Allowed

Muppalaneni Seshagiri Rao, v. Government of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh HC17 Jun 2024WP/1461/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Writ petitions sought quashing of an FIR registered under the SC/ST Act and IPC sections alleging land occupation. The court found the FIR lacked specific allegations attracting the statutory ingredients, noted no such co-operative society existed on revenue records, held the criminal proceedings were abuse of process converting a civil dispute into criminal, and allowed the writ petitions.

What did the court decide?

FIR No.179 of 2011 dated 30.12.2011 quashed as far as the petitioners are concerned; miscellaneous applications closed; no costs.

Muppalaneni Seshagiri Rao, Vs Government of Andhra… — Caste Atrocities | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

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HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

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WRIT PETITION Nos.2333 and 1461 of 2012

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COMMON ORDER :

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Both the Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief:-

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“to issue an order direction or writ more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring that registration and continuance proceedings in FIR No.179 of 2011 on the file of 3^rd respondent against the petitioners is contrary to law and abuse of process and consequently quash the said proceedings and pass such other order or orders … … .”

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Since the facts and issue involved in both the Writ Petitions, I find it expedient to decide these matters by a Common Order.

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The petitioners in both the writ petitions are shown as Accused in Crime No.179 of 2011, dated 30.12.2011. 4^th respondent is the complainant. Basing on private complaint vide C.F.R.No.9652 of 2011 forwarded by the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Bapatla, to the 3^rd respondent, a case in Crime No.179 of 2011 has been registered against the petitioners alleging commission of offence under Section 3(i)(iv)(v) of Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short “SC and ST Act’) and Section 204, 383, 420 and 441 of IPC.

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The precise case of the petitioners is that they have landed properties, purchased under various registered sale deeds. Since their date of purchase, they have been in physical possession and enjoyment of the same. The father of the one of the petitioners by name Venkateswarlu was elected

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as Member of Legislative Assembly from Bapatla constituency and subsequently elected as Member of Parliament from Tenali Constituency. The 4^th respondent with an intention to defame the family of the petitioners, got filed a false report to the 3^rd respodnent alleging that they have occupied the lands of Adi Andhra Tenants Co-operative Society, Marripudi through one Y. Moses Raju of Bapatla. The 4^th respondent filed W.P.No. 8694 of 2010 before this Court, questioning the inaction of the 3^rd respondent in not registering the crime against the petitioners and the same was dismissed dated 13.12.2011 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing a private complaint. Thereupon, the 4^th respondent filed private complaint, vide CFR No. 9652 of 2011 on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Bapatla against the petitioners and others. Further the Tahsildar initiated proceedings under Section 3 of A.P.Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1977 and the revision petitions are being pending before the Joint Collector, Guntur. Even in the said proceedings, it is not claimed by the revenue authorities that the said land was assigned to the Maripudi Adi Andhra Tenants Co-operative Society, West Bapatla. Therefore very initiation of the proceedings by the 4^th respondent is vitiated by malice and personal vendetta. The judicial process is being misused by the 4^th respondent and that the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed.

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Heard Mr. A. Srikanth Reddy and Mr. Srinivasa Rao Bodduluri learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Assistant Government

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Pleader, Home for the respondents 1 to 3/ police and learned counsel for the

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4^th respondent.

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During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated the contents urged in the writ petition and mainly contended that even if the allegations in the complaint are taken to be true, still there is no offence made out under Section 3(1)(iv)(v) of ‘SC and ST Act’. For such offence the sine quo is that the land from which the dispossession, occupation, transferred or prevented from cultivation takes places must be owned/ allotted/ notified to be allotted to the member of a Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe. In the complaint, no such allegation is made out. Further except referring Section 204, 383 and 420 of IPC, there are no such allegations in the complaint and taking the allegations to be true, no complaint under the said provisions can be registered and investigated. Similarly, the alleged act of occupation even as per complaint is in the year 1970 and it cannot be subject matter of enquiry and investigation in the year 2011. Therefore, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed on this count alone.

