Gudimella Sandhya Vs State of a.P., Rep by Its Public Procecutor and 2 Anothers

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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MONDAY. THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF MARCH

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TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.769 of 2006

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Revision filed under Sections 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C, aggrieved by the Judgment dated 17-3-2006 made in C.C.No.343/2002 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District.

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Between:

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Gudimella Sandhya, W/o. G.L.N.V.Raghavan, aged about 29 years, R/o. D.No.31-16-33/1 Machavaram Down, Vijayawada, Krishna District.

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...Petitioner/P.W.1

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AND

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State of A.P. rep by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Amaravati, Through sub-inspector of Police, Eluru Women Police Station, Eluru, West Godavari District.

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Gudimella Lakshmi Narasimha Venkata Raghavan S/o. Late Avadanandan, aged about 34 years Junior assistant. District Panchayat Office, Gowravaram, Sanivarapu Peta Eluru, West Godavari District. (A-1)

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Smt. Gudimella Yathirajavali, W/o. Late Avadanandan, aged about 56 years, C/o. Gudimella Venkatacharyulu, R.R.Pet Eluru, West Godavari District. (A-2)

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...Respondents/Accused

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/

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Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri P Prabhakar Rao Counsel for Respondent No.1 : Public Prosecutor

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Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 & 3: Sri Turaga Sai Surya

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The Court made the following:

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f

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APHC010124402006

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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[3521]

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(Special Original Jurisdiction)

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MONDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO^ 769/2006

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Between:

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Gudimella Sandhya ...PETITIONER

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AND

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State Of A P Rep By Its Public Prosecutor And 2 Another ...RESPONDENT{S) and Others

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Counsel for the Petitioner:

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1.PPRABHAKARRAO

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

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2.TURAGA SAI SURYA

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THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

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This Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C’) against the order dated 17.03.2006 passed in C.C.No.343 of 2002^on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District (in short ‘the trial Court’) in acquitting the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (A1 and A2) for the alleged offence under Section 498(A)^ofthe Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘ the I.P.C.’) under Section^{248of‘theCr.P.C’.}

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Dr.YLR, Crl.R.CNo.769 of2006 Dated: 17.03.2025

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Heard Sri P.Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner. Ms.Akhila Naidu learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No. 1-State and Sri Turaga Sai Surya, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3.

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Sri P.Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the wife/defacto complainant before the trial Court. While reiterating the grounds of Revision, he argued that even though P.Ws1 to 5 categoncally supported the case of the prosecution, the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent Nos.2 and 3; the observations of the Civil Court in the matrimonial proceedings have to be understood in the limited context of disposal of the case and it is not decisive on the outcome of criminal case as the evidence in the criminal case alone, is to be considered- if the evidence of P.Ws1 to 3 are examined, it would constitute cruelty as defined under Section 498(A) of I.P.C.; P.W.1 deposed about the cruelty meted out to her and there was no cross examination to impeach the evidence of P.W.1. Therefore, it was sufficient to find the guilt of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 and urged to allow the Criminal Revision Case.

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Per Contra, Sri Turaga Sai Surya, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 argued that the learned trial Court having examined in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, rightly came to the conclusion that the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the accused beyon^asonable doubt

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/r

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Dr.YLRJ Crl.R.C.No.769 of 2006 Dated: 17.03.2025

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and therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly found^{therespondentNos.2and} 3 not guilty for the offence under Section 498(A) of^the I.P.C. He further submits that the Judgment of the learned Trial Court^{doesn’trequireany} interference on whatsoever grounds and urged to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case.

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Ms.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor^supportedthe arguments of learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2^{and3andurgedto} dismiss the Criminal Revision Case.

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Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments^advancedby the learned counsels on both sides. Perused the record. 7. Now the point for consideration is;

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“Whether the judgment in C.C.No.343 of 2002, dated 17.03.2006, passed by the learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, is correct, legal,^{andproperwith} respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and^thereareany material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed before the trial Court. 9. The marriage between P.W.1 and A1 was performed^{on19.05.1996in} the Rice Millers Convent School, Palakol, as per Hindu Rites and Caste Customs. At the time of marriage P.Ws2 and 3 gave Rs.46,000/to A1 towards Dowry, subsequently, P.W.1 joined with the^{A1toleadmaritallifeat} Eluru. After three months the A1 was transferred to^{Narsapur.A2andsister-}

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Dr.YLR,^ Crl.R.C.No.769 of2006 in-law of P.W.1 has been residing with them and Dated: 17.03.2025 during their wed lock, they blessed with a son. From the date of marriage, the accused started harassing P.W.1 saying that the dowry amount which was given was not sufficient and demanded to bring additional dowry amount from her parents houses and they used to harass P.W.1. They used to say that they would perform another marriage to A1, if P.W.1 fails to bring additional amount and they necked out P.W.1 from the house. Thereupon, she had qi given a complaint to police in Vijayawada, the police pacified the matter and sent her to A1 to lead marital life. A1 addicted to vices and used to come late in the night in a drunken Stage. When P.W.1 questioned the behavior A1 used to say that he developed illegal intimacy with one Mythili, who is his colleague. When P.W.1 questioned the same, A1 used to say that he will live with Mythili and asked her to go away. While that being so, A1 beat her and necked her out from the house. She sent P.Ws.2 and 3 to the accused with a request to take her back, but the accused refused. Accordingly to P.Ws. 2 and 3 also, the accused harassed P.W.1 and demanded dowry. She had gone to Police Station gave complaint, but the police refused to receive the complaint. Then, P.W.1 filed a private complaint before the Court as in Ex.P1 and upon receiving the same. this Court referred the S.H.O., for investigation and report. P.W.5 registered the same and issued Ex.P3 F.I.R. after completion of investigation, P.W.5 laid charge sheet against the accused. Therefore the prosecution contends that the accused are liable for the offences under Section 498(A) of I.P.C. as they harassed P.W.1.

