representation, dated 10.08.2019 and pass such other orders……"

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According to the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, the Central Police Department, i.e., C.R.P.F. issued notification in the year 2012 for recruitment of Constable. The petitioner herein participated and got selected and appointed to the post of Constable (General Duty) in C.R.P.F. at Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Hyderabad on 04.10.2014. While the petitioner availed mid-term leave with effect from 17.05.2016 to 30.05.2016, the petitioner was sustained an injury to his right hand. Subsequently, he reported to duty on 23.06.2016 and remained under treatment upto 23.08.2016. The affidavit further indicates that the petitioner on receiving information, he left to his native place as his wife felt sick.

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While so, the Commandant, G.C.II, C.R.P.F., Ajmer issued notice dated 10.01.2017, terminating the services of the petitioner under subrule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The petitioner contends that the very termination is without following due procedure. Against the termination order, the petitioner filed an appeal to the D.I.G., Ajmer and subsequently, the D.I.G. rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner and the same was sent

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through post to the native place of the petitioner, i.e., Pamulalanka, Thotlavalluru Post, Krishna District. Subsequently, the petitioner made a representation to consider his case sympathetically for reinstatement

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into the service. Without considering the factual aspects and rule position, the appeal was rejected by the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, vide order dated 12.07.2017. Subsequently, he made another representation dated 10.08.2019 to the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Sector, C.R.P.F., Jaipur, Rajasthan, requesting to review the order dated 12.07.2017 and to set aside the termination order dated 10.01.2017. The representation dated 10.08.2019 was rejected by the Inspector General of Police, vide order dated 26.08.2019.

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Now the termination order dated 10.01.2017 is under challenge before this Court on the ground that no opportunity was given to the petitioner herein and the respondents have not followed the procedure as envisaged under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Hence, prayed to set aside the impugned termination order and the consequential orders and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service.

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The 2^nd respondent on his behalf and on behalf of the other respondents, has filed counter affidavit and denied all the contentions raised by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, inter alia , it is contended that the petitioner rejected for basic training and without permission of the competent authority, absented himself without any valid reasons and also did not report back for duty even after issuance of repeated directions by the competent authority issued vide RTC-Latur letters dated 07.10.2016, 15.10.2016, 27.10.2016 and 03.11.2016. And also further stated that the petitioner has failed to respond to the directions of his controlling authority and disobeyed the lawful orders and he is a newly recruited Constable in the unformed force and he should have been followed the directions of the competent authority, but he failed to do so and ample opportunities were also provided to the petitioner by the competent authority, but the petitioner failed to resume his duty and wilfully disobeyed the order of the competent authority. Hence, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition.

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Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Jupudi V.K.Yajnadath, learned counsel for the respondents.

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Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterated the facts stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition in his oral argument.

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The respondents’ counsel reiterating the counter contents, it is further argued that even assuming that the respondents did not follow due procedure before terminating the service of the petitioner, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action much less a part of cause has been aroused, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner ought to have been approached the Court, where the cause of action arose, and on this ground, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, and he relied on the judgment of the Telangana High Court in the case of K. Padmaja Vs Union of India reported in 2023 SCC Online TS 892. A learned Single Judge of the Telangana High Court has dismissed the writ petition, placing reliance on the law laid down by the Apex Court, as there is no cause of action, much less part of cause of action has been aroused within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Except the fact that the petitioner herein is residing in Hyderabad, there is no cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

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Per contrary, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that under keeping as per the expression used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably, even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter, and the cause of action is nothing but a bundle of facts which gives rise to a legal right enabling the party to seek a relief. In addition, it is submitted that the writ petition can be filed against the respondents where the respondent resides and/or voluntarily works for gain and/or carries on business and the respondents are having office at Andhra Pradesh, therefore, this Court is having jurisdiction regarding the relief claimed by the writ petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of P.K.S.Shrivastava Vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in 2016 SCC Online Delhi 6149, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that a legal cause of action is complete only on such communication of an order to the concerned is complete, without such communication of an order to the concerned person, the cause of application is not complete for filing a case in a Court of law, accordingly, held that place where the territorial jurisdiction would exist, although the order would have been passed elsewhere.

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According to this Court, if the principle is accepted as rendered by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the definition of cause of action may vary.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329, held that the answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action.

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Respondents’ counsel argued that respondents do not have an official office or presence in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Now the issue fall for consideration is whether the residency of the party within the jurisdiction would confer the jurisdiction rather than the fact that the subject matter of the dispute arose within its jurisdiction.

