Dismissed

The State of Ap., Rep. Pp., v. T.Nagabhushanam at Peddabilla, Guntur and 5 Othrs.

Andhra Pradesh HC1 Nov 2022CRLA/157/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

High Court disposed of appeal and revision challenging acquittal of accused accused in murder case. Upheld trial court's view that evidence was unreliable and disputed, affirming acquittal due to lack of substantial reasons for interference.

What did the court decide?

Criminal Appeal No.157 of 2014 and Criminal Revision Case No.2095 of 2018 dismissed confirming acquittal.

The State of Ap., Rep. Pp., Vs… — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Andhra Pradesh HC (2022)

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI

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CRIMINAL APPEAL No.157 of 2014 AND CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.2095 of 2018

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COMMON JUDGMENT:- (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice C.Praveen Kumar)

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Heard Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy, learned Public Prosecutor for the State/appellant in Crl.A.No.157 of 2014, Sri B. Devadas, learned counsel for the de facto complainant/revision petitioner in Crl.R.C.No.2095 of 2018, and Sri N. Hari Nadh, learned counsel representing Sri Ch. Ravindra Babu, learned counsel for the accused in both the cases.

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Criminal Appeal No.157 of 2014 is filed by the State challenging the judgment, dated 18.05.2011, passed by the learned XI Additional District Judge (FTC), Guntur at Tenali in Sessions Case No.443 of 2010, wherein the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused for the charges levelled against them.

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Criminal Revision Case No.2095 of 2018 is filed by one A. Rajasekhar - de facto complainant, who is the son of one Athota Prabhakara Rao (hereinafter, referred to as “the

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deceased), challenging the acquittal of the accused in the very same judgment.

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Originally, the accused were tried for the offences punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. against A-1 to A-6, 302 read with 149 I.P.C. against A-1 to A-6, 323 read with 34 I.P.C. against A-4 and A-5 and 324 read with 34 I.P.C. against A-2, A-3 and A-6.

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The facts in issue are as under:-

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A-1 to A-6 are inter-related and residents of Ithanagar, Tenali. Deceased was also a resident of Ithanagar, Tenali. A-1 is a mason and A-2 is his nephew. The deceased Athota Prabhakara Rao was P.W.1’s wife’s maternal uncle. P.W.4 is the son of the deceased. On 11.06.2009, there was annual death ceremony in the house of the deceased, relating to the mother of the deceased. For purchasing new clothes to be given by the mother-in-law on the said date, P.W.1 and the deceased went on cycle to Sharaf Bazar, Tenali. After purchasing clothes, they were returning to Ithanagar. P.W.1 was pedaling the cycle, while the deceased was sitting on the rear carriage of the cycle. After crossing Annabattula Satyanarayana Samadhi and when they reached a culvert near a hostel, A-1 to A-6, who were standing

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there, attacked the deceased. It is said that A-1 was armed with an axe and others were armed with sticks. When they reached the culvert, all the accused surrounded the cycle, A-1 caught hold of the shirt of the deceased and pulled him down. Thereafter, A-1 axed the deceased on his left calf (on the knee joint back side) and caused a bleeding injury. A-2 beat the deceased with a stick on the back of the head and caused a bleeding injury. The remaining accused also beat the deceased with sticks all over his body. When P.W.1 went to the rescue of the deceased, A-1 to A-6 threatened to kill him. On hearing the shouts of P.W.1, P.Ws.2 and 3 came there. On seeing P.Ws.2 and 3, the accused escaped along with their weapons. P.W.2 attended on the injury caused to the deceased and then telephoned to 108 ambulance. The deceased was initially shifted to District Hospital, Tenali in the said ambulance where he was given medical treatment.

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P.W.12 – the Doctor, who was working at Deputy Civil Surgeon in District Hospital, Tenali, sent Ex.P-8 - intimation about the admission of the injured in the hospital. On receiving the said intimation, P.W.8 – the Head Constable, II Town Police Station, Tenali proceeded to the hospital and recorded the statement of the injured, which is marked as Ex.P-9. After

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recording the said statement, he read over the contents of the statement to the injured and then obtained his thumb impression. The said statement was handed over to P.W.10 – Sub-Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station, Tenali Police Station, who registered the same as a case in Crime No.94 of 2009 for the offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. and issued Ex.P-11 – F.I.R. Thereafter, P.W.10 visited the hospital and recorded the statements of P.Ws.1 to 3. On the next day i.e., on 12.06.2009, P.W.10 visited the scene of offence and in the presence of P.Ws.5 and 6, observed the scene of offence. At the scene, he seized M.O.2 -chappals. Ex.P-12 is the scene of offence observation report while Ex.P-13 is the rough sketch of the scene of offence. On 15.06.2009, on receipt of reliable information, P.W.10 proceeded to the house of A-1 and arrested all the accused who were in the said house. Pursuant to the statement given by A-1, M.O.1 was discovered, which is seized under Ex.P-15.

