A v Rameswara Rao Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh

A V RAMESWARA RAO, S/O. A.V.S.PANDURANGA RAO BABJI, AGED 45 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.3-168, FLAT NO.41, SRI GEETHANJALI GRAND, GANDHI NAGAR, MORAUMPUDI, RAJAHMUNDRY, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT-533101.

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...PETITIONER

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AND

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THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY ENERGY DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

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THE A P EASTERN POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED, REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CORPORATE OFFICE, SEETHAMMADHARA ROAD, TPT COLONY, P AND T COLONY, VISAKHAPATNAM-530013.

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THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER, A.P EASTERN POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED, CORPORATE OFFICE, SEETHAMMADHARA ROAD, TPT COLONY, P AND T COLONY, VISAKHAPATNAM-530013.

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THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEEROPERATION, EASTERN POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED, RAJAHMAHENDRAVARAM.

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...RESPONDENT(S):

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This Court made the following ORDER:

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This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Petitioners for the following relief:

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“to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the impugned action of 3^rd respondent being Appellate authority in interfering with the decision making process of the disciplinary authority i.e. respondent and further action of 4th respondent in issuing revised Show Cause Notice vide Memo No.SE/O/RMV/EE-T/PO/JAO/ADM/SA-3/D.No.205/24, dt 11.09.2024, on the dictate of 3rd respondent suggesting punishment for compulsory retirement, contrary to the earlier Show Cause Notice issued vide Memo No. SE/O/RJ Y/DE-T/PO/J AO/AN D/SA-3/ D.No.59/24, dt 17.05.2024, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, apart from contrary to APSEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations 1970, apart from violative of Principles of natural Justice, consequently set aside the same and pass…”

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Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.

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The petitioner was appointed as a Contract JLM in the year 2007 and his services were regularized in the year 2008. Subsequently, he was appointed to the post of Typist in the year 2011. While the matter stood thus, the petitioner was placed under suspension by proceedings dated 12.09.2023 on the allegations of misappropriation. Thereafter, a charge

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memo dated 21.09.2023 was issued by the 3^rd respondent, to which the petitioner submitted his explanation on 14.11.2023. Pursuant thereto, a departmental enquiry was conducted and an enquiry report came to be submitted. Based on the findings of the enquiry report, the 3^rd respondent issued a Show Cause Notice dated 17.05.2024 proposing the punishment of reduction to a lower post for a period of three (03) years, along with stoppage of increments during the said period with cumulative effect, and for regulating the suspension period accordingly. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the said Show Cause Notice, which was duly received by the respondents. Subsequently, the matter was placed before the Concurrence Committee, as required under the rules. However, based on the observations made by the said Committee, a revised Show Cause Notice dated 11.09.2024 was issued, proposing an enhanced punishment of compulsory retirement. The said notice further proposed to treat the suspension period as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) and to restrict the petitioner’s pay and allowances to subsistence allowance. Aggrieved by the issuance of the revised Show Cause Notice dated 11.09.2024, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition.

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The petitioner contends that the respondents, while proposing/imposing the punishment, have failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure contemplated under Regulation 10 of the APSEB

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Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1970. In particular, no proper enquiry was conducted, relevant documents were not furnished, and reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner to defend his case.

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The provision stipulates that the penalties specified under Item Nos. IV, V, VI and VIII of Regulation 5 shall be imposed only by the competent authority, subject to obtaining concurrence from the duly constituted Concurrence Committee.

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As per the relevant provisions, the Screening/Concurrence Committee is constituted with specified members, including officers such as the CGM/CS and other senior officials nominated by the Director/HRD. A reading of the said provisions makes it clear that the concurrence of such Committee is required in cases involving major penalties. However, the scope of the Committee is limited to according or refusing concurrence, and it does not have the authority to alter or enhance the punishment proposed by the Disciplinary Authority.

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In an identical issue, the erstwhile A.P.High Court, Division Bench in T. Pundarika v. Superintending Engineer, Operation Circle, APSEB and others (W.P. No.18125 of 1993), categorically held as under:

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7. The Division Bench, while agreeing with the contention of the petitioner herein that the committee has no power to suggest higher punishment, categorically observed:

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“We are however in agreement with the petitioner that the disciplinary committee whose concurrence was necessary was not entitled to suggest any higher punishment. The disciplinary committee could have granted or refused concurrence. If the committee refused to grant concurrence, the disciplinary authority would have on its own considered the matter afresh."

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At another palce, while stating that the Disciplinary Committee had no power to At another place, which recommend higher, punishment, the Division Bench observed:

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"the course open for the disciplinary authority was to continue the proceedings from the stage where it was left off by the judgment of this court setting aside the penalty order."

