P.Srinivas, Nellore District Vs Apsrtc., Rep.by M.D., Musheerabad, Hyderabad & 2 Others

which was earmarked for B.C.-A category. Petitioner being ‘Vada Balija’, claimed to be belonging to B.C.-A category, basing on the said caste certificate, he came to be appointed. After putting about six years

¶19

2

¶20

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶21

in service, he was served charge memo, dated 21.01.1998, alleging that the caste certificate, produced by him claiming to be belonging to BC-A category, for the purpose of securing employment, was false and bogues, and therefore, disciplinary proceedings came to be initiated. Petitioner contested the charge-memo, however, ultimately, by proceedings, dated 19.06.1998, his services came to be terminated, holding that the caste certificate so produced was found to be false and bogus. The same came to be eventually challenged in W.P.No.36001 of 1998. After contest, the writ petition has been allowed by order, dated 29.11.2001. This Court, having noted the factum that the disciplinary proceedings came to be initiated based on the alleged report of Mandal Revenue Officer, which concluded that petitioner belonged to ‘Balija’ caste, which was included in forward community, and that the caste certificate then issued in favour of petitioner stating to be ‘Vada Balija’ to be false, which report, in turn, was forwarded by District Collector, Nellore to the respondent Corporation, inasmuch as the procedure so adopted was clearly being contrary to Section 5 the A.P. (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 (for short, “the Act”) read with Rule 8 of the A.P. (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Issue of Community, Nativity and Date of Birth Certificates Rules, 1997 (for short, “the Rules”) has set aside the termination order

¶22

3

¶23

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶24

and relegated the enquiry to the District Level Screening Committee (for short, ‘the DLSC’) headed by District Collector to enquire into the caste certificate produced by the petitioner whether to be genuine or not, within a period of six months, and in turn, the respondent Corporation to proceed with the enquiry thereafter. In view of setting aside the termination order, the respondent Corporation was directed to reinstate petitioner into service forthwith. The respondent Corporation had, thereafter, preferred Writ Appeal No.325 of 2002, assailing aforesaid order of the learned single Judge. By interim order, dated 23.09.2002, the Hon’ble Division Bench directed the respondent Corporation to reinstate the petitioner as the enquiry before the DLSC could not be concluded within the time stipulated. In compliance thereof, petitioner came to be reinstated back into service on 17.10.2002. The DLSC, having concluded the enquiry, submitted its report, dated 16.04.2005, holding that the initial certificate produced by the petitioner was valid and legal and that petitioner belonged to B.C.-A category. Eventually, even the Writ Appeal also came to be dismissed, by judgment, dated 10.06.2005, by taking note of aforesaid report of the DLSC. Further, the respondent Corporation was also directed to reinstate petitioner into service forthwith. Accepting the same, 2^nd respondent herein issued proceedings, dated 06.02.2006, reinstating petitioner into service with continuity of service, however, without back wages for fixation of his pay

¶25

4

¶26

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶27

and drawal of subsequent increments. Petitioner immediately made representation, dated 29.03.2006, claiming for back wages and also increments for the period from 19.06.1998 to 16.10.2002. As there was no further action forthcoming, he preferred present writ petition.

¶28

3. The respondent Corporation filed counter-affidavit, inter alia , stating that inasmuch as the District Collector, Nellore, by proceedings, dated 09.11.1997, brought to the notice of the respondent Corporation that the caste certificate produced by petitioner, on verification by concerned M.R.O., found to be false certificate, rather petitioner’s caste ‘Balija’ falls under O.C. category, after due enquiry, he has been terminated from service, by proceedings, dated 19.06.1998, eventually, in view of the judgment and order, in W.P.No.36001 of 1998 and the interim orders in W.A.No.325 of 2002, petitioner came to be reinstated into service, therefore, petitioner was not justified in claiming for back wages and drawal of the subsequent increments. It is also denied that petitioner’s removal from service was illegal, therefore, respondent Corporation tried to justify their action in denying back wages and extending the benefit of increments.

¶29

4. Heard Sri Madhava Rao Nalluri, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Aravala Rama Rao, learned standing counsel for APSRTC, appearing for the respondent Corporation.

