Dismissed¶25

Bhimsen Awasthi v. Smt. Manorma and 4 Others

Allahabad HC29 Apr 2026FAFOD/276/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench (Prashant Kumar, J.), FAFOD No. 276 of 2025, decided April 29, 2026: condonation of 812 days' delay refused for appeal under Sections 173/168 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against MACT (North), Lucknow award dated 29.04.2023 in M.A.C.P. No.263 of 2010; sufficient-cause plea (loss of mobile phone, ignorance of award until 21.07.2025) held bald and unconvincing since the appellant had counsel and had filed a written statement before the Tribunal; delay-condonation application rejected and appeal dismissed on delay and laches.

What did the court decide?

The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant seeking condonation of delay, who must prove that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bona fide and free of negligence. ¶12

Bhimsen Awasthi vs Smt. Manorma and 4 Others — Motor Accident Claims | Allahabad HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the delay of 812 days in filing the appeal under Section 173 read with Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the judgement and award dated 29.04.2023 ought to be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for sufficient cause.

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Court's answer

The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant seeking condonation of delay, who must prove that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bona fide and free of negligence.

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Ratio / Principle

Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction or casual indifference, as doing so would undermine the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' and the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

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Key takeaways

On the affidavit and the record, the appellant was well aware of the impugned judgement and award dated 29.04.2023 and himself chose not to challenge it in time; he was represented by counsel before the Tribunal and a Written Statement had been filed on his behalf; the explanation of loss of mobile phone and inability to contact counsel does not inspire confidence and no material substantiates it.ratio¶20
Since the claim petition was instituted in 2010 and decided in 2023, it is completely improbable that the appellant remained unaware of the outcome for over two years; the submissions are merely bald assertions demonstrating lack of diligence, and the belated appeal is an attempt to reopen the case.ratio¶21

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Condonation of delay refused - Appeal under Section 173 read with Section 168, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against judgement and award dated 29.04.2023 of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (North), Lucknow in M.A.C.P. No.263 of 2010 - delay of 812 days - Section 5, Limitation Act: burden on applicant to show sufficient cause that is real, bona fide and free of negligence; condonation is discretionary and courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction or casual indifference, the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' - appellant was represented by counsel before the Tribunal and a Written Statement had been filed; plea that he lost his mobile phone and learnt of the 2023 award only on 21.07.2025 held bald, unconvincing and unsupported by material - implausible that he remained unaware of the outcome for over two years - delay not to be excused as a matter of generosity - delay-condonation application rejected; appeal dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Precedents relied on: Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd (AIR 1962 SC 361); Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai ((2012) 5 SCC 157); Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu ((2014) 4 SCC 108); Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (2024 SCC OnLine SC 489); Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA) ((2024) 12 SCC 336). (Paras 12, 19-25)

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 276 of 2025

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Bhimsen Awasthi

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.....Appellant(s)

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Smt. Manorma And 4 Others	Versus .....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) Counsel for Respondent(s)	: Kaushlendra Tewari, Shivangi Pandey, Vikas Chandra : Mahendra Kumar Mishra

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Court No. - 20

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HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

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C.M. Application no.1 of 2025 - Delay Condonation

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This is an application for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as Shri Mahendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

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This belated appeal has been filed under Section 173 read with Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the judgement and award dated 29.04.2023 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (North), Lucknow in M.A.C.P. No.263 of 2010.

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The office has reported a delay of 812 days in filing the instant appeal.

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The reasons shown in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application are as follows :

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"3) That the appellant was not aware about the passing of the judgment and award dated 29.04.2023 and during the pendency of the said claim petition he had lost his mobile phone due to which he was not able to contact his counsel and the counsel for the appellant had sent a letter dated 06.09.2021 through registered envelope thereby intimating the appellant regarding his appearance and filing the defence witness but the same was returned back by the postman showing it to be the insufficient address and when he came to Lucknow and started searching his counsel and after deep search, he met his counsel on 21.07.2025 who tried to find out the status of

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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the said claim petition and after gaining the information from the Hon'ble Tribunal Office, he had informed the appellant that the said claim petition had been decided against in favour of the claimants on 29.04.2023 and then the appellant came to know about the passing of the said order.

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4) That on the very next day i.e. on 22nd July, 2025, the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copies of the judgment and award dated 29.04.2023 as well as the decree but since the said file has been sent for scanning in the record room, therefore after many efforts, he get the certified copies of the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2023 on 04.08.2025 and then it had been decided to file the appeal before the Hon'ble High Court.

