Allowed¶51

State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Shri Ajay Chauhan U.P. P.W.D. Lko and Another v. Chandan Pathak

Service Law – Transfer/Posting – Intra-Court Special Appeal

Allahabad HC24 Apr 2026SPLA/213/2026

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Transfer posting restitution service law; suspension quashed Writ-A No.11666 of 2025 dated 06.11.2025; reinstatement order 08.01.2026; posting to Shahjahanpur 22.01.2026 and 23.01.2026; representation decided 24.01.2026; Siddharth Nagar Prantiya Khand Lok Nirman Vibhag; State of U.P. PWD; transferable post; per se non-stigmatic posting order; no change in service conditions; mala fides; employer's right to post per exigency; State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal (2004) 11 SCC 402; intra court special appeal allowed; writ petition dismissed.

What did the court decide?

Impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 set aside; Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 dismissed; intra court appeal allowed. ¶51

State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Shri Ajay Chauhan U.P. P.W.D. Lko and Another vs Chandan Pathak — Allahabad HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 set aside; Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 dismissed; intra court appeal allowed.

¶51

Issue for consideration

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in applying the principles of restitution in service jurisprudence to protect/direct the place of posting of the writ petitioner at Siddharth Nagar after the suspension order was quashed. +1 more

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Court's answer

Principles of restitution apply contextually; the place of posting accorded prior to the set-aside suspension order is essentially a condition of service and not a 'benefit' received prior to the set-aside order, so restitution does not require reversal to status quo ante as regards the place of posting.

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Ratio / Principle

The employer has a right to post its employee at any place which in the employer's estimation is more suitable or as exigency requires; courts usually do not interfere in the absence of clear mala fides or violation of any service condition, rules or regulations.

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Key takeaways

Even if the principles of restitution were applied, they would not require the writ petitioner to be reverted to the same place of posting from which he was suspended; the employer is well within its right to place the employee where it deems fit.ratio¶46
An employee cannot claim as a matter of right that he must remain posted at a place of his own choice; therefore the Single Judge's direction, applying restitution, to post the writ petitioner at his earlier place of posting and permit joining there was clearly not justified.ratio¶47

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Service Law — Transfer/Posting — Intra-Court Special Appeal — After the writ court quashed the suspension order (Writ-A No.11666 of 2025, order dated 06.11.2025), the State reinstated the employee (order dated 08.01.2026) and posted him to Shahjahanpur (orders dated 22.01.2026 and 23.01.2026), deciding his representation only thereafter (24.01.2026); the learned Single Judge set aside these orders and, invoking principles of restitution, directed posting at Prantiya Khand, Lok Nirman Vibhag, Siddhart Nagar — Held by the Division Bench: the place of posting accorded prior to a set-aside suspension order is essentially a condition of service, not a 'benefit' restorable to status quo ante by way of restitution; even if restitution applied, it would not compel reversion to the same place of posting; the employer may post its employee anywhere according to suitability or exigency, and courts do not interfere absent clear mala fides or violation of service conditions, rules or regulations; an employee cannot claim posting at a place of his own choice — Reliance placed on State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal (2004) 11 SCC 402 — Single Judge's judgment set aside; Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 dismissed; appeal allowed.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 213 of 2026

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State of U.P. through. Prin. Secy. Shri Ajay Chauhan U.P. P.W.D. Lko and another

.....Appellant(s)

Versus

Chandan Pathak

.....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)	: Tushar Verma C.S.C.
Counsel for Respondent(s)	: In Person

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Chief Justice's Court

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HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

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This intra court appeal has been filed by the State assailing the judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 (Chandan Pathak Vs. State of U.P. & others), whereby the writ court has set aside the order impugned therein dated 08.01.2026 relating to posting of the writ petitioner to Shahjahanpur and four subsequent ancillary orders and a further direction was issued to issue appropriate orders for posting the writ petitioner in Prantiya Khand, Lok Nirman Vibhag, Siddhart Nagar within a period of ten days from the date a certified copy of the order was served on the authority concerned.

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Chandan Pathak, the respondent/writ petitioner filed Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 with the averments that the respondent was put under suspension on 15.09.2025. The said suspension order was challenged by him in WritA No.11666 of 2025, which was allowed by the writ court by means of judgment and order dated 06.11.2025 and the impugned suspension order dated 15.09.2025 was quashed with the liberty to the appellants (who were the respondents in the writ petition) to pass fresh orders only in consonance with law.