¶30

5

¶31

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶32

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when once the termination of services of petitioner is declared to be illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, which determined the procedure for enquiry, in case of the genuineness or otherwise of caste certificate, and that as petitioner on oath has pleaded that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of termination, he is entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and back wages, which is the normal rule. But for the illegal termination, he has been deprived of working during the subject period, therefore, for no fault of his, the back wages and the increments cannot be denied. In support of the said contentions, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya¹ and Maharashtra SRTC v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik² .

¶33

6. Per contra , learned standing counsel for respondent Corporation, opposing above submissions, vehemently contended that the respondent Corporation has not initiated disciplinary proceedings suo moto, rather it only on account of the letter, dated 09.11.1997, addressed by the District Collector, Nellore, which suggested that the caste certificate issued in favour of petitioner was false and bogus, such

¶34

1 (2013) 10 SCC 324

¶35

2 (2025) 4 SCC 321

¶36

6

¶37

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶38

action was required to be initiated, therefore, the eventual termination of petitioner from service cannot be claimed as wrongful or illegal act. He further contended that petitioner on earlier occasion in W.P. No.36001 of 1998 had specifically prayed for setting aside of termination order and sought for consequential direction to reinstate him into service along with full salary for the period of removal, inasmuch as neither in the said writ petition nor in the writ appeal, such prayer has been ordered, petitioner is not entitled to claim for back wages and other benefits. He further contended that granting of back wages is not automatic, unless and until there is a specific direction for reinstatement along with consequential benefits, he cannot claim the said benefits. In support of the same, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.P. SRTC v. S.Narsagoud³ ; A.P. SRTC v. Abdul Kareem ,⁴ and J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal⁵ .

¶39

7. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, the claim of petitioner for back wages and consequential increments is being examined as under.

¶40

8. The undisputed facts that would emerge from the respective

¶41

pleadings of both parties would be as under:

¶42

3 (2003) 2 SCC 212

¶43

4 (2005) 6 SCC 36

¶44

5 (2007) 2 SCC 433

¶45

7

¶46

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶47

Petitioner was appointed as Kalasi in the year 1992 in a post which was reserved for B.C.-A category, as he claimed to be belonging to ‘Vada Balija’. The District Collector, Nellore district, stated to have issued letter, dated 09.11.1997, to the respondent Corporation informing that the caste certificate produced by the petitioner at the time of employment was not genuine rather petitioner’s caste being ‘Balija’, which falls under O.C. category, could not have been employed in the post, which was reserved for B.C.-A category. This letter, eventually, led to departmental enquiry and issuance of the termination order, dated 19.06.1998. Petitioner challenged the same. This Court allowed the writ petition by holding that the respondent Corporation could not have issued termination order solely basing on the letter addressed by the District Collector. Any enquiry regarding the genuineness of caste certificate was required to be conducted by DLSC headed by the District Collector, who is the competent authority under the provisions of the Act, after following the procedure contemplated under the Rules, therefore, until and unless such exercise is done, the initiation of any disciplinary proceedings against petitioner were held to be vitiated. However, this Court has relegated the enquiry to the competent authority to be concluded within six months after providing due opportunity to the petitioner. This order has been appealed by the respondent Corporation. In view of the interim orders passed by the Division Bench,

¶48

8

¶49

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶50

petitioner came to be reinstated on 17.10.2002. Ultimately, on enquiry, the DLSC submitted its final report on 16.04.2005, upholding the genuineness of the caste certificate produced by the petitioner. Considering the aforesaid report, the writ appeal has been dismissed. The petitioner was later reinstated into service by proceedings, dated 06.02.2006, however, he was denied back wages and increments for the period from 19.06.1998 to 16.10.2002.

¶51

9. On close scrutiny of aforesaid facts and also the orders passed in W.P.No.36001 of 1998 and W.A.No.325 of 2002, it emerges that the order of termination issued by the respondent Corporation has been interdicted by this Court to be unlawful. Even before the competent authority could enquire into the genuineness of caste certificate in terms of the Act and the Rules, the disciplinary action came to be initiated, therefore, the entire exercise was held to be bad in law. However, this Court deemed it appropriate to refer the matter to the DLSC for enquiry. Ultimately, petitioner has come clean in the said enquiry. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, petitioner has been illegally terminated and such termination was in violation of statutory provisions, i.e., the Act and the Rules by the competent authority.