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In view of the above, first I will deal with the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

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Now the issue falling consideration is that whether court jurisdiction is determined by where the dispute substantially arose, whether trivial and unconnected events are sufficient, whether the

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parties reside within the jurisdiction, or whether the subject matter of the dispute is located here.

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The Apex Court in the case of N. Kumara Swamy v. UCO

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Bank [2012 SCC OnLine AP 936], it was held as follows:—

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“24. The mere residence of the petitioner at Hyderabad after his retirement and merely because the charges relate to the alleged omissions and commissions of the branch of the respondent bank at Hyderabad, in my view, has no nexus with the cause of action relating to initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. In a given case, the charges may relate to any event happening in any branch in any part of India but the situs with respect to initiation of disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have any integral nexus with the omissions and commissions at all/any of such branches. The show cause notices as well as the charge memos in the present case incidentally refer to omissions and commissions at Banjara Hills branch at Hyderabad, but even if it could have been at some other branch in Karnataka or Kerala, it would not be permissible, under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, for the petitioner to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court within who's territorial limits, such branch is situated. The preliminary objection raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondents has, therefore, to be held as well founded and sustainable and consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

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The Apex Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) [(2004) 6 SCC 254, it was held as follows:—

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We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience.

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A three Judge Bench of Apex Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu , (1994) 4 SCC 711 remarked that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the Court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however, trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would “lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do

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not strongly depreciable the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.

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Patna High Court in the case of Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar, 1984 SCC OnLine Pat 345 (FB), after referring the judgment of Apex court in Indian Cable Company, Ltd. v. Its workmen , reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 49 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 589. This in terms was more explicitly re-affirmed in Sri Rangavilas Motor case , [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1040], has formulated three issues for determining the jurisdiction:

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(i) Where does the order of the termination of services operate?

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(ii) Is these some nexus between the industrial dispute arising from termination of the services of the workman and the territory of the State?

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(iii) That the well-known test of jurisdiction of a Civil Court including the residence of the parties and the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arising therein would be applicable.

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20. Answering all the issues finally held that, one may either assume

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fictionally that there is no Industrial Disputes Act in force or that the workman in terms elects (where it is permissible so in law) to resort to

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the ordinary civil remedy for the wrongful termination of his services and prefers a suit for damages therefor. Obviously in such a situation the territorial jurisdiction would undoubtedly be of the Courts within whose territory the workman was employed and as in the present case in would be at Patna, and in any case in the State of Bihar. Reference in this context may be made to S. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides for the territorial jurisdiction for suits, for compensation, for wrongs to persons or movables.

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Following the judgment of the Full bench judgment of the Patna High court in the case of Siemens Limited Vs Presiding Officer Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad reported in 2002 SCC OnLine AP 841 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has dealt with similar issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Government.

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Observed that the transferability was one of the conditions of service of the employee. The employer had its Head Office in Chennai and Branches at Hyderabad and other places. The employee who was located at Hyderabad was transferred to Manipal in Karnataka. The transfer order indicated that the services of the workman stand transferred to the Manipal office. The workman refused to go to the

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place of transfer and tried to attend his office at Hyderabad whereupon the management informed him that he had seized to have any link with the Hyderabad office on the notified date. The workman still did not join duty pursuant to his order of transfer, whereupon the management issued a show cause notice as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. This employee also, as in the instant case, did not participate in the inquiry despite it being adjourned from time to time. The enquiry therefore was proceeded ex-parte at the Bangalore office where the workman was supposed to report for duty. The disciplinary authority passed the order of termination which was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner raised the dispute before the labour court aggrieved by the order of termination wherein the issue arose as to the maintainability of the industrial dispute before the labour court to whom it stood referred. Therefore, as contended by the counsel for the management, just because the workman stayed illegally at Hyderabad without proceeding to Manipal or just because he was pursuing legal remedies at Hyderabad, it cannot validate the illegal stay of the workman at Hyderabad and confer the jurisdiction on the Courts in Andhra Pradesh.

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There is no dispute that the petitioner is resident of Andhra Pradesh and no part of cause of action arose in the state of Andhra Pradesh, except the petitioner’s residence and receipt of the notices from the respondents. As discussed, mere residence and receiving the notices will not gives rise to a legal right enabling the party to seek a relief before this court. The petitioner herein has participated for selection in the State of Telangana and petitioner was appointed other than the State of Andhra Pradesh.

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Because no part of cause of action arose in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the present writ petition is dismissed on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. There shall be no order as to costs.

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As a sequel thereto, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.

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__________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

Date: 11.09.2026

siva

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

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