Allowed

V.Adinarayana Reddy, Kadapa Dist. v. Secy. Agrl. Coop. Dept. Hyd and 6 Others

Andhra Pradesh HC12 Sept 2023WP/26773/2010

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by a dismissed government employee challenging his dismissal order. The Court held that relying solely on a preliminary enquiry report without disclosing it to the petitioner for cross-examination violated natural justice, rendering the dismissal order unsustainable.

What did the court decide?

The Writ Petition was allowed, setting aside the order of the Administrative Tribunal, the disciplinary authority, and the appellate authority. Respondents directed to extend consequential benefits wi

V.Adinarayana Reddy, Kadapa Dist. Vs… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Andhra Pradesh HC (2023)

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HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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WRIT PETITION NO.26773 OF 2010

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Between:-

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V.Adinarayana Reddy, S/o.Subbi Reddy, Aged about 65 years, Occ: Secretary Grade-II, (Dismissed from service), Agricultural Market Committee, Jammalamadugu, Kadapa District.

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Versus

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The Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep by its Secretary, Agriculture and Cooperation(V.C.H) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and 6 others.

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… Respondents ****

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DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 12.09.2023

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SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI &

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

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1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment?	Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals?	Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment?	Yes/No

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__________________________ JUSTICE A V SESHA SAI

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____________________________ R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J

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*** THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI**

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

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+ WRIT PETITION NO.26773 OF 2010

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% 12.09.2023

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# Between:

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V.Adinarayana Reddy, S/o.Subbi Reddy, Aged about 65 years, Occ: Secretary Grade-II, (Dismissed from service), Agricultural Market Committee, Jammalamadugu, Kadapa District.

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…Petitioner

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Versus

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The Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep by its Secretary, Agriculture and Cooperation(V.C.H) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and 6 others.

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…Respondents

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! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri Bonu Rama Shankar Rao

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^ Counsel for the Respondents : Learned Government

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Pleader for Agriculture

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2. Learned Government

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Pleader for Services-II

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3. Sri B.Prakash, learned Standing Counsel for Agricultural Market Committee.

< Gist:

> Head Note:?

Cases referred:

1) (2009) 2 SCC 570

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2) (2013) 4 SCC 301

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3) (2010) 13 SCC 427

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4) AIR 2022 SC 1153

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI & THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO WRIT PETITION. No. 26773 OF 2010

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ORDER : (per A.V. Sesha Sai, J)

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Unsuccessful applicant in O.A.No.5431 of 2003 on the file of the A.P.Administrative Tribunal is the petitioner in the present Writ Petition.

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Challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the order, dated 21.04.2010, passed by the Tribunal in the aforesaid O.A. By way of the said order, the Tribunal dismissed the O.A., filed by the petitioner herein.

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O.A.No.5431 of 2013 came to be filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, assailing the order of dismissal passed by Respondent No.2-Director of Marketing, vide proceedings, dated 20.12.2002, as confirmed in appeal by Respondent No.1-Government vide Memo No.1437/V-CII(1)/2003, dated 23.07.2003. While the Writ

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Petitioner was working as Secretary, Grade-II in the Agricultural Market Committee, Jammalamadugu, Kadapa District, the Director of Marketing-Respondent No.2 issued a Charge Memo dated 25.02.1999, framing the following charges:-

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“Charge No.1:-Sri Y.Adinarayana Reddy, who worked as Secretary Grade.II and person-incharge, Agricultural Market Committee, Jammalamadugu from 08.12.1995 onwards incurred huge expenditure of Rs.1,74,531/- during 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 for purchase of electrical goods and on installation charge without following the procedure and budget provision.

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Charge No.2: That Y.Adinarayana Reddy, while working as Secretary, Grade-II has purchased gates and incurred fixed charges of Rs.57,918/- during 1997-98 without following the procedure and budget provision.

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Charge No.3:- That Sri Y.Adinarayana Reddy, while working as Secretary Grade-II in Agrl.Market Committee, Jammalamadugu has incurred Rs.54,432/- for purchase of stationery articles and printing without following the procedure and budget provision.

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Charge No.4:- That Sri V.Adinarayana Reddy, while working as Secretary, Grade-II in Agrl.Market Committee, Jammalamadugu has incurred huge expenditure under miscellaneous items without following the procedure and budget provision.

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Charge No.5:- That Sri V.Adinarayana Reddy, while working as Secretary, Grade-II in Agrl.Market Committee, Jammalamadugu committed certain irregularities under Janmabhumi programme without following the procedure and budget provision.

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Charge No.6:- That Sri V.Adinarayana Reddy, while working as Secretary Grade-II in Agrl.Market Committee, Jammalamadugu has committed certain irregularities in implementation of Rythu Bandh pathakam by violating the rules and guidelines issued by Government and Commissionerate”.

