Jyothi Pratap Vs M/S. Sree Madavi Travels & 3 Others

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 13 days in resubmitting the MACMA SR No. 7066 of 2012 and pass

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Counsel for the Appellant:

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1.D KODANDARAMI REDDY

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1.GUDI SRINIVASU

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2.T V P SAI VIHARI

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MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 2224/2012

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Between:

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THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.,, REP. BY ITS DIVIL. MANAGER, DIVIL. OFFICE NAGARAJUPETA, KADAPA

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...APPELLANT

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AND

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JYOTHI PRATAP 3 OTHERS, S/O LATE DEVASAYAM, CHRISTIAN, PREVIOSULY BUS DRIVER, R/O HARIJANAWADA, PATHA KADAPA,KADAPA DISTRICT.

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M/S SREE MADAVI TRAVELS REP BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, K. JANARDHAN, PURANIKA, FATHERS NAME NOT KNOWN R/O D.NO. 19/100, MADRASS ROAD, KADAPA

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SMT J SOBHA RANI, W/O JAGADESWARA REDDY HINDU, OWNER OF THE BUS NO. AP 04 U 3979 R/O DOOR NO. 11/6, NABIKOTA, KADAPA DISTRICT.

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UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REP. BY ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER, DIVISIONAL OFFICE DHOBIGHAT ROAD, KADAPA

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...RESPONDENT(S):

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Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be pleased toto allow the appeal.

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IA NO: 1 OF 2012(MACMAMP 4058 OF 2012

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the execution of decree and Judgment passed in MVOP No. 528 of 2006 dt. 5-1-2012 on the file of the Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Cum VI Additional District Judge, Kadapa, Pending the final disposal of the main appeal and pass

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Counsel for the Appellant:

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1.T V P SAI VIHARI

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1.D KODANDARAMI REDDY

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2.GUDI SRINIVASU

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The Court made the following:

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

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M.A.C.M.A.Nos.737 and 2224 of 2012

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COMMON JUDGMENT :

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Introductory:

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Claimant in M.V.O.P.No.528 of 2006 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Family Court-cum-VI Additional District Judge, Kadapa (for short “the learned MACT”) filed M.A.C.M.A.No.737 of 2012 and Respondent No.2 (the New India Assurance Company Limited) before the learned MACT filed M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012.

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The petitioner/claimant i.e. Jyothi Pratap, filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- for the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 18.08.2005.

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The learned MACT partly allowed the claim and awarded a total compensation of Rs.2,53,600/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, while dismissing the claim against respondent Nos.3 and 4.

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Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/claimant preferred M.A.C.M.A.No.737 of 2012 contending inadequacy of compensation, while respondent No.2/Insurance Company filed appeal i.e. M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012 disputing liability and challenging the quantum of compensation.

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For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as the

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claimant and the respondents as and how they are arrayed before the learned MACT.

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Case of the Claimant:

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6(i). The claimant, working as a driver of a bus bearing No.AP 04 U 3979 under respondent No.3 and was earning Rs.3,000/- salary per month and Rs.60/- per trip towards batta. The claimant used to drive bus owned by Respondent No.3 for 15 nights in a month from Kadapa to Hyderabad and vice versa and he was earning Rs.3,900/- per month.

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(ii). While the claimant was driving the bus of respondent No.3 from Hyderabad to Kadapa on the night of 17.08.2005, when he reached the 195 KM stone on Hyderabad to Kurnool Highway at about 02:00 a.m. on 18.08.2005, a Volvo bus bearing No.AP 04 U 9090 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”) driven by respondent No.1, came in the opposite direction and dashed the bus driven by the claimant and the accident occurred. As a result, the glasses of both the vehicles broken and the broken glass pieces pierced into the eye of the petitioner. The passengers of both vehicles also sustained grievous injuries. Soon after the accident, the petitioner was shifted to Government General Hospital, Kurnool and after initial treatment, he was shifted to Sarojini Devi Eye Hospital, Hyderabad, where he took treatment from 18.08.2005 to 27.08.2005 as an inpatient, during which his left eye was operated upon. Thereafter, he joined Medivision Eye and Health Care

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Hospital, Hyderabad, wherein he took treatment for one month as an inpatient and second surgery was conducted.

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(iii). The petitioner/claimant sustained grievous injuries resulting in total loss of vision in the left eye. He has incurred huge expenditure towards medicines, treatment, transport, attendant charges and extra-nourishment etc.

