V.Santosh Kumar Vs v.Maniratnam

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APHC010049552019

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B^0 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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FRIDAY, THE TWENTY NINETH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 187 OF 2019

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Revision filed under Section 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C., against the impugned speaking orders dated 27-12-2016 passed in M.P.131/2016 in F.C.O.P. No.934/2016 on the file of the Family Judge Court -cum-^{VAdditionalDistrict} Judge, Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam District.

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Between:

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Virothu Santosh Kumar @ Santosh, S/o. Viswanadham, Hindu, aged about 24 years, W/as Subedhar, Boxing Coach Trainer, Netaji Subhash National Institute of Sports (NIS), Old Moti Bagh, Patiala, Pubjab - 147001.

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...Petitioner

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AND

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Virothu Maniratnam @ Priyanka, W/o. Vuirothu Santosh Kumar @ Santosh, D/o. Vankayala Maruthi Prasad, Hindu, aged 19 years. Household Wife, Resident at # 14-199/1, Swatantranagar, opp. Government hospital, Madhurawada, Visakhapatnam.

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The State of Andhra Pradesh., Represented by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravathi.

...Respondents

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lA NO: 1 OF 2019

Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying that^{inthecircumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay of all further proceeding sin FCOP.^{934/2016onthefileofthe} Family Court-cum-V Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam including personal appearance of the petitioner before the lower court pending disposal of the Criminal Revision Case.

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lA NO: 2 OF 2019

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Between:

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Virothu Maniratnam @ Priyanka, W/o. Vuirothu Santosh Kumar @ Santosh, aged 21 years, Occ; Housewife, Resident at Flat No.304, Padmaja Pride, Beside BSNL Office, Kommadi Junction, Madhurawada, Visakhapatnam District.

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...Petitioner/Respondent No.1

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AND

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Virothu Santosh Kumar @ Santosh, S/o. Viswanadham, aged about 28 years. Working in Indian Army, Native of D.No. 19-284,^SaiMadhava Nagar, Naidu Thota, Vegapunta, Visakhapatnam District.

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...Respondent/Petitioner

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The State of Andhra

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Pradesh., Represented by its Public Prosecutor, High^{CourtofAndhra} Pradesh, Amaravathi.

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...Respondent/Respondent No.2

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Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying that^{inthecircumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be

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s-f

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pleased to vacate the interim orders dt 22-02-2019 in I.A. No.1/2019 in CrI.R.C. 187/2019 on the file of this Hon’ble Court.

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Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Shaik Mohammed Ismail (Legal Aid)

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Counsel for the Respondent No.1: Sri T D Pani Kumar

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Counsel for the Respondent No.2: Public Prosecutor

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The Court made the following order:

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HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.187 of 2019

Between;

V.Santosh Kumar

...PETITIONER

AND

1- V.Maniratnam

The State Of Ap Rep By Its PP Hyd

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...RESPODENT

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DATE OF ORDER PRO.NOUNCED

9Q OQ omc

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SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

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Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No

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Whether the copy of Judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

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Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No

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/

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3

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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

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t CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.187 of 2niQ

% 29.08.2025

Between:

Between:

V.Santosh Kumar

...PETITIONER

AND

I- V.Maniratnam 2. The State Of Ap Rep. By Its PP Hyd

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...RESPODENT

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! Counsel for the Petitioners : Ismail, Legal Aid ''Cou.nse! for the .Respondent : T.D.Phani Kum^-

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< Gist:

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The Order of the Court was delivered by

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Dr. Justice Y.Lakshmana Rao For the convenience of exposition,

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this order is divided into the following parts :

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A. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION

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B. CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

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C. ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE

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D. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION

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E. ANALYSIS

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F. CONCLUSION

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Head Note:

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4

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? Cases referred:

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1. (2021) 2 see 324

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1. (1978)4 see 70

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1. (1975) 2 see 386

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1. (2008) 2 see 316

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1. (2014) 1 see 188

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1. Tr.erl.P.No.180 of 2014 and batch held on 20.10.2014

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1. erl.R.e.No.1522 of 2012 dated 02.05.2025

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1. 1987 Supreme (Ori) 211

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1. 2025 Supreme (HP) 788

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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 187/?niq

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ORDER:

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Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27.12.2016 in M.P.No.131/2006 in O.P.No.934/2016 on the file of the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-V Additional District and Sessions, Visakhapatnam (for short the Trial Court’). 2. As there was no representation on behalf of the Petitioner on 12.08.2025, the matter was adjourned and posted for dismissal on 19.08.2025. However, even on 19.08.2025, when the case was listed for dismissal, there was no representation for the Petitioner. Mr. Ismail learned Counsel was requested to assist this Court as legal aid counsel for the Petitioner. The Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee was directed to issue necessary proceedings in this regard.

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Contentions of the learned I eqal Aid Counsel for tho

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Mr. Ismail, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner is a native of Visakhapatnam Andhra Pradesh, and a decorated athlete, having won a Gold Medal in the Youth Commonwealth Games and a Sliver Medal in the 16'^ Asian Games held in China. In recognition of his achievements, he was appointed as Naik Subedar (JC-309978P) and subsequently promoted to Subedar, currently posted in Haryana for training towards upcoming National and Olympic Games. It is due to his service

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Obligations and national representation, his physical presence before the learned Family Court at Visakhapatnam is not feasible,

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The present Criminal Revision Case pertains solely to F.C.O.P.934/2016 filed by the first respondent under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ along with M.P.131/2016 seeking interim maintenance of Rs.25,000/per month. The learned Trial Court passed a Docket Order dated 27-12-2016 granting Rs. 10,000/- per month as interim maintenance. The petitioner submits that the said Docket Order was not a formal, signed decree and hence not enforceable in law. Inspite of this, the first respondent filed I.A.2295/2017 seeking for recovery of arrears and issuance of arrest warrant, which petition was allowed by the learned Trial Court on 23-07-2018, treating the Docket O rc! 0 r f^ r ^ r:* H |

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The conversion of the Docket Order into a Speaking Order and its signing by the successor Presiding Officer. Smt. K. Sai Ramadevi on behalf of her predecessor, is contrary to Order XX Rule 8 of ‘the C.P.C.,’ which permits such signing only where the judgment was pronounced but the decree remained unsigned. In the present case, no formal judgment or decree was pronounced by the predecessor. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the issuance of Non-Bailable Warrant dated 11-09-2018 despite filing a memo citing his military service obligations. was arbitrary and unwarranted. The execution of the NBW and sentencing to 15 days’ imprisonment on 06-10-2018 was unjustified, especially in light of the disputed enforceability of the underlying order. ’

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The Petitioner’s bail application (CrI.M.P.74/2018) was dismissed solely on the ground of alleged wilful default, without appreciating the legal infirmity in the original order and the petitioner’s service constraints. Aggrieved by the procedural irregularities and judicial overreach, the petitioner made a representation to the Registrar (Vigilance), Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, seeking inquiry into the conduct of the Presiding Officer. The Registrar advised the petitioner to pursue legal remedies on the judicial side.

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Considering the above, the Petitioner submits that the Docket Order dated 27-12-2016 is not a valid and enforceable one. Its conversion into a Speaking Order and execution thereof is legally untenable.^{Theissuanceof} NBW and subsequent imprisonment violates principles of natural justice. The learned Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted contrary to settled legal procedure. Hence, the impugned orders are liable to^besetaside.

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Arguments of the learned Counsel for Respondent No.1:

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Sri T.D.Pani Kumar, learned Counsel for the Respondent^No.1submits that the interim maintenance order dated 27-12-2016, though issued as a Docket Order, was passed by a competent Family Court after considering the merits of the case and the financial needs of the Respondent^{No.1.Theformat} of the order does not diminish its legal enforceability, especially when it clearly records the judicial intent and direction. The subsequent^conversion of the Docket Order into a Speaking Order by the successor Presiding Officer was a procedural clarification and did not alter the substance of the original decision.