¶52

10. Coming to the law on the subject of awarding back wages, it is now fairly settled in various judicial precedents. Though learned

¶53

9

¶54

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶55

counsels for both petitioner and the respondent Corporation cited various judgments, in order to avoid repetition, reference is made to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahadeo Krishna Naik ’s case³ , which almost summarised the law on this aspect. It is informative to refer to the following few paragraphs of the said judgment:

¶56

“ 41. It is now time to consider the important point of award of back wages. There is no dearth of judicial precedents on such point. While not referring to all the precedents, we may notice only a couple of them here.

¶57

42. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [ Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees , (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] is a decision rendered by a Bench of three Judges of this Court. The following passage from the judgment authored by Hon'ble D.A. Desai, J. (as his Lordship then was) is instructive : (SCC p. 86, para 9)

¶58

“ 9 . It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has

¶59

10

¶60

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶61

been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule . Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages . Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect.”

¶62

(emphasis supplied)

¶63

(underlining by this Court)

¶64

43. Close on the heels of Hindustan Tin Works [ Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees , (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] came another seminal decision on entitlement to back wages by another three-Judge Bench in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Labour Commr. [ Surendra Kumar Verma v. Labour Commr. , (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] Hon'ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J. (as his Lordship then was) in his Lordship's inimitable style remarked : ( Surendra Kumar Verma case [ Surendra Kumar Verma v. Labour Commr. , (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] , SCC p. 447, para 6)

¶65

“ 6 . … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of “bread and butter” statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. “ Void ab initio ”, “invalid and inoperative” or call it what you will, the workmen and the employer are primarily concerned with the consequence of striking down the order of termination of the services of the workmen. Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too . But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-à-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer . In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is

¶66

11

¶67

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶68

clearly shown . True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted.”

¶69

(emphasis supplied)

¶70

44. There have been decisions of this Court rendered thereafter where a shift in approach on awarding full back wages is clearly discernible. However, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase [ Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya , (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] considered a dozen precedents on award of back wages upon reinstatement (referred to in paras 13 and 14). Speaking through Hon'ble G.S. Singhvi, J. (as his Lordship then was), the legal position was neatly summed up in the following words : (SCC pp. 344 & 356-58, paras 22 & 38)

¶71

“ 22 . The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments .

¶72

(underlining by this Court) ***

¶73

38 . The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are:

¶74

12

¶75

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶76

38.1 . In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule . 38.2 . The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.

¶77

38.3 . Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.

¶78

38.4 . The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.

¶79

38.5 . The cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages . In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Articles 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium

¶80

13

¶81

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶82

to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages .

¶83

38.6 . In a number of cases, the superior courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement . The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [ Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees , (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] .

¶84

38.7 . The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal [ J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal , (2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 651] that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three-Judge Benches [ Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees , (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53]^, [ Surendra Kumar Verma v. Labour Commr. , (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman.”

¶85

(emphasis supplied) 45. We cannot but endorse our wholehearted concurrence with the views expressed in the aforesaid decisions. Taking a cue therefrom, it can safely be concluded that ordering back wages to be paid to a dismissed employee — upon his dismissal being set aside by a court of law — is not an automatic relief; grant of full or partial back wages has to be preceded by a minor fact-finding exercise by the industrial adjudicator/court seized of the proceedings. Such exercise would require the relevant industrial court or the jurisdictional High Court or even this Court to ascertain whether in the interregnum, that is, between the dates of termination and proposed reinstatement, the employee has been gainfully employed. If the employee admits of any gainful employment and gives particulars of the employment together with details of the emoluments received, or, if the employee asserts by pleading that he was not gainfully

¶86

14

¶87

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶88

employed but the employer pleads and proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the court, the quantum of back wages that ought to be awarded on reinstatement is really in the realm of discretion of the court. Such discretion would generally necessitate bearing in mind two circumstances : the first is, the employee, because of the order terminating his service, could not work for a certain period under the employer and secondly, for his bare survival, he might not have had any option but to take up alternative employment.