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The writ petitioner had also averred that he had filed another petition bearing Writ-A No. 13953 of 2025 which was disposed of by the writ court permitting the respondent herein to prefer a fresh representation before the State appellants who were directed to decide the same

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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expeditiously by a reasoned and speaking order within a period of four weeks, from the date of receipt of the said representation.

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In furtherance of the order dated 05.12.2025, the writ petitioner preferred a detailed representation annexing a copy of the order passed by the Court dated 05.12.2025. It was the case of the writ petitioner that the State appellants passed an order dated 08.01.2026, whereby the writ petitioner was reinstated, as a consequence of setting aside of the suspension order, and he was attached with the Headquarters at Lucknow. Subsequently, another order was passed on 22.01.2026, whereby the writ petitioner was posted at Shahjahanpur. Another order dated 23.01.2026 was passed relieving the writ petitioner and requiring him to join at his place of posting at Shahjahanpur. Yet again another order was passed on 24.01.2026, whereby a detailed representation given by the writ petitioner was decided by the State appellants. Accordingly, all the aforesaid four orders were challenged by the writ petitioner and this writ petition came to be allowed by means of judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 which is under challenge in the instant intra court appeal.

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Shri Tushar Verma, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in law in applying the principles of restitution in service jurisprudence, to protect the place of posting for the writ petitioner which was not justified. It was submitted that the writ petitioner could have been posted in any district depending on the exigency of service.

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It was further submitted that there was no change in the service condition, rank or any facility available to the writ petitioner, hence in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge erred in interfering with the order of posting which was purely in the domain of the employer.

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Learned counsel for the appellants further urged that the writ petitioner could not establish any prejudice caused to him due to posting of the writ petitioner at Shahjahanpur. It was also urged that the writ petitioner was earlier posted at Siddharth Nagar. He had been put under suspension and was attached with the Headquarters at Lucknow. Since the suspension order had been quashed by the Court, hence he was reinstated in service

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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and it is only thereafter that he had been posted at Shahjahanpur which was also a posting of equal prominence for the writ petitioner and this order of the employer could not be assailed especially when no mala fide or prejudice could be established. In such circumstances, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and in support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and others Vs. Gobardhan Lal (2004) 11 SCC 402.

¶24

Chandan Pathak, the respondent/writ petitioner appeared in person and has submitted that the entire exercise of the State appellants is to harass the writ petitioner. It was submitted that once the suspension order has been quashed by the Court, the writ petitioner ought to have been reinstated at Siddharth Nagar. He further urged that it may be true that the employer has the right to post the writ petitioner at any place but in the instant case the mala fide was apparent; inasmuch as after the quashing of the suspension order by means of the order dated 15.09.2025 passed in Writ-A No.11666 of 2025, the writ petitioner ought to have been reinstated at Siddharth Nagar.

¶25

It was further urged that the writ petitioner had filed a subsequent petition bearing Writ-A No.13953 of 2025 seeking a direction for the State appellants to permit the writ petitioner to join at Siddharth Nagar with a prayer that the representation of the petitioner be decided and in furtherance thereof the writ petition was disposed of by the Court on 05.12.2025 permitting the writ petitioner to file a fresh detailed representation which was to be decided by a reasoned and speaking order within four weeks.

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It is submitted that instead of deciding the said representation, the State appellants first passed the order dated 22.01.2026 directing the writ petitioner to join at Shahjahanpur, order dated 23.01.2026 relieving the writ petitioner from the Headquarters to join at Shahjahanpur and only thereafter the order dated 24.01.2026 was passed deciding the representation which in effect ought to have been decided first. Thus, the submission was that the State appellants deliberately did not decide the representation first, rather they got the order of reinstatement and posting and thereafter decided the representation, which was an arbitrary exercise

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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of power by the State appellants. Noticing the aforesaid, the writ court interfered by means of judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 and the order does not require any interference, accordingly the intra court appeal deserves to be dismissed.

¶30

The Court has heard the learned counsel for the State appellants as well as Chandan Pathak in person.