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Such conversion is permissible and does not violate^{OrderXXRule8of‘the} C.P.C.,’ as the order was already pronounced and acted^upon. 9. The Petitioner’s claim of service obligations preventing his appearance before the learned Family Court cannot be accepted^{asavalidexcusefornon-} compliance with a lawful order. While his military^service is commendable, it does not exempt him from his legal responsibilities^{towardshisspouse.The} Petitioner had ample opportunity to seek exemption^or adjournment through proper legal channels but failed to do so. His continued^{defaultinpaymentof} interim maintenance, despite being aware of the order, amounts to wilful disobedience, warranting coercive action under Section 125(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ 10. The issuance of the Non-Bailable Warrant and the subsequent sentencing to 15 days' imprisonment were Inwfij! end^propodionate roc to the Petitioner’s persistent non-compliance. The^{TrialCourtactedwithin} its jurisdiction and followed due process before passing these orders. The Petitioner’s bail application was rightly dismissed, as the default was not only wilful but also continued despite repeated opportunities to comply. Allegations of judicial overreach and procedural irregularities^{areunfoundedandappearto} be an attempt to deflect attention from the Petitioner’s failure to fulfil his obligations. The Respondent No.1, being the legally^wedded spouse, is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’^which is a welfare provision designed to protect dependents from destitution.^The Petitioner’s decorated status and national representation, while^{admirable,cannotoverride} the statutory duty to provide for his spouse. The Respondent has been

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compelled to seek legal remedies due to the Petitioner’s persistent default, and the orders passed by the learned Trial Court were necessary to uphold the rule of law and ensure justice.

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Considering the above submissions, the learned Counsel for Respondent No.1 prays that the Criminal Revision Petition be dismissed as devoid of merit and that the Petitioner be directed to comply with the maintenance order and clear the arrears without further delay. Arguments of ;

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On the other hand, Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material available. There was no flagrant miscarriage of justice. There were no perverse fifidings. There was no irregularity iet aione material irreguianty.i l he order impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or procedure which had resulted-in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order doesn’t suffer from any iltegality'or infirmity. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the criminal revision case.

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Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.

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Point for consideration-

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Now the point for consideration is:

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"Whether the order in M..PNo. 131 of 2006 in O.RNo.934 of 2016 ated 27.12.2025, passed by the learned Judge, Family Courtcum-V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding or judgment and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?”

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Analysis:

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Having heard the learned Legal Aid Counsel for the PetHoner, the learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, and upon perusal of the material placed on record, this Court is of the benign and considered view that the Criminal Revision Petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. The factum of marriage in betvi./een the Petitioner and Respondent No.1 is not in dispute. The Respondent No.1 contends that the Petitioner neglected and refused to maintain the Respondent No.1. The Respondent No.1 is unable to maintain herself as she has no avocation or occupation. She is aiso not in a position to gain any employment to feed herself. The Respondent No.1 contends that the Petitioner is gai! iTuily Ofv-f«Tipioyed and working as Subedar. The principal contention raised by the Petitioner pertains to the enforceability of the Docket Order dated 27-12-2016, granting interim maintenance under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.' It is contended that the said order not being a formal decree, is unenforceable in law. However, this Court finds that the said order was passed by a competent Family Court after due consideration of the pleadings and financial circumstances and clearly reflects judicial intent. The subsequent conversion of the Docket Order into a Speaking Order by the successor Presiding Officer was a procedural act aimed at clarity^anddoes not vitiate the substance or legality of the original order. 16. In this regard it is apposite to refer to Order XX Rule 8 of ‘the C.P.C’: “Rule 8: Procedure where Judge has vacated office before signing decree - Where a Judge has vacated office after pronouncing judgment but without signing the decree, a decree -drawn up in accordance with such judgment may

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be signed by his successor or, if the Court has ceased to exist, by the Judge of any Court to which such Court was subordinate. ”

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On a careful study of Order XX Rule 8 of ‘the C.P.C’ it could be gleaned that if a decree is not signed by the judge who pronounced the judgment, such decree may be drawn up as per the judgment and the decree will be signed by the successor judge. In the instant case, as seen from^{therecordtheearlier} presiding officer himself in his own handwriting passed^{thedocketorder.} It is as good as the order or judgment. Therefore, Order^{XXRule8of‘theC.P.C’} cannot made be applicable to this case. The Petitioner’s^{relianceonOrderXX} Rule 8 of ‘the C.P.C’ is misplaced, as the said provision applies to judgments pronounced but not signed, whereas in the present case, as mentioned supra the interim maintenance order was a docket order written by the then presiding officer of the Family Court, which is competent to pass order. granting interim maintenance and it was already operative and acted upon. The contention that the successor Presiding Officer lacked authority to sign on the computer type written order is untenable considering settled judicial practice and the inherent powers of the Court to clarify^andformalize its own directions. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the interim maintenance order, despite being aware of its existence and having had sufficient opportunity to seek exemption or modification, amounts^{towilfuldefault.} His military service conditions, while acknowledged with due regard, do not absolve him of his statutory responsibilities towards his spouse, especially under a welfare provision i.e.. Section 125 of ‘the^Cr.P.C.

