Dismissed¶81

Munna Lal v. Smt. Geeta Devi and Another

Allahabad HC9 Feb 2026SAPLD/99/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Condonation of delay; Section 5 Limitation Act; sufficient cause versus excuse; delay and laches; second appeal under Section 100 CPC; 2089 days delay; Gonda courts; first appellate affirmation of trial decree dismissing appellant's suit; poverty, old age, illness and counsel's fee explanation rejected as afterthought and eye wash; finality of lis; diligence test for condonation; Supreme Court precedents on limitation applied by Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench.

What did the court decide?

The discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case; the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party, and the burden of proving sufficient cause lies on the appellant. ¶71

Munna Lal vs Smt. Geeta Devi and Another — Allahabad HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the delay of 2089 days in filing the second appeal under Section 100 CPC should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. +1 more

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Court's answer

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Ratio / Principle

Delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity; the appellants failed to establish that they were reasonably diligent in pursuing the matter, and therefore the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied.

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Key takeaways

The reasons shown by the appellant in the delay condonation application are nothing but an eye wash, as no case is made out as to what prevented him from contesting the proceedings; the delay of 2089 days is miserably barred by limitation, neither sufficient cause being shown nor the Court being satisfied.ratio¶75
The appellant was well aware of the impugned order dated 14.10.2016 yet chose not to challenge it; the explanation for the period from 20.01.2017 to 25.11.2024 appears to be an afterthought.ratio¶76
Arranging funds for the advocate's fee cannot justify such a prolonged period of inaction; reopening the matter after such a long delay would cause prejudice to the opponents and undermine the principles of finality in lis, so the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) - Second Appeal Defective (SAPLD) No. 99 of 2024 - Munna Lal v. Smt. Geeta Devi and Another - Prashant Kumar, J. - Second appeal under Section 100 CPC against the judgment, order and decree dated 14.10.2016 of the Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Gonda in Civil Appeal No.35/2015, which affirmed the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2015 of the Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), Court No.1, Gonda in Regular Suit No.730/2012 dismissing the appellant's suit. Appeal filed with a delay of 2089 days; condonation sought on grounds of poverty, old age and infirmity, want of funds for counsel's fee, and re-procurement of a missing certified copy of the appellate decree. After surveying Supreme Court authority on Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Ramlal; Amachandran; Rajender Singh; Maniben Devraj Shah; Chief Post Master General v. Living Media; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply; State of M.P. v. Perfect Sales; Sheo Raj Singh; Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy; Pathapati Subba Reddy), the Court held that the discretion to condone must be exercised judiciously, that the explanation for 20.01.2017 to 25.11.2024 was an afterthought and the grounds shown a mere 'eye wash', that arranging counsel's fee cannot justify prolonged inaction, and that reopening would prejudice the opponents and undermine finality of the lis. Condonation refused; appeal dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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SECOND APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 99 of 2024

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Munna Lal

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.....Appellant(s)

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Versus

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Smt. Geeta Devi And Another	.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) Counsel for Respondent(s)	: Maya Ram Yadav :

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Court No. - 20

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HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

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As per office report, the instant appeal has been filed with delay of 2089 days.

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Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the record.

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This second appeal has been filed under Section 100 CPC against the impugned judgment, order and decree dated 14.10.2016 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Gonda in Civil Appeal No.35/2015 affirming the judgment, order and decree dated 28.02.2015 passed by Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), Court No.1, Gonda in Regular Suit No.730/2012 by which the the suit filed by the appellant was dismissed.

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The reasons for the delay in filing the appeal shown is as follows:-

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"3. That after being passed the aforesaid impugned judgment & order dated 14.10.2016, on 03.11.2016 the deponent get applied for certified copies of the impugned orders & decree dated 14.10.2016 and 28.02.2015 and after preparation, same was received on 20.01.2017.

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4. That after receiving the certified copy of the aforesaid impugned judgments, orders & decree the deponent tried to arrange the necessary expenditure as well as fee of the counsel to avail legal remedy against the same but due to poverty he failed to arrange the same and also due to old age and infirmity he often remained ill.

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5. That on 23.11.2024 the deponent may able to arrange necessary expenditure and some amount for fee and on 25.11.2024 he met to Sri Maya Ram Yadav, Advocate and showing the file asked to avail legal remedy against the same

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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then he was advised to file second appeal against the impugned orders & decree.