¶31

Primarily the facts are not in dispute between the parties. The writ petitioner was put under suspension which was quashed by the writ court by means of its judgment and order dated 06.11.2025 passed in Writ-A No.11666 of 2025. Once the suspension order has been quashed, the petitioner was reinstated and he was posted at Shahjahanpur.

¶32

It is not disputed by the respondent that there has been no change in his service condition nor there is any adverse impact on his designation or post. It is also not disputed that the post held by the writ petitioner is transferable and it is also admitted that the order posting the writ petitioner is per se non-stigmatic.

¶33

In light of the aforesaid undisputed facts, it is clear that the employer has a right to post its employee at any place which in the estimation of the employer is more suitable or the exigency so requires. In absence of any clear mala fides or violations of any service condition, rules or regulations, the Courts usually do not interfere in such matters.

¶34

It will be worthwhile to notice the observations of the Apex Court in Gobardhan Lal (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-

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" 6…………… reiterate that the prime concern in these appeals, at the present stage, is only with reference to the omnibus and general directions issued by the High Court placing an embargo on the right of the authorities of the Government competent and concerned to pass orders of transfers and also as to the remedial or other measures, if any, to be provided for in such cases, apart from those as are available in law.

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It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision.

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---------*******-------******

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9.............Conditions of service or rights, which are personal to the parties concerned, are to be governed by rules as also the inbuilt powers of supervision and control in the hierarchy of the administration of State or any authority as well as the basic concepts and well-recognised powers and jurisdiction inherent in the various authorities in the hierarchy. All that cannot be obliterated by sweeping observations and directions unmindful of the anarchy which it may create in ensuring an effective supervision and control and running of administration merely on certain assumed notions of orderliness expected from the authorities affecting transfers. Even as the position stands, avenues are open for being availed of by anyone aggrieved, with the authorities concerned, the courts and

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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tribunals, as the case may be, to seek relief even in relation to an order of transfer or appointment or promotion or any order passed in disciplinary proceedings on certain well-settled and recognized grounds or reasons, when properly approached and sought to be vindicated in the manner known to and in accordance with law. No such generalised directions as have been given by the High Court could ever be given leaving room for an inevitable impression that the courts are attempting to take over the reigns of executive administration. Attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective fields or areas of jurisdiction earmarked for the various other limbs of the State. Giving room for such an impression should be avoided with utmost care and seriously and zealously courts endeavour to safeguard the rights of parties."

¶45

The learned Single Judge has invoked principles of restitution for issuing the directions for posting the petitioner at Siddharth Nagar. The principles of restitution are applied as an equitable doctrine to prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their pre-wrongful position. The principle has to be applied contextually, balancing employee rights, public interest, administrative efficiency and keeping in view the general principles governing service jurisprudence. The place of posting accorded prior to the order which is set aside (in the present case the order of suspension) is essentially a condition of service and not a 'benefit' received prior to the order which came to be set aside, for which it can be said that by way of restitution, the same needs reversal to status-quo ante. The situation may be different, in case, subject matter of the challenge is the place of posting itself, which is not the case here.

¶46

Even if the principles of restitution were to be applied, it could at best be in the context of putting the writ petitioner in the same position as he was prior to passing of the order of suspension. However, this does not necessarily imply that the writ petitioner must be reverted to the same place of posting from where the writ petitioner was placed under suspension. The employer is well within his right to place his employee where the employer deems fit.

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Similarly, an employee cannot claim as a matter of right that he must remain posted at any place of his own choice. Thus, to this extent

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SPLA No. 213 of 2026

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applying the principles of restitution to place the writ petitioner at his place of posting with a further direction to permit him to join there, was clearly not justified.

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In view of the aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the order impugned dated 16.03.2026 passed in Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. The intra court appeal is allowed and as a consequence the Writ-A No.2241 of 2026 shall stand dismissed.

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(Jaspreet Singh,J.) (Arun Bhansali,CJ.)

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April 24, 2026 ank

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Digitally signed by :- ALI NEWAZ KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Shri Ajay Chauhan U.P. P.W.D. Lko and Another v. Chandan Pathak

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State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Shri Ajay Chauhan U.P. P.W.D. Lko and Another v. Chandan Pathak

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