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Whereas, learned counsel for the 4^th respondent placed on record the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Another”¹ , wherein it was referred the case in “ State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, where in it was stated that if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. Further in

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1 (2012) 9 SCC 460

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“J.P.Sharma v. Vinod Kumar Jain and Others”² , where in it was held as

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follows:

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“52. We are not concerned with the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint, that would be investigated at the time of the trial. In that view of the matter we are unable to sustain the order under appeal. We make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merit of the charge and the complaint would be investigated in accordance with law and the accused persons would be entitled to prove before the court that no charge has been made out against them and they should be acquitted of the charges. But at this stage under inherent power of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in our opinion, in the background and circumstances of this case the court should not have used the extraordinary power. In the premises, the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment quashing the proceedings are set aside.”

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8. Further in “Ghanshyam Sharma v. Surendra Kumar Sharma and

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Others”³ , where in it was held as follows:

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“8. Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not is a matter of evidence. The fact that the police chose to file a charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the offences for which the respondentaccused are to be tried. The trial court can always frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the report of the police available before it. In case where the material is insufficient to frame a charge, the trial court may either discharge the accused or may direct further investigation in the matter. Before deciding as to which one of the three courses of action mentioned above is to be resorted to, the trial court must examine the content of the complaint, the evidence fathered by the investigating agency and also scrutinize whether the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction”.

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9. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ

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petitions in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court referred above and hence requested to dismiss the writ petitions.

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Perused the record.

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2 (1986) 3 SCC 67

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3 (2014) 13 SCC 401

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11. In “Sri Gulam Mustafa v. The State of Karnataka and Another⁴ ”,

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wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-

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26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

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4 Criminal Appeal No.1452 of 2023 (SC), dated 10.05.2023

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29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336, at Para 7 thereof, it was held that when the complaint fails to disclose any criminal offence, the proceeding is liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code:

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“In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 Code which it has erroneously refused.” (emphasis supplied)

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31. In Vinod Natesan v State of Kerala, (2019) 2 SCC 401, this Court took the position outlined hereunder:

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“11. … Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of the accused and a civil dispute is tried to be converted into a criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)

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Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that there was no insult or intimidation with an intent to humiliate in a place within public view and there is no allegation that the petitioners in the FIR and without having the ingredient of intentional insult the petitioners should not be prosecuted under the provisions of the SC and ST (POA) Act, 2015 and more

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over, there is no whisper in the complaint that the petitioners have insulted him with her caste for humiliating her and without alleging the same, the petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offence. Therefore, requested to quash the FIR.

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As could be seen from the FIR, there are no specific allegations against the petitioners herein attracting the section of law. Further a perusal of the District Collector’s Report vide letter addressed to the Secretary, A.P.State Human Rights Commission, dated 03.11.2010, it is clearly mentioned that there is no such Co-operative Society on the name of “ The Marripadu Adi Andhra Tenant Co-operative Society” of West Bapatla Village and the same was certified by the Assistant General Manager, GDCCB Ltd., Guntur. As per the Revenue Record, no land was allotted to the said Society and hence the contents of the petition are also false”. It clearly vitiated that no land was allotted to the said society. Further, the petitioners have produced relevant records to prove their title over the subject land that they have purchased under various registered sale deeds under valid consideration. Therefore, question of disputing title does not arise.

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Upon perusal of the material available on record, it is made clear that the ingredients of Section of law in the FIR does not attract against the petitioners. Further the respondents have failed to explain the exact reasons, how the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted as per aforesaid section of law. Under these circumstances and following the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited supra, this Court clarify that in no manner, are to dilute the

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applicability of special statutes, but only to remain the police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position. If the allegations are to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the petitioners. It appears that there the respondents/ police committed abuse of process of law in the matter. Further, this Court observed that there is no direct evidence or statements against the petitioners with regard to alleged allegations make out in the complaint by the 4^th respondent. Under the aforementioned circumstances, the petitioners are entitled to claim the relief as prayed for.

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Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are allowed by a Common Order, while quashing the FIR No.179 of 2011, dated 30.12.2011 of the 3^rd respondent for the petitioners herein are concerned. There shall be no order as to costs.

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The miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand closed.

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Date: 18.06.2024 KK

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______________________________ DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

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HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

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WRIT PETITION Nos.2333 and 1461 of 2012

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