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6. That the deponent handing over the file to Sri Maya Ram Yadav, Advocate as well as available necessary expenditure & fee, requested to assail the impugned orders before this Hon'ble Court thereafter preparation of the instant appeal was started and during preparation it was found that the certified copy of decree of the learned Appellate Court was missing then the deponent was told to apply folio to get certified copy of the same.

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7. That on 02.12.2024 folio was applied to get certified copy of the decree of the learned Appellate Court and after preparation the same was issued on 03.12.2024 and after collecting the same the deponent again met to Sri Maya Ram Yadav, Advocate and handing him over the same requested to assail the same, thereafter, the instant second appeal was prepared and is being filed before this Hon'ble Court without any further delay.

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8. That the delay in filing the instant second appeal has occurred, due to aforesaid reasons & circumstances which is bona-fide but neither intentionally nor deliberately and also the delay in filing the instant second appeal is not going to provide any undue gain to the deponent, therefore, the same is liable to be condoned and the appeal is liable to be heard and decided on its merit.

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9. That in case this Hon'ble Court does not please to condone the delay and hear the second appeal on merit, the deponent would have to suffer a great irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated in another terms and also the matter would remained undecided on merit.

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10. That in view of aforesaid facts reasons & circumstances, the delay in filing the second appeal is liable to be condoned and the same (the instant second appeal) is liable to be heard & decided on its merit in the interest of justice."

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This Court deems it appropriate to deal with the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the interpretation of Condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in [AIR 1962 SC 361] , has emphasized that even

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled for the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a “sufficient cause” for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The relevant extract is as follow :-

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“ 7. In construing Section 5(of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decreeholder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.

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12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone.”

(emphasis added)

SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

Amachandran v. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 , has categorically held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, reported in [(1973) 2 SCC 705], has observed that the object of law of limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

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The object of fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare and they are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. To assail the remedy, the person has to be vigilant and has to approach court within the prescribed limitations.

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Hon. Supreme Court in the matter of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:—

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“ 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.”

SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

(emphasis added)

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 : AIR 2012 SC 1506 has held that unless reasonable and acceptable explanation of delay and sufficient cause is shown, the application need not be accepted.

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reasons, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of State of M.P. v. Perfect Sales, Gwalior, reported in [AIR 2015 MP 161] , has categorically held that the appellant slept over the matter for 296 days and did nothing to assail the judgment of the subordinate court. It shows careless attitude on the part of the appellant and there being no sufficient cause shown, the delay can not be condoned.

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This Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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India and Another; reported in [(2023) 10 SCC 531]. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:-

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"31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

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32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

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(emphasis added)

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr, reported in [2024 SCC OnLine SC 489] has held as under :-

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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"27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants."

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(emphasis added)

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On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of law, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA) , reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 , has held as follow :-

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“ 28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

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(emphasis added)

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It is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. The burden to prove ‘sufficient cause’ lies on the appellant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real and bonafide and free of negligence.

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In a plethora of judgements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice does not mean causing prejudice to the respondents. In the present case, the appellants have failed to establish that they were reasonably diligent in pursuing the matter and, therefore, the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied.

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of law as regards object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretionary power to be exercised under Section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the reasons shown by the appellant in the delay condonation application is nothing but an eye wash as no case is made out by the appellant as to what prevented him from contesting proceeding. Thus, the delay of 2089 days caused in filing the instant appeal by the appellant is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to be the satisfaction of this Court.

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As per the averments made in the delay condonation application, it is evident that the appellant was well aware of the impugned order dated 14.10.2016, yet he chose not to challenge the same. The explanation for the period from 20.01.2017 to 25.11.2024 appears to be an afterthought. The appellant applied for a certified copy of the impugned order and judgment within a period 20 days of the impugned judgement and received the same on 20.01.2017. Thereafter, he met his advocate to file the instant appeal on 25.11.2024, after a lapse of more than a thousand days.

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The reason assigned by the appellant for this inordinate delay is that he was arranging funds for fees of the advocate, which cannot justify such a prolonged period of inaction. Reopening the matter after such a long delay would prejudice to the opponents and undermine the principles of finality in lis. Therefore, the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

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Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds that a bleak effort has been done to justify the delay; the delay as stated in the affidavit does not show sufficient cause and accordingly, the instant

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SAPLD No. 99 of 2024

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appeal is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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(Prashant Kumar,J.)

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February 9, 2026

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Saurabh Yadav/-

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