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Dr.YLRJ Crl.R.C.No.769 of2006 Dated: 17.03.2025

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On perusal, this Court finds that to prove the guilt of the accused, prosecution examined P.Ws 1 to 5 and got marked Exs.P1^toP3andEx.DI is marked for the accused; the learned Trial Court by threadbare analyzed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses did not believe^the version of the prosecution and acquitted the respondent Nos.2 and 3, there were no misreading of evidence and there were no material irregularities . 11. In this connection, it is apposite to refer the Judgments^{oftheHon’ble} Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar^^wherein at

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Paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 it is held as under:

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“12. ...We have carefully considered the material on^record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justifiedⁱⁿ reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information^underSection 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall^bedeemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal^intooneof conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places^{alimitationon} the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it^fromconverta finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself^{indicativeofthe} nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court^couldnot convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering^are-trial. It is well settled bv a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor^advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional Jurisdiction may be Justified, but decisions^ofthisCourt have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional Jurisdiction

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^2002) 6 see 650

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Dr.YLR,0^ Crl.R.C.No.769 of2006 by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of CriminalDated: 17.03.2025 Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party.

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13.. ■■■ — absence of any legal infirmity nithe^r in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, therfi was no^ iustificafinn fnr the High Court to interfere in . ^ ^ gxerc/se of its revisional iurisdinfinn it has repeatedly been held that the High Court ahouM nnt ^ a findincj rliff^rent fmm th^ tri^i Court. In the absence ot manifest illedMv resulting in mscamaqe of justice, exem^e of revisinnol jurisdiction in ^ cases IS not warranted ”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla^ at Paragraph

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No. 10 held as under:

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“The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt, has no right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public Justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of Justice. This Jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.”

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AF^, at

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Paragraph No.7 held as under:

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'7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought ift to appeal; but this Jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of Justice. Sub section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of

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^AIR1951SC 196 ^AIR1962SC 1788

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Dr.YLR,J Crl.R.C.No.769 of 2006 Dated: 17.03.2025

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ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places^{limitationsonthe} power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal^inrevision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power^shouldbe exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover air contingencies.^We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which wouldⁱⁿ our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal In revision. These cases may be: where the trial court^hasno Jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence^which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial^courttobe inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is^invalidunder the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High^Courtcan justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an^{insuchacaseitis} obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court vi/as doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.”

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From the authoritative pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that this Court being a Revisional Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in the Revision filed by the defacto complainant.

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There was no misreading of the evidence in finding the revisionist guilty by the trial court and the Appellate Court. There are no perverse findings. The learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence and found the revisionist guilty for the offences charged. There are no grounds to interfere with the conviction.

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Dr.YLR, Crl.R.C.No.769 of2006 Dated: 17.03.2025 16. It is not out of place to mention that,here that P.W.1 and respondent No.1 filed H.M.O.P.No.83 of 2017, on the file of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Eluru, and the competent Civil Court granted decree of divorce on mutual consent. The petitioner filed an appeal in C.M.A.No.745 of 2018 on the file of this Court.

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The relevant paras of the Judgment in C.M.A.No.745 of 2018 ISi extracted hereunder:

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The order records in para-10, that the appellant received an amount of Rs.22,50,000/and Rs.50,000/from the respondent/husband in the presence of elders and she also reported that she had no objection to give divorce. The respondent/husban d also reported to the Court that he had no objection for divorce, as per the settlement between the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that terms and conditions of the agreement at page-28 of the appeal memo, are not compiled with.

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8 By the orders passed previously, the respondent was asked to file the affidavit.

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Learned counsel for the respondent submits that an affidavit has been filed, inter-alia submitting that the condition Nos 2 5 & 6 of the ■ agreement, dated 18.04.2017 said to have been not complied, because those conditions were dependent on the compliance of certain conditions by the wife, which she did not comply The wife/appellant had to withdraw the cases filed by her against the husband/respondent, but those cases are still pending, The respondent has also remarried after the decree of divorce on 26.11.2018.

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The appellant has filed the reply affidavit, inter-alia denyinq the contents of the affidavit of the respondent.

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On consideration of the submissions and on perusal of the record, we are of the view that the petition for divorce i/i/as filed by the appellant/wife. The same ivas decreed, based on the submissions advanced before the learned Court. Some compromise i/zas entered between the parties out of the Court. However, the compromise' was

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not filed before the Court in the proceedings. Any^{verificationofthe} compromise did not take place. The wife however, received^some benefit of Rs.23,00,000/-. Consequently we are of the view that filing of the appeal to set aside the divorce decree alleging^{theviolationof} some of the terms and conditions of the agreement/compromise cannot be maintainable. The learned counsel for the appellant has not advanced any argument so as to challenging the decree on merits. The entire effort of the wife is to get compliance^ofthesaid agreement/compromise, out of Court, of the allegedly violated conditions. In other words, the appeal appears to have^beenfiledfor implementation of the compromise, not even brought^before the learned Court. It is not so permissible in this appeal.

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The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed, however, leaving it open for the appellant to seek such other relief, as may be open, before the appropriate forum of law.

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