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At another place, the Division Bench observed in unambiguous terms:

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"The disciplinary authority has to ignore, the proceedings of the disciplinary committee dt. 21.7.1987 and take up its proposal to impose that punishment as recommended by the Inquiry Authority and which it had formulated in its earlier show-cause notice dt. 8.12.1986".

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8. The above quoted passages occurring in the judgment of the Division Bench, in our considered view, do not empower the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh show cause notice proposing higher punishment. The first show-cause notice dated 8.12.1986 was the result of conscious application of mind by the disciplinary authority after Considering the entire evidence and the explanation of the petitioner. When the Disciplinary Committee has no power to suggest enhanced punishment the position accepted by the Division Bench it is hard to accept the plea that when the matter was remitted to

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the disciplinary authority, the latter, can ignore its own earlier view as to what was the reasonable punishment to be suggested in the second show-cause notice. On the basis of the same material, the disciplinary authority cannot come to a totally different conclusion in the absence of any other material subsequently coming into existence. We must also make it explicit that the regulations confer power on the appellate and revisional authorities to enhance the punishment imposed on any employee of the Board after issuing a show-cause notice. The observation of the Division Bench: "if a major punishment is proposed, it shall proceed according to the provisions contained in the Disciplinary Regulations, obtain the concurrence of the Disciplinary Committee and pass final orders. If on the other hand, a minor punishment is chosen, the disciplinary authority may pass final orders on its own" do not confer power on the disciplinary authority to propose a punishment higher than the punishment of reduction by 10 places in the seniority list. In our view, the Division Bench intended only this and nothing more. That is the reason why the Division Bench said that the disciplinary authority should take up the proposal to impose punishment as suggested in the "earlier show cause notice dated 8.12.1986". This view was taken by the Division Bench for the obvious reason that reduction in the seniority being a major punishment, it requires concurrence of the Disciplinary Committee. Merely because the Division Bench observed that if a major punishment is proposed, the disciplinary authority shall proceed in accordance with the provisions contained in the regulations, it does not mean that a major, punishment higher than reduction by 10 places in the seniority list, the disciplinary authority can propose. That could not be the intention of the Division Bench is very clear from a careful reading of the entire judgment. In the examination of judgments, we might observe in passing, canons of statutory interpretation have no place: Judgments are not statutes is a self evident reality.

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In the above said judgment, the erstwhile A.P.High Court, Division Bench has categorically held that the Disciplinary Authority is not empowered to issue a fresh show cause notice proposing a higher punishment, once the initial show cause notice was issued after due application of mind, upon consideration of the entire material on record and the explanation submitted by the delinquent. It was further held that the Committee has no authority to suggest or enhance the punishment, and accordingly, the second show cause notice proposing a higher punishment was set aside.

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In the present case also, the issue involved is identical. After completion of the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority, upon consideration of the enquiry report, proposed the punishment of reduction to a lower post along with stoppage of certain increments, and the petitioner had also submitted his explanation to the said show cause notice. However, thereafter, based on the recommendation of the Committee, a second show cause notice dated 11.09.2024 came to be issued proposing the enhanced punishment of compulsory retirement, which is beyond the jurisdiction, as observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment.

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Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that under the earlier Regulations, the Committee

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functioned as an Appellate Authority, and therefore, the erstwhile A.P.High Court, Division Bench held that such Appellate Authority was not entitled to propose a higher punishment. It is further contended that, in the present case, the Screening/Concurrence Committee is constituted separately under Clause 10 of the Regulations, and that the said Committee deals only with cases involving major penalties and does not function as an Appellate Authority. Hence, according to the respondents, the observations made by the Division Bench are not applicable to the present case.

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Considering the submissions made by both the learned counsel, this Court is of the view that the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the erstwhile A.P.High Court, Division Bench, wherein the second show cause notice proposing an enhanced punishment was set aside. The Division Bench has clearly held that the Committee has no power to enhance the punishment proposed by the Disciplinary Authority, once the Disciplinary Authority has, upon due consideration of the entire material and the enquiry report, proposed a particular punishment. The role of the Concurrence/Screening Committee is limited to examining whether the procedure has been duly followed, particularly in cases involving major penalties, and not to alter or enhance the punishment.

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In view of the above, and upon careful consideration of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No.18125 of 1993, this Court is of the considered opinion that the second show cause notice issued by the respondents, proposing an enhanced punishment, is without jurisdiction and is contrary to the scheme and scope of the Concurrence Committee as contemplated under the relevant Regulations. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned show cause notice dated 11.09.2024 and the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner in terms of the earlier show cause notice dated 17.05.2024, by duly taking into consideration of the explanation submitted by the petitioner dated 22.05.2024, and pass appropriate orders, strictly in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.

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As a sequel, interlocutory applications if any pending, shall stand closed.

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________________________ JUSTICE D. RAMESH

Dt:09.02.2026

klk

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D. RAMESH