Amathi Appa Rao Vs the State of Ap

“…to issue an appropriate Writ, Order, or Directioh, more particularly one in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus, declaring the action of the Respondents, specifically the Respondent No. 3 herein, in not filing Charge Sheet pursuant to Crime No. 155/2023 dated 18.07.2023, as being illegal, arbitrary, irrational, unconstitutional, and in blatant violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and consequently, direct the Respondent No. 3 to conclude the investigation and file the Charge Sheet in connection with Crime No. 155/2023 dated 18.07.2023 on the file of Medikonduru Police Station, Guntur District, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a stipulated timeframe…”

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Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant

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Government Pleader.

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Mr. Baggi Venkata Pavan Kumar, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that although the complaint lodged by the petitioner was registered as a case against Accused Nos.1 to 8 in F.I.R.No.155 of 2023, dated 18.07.2023 on the file of Medikonduru Police Station, Guntur District, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) by Respondent No.3, he has failed to proceed with the investigation and has not taken any steps to file the charge sheet.

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Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader, on written instructions, submits that the investigation is at progressive stage, charge sheet would be filed after completion of the investigation.

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Be that as it may, the Respondent No.3 is duty bound to conduct a thorough, fair, impartial and effective investigation and conduct the investigation to the logical end as per the procedure.

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6. In this regard, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex

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Court in A. Shankar v. State¹ , wherein at paragraph Nos.15 and 20, it is held as under:

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15. If the high court directs, at a stage prior to conclusion of investigation, that a charge-sheet has invariably to be fled upon closure of investigation in a particular case irrespective of what the materials are which have been collected during investigation and without allowing the investigating officer to form his own opinion as regards the next course of action, that would take away the discretion of such officer and he would be left with no other option but to proceed in the direction as required by the high court under pain of threat of contempt. Other than very extreme cases, the high courts ought to exercise restraint and not issue such directions which foreclose the discretion of the executive.

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20. However, if the high court proceeds to make a direction that charge-sheets should be fled upon conclusion of investigation or that a trial should be concluded within a particular time-frame, without even attempting to ascertain the stage the trial has reached, the consequence of such an order could be far-reaching. The concept of a fair trial could be rendered a casualty. Directions of the nature made by the learned Judge amounts to improper exercise of writ jurisdiction and such an approach cannot but be disapproved by us.

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Therefore, in A. Shankar supra , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

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the High Court should not, at the stage of investigation, direct the filing of a charge-sheet, as it would curtail the discretion of the investigating officer and amount to an improper exercise of jurisdiction. It was further held that issuing directions to file charge-sheets or to conclude trials within a fixed timeframe, without considering the stage of the proceedings, may prejudice a fair trial and is liable to be disapproved.

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Further, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan² , wherein at paragraph Nos.9 to 11, it is held as under:

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1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 120

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2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2894

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9. In exercise of these wide-ranging powers - was it justified to direct time bound completion of investigation? The investigation of an offence is a long, winding road. It is full of ups and downs and is not, possibly, even for a moment, predictable in the true sense. There can be delays in the investigation, witnesses who at one point in time appeared confident, may begin to hesitate or completely resile from their statement, documentary evidence on which much hope was pinned, may turn out to be unusable or so many other such possibilities may occur. Legal proceedings frequently intersect with the investigation and affect its pace and direction. Applications for anticipatory bail, regular bail, or the like can result in temporary pauses or changes in strategy. Courts may call for further investigation, ask for clarification on specific aspects or even direct a change of the investigating officer. Each such intervention requires the investigating agency to revisit its work and sometimes take a fresh path altogether. So, it can be seen that the investigative process is at times straight, at other times one of lots of twists, turn and recalibrations and in yet others, frustratingly round-about like, before it can come to a somewhat definitive conclusion to present the case for trial before the concerned, and sometimes, even at that time the definitive conclusion, at least from an investigator's standpoint, remains elusive.

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While all this may undoubtedly be true, it is also unquestionably so that it cannot be an excuse for avoidable delay. Speedy trial, which necessarily includes timely and diligent investigation, has been recognized as an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution and is essential to the fairness and credibility of the criminal justice system. Undue delay prejudices not only the accused, whose liberty and reputation remain under a cloud, but also the victim and society at large, for whom justice loses meaning when it is endlessly deferred. The challenge, therefore, lies in balancing the practical realities of investigation with the constitutional mandate that criminal proceedings, from investigation through trial, be conducted with reasonable promptitude and care. It is this balancing role that the judiciary plays. It is for those reasons that while on the one hand there is a statutorily laid down process in place which is generally followed, powers such as that of Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 197314 have been kept open in their widest sense possible- to secure the ends of justice. 10. Courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the norm. Investigation is, as can be seen from the above discussion, a product of many factors and happenings apart from the crime itself, that lend to it a sense of uncertainty and the law therefore accords investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. At the same time, the Constitution does not permit investigations to remain openended. The Supreme Court has long held that the right to a speedy trial, which necessarily includes a timely and diligent investigation, forms an essential part of Article 21, as first recognized by a Constitution Bench in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar15, and later elaborated by another Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak16. It is in this constitutional setting that courts have, in appropriate cases, intervened where delay itself begins to cause prejudice. Where there is evident stagnation, unexplained inaction, or a pattern of delay that cannot be justified by the nature or

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complexity of the case, judicial directions fixing timelines have been considered warranted. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India17, the Court emphasized the need for prompt and effective investigation, particularly where delay risks allowing serious matters to drift without resolution. More recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar18, the Court reaffirmed that investigations cannot be allowed to continue endlessly, and that prolonged and unexplained delay between the registration of an FIR and the filing of a chargesheet may itself infringe Article 21, especially where such delay keeps an individual under a continuing cloud of suspicion without meaningful progress. Courts have also been mindful of the impact of prolonged investigation on personal liberty, particularly where coercive measures or extended custody are involved. In such cases, fixing timelines is viewed not as an intrusion into the investigative domain, but as a safeguard against inertia and arbitrariness. At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned against routine or mechanical directions for time-bound investigation, reiterating in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja19, that the manner and pace of investigation ordinarily lie within the investigator's domain. What emerges, therefore, is a balanced approach: courts respect the practical realities of investigation, yet intervene where delay itself threatens fairness, liberty, or the integrity of the criminal justice process.

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11. The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that timelines are not drawn by the Court to be followed by the investigators/the executive right from the beginning, for that would clearly amount to stepping on the toes of the latter. Timelines are therefore imposed at a point where not doing so would have adverse consequences i.e., there is material on record demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or the like. In sum, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically. As such, the timelines imposed by the High Court need to be interfered with and set aside. Ordered accordingly.

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9. Similarly, in Mohd. Arshad Khan supra , the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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held that time-bound investigation should be an exception, as the process is inherently uncertain and influenced by multiple factors, though undue delay cannot be justified in view of the right to speedy trial under Article 21. Courts may intervene and fix timelines only where there is clear stagnation or unexplained delay causing prejudice, and not as a routine measure; hence such directions must be imposed sparingly and reactively.

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Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Respondent No.3 is directed to complete the investigation and take appropriate steps, either by

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filing a charge sheet or a final report before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate, within a reasonable time, in accordance with law, and submit about the results of the investigation to the District Superintendent of Police concerned.

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