Dismissed

Mallu Jayaramireddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh HC22 Jan 2024WA/1144/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appellants whose land was acquired for the Somasila project in 1980 challenged dismissal of their writ petition seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, filed decades later. The Division Bench held Tukaram Kana Joshi did not bar dismissal on delay and laches and dismissed the appeal, finding no explanation for the 40-year delay.

What the court decided

AI extract

Mallu Jayaramireddy Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh — Land Acquisition | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI

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HON‟BLE MR.JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE & HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

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WRIT APPEAL No.1144 of 2023

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Mallu Jayaramireddy, S/o Narasimha Reddy, Aged about 68 years, Occ: Agriculture, R/o Eguvavakamada (Vil), Gopavaram Mandal, Y.S.R. Kadapa District and others.

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... Appellants

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Versus

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The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Water Resources Department, Secretariat, Velagapudi, Amaravati, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh State and others.

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…Respondents

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Mr.Ch. C. Krishna Reddy, Counsel for the appellants.

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Government Pleader for Irrigation & CAD, for respondent No.1.

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Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, for respondent Nos.2 and 3.

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DATE : 23.01.2024

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PER DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ (Oral):

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The present Letters Patent Appeal is preferred against the

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judgment and order, dated 30.09.2020, passed in W.P. No.22483 of

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HCJ & RRR, J 2 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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By virtue of the judgment and order impugned, the Writ Petition has been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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Briefly stated, the material facts are that land of the petitioners/appellants herein came to be acquired for the Somasila project and an Award bearing No.26/79-80, dated 10.03.1980, came to be passed. While the petitioners received the compensation amount under protest, yet it is stated that an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short „the Act‟) was filed seeking reference to the Court. This application is stated to have been filed on 08.04.1980.

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The grievance of the writ petitioners before the learned single Judge was that despite having filed an application as far back as on 08.04.1980, respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the writ petition i.e., the Special Collector (Land Acquisition) and the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Somasila Project, did not refer the matter for determination in terms of Section 18 of the Act, which action was thus illegal and unwarranted and in those circumstances, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus for directing the respondents to refer the matter to the civil Court for its consideration in accordance with law.

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HCJ & RRR, J 3 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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In the counter-affidavit, the stand of the official respondents was that no applications under Section 18 of the Act were filed and signed by the original awardees and that a bunch of applications were filed by a single person on behalf of other interested persons without carrying the signatures of the original awardees. It was therefore sought to be emphasized that the Section 18 applications were not recorded in the relevant register of the office of the Collector (Land Acquisition) and therefore, no reference was made. Apart from this, the stand of the official respondents was that the petition was an afterthought inasmuch as the same was filed more than 40 years after the passing of the Award in question.

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The learned single Judge, by virtue of the judgment and order impugned, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. A review petition then came to be filed seeking review of the said judgment and order by placing overwhelming reliance upon the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation¹ to bring home the point that since the writ petition pertained to a matter concerning land acquisition, the same could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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1 (2013) 1 SCC 353

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HCJ & RRR, J 4 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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The said review petition, however, was also dismissed by virtue of the order, dated 15.06.2023, by holding that reference to the judgment in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) was not apt inasmuch as the facts involved therein were quite different.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records on file.

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Learned counsel for the appellants would reiterate the assertions made before the learned single Judge and also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi. In the aforestated case, the land of the petitioners was notified for acquisition vide notification, dated 06.06.1964, in terms of Section 4 of the Act for an industrial development project. No subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter and the acquisition proceedings had elapsed. The predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, being illiterate and unaware of their rights, were persuaded by the authorities to handover possession of the said land. The authorities subsequently realizing that injustice had been done to the appellants, issued a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act, dated 14.05.1981. However, no further proceedings under the Act were initiated and lapsed in due course leaving the appellants before the Apex Court bereft of any compensation, notwithstanding the fact that

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HCJ & RRR, J 5 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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continuous efforts were made by the said appellants in that regard. A writ petition was filed in the Bombay High Court in the year 2009, which came to be dismissed on the ground of delay as also on account of non-availability of certain documents. The Apex Court, in those circumstances, reiterated the principle of law that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion and has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of a particular case and that the High Court could interfere in spite of the delay, if the demand for justice was compelling. It was also held that in such cases, discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to be defeated and that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice must prevail. It was also held that the appellants had been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century and that they had been seriously discriminated qua others whose lands were also acquired but compensation was paid.

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On a reading of the aforementioned judgment rendered in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi, it cannot be inferred that the Apex Court had laid down the ratio that a petition cannot be dismissed on account of laches in every case where the issue was one pertaining to acquisition of land. However, the judgment is quite clear that the issue of delay and laches has to be considered in the facts and

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HCJ & RRR, J 6 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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circumstances of every case that are placed before a Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned single Judge did not commit any mistake in holding that the ratio in the judgment in Tukaram Kana Joshi would not be of any assistance to the petitioners‟ case. In fact, the learned Single Judge rightly held that there had to be some explanation on record by the petitioners to explain the delay and that there was no explanation at all much less an explanation which could be called as sufficient for overcoming the hindrance in entertaining the petition on account of delay and laches.

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In fact , in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v.

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M. Meiyappan² , it was held:

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“13. At the outset, we must state that on the facts of this case, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. In our opinion, the writ petition must fail on the short ground that the writ petition had been filed 16 years after the award was announced by the Collector. It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. If there is such negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner to assert his right which, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party, the High Court must refuse to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner.”

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2 (2010) 14 SCC 309

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HCJ & RRR, J 7 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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In the case of Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India³ , a

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Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held:

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"32. ....we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay."

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The aforementioned observations made by the Apex Court, although made in the context of Article 32 of the Constitution, were held to be applicable to even petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution as per the ratio of the judgment in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai (supra).

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Considering the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the judgments mentioned above, it can be seen that there is no explanation given as to why it took the petitioners 40 years to approach this Court after having allegedly filed the application under Section 18 of the Act as early as in the year 1980, notwithstanding the fact that the said application is stated to have

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3 (1970) 1 SCC 84

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HCJ & RRR, J 8 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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been ineffective as not having been signed by the original claimants. In our opinion, the view expressed by the learned single Judge calls for no interference. The Appeal is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

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Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.

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DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J

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AKN

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HCJ & RRR, J 9 W.A.No.1144 of 2023

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227

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HON‟BLE MR.JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE