C.Bhaskar Reddy, s/o. Muniratnam Reddy Vs The Commissioner for Co-operation &

Advocate for Petitioner: MOHAMMED ABDUL BASITH Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): BRAHMANANDA REDDY SOMASANI (SC for AP State Cooperative Bank), GP FOR COOPERATION

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CORAM :SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN DATE : 13^th March 2026

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ORDER:

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Present writ petition challenges the orders of dismissal passed by 2^nd respondent by proceedings CDR/F.206/6/3606/ 3618, dated 24.05.2002, as affirmed by appellate authority – 1^st respondent by proceedings Rc.No.34996/2002-Z.I.2A, dated 15.10.2003, to be illegal and consequently to set aside the same and allow all consequential benefits.

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2. Brief facts of the case are set out as under:

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(a) Petitioner served as General Manager (on Full Additional

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Charge basis) with A.P. State Co-operative Bank Limited (herein

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after, for short ‘APCOB’) at Visakhapatnam Branch. He was served with charge Memo dated 14.08.2000 setting out four articles of charge. The allegations levelled against him were that in the capacity of G.M. (FAC), he stated to have invested huge sum of Four Crores from out of the bank funds in private bank namely Sikkim Bank at Hyderabad vide four different FDRs dated 05.11.1998, 16.11.1998, 19.11.1998 and 07.12.1998 in violation of prescribed norms and out of such investments, one of the fixed deposit failed realization despite maturing on 18.03.1999, resulting in huge financial loss to the bank.

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(b) The allegation was that on account of petitioner’s negligence and not acting in best interest of the bank, violated Regulation Nos.28 and 29 of Common Cadre Regulations. Further, yet another allegation was that though the FDR could not be realized, petitioner stated to have facilitated adjustment vouchers as if the matured proceeds of ₹1,02,69,260/- came to be realized, thereby exhibited dishonesty and unfaithfulness contravening Regulation 29 of the Regulations.

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(c) Lastly that petitioner, having full knowledge of nonrealization of aforesaid FDR, failed to report the matter either to

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Board of DCCB or to APCOB, which constituted suppression of fact and violated Regulation 29 of Regulations.

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(d) Petitioner submitted explanation refuting the allegations. The same was followed by Enquiry and Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 06.11.2001 holding that 1^st charge was not proved, did not answer whether any specific financial loss occurred as mentioned under 2^nd charge and held that charges 3 and 4 in relation to dereliction of duty and suppression of information were proved. Petitioner was issued show-cause notice.

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(e) The Disciplinary Authority, having disagreed with findings of enquiry officer to the extent of charges 1 and 2 and approving the findings with regard to charges 3 and 4, recording reasons for disagreement, issued show-cause notice dated 07.03.2002, calling upon petitioner to submit explanation as to why punishment of dismissal from service for grave irregularities should not be inflicted.

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(f) Petitioner submitted explanation on 12.04.2002 and eventually, the disciplinary authority passed impugned order vide proceedings No.CDR/F.206/6/3606/3618, dated 24.05.2002, holding that the charges since came to be proved imposed

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punishment of removal from service. The said order came to be affirmed by 1^st respondent – appellate authority by proceedings Rc.No.34996/2002-Z.I.2A, dated 15.10.2003.

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(g) Assailing the same, present writ petition is filed. Respondents filed counter opposing the writ petition.

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3. Heard Sri Mohd. Abdul Basith, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Brahmhananda Reddy Somasani, learned standing counsel for A.P. State Cooperative Bank.

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4. Learned counsel for petitioner assailed the impugned punishment order on following grounds:

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(a) that no specific reason has been assigned in disagreeing with the findings of enquiry officer, therefore, the same is in contravention of Rule 21(2) of A.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991, (herein after, for short ‘CCA Rules’) which were adopted to the respondent bank. In support, reliance has been placed on following judgments:

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(i) Judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and others v. Kunj Behari Misra¹

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1 (1998) 7 SCC 84

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(ii) Judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Yoginath D.Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another²

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(b) that charges 2 and 3 do not fall within the ambit of Regulation 28 of Regulations, therefore, the said charges are not specific and definite for proceedings with disciplinary action.