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5) That thereafter the appellant after taking out the certified copies of the judgment and award dated 29.04.2023 as well as the decree and thereafter, the deponent had arranged for the statutory deposit of Rs.25,000/- for filing the appeal and he got prepared the said bank draft on 12.08.2025 and thereafter he fell ill and after arranging the money for filing the present appeal, is now filing the appeal without any delay."

¶20

Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that there is a delay of 812 days in filing the instant appeal. He further submits that the appellant was not aware of the judgment and award dated 29.04.2023, as he had lost his mobile phone during the pendency of the claim petition and was unable to contact his counsel. The counsel had earlier sent a letter dated 06.09.2021, which was returned due to an insufficient address. Upon visiting Lucknow, the appellant traced his counsel on 21.07.2025 and got to know that the claim petition had already been decided against him on 29.04.2023. He further submits that the certified copies were applied and obtained and thereafter, the appellant arranged the statutory deposit (draft dated 12.08.2025) but later fell ill.

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He further submits that the reason for delay has been well explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay and the delay caused is neither intentional nor deliberate. Hence, the delay so occasioned may be condoned.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vociferously opposes the application and submits that the appellant was represented by a counsel before the Tribunal. Hence it cannot be said that he was not aware about the case. He further submits that the reasons for the delay shown in

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay are not sufficiently explained.

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He further submits that the instant belated appeal has been preferred after a delay of 812 days however, no sufficient cause has been given for such long delay neither any day to day explanation has been made in the appeal. The entire efforts shown in the affidavit is nothing but an eyewash and has been engineered to explain the delay in which they have clearly failed to do so. He further submits that the delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity at this belated stage.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondent and perused the records.

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Before proceeding further, this Court would like to delve into various observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and also deems it appropriate to look into the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which is reproduced herein-under:-

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" 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-

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Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

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Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."

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A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such time. The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence. No doubt this expression has been constituted with justice-oriented approach so as to not punish an innocent litigant for circumstances beyond the control. However, the Courts must

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

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It has been emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court way back in 1962 in the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd ., reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 , that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a "sufficient cause" for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The relevant extract is as follow :-

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"7. In construing Section 5(of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.

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***

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12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone."

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(emphasis added)

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The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare.

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. To assail the remedy, the person has to be vigilant and has to approach court within the prescribed limitations.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai , reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:

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"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

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(emphasis added)

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant, a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :-

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"27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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and fancies of the appellants."

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(emphasis added)

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On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of law the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 , has held as follow :-

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“ 28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

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(emphasis added)

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On the touchstone of the dictum noted above, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each and every case. The expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the applicant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real and bonafide and free of negligence.

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On bare perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay shows that the appellant was well aware of the impugned judgement and award dated 29.04.2023 and he himself chose not to challenge the same within prescribed time. The record reveals that the appellant was duly represented by counsel before the Tribunal, and a Written Statement had also been filed on his behalf. In such circumstances, it cannot be accepted that the appellant was wholly unaware of the proceedings or the eventual final judgement and decree. The explanation regarding the alleged loss of mobile phone and consequent inability to remain in contact with counsel, does not inspire confidence. No material has been placed on record to substantiate this argument.

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Further, considering that the claim petition was instituted as far back in the year 2010 and remained pending till its disposal in 2023, it is completely improbable that the appellant would remain unaware of the outcome for over two years thereafter. This clearly shows that the submissions made to condone the delay are merely bald assertions, and further it demonstrates that he was not diligent in prosecuting his case. The belated Appeal appears to be nothing but an attempt to reopen the case.

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In a plethora of decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court as well as this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the

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FAFOD No. 276 of 2025

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opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

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Thus, the delay of 812 days caused in filing the instant appeal by the appellant is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to be the satisfaction of this Court. Therefore, the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied, thus the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

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Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds that a bleak effort has been done to justify the delay. The delay as stated in the affidavit does not show any sufficient cause and accordingly, the instant application for condonation of delay is rejected .

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Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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(Prashant Kumar,J.)

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April 29, 2026

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Anupam S/-

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Digitally signed by :- ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Bhimsen Awasthi v. Smt. Manorma and 4 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Bhimsen Awasthi v. Smt. Manorma and 4 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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