An insurer's belated appeal against a motor accident compensation award was dismissed after its condonation-of-delay application was rejected, the Court finding internal file movement no sufficient cause for an institutional litigant with a dedicated legal set-up.
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW
FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 48 of 2025
Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Ltd. Thru. Asst. Manager(Legal)
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Smt. Haseena Begum And 9 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Tarun Kumar Misra Counsel for Respondent(s) : Aakchad Nath, Aakchad Nath, Mukesh Singh, Nirmit Srivastava
Court No. - 20
HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.
C.M. Application No.1 of 2025
FAFOD No. 48 of 2025
2
“ 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone.”
(emphasis added)
"31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a
FAFOD No. 48 of 2025
3
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
(emphasis added)
"27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
(emphasis added)
FAFOD No. 48 of 2025
4
“ 28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay andcondoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
(emphasis added)
FAFOD No. 48 of 2025
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that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
FAFOD No. 48 of 2025
6
misconceived and liable to be dismissed.
(Prashant Kumar,J.)
January 20, 2026
Anupam S/-
Digitally signed by :- ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
1 issue framed by the court
Whether the 57-day delay in filing the insurance company's appeal against the MACT award should be condoned.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.Relied on¶6
AIR 1962 SC 361 · Who else cites this
Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and AnotherRelied on¶7
(2023) 10 SCC 531 · Who else cites this
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali BabuRelied on¶8
(2014) 4 SCC 108 · Who else cites this
Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His LrRelied on¶9
2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 · Who else cites this
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA)Relied on¶10
(2024) 12 SCC 336 · Who else cites this
Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Ltd. Thru. Asst. Manager(Legal)
Smt. Haseena Begum
9 Others
Prashant Kumar
As recorded by the court registry
3 orders share this CNR
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