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The issuance of the Non-Bailable Warrant and the sentencing^ofthe Petitioner to 15 days’ imprisonment were consequences of persistent noncompliance and were preceded by adequate opportunity to remedy the default. The learned Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction. It had followed settled due process of law. The dismissal of the Petitioner's bail application was based on a finding of wilful default and cannot be faulted for lack of judicial appreciation. Allegations of procedural irregularity and judicial overreach are not only speculative but also unsupported by the record. The representation made to the Registrar (Vigilance) does not change the legal position. The advice offered by the Registrar (Vigilance) to pursue remedies on the judicial side was appropriate.

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-1 o \A/;thV I w nV,; CiO rW +i. ^ hk> C* w , 'w' !! ici!! iiGnsnCG to the WiVeS who csTe entitled for such relief the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments laid down the parameters and considerations for grant of maintenance. In Rajnesh v. Neha\ at paragraph No. 1.11 it is held as under:

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“111. The rationale of granting maintenance from the date of application finds its roots in the object of enacting maintenance legislations, so as to enable the wife to overcome the financial crunch which occurs on separation from the husband. Financial constraints of a dependent spouse hamper their capacity to be effectively represented before the court. In order to prevent a dependant from being reduced to destitution, it is necessary that maintenance is awarded from the date on which the application for maintenance is filed before the court concerned.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena

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KaushaP, at paragraph No.14 it is held as under:

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“9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of

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’ (2021) 2 see 324

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2 (1978) 4 see 70

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Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt^{thatsectionsof} statutes calling for construction by courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and^children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause — the cause of the derelicts. ”

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi ^, at

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paragraph No. 19 it is held as under:

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“19. The object of these provisions being to prevent vagrancy and destitution, the Magistrate has to find out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for such moderate living can be fairly determined, only if her separate income, also, is taken into account together with the earnings of the husband and his commitments."

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22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai"*, at paragraph No.6

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it is held as under:

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“6. The object of the maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support^{themselvesandwho} have a moral claim to support. The phrase “unable to^{maintainherself’inthe} instant case would mean that means available to the deserted wife while she w/as living with her husband and would not take within^{itselftheeffortsmade} by the wife after desertion to survive somehow. Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [(1978) 4 SCC 70 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1978 SC 1807] falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter^{tothedesertedwife.} It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties^{ofamantomaintainhis} wife, children and parents when they are unable to^{maintainthemselves.The} aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787: (2005) 2 Supreme 503]."

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse®, at

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paragraph No. 13.3 it is held as under:

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^(1975) 2 see 386 ■’(2008) 2 see 316 '(2014) 1 see 188

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“13.3.Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation^{needstobegiven} to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with^{theapplicationofa} destitute wife or hapless children or parents under^{thisprovision,theCourtis} dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose Is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional^vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble^{totheConstitutionof} India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic^{pathundertherule} of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its^{citizens,justice,} liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights^{achievingtheirsocialjustice.} Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts^{toadvancethecause} of the social justice. While giving interpretation^{toaparticularprovision,the} court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law^{andsociety.”}

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The docket proceedings and orders are to be considered^sacrosanct. In Madapuram Maddileti Naidu v. State of A.P® a learned^{SingleJudgeofthis} Court and also in Penumatsa Vasundhara v. Penumatsa Neelakantha Bangar Raju^ this Court also held that the docket proceedings^{aresacrosanct} and unchallengeable. They could not speak falsehood.^{Theyareasgoodand} valid as orders passed by the Courts in a prescribed format. The orders written by a presiding officer either in his own handwriting^{ortypedandsigned} by him are perfectly valid and enforceable. In the instant case also on 26.07.2016, the then presiding officer of the learned^{TrialCourtissuednotice} to the Petitioner herein and posted on 01.08.2016.^{OnthatdateRespondent} No.1 was called present, and Petitioner herein was^{calledabsent.Adirection} was issued to serve notice on Petitioner through Court and registered post and posted to 03.09.2016. On 03.09.2016, Respondent^{No.1waspresent,} and Petitioner was called absent. Whereas there was an endorsement by the Bench Clerk, “Notice to Respondent not yet returned”.^{Atthispointoftime,the} Court has got two options: one is awaiting service of notice on the