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On 18.06.2009, at 4:30 P.M., P.W.9 received Ex.P-10 - the death intimation of the injured from the Government Hospital. Basing on Ex.P-10, the section of law was altered to Section 302 I.P.C. Ex.P-16 is the altered F.I.R.

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P.W.11, who took up further investigation, proceeded to the hospital and conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.W.7 and others. Ex.P-7 is the Inquest Report. After completing the inquest proceedings, the body was sent for post mortem examination.

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P.W.13 – Professor in Forensic Medicine, Guntur Medical College, Guntur conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and issued Ex.P-19 – Post Mortem Certificate. According to the Doctor, the deceased died due to complications of multiple injuries due to infection, which may be caused due to air, water and other pollutants. After receiving all the necessary documents, a charge sheet came to be filed, which was taken on file as P.R.C.No.2 of 2010 on the file of the learned I Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tenali.

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On appearance of the accused, copies of the documents, as required under Section 207 Cr.P.C., were supplied to them. As the offence is triable by a Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of the Sessions under Section 209 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the same was made over to the Court of the learned XI Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur at Tenali for trial and disposal in accordance with law.

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Basing on the material available on record, charges, as referred to earlier, came to be framed, read over and explained to the accused in Telugu to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 13 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-19 and M.Os.1 and 2. Out of 13 witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.Ws.5 and 6 did not support the prosecution case and were turned hostile by the prosecution. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to which they denied. No oral evidence was adduced on their behalf except marking Ex.D-1.

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After perusal of the entire evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused in view of the discrepancies in Ex.P-9 and the version of P.W.1 being inconsistent not only with the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 but also with Exs.P-8 and P-9. Against the order of acquittal, the State as well as P.W.4 preferred the aforementioned Criminal Appeal and Criminal Revision Case.

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Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy, learned Public Prosecutor for the State, and Sri B. Devadas, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/ de facto complainant, would submit that in view of the evidence of P.W.1, who is an eye witness to the incident, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge is erroneous and according to them, the reasons given for disbelieving the evidence of P.W.1 does not stand to any reason. It is further pleaded that the evidence of P.W.1 also gets corroboration from the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 in all material aspects and as such, the order of the learned Sessions Judge warrants interference. It is further argued by both the learned counsel that the dying declaration recorded by the police under Ex.P-9 gets corroboration on all material particulars not only from the oral evidence of P.W.1 but also from the evidence of the Doctor, who categorically speaks about the injuries on the body of the deceased.

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On the other hand, Sri N. Hari Nadh, learned counsel representing Sri Ch. Ravindra Babu, learned counsel for the accused, opposed the same contending that as this appeal and the revision case are against an order of acquittal, the prosecution has to prove illegality or perversity in the order. Since the trial Court has appreciated the evidence in detail and

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gave reasons, which are cogent and convincing, the order under challenge warrants no interference. He took us through the findings given by the trial Court and also the evidence on record to contend that P.W.1 could not have been an eye witness to the incident and the alleged dying declaration recorded by P.W.8 is brought into existence at a belated stage.

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The point that arises for consideration is:-

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“Whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 302 read with 149 I.P.C. against A-1 to A-6, 323 read with 34 I.P.C. against A-4 and A-5 and 324 read with 34 I.P.C. against A-2, A-3 and A-6 beyond all reasonable doubt?”

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POINT :-

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As seen from the record, the prosecution has mainly relied upon two circumstances viz., Ex.P-9 – dying declaration recorded by P.W.8 and the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, who were examined as eye witness to the incident.

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Before proceeding further, it is to be noted here that the incident in question took place on 11.06.2009 and immediately thereafter, the injured was taken to District Hospital at Tenali and from there, to Government General Hospital, Guntur. The intimation about the death of the deceased was received by P.W.9 on 18.06.2009 at 4:30 P.M. It is nobody’s case that the deceased was unconscious from 11.06.2009 to 18.06.2009.

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That being so, no explanation is forthcoming as to why no effort was made to get the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate. It is no doubt true that it is not mandatory, that the dying declaration has to be recorded by the Magistrate to base a conviction. If the dying declaration recorded by the Constable is convincing and inspires confidence of the Court, the same can be made the basis to convict the accused. But here is a case where Ex.P-9 – dying declaration recorded by P.W.8 is full of discrepancies. A perusal of original of Ex.P-9 vis-à-vis the evidence of P.W.1 would show that before recording the said statement, the Police Constable neither disclosed his identity nor put any preliminary questions to the injured to test his capability to make a statement. Further, P.W.8 admitted in his evidence that there is a correction regarding name of the injured in Ex.P-9 to which no explanation is forthcoming. Further, a perusal of Ex.P-9 would show that there is a difference of ink in the body of Ex.P-9 to the signature of P.W.8 below it. Further, the hand writing in the body of Ex.P-9 is also at variance with the signature of P.W.8 at the bottom. While the hand writing in Ex.P-9 is round in shape, the signature of P.W.8 is different. The English letters above the signature of P.W.8 are entirely different from the letters written by P.W.8 in his signature. The

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learned Sessions Judge categorically observed the way “H” noted by P.W.8 below his signature is entirely different from “H” in District Hospital. Similarly so with regard to letter “C”.

