Partly allowed

Maddi Sudarshan Kumar v. The State of A.P.

Andhra Pradesh HC4 Mar 2021CRLRC/1525/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this criminal revision, the High Court allowed the petition partly. It held that the allegations failed to establish essential ingredients of offences under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act regarding public view and intent to humiliate. Consequently, charges were dropped for atrocity offences but remained for Section 506 IPC.

What did the court decide?

Petritioner discharged from offences under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

Maddi Sudarshan Kumar Vs The State of A.P. — Caste Atrocities | Andhra Pradesh HC (2021)

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THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1525 of 2018

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ORDER:

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Challenging the order dated 03.01.2018 in Crl.M.P.No.788 of 2017 in S.C.No.33/S/2017 on the file of the Court of Special Sessions Judge-cum-IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, dismissing the petition filed under Section 227 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) seeking to discharge the petitioner for the offences charged against him, the present revision is filed.

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The facts of the case, in a nutshell are that a report was lodged by the defacto complainant on 12.01.2017 stating that he is working as Manager in Sri Krishnashramam Harijan Industrial School for the past 20 years. One Ranganath Sai is the Managing Trustee, M.Sekhar is the Trustee and Kota Lakshmidhar Naidu is the founder trustee member of the said school. Though the management of the trust was changed, no information was given to him and one M.Sudarshan Kumar and A.Suryanarayana obstructed him from doing his duties. When he questioned them, they abused him in the name his caste. It is also stated that one month prior to filing of the complaint, M.Sudarshan Kumar scolded him stating that “ madiga naa kodaka neevu emi chestunnavra office lo ”. A.Suryanarayana also abused him as “ nuvvu emichestunnavra madiga naa kodaka ”. Though the defacto complainant reported the same to the founder trustee Lakshmidhar Naidu, no action was taken due to his ill-health. Basing on the said report, the case was registered as Crime No.12 of 2017 for the offences under Section 506 of IPC and Section 3

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(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Thereafter on completion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet for the offences under Section 506 r/w 34 of IPC and Section 3 (1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (for short “ Act 2015 ”) and the same was numbered as S.C.No.33/S/2017. During the pendency of the case, the petitioner along with A-2 filed a petition in Crl.M.P.No.788 of 2017 under Section 227 of Cr.P.C to discharge them for the offences charged against them. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the said petition on 03.01.2018. Assailing the same, the present revision is filed.

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Heard Sri Ravi Cheemalapati, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.Anand Kumar, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent-State.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has not committed any offence and he is falsely implicated in the case and without conducting proper investigation the police filed charge sheet. Learned counsel submits that the allegations in the complaint as well as charge sheet do not satisfy the ingredients of the offences under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015, since there is no averment that the alleged abuse of the complainant is with a view to humiliate him and the said abuse was within the public view. He submits that earlier A-2 filed revision before the composite High Court in Crl.R.C.No.1347 of 2018 assailing the very same impugned order and the Court allowed the revision. He submits that the petitioner herein also

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stands on the similar footing where the allegations are one and the same, as such the present revision may also be allowed.

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Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent-State supported the impugned proceedings and submitted that all the grounds raised are beyond the scope of discharge petition and all these allegations can be decided after a full-fledged trial.

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In the light of the above rival contentions, the point that arises for consideration is:

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Whether the Court below was right in dismissing the discharge petition filed by the petitioner/Accused?

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While dealing with the revision in Crl.R.C.No.1347 of 2018 in respect of A-2, this Court observed that –

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“ The offence mainly alleged against the petitioner is one under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015, which reads thus:

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“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities .— (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

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(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

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(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

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(s) abuses any member of a Schedule caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.”

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To attract the said offence, the requisite ingredients are that the offender should not be a member of Schedule Caste or Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and it should be in any place within public view. In the light of the said rival contentions and the language employed in the above said provision, it is to be seen

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whether any prima facie case is made out against the petitioner for commission of the offence for which he is charged.