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(iv). Due to the accident, the petitioner became disabled and is unable to work as a driver. He was a skilled worker prior to the accident and the disability is permanent in nature. Charge sheet was laid against the driver employed by respondent No.1. Respondent No.2 is the insurer. Respondent No.3 was the owner of the bus which the claimant was driving. Respondent No.4 was the Insurance Company with which the said vehicle was insured. The petitioner is entitled for just and reasonable compensation from all the respondents.

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Respondent No.3 remained ex parte . Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 filed their written statements.

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Case of Respondent No.1:

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8(i). The offending vehicle was entrusted to a driver who possessed a proper and valid driving licence.

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(ii). The allegation of negligence on the part of the driver employed by respondent No.1 is not correct.

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(iii). Respondent No.2 issued an insurance policy covering the period between 24.05.2005 to 23.05.2006, which covers the accident dated 18.08.2005. Therefore, the liability, if any, shall be on respondent No.2:

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Case of Respondent No.2:

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9(i). Pleaded accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, nature of injuries sustained by the claimant and the effect thereof, including causing disability by the claimant shall be proved.

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(ii). Negligence of the claimant in driving the vehicle cannot be ignored. The disability pleaded, age, occupation, income of the claimant and loss of income, if any, shall be proved with proper evidence.

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(iii). In any event, the quantum of compensation claimed is excessive.

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Case of Respondent No.4:

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10(i). The petitioner shall prove the manner of accident, age, occupation income, disability etc., the contention of the petitioner/claimant suggest that there was no negligence on his part and that the charge sheet was laid against the driver employed by respondent No.1.

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(ii). The negligence, if any, is on the part of the driver of respondent No.1. Respondent No.4 is not liable to pay any compensation. (iii). In any event, the claimant shall prove all the facts necessary for his entitlement for compensation and the liability of respondent No.4.

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Learned MACT considering the evidence of the claimant as P.W.1, evidence of Doctors as P.Ws.2 and 3 and the evidence of P.W.4, Motor Vehicle Inspector and P.W.5, Junior Assistant, Deputy Commissioner of Transport office, Kadapa along with Exs.A1 to A11 and Exs.X1 to X3, allowed the claim in

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part awarding a compensation of Rs.2,53,600/- payable by Respondent Nos.1

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and 2.

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Arguments in the appeals:

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For the claimant:

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12(i). The quantum of compensation awarded is inadequate.

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(ii). The learned MACT erred in taking disability at only 30%. When there is

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total loss of vision in the left eye and loss of earning capacity should have been considered at 100%.

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For Respondent No.2 / Insurance Company:

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Charge sheet is not the total basis. The claimant stated before the Criminal Court that he could not identify the driver of the vehicle, which amounts to false evidence. Owner and Insurance Company of the vehicle in which the claimant was engaged are liable under Workmen‟s Compensation Act. But, the liability was imposed on the respondent Nos.1 and 2 without any basis.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.4 submitted that respondent No.4 is not liable to pay compensation and that the learned MACT has rightly dismissed the claim against respondent No.4

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Extensive arguments are submitted by both sides reiterating their respective contentions.

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Points that arise for determination in these appeals are:

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1. Whether the pleaded accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle bearing No.AP 04 U 9090, the claimant sustaining injuries in the pleaded accident and the effect thereof are properly placed by the claimant and whether the findings of the learned MACT as to negligence, entitlement of the claimant for compensation and quantification thereof are sustainable in law and on facts or whether any interference is necessary, and if so, to what extent and on what grounds?

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1. What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012?

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1. What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.737 of 2012?

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Point No.1:

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Accident and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle:

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Statutory Guidance:

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17(i). It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows:

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176. Power of State Government to make rules.— A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:—

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(a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications;

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(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;

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(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;

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(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and

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(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.

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(ii). Chapter „11‟ of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from

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Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues, judgments and enforcements of awards, Court fee relating to claim petitions applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 reads as follows:

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Rule 476: Application for claim :-

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(7) Basis to award the claim :- The Claims Tribunal shall

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proceed to award the claim on the basis of;-

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(i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident;

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(ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk;

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(iii) Copy of First Information Report;

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(iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the Medical Officer; and

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(v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim.

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(7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them.

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As per Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the crime record can be the basis. The official acts done are presumed to be proper until a contrary is proved particularly when some statutory recognition is given to such official records.

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It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have

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to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and consistent.

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Precedential Guidance:

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The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation¹ , in para 15 observed as follows:

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“ 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties..”