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®Tr.CrLP.No.180 of 2014 and batch held on 20.10.2014

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" Crl.R.C.No.1522 of 2012 dated 02.05.2025

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Respondent, and the second one is either to proceed for passing orders or posting to some other day for passing orders. However, it was mentioned in the docket proceedings that Smt. K.P offered to come on record. For counter the matter was posted on 05.10.2016. On 05.10.2016 Petitioner was present, Respondent was called absent. No counter was filed. The case was adjourned to 13.11.2016 as the presiding officer was on leave. On 13.11.2016 V.V.N.M and Smt. K.P came on record. Case was posted for counter and hearing^on 02.12.2016. On 02.12.2016 counter was not filed by the Respondents therein, The learned presiding officer heard both sides and posted the matter for orders on 27.12.2016. On 27.12.2016, the then presiding officer passed a reasoned docket in his own handwriting.

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The then learned presiding officer passed the impugned order on 27.12.2016, and it is extracted as under;

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Pe«/oneA was sent to her parents house in July 2015 durina

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per

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Indeed, second proviso of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.,’ empowers the learned Presiding Officer/Trial Court to pass interim maintenance either exparte or after hearing of both parties. Such order is perfectly maintainable, valid and well enforceable, be that a docket order in the own handwriting of

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the then learned presiding officer or an order in a regular prescribed format in

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type writing.

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A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Orissa in Biswanath Kabi

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V. Susama Dei^, at paragraph No.7, with regard to passing ex-parte interim

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order, it is held as under;

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“7A plan interpretation of Sub-section (2) of Section 126 has been made in Smt. Suiochana Sahu v. Baman Ch. Sahu 1987 (1) O.L.R. 558, the relevant part of which is quoted below for easy reference: Thus, the sum and substance of the principal of law is that if the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte. Before proceeding to hear and determine the case ex parte, a specific order has to be recorded by the Magistrate to the effect that the persons against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court.”

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A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Simla

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. \ i: i o V nstiel o Od V. Poonam 3ood° al parayiapr) No.io, with regard to

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passing of ex-parte interim order of maintenance, it is held as under;

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“18. It was further held that if the other party refuses to accept the notice, an inference can be drawn that he was willfully avoiding the service. It was observed:“5. As provided under S. 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is duty-bound to inform the person against whom the claim of maintenance is made to enable him to appear and contest the same. The Magistrate will further record evidence in the presence of that person if he puts in his appearance but the Magistrate cannot compel him if he chooses not to appear and contest the claim against him. In these circumstances, the Magistrate is at liberty to proceed ex parte but after satisfying himself that the person against whom the claim of maintenance is made is wilfully avoiding sen/ice or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court. The avoiding of service or failure to attend the Court should be deliberate. The perusal of the provision shows that the Magistrate is not required to record his satisfaction in his order and failure to do so will not vitiate the proceedings. On the other hand, it is always better if such a satisfaction of the Magistrate is explicit in his order. If not, it should be discernible from the facts and circumstances on the record to hold the ex-parte proceedings valid.)

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" 1987Supreme{0ri) 211

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^2025Supreme(HP) 788

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in spite of granting three ample opportunities for filing counter, the Petitioner herein had not chosen to file counter. Hence the learned Presiding Officer was constrained to post the case for orders on 27.12.2016 after hearing both sides on 02.12.2016. For nearly three months the Petitioner herein had not filed counter.

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Conclusion:

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This Court finds no manifest error of law or procedure in the impugned orders. The learned Trial Court's findings are neither perverse nor arbitrary, and the orders passed are in consonance with the statutory framework and judicial precedents. The Respondent No.1, being the legally wedded spouse, is entitled to maintenance, and the Petitioner’s status cannot be a ground to evade legal obligations. In view of the foregoing discussion and the absence of any compelling ground warranting interference this Court finds no merit in the Criminal Revision Petition. 31. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

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As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand

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closed.

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Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR

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//TRUE COPY//

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0 SECTION OFFICER

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One Fair Copy to the Hon’ble DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA^RAO (For his Lordship’s Kind Perusal)