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A perusal of the complaint as well as the charge sheet would indicate that except abusing the complainant with his caste name there is absolutely no allegation that the petitioner with a view to intentionally insult or intimidate or humiliate the complainant, abused him and that too in a place within the public view. In the charge sheet for the first time, it is mentioned that on 25.12.2016 at about 12.00 noon the complainant openly and publicly abused and made false allegations against the management to media. Taking the said incident as basis A-1 threatened to do away with the life of the complainant besides abusing him taking his caste name. On 26.12.2016 at 9.30 a.m. when the complainant was in the company of L.W.4 (attender), A-2 found fault with him for leaking out the trust matters to the press, media and humiliated him by taking his caste name and threatened him that he will be sent away from the office by the end of the month. Finally, termination notice was issued on 28.12.2016. Admittedly, the complaint was lodged on 12.01.2017 i.e. more than two weeks after the alleged incident. There is no explanation for the said delay either in the complaint or in the charge sheet. Besides that the allegations made therein also will not satisfy the basic ingredients for commission of offence under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015. The said issue has been considered by this Court in Parsa Somaiah and others Vs. State

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of A.P. and another¹ , wherein it was held thus:

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“To attract the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the Mens rea is the essential ingredient. The utterances made in the name of caste should be with an intention to humiliate or intimidate the persons belonging to Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe in a place within public view. If in the course of a quarrel took place in the fields the petitioners abused the de facto complainant and his people by using the caste name, the said act by itself in my view does not automatically attract the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989. The manner in which the

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1 2015 (1) ALD (Crl.) 143

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utterances were made must be with an intention to humiliate or intimidate the persons belonging to Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe.”

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In P.Bhaskar Raju Vs. State of Telangana and others² , it was

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held thus:

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In Daya Bhatnagar’s case (supra) one of the points referred to third Judge is:

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“(1) What is the correct and real meaning of expression "public view" occurring in Section 3(i)(x) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 and whether it would include the view of the accused in a counter FIR?”

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It was held as follows:

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Para 15 xxxxx

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(c) the incident must occur in any place within the public view. There cannot be any dispute that the offence can be committed at any place whether it is a private place or a "public view" as long as it is within the "public view". The requirement of "public view" can be satisfied even in a private place, where the public is present.”

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Para-19 xxxxx

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“Keeping this in view, looking to the aims and objects of the Act, the expression "public view" in Section 3(i)(x) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present, (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties.”

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In the case on hand if all the facts mentioned in the complaint and the charge sheet are accepted to be correct in their entirety, the same cannot establish commission of the offence under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015, against the petitioner. Besides that there is a delay of more than two weeks from the date of alleged incident and lodging of a complaint and this is also a strong circumstance which shows any amount of doubt with regard to commission of offence, more so, when it is not properly explained as to the delay for lodging the complaint.

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In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that no prima faice case is made out for commission of the offence under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015 and to that extent the revision case is liable to be allowed.”

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2 2015 (2) ALD (Crl.) 150

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8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hitesh Verma Vs. State of

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Uttarakhand and others³ held thus:

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The offence Under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable Section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the Appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent No. 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent No. 2 is member of Scheduled Caste.

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Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh and Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel and Ors. MANU/SC/7954/2008 : (2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under:

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It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can

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3 (2020) 10 SCC 710 = MANU/SC/0843/2020

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be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.

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As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

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There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent No. 2 herself. Due to dispute, Appellant and others were not permitting Respondent No. 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

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In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the Appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under:

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As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence Under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to "Khangar"-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the Appellant-Accused Under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.

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Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a

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Scheduled Caste, the offence Under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.”

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In the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case on hand both the ingredients of public view and intention are not made out from the complainant. Further taking into consideration the order of the composite High Court in Crl.R.C.No.1347 of 2018 dated 15.06.2018, the present revision is liable to be allowed in part. As far as the offence under Section 506 of IPC is concerned, prima facie, there are allegations and it is not a fit case for discharge as per the law laid down by the Apex Court.

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Accordingly, the criminal revision case is allowed in part to the extent of discharging the petitioner for the offence under Section 3(1)(x)(r)(s) of the Act, 2015 in S.C.No.33/S/2017 on the file of the Court of Special Sessions Judge-cum-IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur.

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As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications are closed.

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___________________________ LALITHA KANNEGANTI, J

4^th March, 2021

PVD

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

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