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Analysis and Evidence:

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21(i). As per Ex.A1-FIR, the accused is shown as one D. Vijaya Kumar, driver

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of the offending vehicle. Under Ex.A3, charge sheet was laid against the said D. Vijaya Kumar.

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(ii). Claimant is an injured eye witness. Evidence of claimant as P.W.1 is clear and categorical as to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicles and the effect of injuries as to broken glass pieces pierced into his left

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eye and also regarding the treatment undergone by him at various hospitals.

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(iii). It is relevant to note that there is no evidence was placed by the

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respondents in any form. Therefore, in the light of evidence of P.W.1, who is

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1 2009 (13) SCC 530

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an eyewitness to the accident, coupled with the entries in Ex.A1-FIR and Ex.A2-Wound Certificate, the irresistible conclusion can be addressed that the accident and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle are shown. (iv). Violations of policy conditions by respondent No.1 were neither pleaded

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in categorical terms nor proved with any semblance of evidence.

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(v). It appears that much effort was putting as to the driving licence particulars of the claimant etc.

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Evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5 related to the driving licence aspects of the claimant. P.W.4-Motor Vehicle Inspector stated that he does not have any knowledge as to whether the claimant / Jyothi Pratap continued as a driver after the accident and whether he applied for licence or not and during cross examination he has stated that Ex.A10 is the copy of driving licence of P.W.1. Evidence of P.W.5 is also relating to the driving licence of Jyothi Pratap, who is the claimant.

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Respondent No.2, for avoiding liability, can take the defence of absence of a valid driving licence to the driver of the vehicle insured with respondent No.2. The driving licence particulars of the claimant have nothing to do with the violations aspect. Therefore, the driving licence of the claimant will not have any effect on the liability of respondent no.2.

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Respondent No.2 / Insurance Company, which is the appellant in M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012, would argue that the claimant failed to identify the

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driver of the offending vehicle in the criminal case. Therefore, his evidence is

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not creditworthy. But, neither the judgment of the said Criminal Court nor the evidence of the claimant in the criminal case are placed before the Court. Even otherwise, the excuse that the evidence of claimant in Criminal Court is different and found as not an important merit and the said objection is found fit to be ignored.

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Quantification of compensation:

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Precedential Guidance :

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A reference to parameters, for quantifying the compensation under various heads, addressed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court is found necessary, to have standard base in the process of quantifying the compensation, to which the claimant is entitled.

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(i) With regard to awarding just and reasonable quantum of compensation, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Baby Sakshi Greola vs. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Anr.² , arising out of SLP(c).No.10996 of 2018 on 11.12.2024, considered the scope and powers of the Tribunal in awarding just

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and compensation within the meaning of Act, after marshaling entire case law, more particularly with reference to the earlier observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in Kajal V. Jagadish Chand and Ors .³ , referred to various heads under which, compensation can be awarded, in injuries cases vide paragraph No.52, the heads are as follows:-

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22025 AIAR (Civil) 1

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3 2020 (04) SCC 413

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S. No. Head Amount (In ₹)

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1.	Medicines and Medical Treatment		xxxxx
2.	Loss of Earning Capacity due to Disability		xxxxx
3.	Pain and Suffering		xxxxx
4.	Future Treatment		xxxxx
5.	Attendant Charges		xxxxx
6.	Loss of Amenities of Life		xxxxx
7.	Loss of Future Prospect		xxxxx
8.	Special Education Expenditure		xxxxx
9.	Conveyance and Special Diet		xxxxx
10.	Loss of Marriage Prospects		xxxxxx
	Total	Rs.	xxxxxx

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(ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court in Yadava Kumar Vs. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and Anr.,⁴ vide para No.10, by referring to Sunil Kumar Vs. Ram Singh Gaud⁵ , as to application of multiplier method in case of injuries while calculating loss of future earnings, in para 16 referring to Hardeo Kaur Vs. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation⁶ , as to fixing of quantum of compensation with liberal approach, valuing the life and limb of individual in generous scale, in para 17 observed that :-

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“The High Court and the Tribunal must realize that there is a distinction between compensation and damage. The expression compensation may include a claim for damage but compensation is more comprehensive. Normally damages are given for an injury which is suffered, whereas compensation stands on a slightly higher footing. It is given for the atonement of injury caused and the intention behind grant of compensation is to put back the injured party as far as possible in the same position, as if the injury has not taken place, by way of grant of pecuniary relief. Thus, in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach will be slightly more broad based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. At the same time it

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4 2010(10)SCC 341

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5 2007 (14) SCC 61

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6 1992(2) SCC 567

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is true that there cannot be any rigid or mathematical precision in the matter of determination of compensation.”