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Apart from that, it is also to be noted that P.W.8, in his cross examination, admits that the motive part was incorporated subsequently in Ex.P-9. An explanation is sought to be given by P.W.8 that he changed glasses and due to the variation in the power of the glasses, the same came to be written at the bottom, which is not acceptable. If really the motive part was disclosed by the deceased to P.W.8, nothing prevented P.W.8 to incorporate the same in the body of Ex.P-9 but instead, at the end, i.e., just above the signature and in very small letters, the motive part came to be incorporated. Therefore, in the absence of any plausible explanation given, a doubt arises as to the contents of the dying declaration. Further, there is no endorsement of the Doctor with regard to the mental capability of the deceased at the time of recording of the dying declaration. Hence, we are of the view that the trial Court rightly rejected the statement of injured – deceased recorded by P.W.8.

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The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, who were examined as eye witnesses to the incident. In order to appreciate the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, it would be appropriate for us to deal with Ex.P-8 - the hospital intimation and also the evidence of P.W.1.

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Coming to the earliest document i.e., Hospital Intimation, which was received by P.W.8 from the hospital, it discloses that the injured was beaten by four unknown persons with knife, but the said version, as stated earlier, is at variance with the contents of Ex.P-9 with regard to usage of axes and sticks. Further, the said version is contrary to the medical evidence as well. The wound certificate issued by P.W.12, which is placed on record as Ex.P-18, refers to five injuries, out of which, injuries 1 to 4 were found to be simple in nature and injury No.5 is grievous in nature and could have been caused by a blunt object. The wound certificate also shows that injury No.5 is possible to have been caused after axing or cutting if the leg is twisted. However, in the cross examination, P.W.12 does not speak about any cut injury. On the other hand, he admits that the deceased sustained injuries by beating by four unknown persons with a heavy knife on 11.06.2009. Various answers came to be elicited in the cross examination of P.W.12, which

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show any amount of doubt with regard to the manner in which injury No.5 was caused. At one point of time, P.W.12 admits that injury No.5 is possible if a person comes into contact with a rough surfaced stone hurled with force weighing two kilograms. It is also to be noted that P.W.13, who conducted post mortem examination eight days after the incident, states that the cause of death was due to complications of multiple injuries and that the complications are due to infection, which may occur due to air, water and other pollutants. Insofar as attack is concerned, the information given by the injured at the first instance show that he was attacked with knife but such a version is neither found in Ex.P-9 nor in Ex.P-8.

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Coming to the evidence of eye witnesses, P.W.1, in his evidence in chief, speaks about going along with the deceased to purchase clothes on the fateful day and when they reached a particular point, all the six accused surrendered them and attacked the deceased. Strangely, none of them attacked P.W.1. If really P.W.1 was present along with the deceased at the time of the incident, the accused, who were six in number and armed with weapons, would not have left P.W.1 with a warning. Apart from that, the evidence of P.W.1, as observed by us earlier, is contrary to Ex.P-8 and P-18 with regard to the nature of

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weapons used by the accused. Therefore, a doubt arises as to whether really P.W.1 was present at the time of the incident.

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P.W.2, who was also examined as an eye witness to the incident, did not attribute any specific overt acts to any of the accused. He claims to have seen A-1 armed with an axe and A-2 to A-6 armed with sticks, which is not the case of the deceased himself either in Ex.P-8, P-9 or P-18.

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Insofar as the evidence of P.W.3 is concerned, he, in his evidence, deposed about A-1 to A-6 beating the deceased but P.W.1, who was present there, speak about A-1 hacking the deceased and A-2 to A-6 beating the deceased. Therefore, a doubt arises as to whether really these three persons have witnessed the incident more so, when their statements came to be recorded by the police long after the incident.

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At this stage, it is also to be noted that there is a delay in lodging the report. As seen from the record, the incident took place on 11.06.2009 at about 1:00 P.M. or 1:30 P.M. and the statement was recorded at 6 P.M. but the same was received by the learned Magistrate on the next day. Therefore, in the absence of any explanation with regard to delay of 22 hours in the report reaching the Magistrate, the argument of the counsel

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for the accused that the said time has been used to fabricate the case against the accused, cannot be brushed aside having regard to the facts in issue.

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It is to be noted here that this is an appeal against acquittal and that too, filed by the State and the Revision Case by a private party. In an appeal against acquittal, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:

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The scope of appeal against acquittal has been gone into by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia , in Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana¹ , wherein it was observed:-

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“21. The principle to be followed by appellate courts considering an appeal against an order of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the order is clearly unreasonable it is a compelling reason for interference (see Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0167/1973 : 1973CriLJ1783 . The principle was elucidated in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0504/1996 : 1996CriLJ2867 : While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the

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1 AIR 2000 SC 1833

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order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then and then only reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ghurey Lal vs State Of U.P² , while referring the case of Sheo Swarup v. King Empero³ , discussed the ambit and scope of the powers of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal and observed as under: (at p. 230):

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"..the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.."

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The law succinctly crystallized in this case has been consistently followed by this Court. On proper analysis of the ratio and findings of this case, it is revealed that the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused further gets reinforced and strengthened by the acquittal of the trial court. The appellate court undoubtedly has wide powers of reappreciating and re-evaluating the entire evidence but it would be justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal only when the judgment of the trial court is

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2 Criminal Appeal No.155 Of 2006

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3 (1934) 36 Bomlr 1185

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palpably wrong, totally ill-founded or wholly misconceived, based on erroneous analysis of evidence and non-existent material, demonstrably unsustainable or perverse.

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46. This Court again in the case of Surajpal Singh & Others v. State⁴ , has spelt out the powers of the High Court. The Court has also cautioned the Appellate Courts to follow well established norms while dealing with appeals from acquittal by the trial court. The Court observed as under: "It is well established that in an appeal under S. 417 Criminal P.C., the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons."

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47. This Court reiterated the principles and observed that presumption of innocence of accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The appellate court could have interfered only for very substantial and compelling reasons.

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48. In Tulsiram Kanu v. The State⁵ , this Court explicated that the appellate court would be justified in reversing the acquittal only when very substantial question and compelling reasons are present. In this case, the Court used a different phrase to describe the approach of an appellate court against an order of acquittal. There, the Sessions Court expressed that there was clearly reasonable doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence put before it. Kania, C.J., observed that it required good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable

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4 AIR 1952 SC 52

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5 AIR 1954 SC 1

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doubt before the appellate court came to a different conclusion.

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49. In the same year, this Court had an occasion to deal with Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh⁶ , wherein it said that the High Court had not kept the rules and principles of administration of criminal justice clearly before it and that therefore the judgment was vitiated by non-advertence to and mis-appreciation of various material facts transpiring in evidence. The High Court failed to give due weight and consideration to the findings upon which the trial court based its decision.

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50. The same principle has been followed in Atley v. State of U.P.⁷ (at pp. 809-10 para 5), wherein the Court said:

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"It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

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It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal."

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6 AIR 1954 SC 637

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7 AIR 1955 SC 807

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51. The question was again raised prominently in Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra⁸ . Bose, J. expressing the majority view observed (at p.220):

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"It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong; Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab⁹ , (at pp.77-78); and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under S. 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view. Surajpal Singh v. State10 at 54."

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52. In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab¹¹ , this Court again had an occasion to examine the same proposition of law. The Court (at page 222) observed as under:

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"It is now well settled that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused person is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court and the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration; and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses must also be kept in mind, and there must be substantial and compelling reasons for the appellate Court to come to a conclusion different from that of the trial Judge."

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8 AIR 1956 SC 217

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9 AIR 1953 SC 76

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10 AIR 1952 SC 52

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11 AIR 1957 SC 216

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23. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Murugesan and 16 others vs.

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State Through Inspector of Police¹² , while dealing with scope of interference in a case arising against an order of acquittal, observed as under:-

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“…. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” (AIR pp. 229-30)

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“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an

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12 (2012) 10 SCC 383

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appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

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Having regard to the judgments referred to above and when two views are possible from the material available, the findings of the Sessions Court, in our view, warrants no interference. It is well established principle of law that interference in an appeal against acquittal is permissible only if

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it is proved that the order is perverse, illegal or the material on record was not considered. In the absence of the same and having regard to the findings given above, we see no grounds to interfere with the order under challenge. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal and the Criminal Revision Case fail and are liable to be dismissed.

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Accordingly, both Criminal Appeal No.157 of 2014 and Criminal Revision Case No.2095 of 2018 are dismissed confirming the judgment, dated 18.05.2011, passed by the learned XI Additional District Judge (FTC), Guntur at Tenali in Sessions Case No.443 of 2010.

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Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in these cases shall stand closed.

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_______________________________ JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

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___________________________________ JUSTICE B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI

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Date : 01.11.2022 AMD

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300

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