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(c) that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the charges. The Disciplinary Authority has therefore failed to apply the test of proportionality in proper perspective, particularly having regard to the financial loss being recouped later on account of decree and judgment passed against the successor of Sikkim Bank i.e., Union Bank of India.

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5. Opposing aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for respondent, while supporting the order of Disciplinary Authority, as confirmed by Appellate Authority, has made following submissions:

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(a) The scope of enquiry and judicial review in testing the correctness or otherwise of the disciplinary authorities' order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India is confined to see whether the findings were palpably perverse, the

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2 (1999) 7 SCC 739

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disciplinary authority lacked jurisdiction, the enquiry was inconsistent with rules of natural justice or the applicable statutory rules and that the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person could have ever reached or the conclusions were based on absolutely no evidence only then writ of certiorari could be issued. Further that the writ court would not sit in appeal and try to reappreciate the sufficiency or otherwise of evidence and conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority. It is therefore urged that the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to examine correctness or reasonableness of a decision of disciplinary authority as a matter of fact. In support, reliance has been placed on decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Indian Oil

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Corporation and Ors. V. Ajit Kumar Singh and Anr.³

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(b) He further contended that the disciplinary authority while considering the enquiry report has gone into the findings so rendered and on independent application of mind, has rendered specific reasons as to why it was disagreeing with the findings arrived at by enquiry authority in order to proceed further with the disciplinary proceedings. Disagreement was only with respect to the findings in regard to charges 1 and 2 and insofar as other two

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3 AIR 2023 Supreme Court 2388

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charges were concerned, enquiry officer report found that the charges levelled against petitioner were sufficiently proved, therefore, the issue has to be judged in that perspective.

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(c) He further contended that 2^nd charge would clearly fall within the purview of Regulation 28(B)(f), inasmuch as there was clear financial loss established to the bank and likewise 3^rd charge would fall within the ambit of Regulation 29, which attracts expression of dishonesty and unfaithfulness. Since adjustment of vouchers was done despite the knowledge that the matured FDR never realized, the same clearly attracted mischief of Regulation 29. Even 4^th charge also clearly fall within the ambit of Regulation 29, inasmuch as petitioner clearly disclosed laxity and infact shielded the information to the Board. Therefore, it has been contended that the charges 2 and 3 are in the nature of misconduct/grave misconduct and would clearly fall within the mischief of Regulations 28 and 29. Hence, the contention of counsel for petitioner in that regard is unfounded.

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(d) Lastly, it is submitted that not only as on the date of imposition of punishment, even later as the bank never recouped the financial loss as otherwise contended by the petitioner,

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considering the size of the bank vis-à-vis magnitude of amount unrealized, which has severe financial impact on the bank, the punishment that of removal from service would clearly pass the muster of proportionality test.

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(e) However, learned counsel for petitioner, in rebuttal, contended that the allegations under charges 2 and 3, in particular, the conduct of petitioner in taking appropriate steps to realize the proceeds upon maturity of FDR resulting in huge financial loss, thereby not acting in the best interest of the bank and the other charge that petitioner allowed the concerned subordinates of the bank to pass adjustment vouchers in the bank’s books as if the matured amount has been received tantamounting the dishonesty and unfaithfulness would not fall within the expression of misconcudct/grave misconduct in terms of Regulation 28. To buttress aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and others v. J.Ahmed⁴ .

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6. Perused the record and considered the respective submission made by both parties.

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4 (1979) 2 Supreme Court Cases 286

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7. Now, the points that arise for consideration of this are as follows:

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(i) Whether the show-cause notice contains specific reasons expressing disagreement with the findings of enquiry officer?

