Sri Kakani Venkataratnam Primary Agricultural Credit Society (Pacs) Vs D Udaya Bhasker Rao

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent to allow the Writ Appeal by setting aside the order dated 20.06.2024 made in WP No. 16489 of 2023 and pass

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Between:

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SRI KAKANI VENKATARATNAM PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SOCIETY (PACS), CHEKKAPALLI VILLAGE, MUSUNURU MANDAL, ELURU DISTRICT, REP. BY ITS CEO/ SECRETARY PASUPULETI DURGARAO, S/O. HARANATH AGED 56 YEARS, R/O. KAMMATURU, CHEKKAPALLI, MUSUNURU MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT.

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...APPELLANT

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AND

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D UDAYA BHASKER RAO, S/O. ATCHIBABU AGE 60 YEARS, OCC CLERK (RETIRED) SRI KAKANI VENKATARATNAM PACS R/O. H. NO. 6-74-1, CHEKKAPALLI VILLAGE MUSUNURU MANDAL, ELURU DISTRICT.

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THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY CO-OPERATIVE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDING, VELAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

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THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY FINANCE AND PLANNING DEPARTMENT SECRETARIAT BUILDING, VELAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

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THE COMMISSIONER FOR COOPERATION AND REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA

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2

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PRADESH, GUNTUR TOWN AND DISTRICT.

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THE DISTRICT COOPERATIVE OFFICER, ELURU, AT ELURU DISTRICT.

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THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, NUZVID TOWN, ELURU DISTRICT.

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THE KRISHNA DISTRICT COOPERATIVE CENTRAL BANK LIMITED, REP. BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT

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...RESPONDENT(S):

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IA NO: 1 OF 2025

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to dispense with the filing of certified copy of order dated 20.06.2024 in W.P No. 16489 of 2023 passed by this Hon‟ble High Court and pass

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IA NO: 2 OF 2025

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to condone the delay of ( 258 ) days in filing this Writ Appeal in the interest of justice and pass

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IA NO: 3 OF 2025

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to suspend the order dated 20.06.2024 made in WP No. 16489 of 2023, pending disposal of the above Writ Appeal and pass

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Counsel for the Appellant:

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1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1.A RAJENDRA BABU

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2.GP FOR SERVICES I

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3.M M M SRINIVASA RAO

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The Court made the following:

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND &

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

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I.A.No.2 of 2025 IN/AND

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WRIT APPEAL No.845 of 2025

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COMMON ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand)

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I.A.No.2 of 2025

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Heard.

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This application is filed seeking to condone the delay of 258 days in filing the Writ Appeal against the order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.16489 of 2023.

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The reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit are that the bureaucratic and practical problems caused while obtaining approval of the authorities had resulted in the present delay of 258 days.

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The reasons stated by the petitioner / appellant to condone the delay of

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258 days do not show sufficient cause to condone the delay. Hence, this application is liable to be dismissed for not showing sufficient cause as per the law declared by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.

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Precedential Guidance:-

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In the case of Office of Chief Post Master General and others vs.

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Living Media India Ltd. and another¹ the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with a petition filed for condonation of delay of 427 days after

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1 2012 LawSuit (SC) 124

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considering various decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, observed as extracted hereunder:

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“12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

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In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there

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was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

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In another judgment relied by the learned counsel for the 1^st respondent, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 663 days, came down heavily, while dismissing the said application in The State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Bherulal² as extracted hereunder:

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“6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being

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adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue

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2 2020 SCC OnLine SC 849

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and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

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We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

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Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

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twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.”

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The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another³ wherein it is held as hereunder:

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“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

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In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to

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3 1992 (3) SCC 563

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considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

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The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 916 days caused in preferring an appeal in case of University of Delhi vs. Union of India (UOI) and others⁴ held as hereunder:

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“20. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by

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4 2020(1) ALT 230

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the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.

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As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law.”

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9. [i] Further, in Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi

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and Ors.⁵ the Hon‟ble Apex Court has considered the tests to be applied in case of condonation of delay. It was a case of condoning the delay of 1011 days in filing an appeal and the High Court while condoning the delay observed that what happens at best is to give opportunity to the parties to canvass their respective cases, in the event of condoning the delay. Further, it was a case of the petitioner that she was suffering from ill-health from 01.01.2017 to 15.03.2017 and she was advised to take bed rest for the said

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period. However, the appeal was filed in the year 2021. For the period not

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5 (2021) 18 SCC 384

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covered under the sick/ ill health, no explanation is offered. However, in the said case delay was condoned by this Court and matter was taken up to Apex Court. In that context, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has referred to five judgments covering the jurisprudence relating to the condonation of delay vide para 7, which reads as under...

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“7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to and considered as under:

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7.1. In Ramlal [ Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] , it is observed and held as under : (AIR pp. 363-64, para 7)

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“ 7 . In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan [ Krishna v. Chathappan , 1889 SCC OnLine Mad 1] : (SCC OnLine Mad para 2)

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„ 2 . … Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words “sufficient cause” receiving a liberal construction so as to

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advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.‟ ”

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7.2. In P.K. Ramachandran [ P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala , (1997) 7 SCC 556] , while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

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7.3. In Pundlik Jalam Patil [ Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project , (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] , it is observed as under : (SCC p. 450)

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“… the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “ interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium ”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

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7.4. In Basawaraj [ Basawaraj v. LAO , (2013) 14 SCC 81] , it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and

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circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

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7.5. In Pundlik Jalam Patil [ Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project , (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] , it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights”

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[ii] The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in ManiBen Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai⁶ , has elaborately considered the point relating to condone the delay and the applicability of the Limitation Act particularly „sufficient cause‟ in terms of Section 5 of Limitation Act, by referring to various judgments vide Para 14 to 25 of the judgment, which reads as follows –

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“ 14. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinised the record. The law of limitation is founded on public

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6 (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157

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policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.

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15. The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.

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23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

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24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

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25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decisionmaking process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.”

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[iii] In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer⁷ , Hon’ble

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Apex Court held that :-

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“ 16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta [AIR 1966 SC 529] , AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma [(2012) 13 SCC 792 : AIR 2013 SC 30] .)

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[iv] Further, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar

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Academy⁸ , the Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down certain parameters vide para 21 of the judgment, which are as follows :-

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7 (2013) 10 SCC 765

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8 (2013) 12 SCC 649

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“21 . from the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

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21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

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21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

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21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

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21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

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21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

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21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

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21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

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21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

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21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh

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the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

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21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

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21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

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21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

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22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

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22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

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22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

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22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

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[v]. In Union of India and Another Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through His Lrs..⁹ Hon‟ble Apex Court has while referring to the cases of locus classicus like Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited.¹⁰ ,

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vide para 30 and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy

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[cited 4 supra], vide para 33, finally held that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party and the parties seeking delay condonation have to prove that they are reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and it is the vital test for condoning the delay, vide para 35.

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In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court stated supra and the petitioner fail to establish sufficient cause for condonation of such huge delay, this Court is inclined to dismiss I.A.No.2 of 2025.

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Accordingly, I.A.No.2 of 2025 is hereby dismissed.

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W.A.No.845 of 2025

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Even on the merits also, on perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge, it appears that considering the resolution passed by the General Body of the appellant-Society on 27.06.2023 and also in the light of the common order passed by this Court in W.P.No.3255 of 2023 and batch dated 06.05.2024, wherein this Court upheld the power of the Society to enhance the age of superannuation from 60 to 62 years through the resolution made by the General Body in compliance with the other provisions of the Act and the

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