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In response to the said Charge Memo, petitioner filed

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explanation on 14.04.2000 and, vide representation

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dated 16.04.2002, requested to furnish copy of the report of the

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Deputy Director of Marketing, Kadapa. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer, after holding detailed enquiry, submitted a report on 04.08.2022, holding that all the charges stood proved. Enclosing the copy of the enquiry report,

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dated 04.08.2002, the Director-Disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice, dated -10.2002, proposing the punishment of dismissal. Subsequently, vide order,

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dated 20.12.2002, Director of Marketing-2^nd respondent herein dismissed the petitioner herein from service. The petitioner preferred Statutory Appeal before the Government against the order of dismissal and the Government vide Memo dated 23.07.2023, dismissed the said appeal. Questioning the validity of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, referred to above, the petitioner herein approached the Tribunal, by way of filing O.A.No.5431 of 2003. The Tribunal vide order, dated 21.04.2010, dismissed the O.A, filed by the petitioner herein.

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Heard Sri M.Vijaya Kumar, learned senior counsel representing Sri Bonu Rama Shankar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader for Services-II for the respondents, apart from perusing the material available on record.

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It is contended by Sri M.Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order passed by the Tribunal which is impugned in the present Writ Petition is highly erroneous, contrary to law and opposed to the basic principles of service jurisprudence. In elaboration, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents did not examine any witnesses and the same is fatal to the case of the department . Learned counsel further submits that the entire basis for the conclusion arrived at by the regular Enquiry Officer is the report of the preliminary Enquiry Officer, and the said report was not furnished to the petitioner and on that ground, the Writ Petition is liable to be allowed and the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are liable to be set aside. It is also the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority did not assign any valid reasons while passing the impugned orders.

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In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following Judgments:-

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Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others¹ ,

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1 (2009) 2 SCC 570

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Nirmala J.Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat and another² ,

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ORYX Fisheries Private Limited Vs.Union of India and

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others³ .

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On the contrary, learned Government Pleader for Services-II, strongly resisting the Writ Petition, contends that there is absolutely no irregularity nor there exists any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal, as such, the orders of the Tribunal cannot be faulted. It is further submitted by the learned Government Pleader that along with the Charge Memo, the report of the preliminary Enquiry Officer was enclosed, as such, the contention advanced contra by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. It is further submitted by the learned Government Pleader that since the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority assigned valid reasons for arriving at the conclusions, the Tribunal is justified in dismissing the O.A.

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In support of his contentions, the learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of T.Takano Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of

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India and Ors⁴ .

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2 (2013) 4 SCC 301

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3 (2010) 13 SCC 427

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4 AIR 2022 SC 1153

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In the above background, now the issues that emerge

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for consideration of this Court in the present Writ Petition are as follows:

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i) Whether the order passed by the Tribunal, confirming the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority is sustainable and tenable?.

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ii) Whether the order passed by the Tribunal warrants any interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

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The State of Andhra Pradesh framed Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991(for short the ‘Rules’) and notified the same vide G.O.Ms.No.487, dated 14.09.2021. Rule, which is relevant for the purpose of resolving the issues in the present Writ Petition, is Rule 20 of the said Rules, which deals with the procedure for imposing major penalty. The punishment imposed in the instant case is major penalty of ‘dismissal from service’. It is an admitted reality that during the course of regular enquiry, pursuant to framing of charges against the petitioner, no witness was examined on behalf of the department to prove the charges against the petitioner. In this

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context, it is appropriate to refer to sub-Rule (3) of Rule 20 of the Rules, which reads as follows:-

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“Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government Servant under this Rule and Rule 21, the Disciplinary Authority or the [x x x] Controlling Authority who is not designated as Disciplinary Authority and who is subordinate to the Appointing Authority can draw up or cause to be drawn up.

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(i) The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior into definite and distinct articles of charge.

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(ii) A statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior in support of each article of charge, which shall contain

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(a) A statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government Servant.

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(b) A list of documents by which and a list of witness by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained”.

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According to sub-Rule (4) of Rule 20, the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the Articles of Charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each

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Article of Charge is proposed to be sustained and copies of the said documents and statements of the said witnesses.

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In the instant case, as mentioned supra, nobody was examined on behalf of the State Government to establish the charges framed against the petitioner herein. Another aspect, which

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needs mention in this context, is that, by way of representation, the petitioner herein specifically requested the disciplinary authority to furnish copies of the preliminary enquiry report. Without furnishing the same, the disciplinary authority appointed the Enquiry Officer, who conducted regular enquiry and the said Enquiry Officer submitted report based on the preliminary report submitted by the Deputy Director of Marketing. Copy of the Charge Memo, dated 25.02.1999, issued by the Commissioner, Director of Marketing is placed on record. In the said Charge Memo, the disciplinary authority framed as many as 6 charges against the petitioner and the fact remains that in all the charges reliance was placed on the report of the Deputy Director of Marketing, Kadapa.

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In the considered opinion of this Court, failure to furnish documents which formed basis for holding enquiry is fatal to the enquiry proceedings and it vitiates the entire proceedings and ‘order of dismissal’. It is also required to be noted that, though the learned Government Pleader submits that the petitioner received preliminary enquiry report, there is no response as to why the department did not respond to the representation, dated 14.04.2000, submitted by the petitioner, wherein the petitioner requested to furnish the said report. It is pertinent to

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note that the Charge Memo, dated 25.02.1999, refers to the Enquiry Officer’s report as enclosure but the entire Charge Memo is a type written one, but at the enclosure portion, the same was written in handwriting.