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(ii) Whether the charges 2 and 3 fall within the ambit of Regulations 28 and 29 of Regulations for initiating disciplinary proceedings?

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(iii) Whether the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the charges levelled?

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8. Before embarking on the issues raised before this Court, the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings has to be kept in mind. In Indian Oil Corporation and Ors.³ , which has been relied by learned counsel for petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court has extracted following passages while explaining the scope of judicial review:

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“The views expressed by this Court on the scope of judicial review in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava⁵ ,

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“ 24 . It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decisionmaking process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness

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5 (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457

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of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence . If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

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28 . The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained .”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Similar view was expressed in the later judgment of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India⁶ .”

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In the light of the settled principles of law on scope of judicial review, issues raised before this Court are required to be considered.

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Point No.(i):

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9. The petitioner being General Manager (FAC) at Visakhapatnam Branch in all authority taken conscious business decision to invest the bank funds with Sikkim Bank at Hyderabad, a scheduled private bank. In all four fixed deposits each of one

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crore were made with the said bank. One such deposit was supposed to have matured on 08.03.1999 for a value of ₹1,02,69,260/-, ultimately could not be realized.

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10. The petitioner tried to justify his decision in choosing to invest surplus funds with Sikkim Bank stating that the said institution had offered higher rate of interest i.e., @10.80% per annum compared to other Government Scheduled Banks and that he was duly authorized by way of Board Resolution to invest said funds. Merely because one of the FDR could not be realized on account that Sikkim Bank later got merged with Union Bank of 6 (2023) 11 SCC 159

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India and under a scheme of amalgamation which according to successor bank, imposed moratorium on payments of matured FDRs, petitioner defended that his decision cannot be said to be either imprudent or there was any laxity or negligence on his part. The non-realization was solely due to RBI moratorium declared on the very next day, for which, he cannot be found fault with. Even the enquiry officer, while dealing with first charge, clearly held that there was no violation of norms nor found laxity on the petitioner’s effort, however, it was only noted that it was a capital mistake for petitioner not to have informed the outcome to the Board sooner.

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11. In that view of the matter, he contended that the disciplinary authorities’ decision in disagreeing with the findings of enquiry officer without specifying any reasons as such falls foul of Rule 21(2) of Regulations.

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12. Since both counsels are in addendum with the applicability of CCA Rules, which prescribe the procedure of conducting disciplinary proceedings, it has to be seen now whether the disagreement expressed by disciplinary authority is in consonance with Rule 21(2) of the said Rules. The disciplinary

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authority issued show-cause notice, dated 07.03.2002, after considering the report of enquiry officer and also indicating its mind in regard to the disagreement expressed. It is therefore necessary for this Court to cull out as to whether, at all, any reasons as such have been given by the disciplinary authority in expressing disagreement. The relevant portion of the showcause notice reads as follows:

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“Charge No.1:

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That the charge is held as not proved is not acceptable, considering the facts surrounding the matter as seen in the Enquiry Report. The Enquiry Officer's observation on one hand that the officer's decision was neither worthwhile nor wise in as much as there was no need to make the investment with a small bank like Sikkim Bank for a negligible margin of 0.3% interest and his further observation that the investment was made to appease somebody or on account of pressure/obligation/influence from quarters and his contention holding the charge as not proved on the other hand, is found to be quite contradictory. On an independent examination of the facts, the Committee takes the view that the charge is proved."

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Charge No. 2:

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"The Enquiry Officer has not returned clear findings as to whether the charge is proved or not. However, while stating

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that there was no laxity in efforts of the charged officer for realization of the FDR amount, the Enquiry Officer has observed that it is a capital mistake on the part of the charged officer in not having informed the fact of dishonour of the FDR to the Board of Management of the DCCB, successor General to seek the assistance of Manager and to the APCOB. He also failed APCOB in the matter of realization of the FDR in question. This manner of conduct of the officer is clearly a breach of trust in the circumstances and on independent examination of the facts, this charge is also taken as proved by this Committee."