¶89

(underlining by this Court)

¶90

46. It is discernible from certain precedents, duly noticed in Deepali Gundu Surwase [ Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya , (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , that the courts are loath to award back wages for the period when no work has been performed by such an employee. Such a view is no doubt debatable, having regard to the ratio decidendi in Hindustan Tin Works [ Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees , (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] , Surendra Kumar Verma [ Surendra Kumar Verma v. Labour Commr. , (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] and Deepali Gundu Surwase [ Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya , (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] . Though the latter decision was cited before the coordinate Bench when it decided Phool Chand [ Rajasthan SRTC v. Phool Chand , (2018) 18 SCC 299 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 270] , any thoughtful discussion appears to be absent.

¶91

47. There is one other aspect that would fall for consideration of the court. In certain decisions, noticed in Deepali Gundu Surwase [ Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya , (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , it has been opined that whether or not an employee has been gainfully employed is within his special knowledge and having regard to Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is on him. What is required of an employee in such a case? He has to plead in his statement of claim or any subsequent pleading before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court that he has not been gainfully employed and that the award of reinstatement may also grant him back wages. If the employee pleads that he was not gainfully employed, he cannot possibly prove such negative fact by adducing positive evidence. In the absence of any contra-material on record, his version has to be accepted. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which confers a right on an employee to seek “full wages last drawn” from the employer while the challenge of the employer to an award directing reinstatement in a higher court remains pending. There too,

¶92

15

¶93

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶94

what is required is a statement on affidavit regarding nonemployment and with such statement on record, the ball is in the court of the employer to satisfy the court why relief under such section ought not to be granted by invoking the proviso to the section. We see no reason why a similar approach may not be adopted.

¶95

48. After the employee pleads his non-employment and if the employer asserts that the employee was gainfully employed between the dates of termination and proposed reinstatement, the onus of proof would shift to the employer to prove such assertion having regard to the cardinal principle that “he who asserts must prove”. Law, though, seems to be well settled that if the employer by reason of its illegal act deprives any of its employees from discharging his work and the termination is ultimately held to be bad in law, such employee has a legitimate and valid claim to be restored with all that he would have received but for being illegally kept away from work. This is based on the principle that although the employee was willing to perform work, it was the employer who did not accept work from him and, therefore, if the employer's action is held to be illegal and bad, such employer cannot escape from suffering the consequences. However, it is elementary but requires to be restated that while grant of full back wages is the normal rule, an exceptional case with sufficient proof has to be set up by the employer to escape the burden of bearing back wages.

¶96

(underlining by this Court)

¶97

49. We hasten to add that the courts may be confronted with cases where grant of lump sum compensation, instead of reinstatement with back wages, could be the more appropriate remedy. The courts may, in such cases, providing justification for its approach direct such lump sum compensation to be paid keeping in mind the interest of the employee as well as the employer.”

¶98

11. Applying the above enunciated principles to facts of the present

¶99

case, as observed in preceding paras, petitioner has been terminated from service in an illegal manner and contrary to the statutory provisions. Further, petitioner, in writ petition, has specifically pleaded on oath that he was not gainfully employed during the period of removal from service. Therefore, petitioner satisfied the twin requirements for

¶100

16

¶101

CGR, J. W.P.No.13930 of 2007

¶102

the purpose of awarding back wages and increments as claimed. In

¶103

view of the same, writ petition has to succeed and accordingly, the proceedings issued by the 2^nd respondent to the extent of denying back wages and all other increments for the period from 19.06.1998 to 16.10.2002, is hereby set aside and further respondents are directed to pay the petitioner the back wages along with increments as entitled to for the aforesaid period within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the said amount shall carry further interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from such default till full payment.

¶104

12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.

¶105

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.

¶106

_____________________________ JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

¶107

Date:22.11.2025. cs

P.Srinivas, Nellore District v. Apsrtc., Rep.by M.D., Musheerabad, Hyderabad & 2 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

P.Srinivas, Nellore District v. Apsrtc., Rep.by M.D., Musheerabad, Hyderabad & 2 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sri Prof. M.V. Subba Rao, Vs Andhra University Its Registrar

P. Kanakasundara Rao Vs State of A.P. Secretary, Education Dept, & 2 Others

The Nellore District Food Corporation of India Godowns Mutta Vs Food Corporation of India

Nellore District Agnikula Kshatriya Sangham Vs the Dist. Colelctor

K.Atcha Rao, E.G.District & 13 Others Vs Ind.Tribunal Cum Labour Court, Visakhapatnam & Anr.

M. Rajulamma & 5 Others, Vs Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court, Vizag & 6 Others