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(iii). In Rajkumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another⁷ , the Hon‟ble Apex

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Court summarized principles to be followed in the process of quantifying the compensation after referring to socio economic and practical aspects from which, the claimants come and the practical difficulties, the parties may face in the process of getting disability assessed and getting all certificates from either the Doctors, who treated, or from the medical boards etc. principles summarized vide para No.19 are as follows:

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19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:

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(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.

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(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability).

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(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.

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(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,

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7 2011 (1) SCC 343

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depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.

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(iv) In Sidram vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Anr .⁸

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vide para No.40, the Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to the general principles relating to compensation in injury cases and assessment of future loss of earning due to permanent disability by referring to Rajkumar’s case, and also various heads under which compensation can be awarded to a victim of a motor vehicle accident.

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(v) In Sidram’s case, reference is made to a case in R.D. Hattangadi V. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd .⁹ . From the observations made therein, it can be understood that while fixing amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But, all these elements have to be viewed with objective standards. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in awarding speculation or

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fancy, though conjecture to some extent is inevitable.

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Evidence and analysis:

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The claimant, as P.W.1, stated about the injuries and the treatment undergone by him at Government General Hospital, Kurnool; Sarojini Devi Eye Hospital, Hyderabad; Medivision Eye and Health Care Hospital, Hyderabad and

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8 2023 (3) SCC 439

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9 1995 (1) SCC 551

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also with Dr. Ravikumar Reddy, Eye Specialist, Hyderabad. He added that he became 50% blind and lost total vision in the left eye. He incurred huge expenditure at Rs.37,000/- towards medicines. He has lost certain bills apart from his medical expenditure. He also incurred expenditure towards transportation, attendant charges and extra nourishment etc.

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P.W.2 / Dr.K.N. Sree Kavitha, Assistant Professor in Ophthamology at Sarojini Devi Hospital, deposed that the claimant was admitted on 18.08.2005 with ruptured left eye with scleral tear and uveal tissue prolapsed. Emergency wound repair was done under anesthesia. He was admitted in the cornea department and discharged on 27.08.2005. The claimant lost total eyesight in the left eye. The eyeball became small and Discharge Summary-Ex.A5 was issued by Sarojini Devi Eye Hospital, Hyderabad. During cross-examination it is elicited that the right eye is normal. 28. P.W.3 / Dr. K. Ravi Kumar Reddy, Medical Superintendent, stated that there was vitreous hemorrhage and treatment was given for absorption of blood in the eye.

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On 27.09.2005, the petitioner visited the hospital with the complaint of defective vision in the right eye. The petitioner‟s vision in the right eye improved. Nothing important could be elicited during cross examination except that the disability is 30% and the same is permanent. It is also elicited that I.V. injections were administered to the claimant.

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Claimant was driver by profession and the other documentary evidence relied by the claimant includes Ex.A7-hospital record / treatment cards and prescription; Ex.A8-Medical Bills, Ex.A9 is the prescription issued by Dr. Pradeep Kumar. Ex.A11 is the certificate for the blind issued by the Medical Board showing disability shown at 30% and Ex.X1 is the case sheet corroborating the evidence of the petitioner as to treatment undergone.

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Employment, income, disability and loss of income:

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Claimant was working as a driver as on the date of the accident i.e. 18.08.2005. Upon considering the socio economic circumstances of the year 2005, the income claimed by the petitioner at Rs.3,900/- per month is found reasonable. Considering the socio economic circumstances of the year 2005, the petitioner, aged 36 years and in private employment, 30% towards progress in income can be safely accepted by rounding the monthly income at to Rs.4,000/- per month. Then the income of the petitioner can be taken at Rs.5,200/- per month and Rs.62,400/- per annum.

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Petitioner cannot work as a driver. However, the disability is shown at 30% and he can opt for other employment. The functional disability of the petitioner as a driver is 100%. His ability to do other work is a mitigating circumstance. However, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, that cannot be the sole basis.