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In view of the representation made on 14.04.2000, which was not responded, this Court does not propose to extend any significance for the same. Another significant aspect, which needs mention in this context, is that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority assigned any valid reasons for arriving at conclusions, nor they discussed the material available on record. It is a settled principle of law that the order of the disciplinary authority is required to be supported by valid reasons. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the Judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner.

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In the case of Roop singh Negi Vs. Punjab National

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Bank and others , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-

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14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary

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proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.

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17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely - preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality."

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21. Yet again in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88, this Court held:

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"....Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into

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consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with."

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22. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & ors. [(2007) 1 SCC 566], this court followed Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), stating: "12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do."

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23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence.

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Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.

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17. In the case of Nirmala J.Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat

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and another , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-

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44. In Naryan Dattatraya Ramteerathakhar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2148, this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:

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“…..a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by observing principles of natural justice of nor, remains of no consequence.

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45. In view of above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to crossexamine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.

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46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 58, this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of earlier judgments held that cross-examination is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, and a statement recorded behind back of a person wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross- examine such persons, the same cannot be relied upon.

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47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.

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48. “A prima facie case, does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case which can be said to be established, if the evidence which is led in support of the case were to be believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out or not, the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence”. (Vide: Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79) (See also: The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa, M.T represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, AIR 1960 SC 1352; State (Delhi Admn.) v. V.C. Shukla & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 1382; Dalpat Kumar & Anr. v. Prahlad Singh & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 276; and Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, AIR 2005 SC 570).

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49. The issue, as to whether in the instant case the material collected in preliminary enquiry could be used against the appellant, has to be considered by taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case. In the preliminary enquiry, the department placed reliance upon the statements made by the accused/complainant and Shri C.B. Gajjar, advocate. Shri C.B. Gajjar in his statement has given the same version as he has deposed in regular enquiry. Shri Gajjar did not utter a single word about the meeting with the appellant on 17.8.1993, as he had stated that he had asked the accused/complainant to pay

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Rs. 20,000/- as was agreed with by Shri P.K. Pancholi, advocate. Of course, Shri C.B. Gajjar , complainant, has definitely reiterated the stand he had taken in his complaint. The chargesheet served upon the appellant contained 12 charges. Only first charge related to the incident dated 17.8.1993 was in respect of the case of the complainant. The other charges related to various other civil and criminal cases. The same were for not deciding the application for interim reliefs etc.

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52. In view of the above, we reach the following inescapable conclusions:-

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i) The High Court failed to appreciate that the appellant had not granted long adjournments to the accused-complainant as the appellant wanted to conclude the trial at the earliest. The case of accused- complainant which was taking its time, had suddenly gathered pace, thus, he would have naturally felt aggrieved by failing to notice it. The High Court erred in recording a finding that the complainant had no ill-will or motive to make any allegation against the appellant.

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ii) The Enquiry Officer, the High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, committed a grave error in placing reliance on the statement of the complainant as well as of Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, recorded in a preliminary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry and its report loses significance/importance, once the regular enquiry is initiated by issuing chargesheet to the delinquent. Thus, it was all in violation of the principles of natural justice.

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18. In the case of T.Takano Vs. Securities and Exchange

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Board of India and others , cited by the learned Government Pleader, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

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47. Applying this test to the facts, we find that the appellant is unable to prove that the disclosure of the entire report is necessary for him to defend the case. The first respondent made following arguments making a prima facie case that the disclosure of the report would violate third party rights:

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i) Investigation reports contain information on the volatile nature of the market:

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ii) The report also contains the personal information of various stakeholders. Disclosure will violate the right to privacy of the third party individuals; and

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iii) It includes strategic information.

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48. The appellant did not sufficiently discharge his burden by proving that the non-disclosure of the above information would affect his ability to defend himself. However, merely because a few portions of the enquiry report involve information on third-parties or confidential information on the securities market, the Respondent does not have a right to withhold the disclosure of the relevant portions of the report. The first respondent can only claim nondisclosure of those sections of the report which deal with third party personal information and strategic information on the functioning of the securities market”.

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In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader are not relevant and would not render any assistance to the case of the respondents, as in the instant case, the entire reliance was placed on the preliminary Enquiry Officer’s report, which was not served on the Writ Petitioner. Though it is the specific case of the applicant that, without issuing any notice, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal, the same is not contradicted by the respondents. In the considered opinion of this Court, the same is violative of the principles of natural justice. At this stage, though a request is made by the learned Government Pleader to remand the matter for fresh enquiry, this Court is not inclined to do so as the petitioner is a senior citizen of approximately 80 years old and at this stage, he cannot be made to undergo disciplinary enquiry. In normal course, the petitioner would have retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation.

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For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed, setting aside the order, dated 21.04.2010, passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.5431 of 2003, and the order of the disciplinary authority dated 20.12.2002, and the appellate authority,

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dated 23.07.2003 and consequently, the respondents are directed to extend all the consequential benefits within a period of three(3)

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months. There shall be no order as to costs.

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As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand

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closed.

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__________________ A.V. SESHA SAI, J

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