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Charge No.3:

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"The Enquiry Officer has not returned clear findings as to holding the charge as proved or not but has observed that there was connivance of the officer with other staff members of the DCCB and that he kept quiet in the matter and that such an act amounts to dereliction of his legitimate duty. The above circumstances also persuade this Committee in taking this charge also as proved."

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Charge No.4:

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"The facts as revealed in the Enquiry Report as also the findings of the Enquiry Officer concluding that the charge sheeted officer indulged in suppression of information with regard to non-realization of the FDR, amounts to the charge having been proved although the Enquiry Officer has not clearly mentioned in his findings that the charge is held proved.

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In the above context, having come to the above conclusion independently based on the facts of the case, the Committee concludes that the charge sheeted officer had infringed upon Cadre Regulation No.28 in respect of charge No.1 and Cadre Regulation No.29 in respect of charge Nos.2 to 4. Considering the gravity of the misconduct of the officer as also the fact that he has admittedly caused huge financial loss to the Bank, the Committee resolves to impose the punishment of dismissal from service under the powers vested with it as per the provisions of Cadre Regulation No.35 and 39.”

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13. A close glance and scrutiny of the aforesaid extracted content of the show-cause notice goes to show that the disciplinary authority, while examining all four charges independently, has given specific reasons as to why it was disagreeing with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. More significantly, with regard to 1^st charge, the disciplinary authority found that there was a clear inconsistency in the enquiry officer’s observation in relation to the decision of making the investment with a smaller bank like Sikkim Bank for a negligible margin of 0.3% interest. Further, with regard to charges 2 and 3, though the enquiry officer has not written clear finding whether charges were proved or not, the disciplinary authority on

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independent application of mind having analyzed the material and also the observations of enquiry officer has formed belief that the decision to invest in a smaller private bank was a capital mistake and that too having not informing the factum of dishonour of FDR to the Board of DCCB or APCOB, the delinquent officer has clearly acted in negligence, laxity besides in breach of trust.

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14. Similarly, with respect to 3^rd charge also, the disciplinary authority has found that the act of delinquent officer in getting the vouchers issued to show as if the matured FDR amount was properly realized clearly amounted to dereliction of legitimate duty. Lastly, with respect to 4^th charge, the findings of enquiry officer came to be accepted in toto, which related to suppression of information.

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15. In that background, the contention of learned counsel for petitioner requires consideration. Much emphasis has been laid on judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and others¹ and Yoginath D.Bagde² . He sought to rely on following passages from aforesaid judgments, which are extracted as under:

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Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra:

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14. In Ram Kishan case [(1995) 6 SCC 157 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1357 : (1995) 31 ATC 475] disciplinary proceedings on two charges were initiated against Ram Kishan. The enquiry officer in his report found the first charge not proved and the second charge partly proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the conclusion reached by the enquiry officer and a showcause was issued as to why both the charges should not be taken to have been proved. While dealing with the contention that the disciplinary authority had not given any reason in the show-cause to disagree with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer and that, therefore, the finding based on that show-cause notice was bad in law, a two-Judge Bench at p. 161 observed as follows: (SCC para 10)

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“The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer for the reasons given in the enquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the enquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show-cause on the basis of which the findings of the enquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions

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reached by the enquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect.”

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15. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the case of State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit [AIR 1963 SC 1612 : (1964) 2 SCR 1 : (1963) 1 LLJ 295] decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court. A question arose regarding the contents of the second show-cause notice when the Government accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects the findings of the enquiry officer. Even though that case relates to Article 311(2) before its deletion by the 42nd Amendment, the principle laid down therein, at p. 10 of the Report, when read along with the decision of this Court in Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] will clearly apply here. The Court observed at SCR pp. 10-11 as follows:

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“We ought, however, to add that if the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should be specified in the second notice. It may be that the report makes findings in favour of the delinquent officer, but the dismissing authority disagrees with the said findings and proceeds to issue the notice under Article 311(2). In such a case, it would obviously

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be necessary that the dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in the notice, it would be impossible to issue the notice at all. There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on some other issues. That is precisely what has happened in the present case. If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety, it is another matter: but if the dismissing authority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the action proposed to be taken on its own conclusions, it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of cases, the action proposed to be taken would be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer in the enquiry report, but also on the view of the dismissing authority that the other charges not held proved by the enquiring officer are, according to the dismissing authority, proved. In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311(2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in such cases, be specified in the notice.

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But where the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it cannot be said that it is essential that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in such cases a statement to that effect should be made. But we do not think that the words used in Article 311(2) justify the view that the failure to make such a statement amounts to contravention of Article 311(2). In dealing with this point, we must bear in mind the fact that a copy of the enquiry report had been enclosed with the notice, and so, reading the notice in common sense manner, the respondent would not have found any difficulty in realising that the action proposed to be taken against him proceeded on the basis that the appellants had accepted the conclusions of the enquiring officer in their entirety.”

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Yoginath D.Bagde v. State of Maharastra and another:

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28. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory rule extracted above, it is open to the disciplinary authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the enquiring authority, it may record its own findings. Where the enquiring authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings, there

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would arise no difficulty. So also, if the enquiring authority has held the charges proved, but the disciplinary authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the enquiring authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the disciplinary authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the disciplinary authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the rules are in this regard silent and the disciplinary authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings different from those of the enquiring authority that the charges were established, “an opportunity of hearing” may have to be read into the rule by which the procedure for dealing with the enquiring authority's report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be “not guilty” by the enquiring authority, is found “guilty” without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of “not guilty” has already been recorded.

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29. We have already extracted Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 which enables the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the enquiring authority on any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. The rule does not specifically provide that before recording its own findings, the disciplinary authority will give an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. But the requirement of “hearing” in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the “tentative” reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of “not guilty” already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with.

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16. Aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court leaves no manner of doubt that when the disciplinary authority expresses disagreement with the findings of enquiry

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officer, it is incumbent upon it to record the reasons for such disagreement. The tentative reasons for disagreement, along with findings of enquiry officer, are required to be furnished to the delinquent officer before proceeding further. Only in case it is found that the disciplinary authority’s decision to proceed with the proposed action albeit the enquiry report which otherwise found none of the charges were proved, supported by specific reasons, the continuation of further enquiry and issuance of show-cause notice was found to be bad in law.

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17. In my considered opinion, the show-cause notice dated 07.03.2002, which differs and disagrees with the findings of enquiry officer in relation to couple of charges and confirms the findings with regard to other remaining charges, clearly manifests specific reasons and also indicates the further punishment sought to be imposed. At that stage, the adequacy or otherwise of the reasons so recorded cannot be gone into and the delinquent officer has been amply given opportunity to further respond to the reasons so indicated for such disagreement. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity as such in the show-cause notice to hold it as bad in law.

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Point No.(ii):-

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18. Relevant portions of Common Cadre Regulations for the purpose of present case read as under:

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“ 28. Conduct:

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Every employee in the Common Cadre shall confirm to and abide by these Regulations and shall observe comply with and obey all orders and directions which may from time to time be given to him by any person or persons, under whose jurisdiction, superintendence or control he may for the time being, be placed and ultimately to the Cadre Committee. Every employee shall maintain strict secrecy regarding the Bank affairs and the affairs of its constituents, and shall not divulge directly or indirectly, any information of a confidential nature, either to a member of public or to any members of the Bank’s staff, unless compelled to do so by judicial authority or unless instructed to do so by superior officer in writing, in the discharge of his duties.

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(A) Acts of Misconduct :

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a) Negligence

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(B) Acts of Grave Misconduct:

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f) Negligence or Wilful act or subversion of rules of business of the bank of violation of circular instructions of financing bank/bank relating to business and resulting in pecuniary loss or damage to the bank.

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29. Employees to promote the Bank’s Interest:

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Every employee shall serve the Bank efficiently, honestly and faithfully and shall use his utmost endeavour to promote the interests of the Bank in which he performs duty.”

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19. The sum and substance of charges 2 and 3 center around non-realization of one of the FDR matured amount to an extent of ₹1,02,69,260/-, causing huge financial loss to the bank, which was on account of the delinquent officer not acting in the best interest of the bank. Allowing fictitious adjustment vouchers being passed in the banks’ books as if FDR matured amount had been received from Sikkim Bank, which amounted to an act of dishonesty and unfaithfulness.

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20. It is the contention of learned counsel that aforesaid allegations do not attract either Regulation 28 or 29, empowering disciplinary authority to proceed with the purported action. It is also contended that aforesaid acts, which are in the nature of omission and commission, would not partake the character of misconduct or grave misconduct. Regulation 28(A)(a) clearly defines an act of negligence to be construed as misconduct. Likewise, 28(B)(f) also postulates that negligence or damage to the bank constitutes grave misconduct.

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21. In the opinion of this Court, the expressions ‘misconduct’ and ‘grave misconduct’ have been clearly defined to include any negligence or willful act concerning the business activity resulting in pecuniary loss. In the facts of present case, the entire gamut of disciplinary action emanated from the decision made by delinquent officer in making fixed deposit with a small private bank, resulting in pecuniary loss to the tune of ₹1,02,69,260/-. Though petitioner’s counsel tried to rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and others² , which explained the concept of misconduct and whether the act of commission or omission would fall within it, in the opinion of this Court, the said judgment would not really come to the aid of petitioner inasmuch as the expression misconduct and grave misconduct as defined in Common Cadre Regulations clearly envisaged to include within itself the negligence and willful act concerning the business decisions resulting in pecuniary loss. Hence, the contention of petitioner has no merit for consideration.

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Point No.(iii):

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22. Both disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, having analyzed the entire material on record and considered the

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evidence, rendered definitive and specific findings that all the charges levelled against petitioner came to be proved, necessitating punishment of removal from service. There is no denial to the factum of writ petitioner being instrumental in taking the decision for making fixed deposit with private bank. The said decision eventually proved to be not only imprudent but also losing entire substratum of principal FDR amount leave about the interest which otherwise it had earned. The disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority have come to conclusion that but for the decision of petitioner to invest the bank funds with private bank, there would not have been any loss. It was found to be an act of negligence.

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23. Top of it, it came to be proved that petitioner tried to camouflage as if the mature amount had already been received, and adjustment entry vouchers were facilitated, besides Board of Directors and APCOB being completely kept dark on such major issue. Coupled with all these aspects, the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority have come to conclusion that the employer has lost confidence on the petitioner and therefore, felt that the punishment of removal from service was commensurate with the charges levelled. Though petitioner contended that the

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loss has been recouped on account of decree and judgment passed in O.S. No.18 of 2002 on the file of learned VI Additional District Judge at Visakhapatnam, this Court is informed that the said judgment stands challenged in appeal and the amount is yet to be realized. The FDR was made on 07.12.1998 and even till today, the same stands unrealized, clearly exposing the bank to huge monetary loss. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the punishment imposed on petitioner is proper and that petitioner clearly failed to demonstrate that the same is disproportionate to the charges.

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24. It is a well-settled principle of law that the punishment imposed by both the disciplinary authority and, if confirmed by the appellate authority, normally be not interfered with by the Constitutional Court in exercise of powers of judicial review, unless and until punishment so imposed is found to be disproportionate to the offence and should be shocking to conscience of the Court. (Judgment of Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra⁷ ).

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7 1962 SCC OnLine SC 106 : AIR 1963 SC 779

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25. In view of aforesaid observations, this writ petition lacks

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merit and accordingly stands dismissed. No costs.

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As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending in this case, if