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33(i). In this context, this court find it proper to refer observations of the

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Hon‟ble Apex Court in Gurdev Singh vs. Reliance General Insurance

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Company Limited and others¹⁰ , wherein 30% visual disability assessed by the Medical Board in respect of claimant who was a driver was treated as 100%

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functional disability. Paragraph 5 of the Judgment reads as follows:

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5. Insofar as the assessment of the disability, we note that the МАСТ, on taking into consideration all aspects of the matter including the disability certificate and the avocation of the appellant, has recorded its finding in para 24 as follows:

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"(24) That, the disability certificate, issued by the Medical Board of Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Hospital, Delhi and as per disability certificate, there is 30 per cent permanent visual impairment disability in relation to his left eye and because of the grievous injuries sustained by the petitioner in the road accident and due to said disability, he is not able to work. The petitioner-injured was a professional driver at the time of accident and was driving the heavy goods vehicle and was also having valid DL, therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, he is unable to drive any heavy vehicle in future because of disability and this Tribunal is of the considered view that there is 100 per cent permanent functional disability of the petitioner."

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(ii). In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same judgment (10 supra), while finding

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fault with the assessment of the High Court in abruptly reducing the disability to not more than 30%, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that the functional disability can be reckoned at 100%.

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Therefore, the disability of the petitioner/claimant can be taken at 100% and the loss of income to the claimant can be taken at Rs.5,200/- per month and Rs.62,400/- per annum. The multiplier applicable for the age group of „36‟

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102023 ACJ 1255

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years is „15‟. Therefore, under the head of the permanent disability, the entitlement of claimant for compensation at Rs.9,36,000/- (Rs.62,400/- x 15).

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In the light of the precedential guidance and in view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimant for reasonable compensation in comparison to the compensation awarded by the learned MACT is found as follows:

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Sl. No.	Head	Granted by the learned MACT	Fixed by this Appellate Court
1.	Pain and suffering	Rs.13,000/-	Rs.50,000/-
2.	(a)Transportation		Rs.25,000/-
	(b)Medical expenditure /treatment	Rs.30,000/-	Rs.50,000/-
	(c)Extra nourishment		Rs.15,000/-
	(d)Attendant charges / assistance		Rs.15,000/-
3.	Loss of income / earnings during the period of hospitalization etc.	-Nil-	Rs.15,000/-
4.	Permanent disability	Rs.2,10,600/-	Rs.9,36,000/-
5.	Loss of amenities of life	-Nil-	Rs.15,000/-
6.	Future Treatment	-Nil-	Rs.15,000/-
	Total:	Rs.2,53,600/-	Rs.11,36,000/-

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For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussion made above, the

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findings of the learned MACT fixing the liability on respondent Nos.1 and 2 are found sustainable. But with regard to quantum of compensation awarded, this

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Court is of the view that claimant is entitled for compensation of Rs.11,36,000/with interest at the rate of 6% per annum and the order and decree dated 05.01.2012 passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.528 of 2006 require modification accordingly. The point framed is answered accordingly.

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Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimant is

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otherwise entitled:-

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The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:

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(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others¹¹ , at para 21 of the judgment, that –

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“.. there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award “just” compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record .”

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(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors .¹² at para 33 of the judgment, as

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follows:-

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“33 . We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just

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11 (2003) 2 SCC 274

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12 2020 (04) SCC 413

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compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor .”

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(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and

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Others¹³ at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-

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“5 . Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs 25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award “just compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation.”

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Point No.2:

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38(i). In view of the discussion and conclusions drawn under point No.1, the appeal filed by the Insurance Company vide M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012 is liable to be dismissed.

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(ii). In the result, M.A.C.M.A.No.2224 of 2012 is dismissed. There shall be

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no order as to costs.

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Point No.3:

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In the result, the appeal filed by the claimant vide M.A.C.M.A.No.737 of

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2012 is allowed as follows:

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13 (2019) 2 SCC 192

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24

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(i) Compensation awarded by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.528 of 2006 at Rs.2,53,600/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum is modified and enhanced to Rs.11,06,000/- with interest at the rate of

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6% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization.

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(ii) Claimant is liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced part of the compensation, before the learned MACT.

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(iii) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the learned MACT are liable to pay the compensation.

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(iv) Time for payment /deposit of the balance amount is two months.

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(a) If the claimant furnishes the bank account number within 15 days from today, respondent Nos.1 and 2 shall deposit the amount directly into the bank account of the claimant and file the necessary proof before the learned MACT.

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(b) If the claimant fails to comply iv(a) above, respondent Nos.1 and 2 shall deposit the amount before the learned MACT and the claimant is entitled to withdraw the amount at once on deposit.

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