Dharmendra Singh and Another vs State of U.P. and Another

Heard Sri Ajay Sengar holding brief of Ms. Gunjan Yadav, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Deepak Dubey, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 and Sri R.K.Singh, learned AGA for the State.

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The present criminal appeal under Section 14-A(1) Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has been preferred to allow the present appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 20.11.2025 passed by learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act) Jalaun at Orai in Criminal Misc. Case (Final Report) No. 0080 of 2025 (State of U.P. vs. Dharmendra Kumar and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 0056 of 2025, under Section 328, 376D, 504, 506 IPC, 1860 and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, P.S. Nadigon, District Jalaun.

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The brief facts of this case are that an FIR in Case Crime No. 56 of 2025, under Sections 376D, 504, 506, 328 IPC and 3(2)(V) SC/ST Act, P.S. Nadigao, District Jalaun, was lodged by the respondent/informant against the present appellants. It was stated in the FIR that Sanjeev Kumar, husband of the informant, was utilizing leased land of Manvendra Singh for growing vegetables. Her husband had also constructed a tube well in the fields where Manvendra Singh @ Sonu and his friends used to arrive. On 27.03.2024, at about 1:30 pm, Manvendra Singh along with his friends Dharmendra Singh, Jitendra Singh, Nikhil Pratap Singh, Pehalwan Singh arrived there in a vehicle when the informant along with her husband was busy in her fields. They stayed there for an hour. They asked her husband to buy some articles from the market. Her husband went to the market, which was 2-3 km away from her fields. After her husband left for the market, all of them raped her at gunpoint. Before leaving from spot, they administered her some sedative substance through inhaling which made her unconscious. They also clicked

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photographs and videos of the incident of rape. She went to the police station with her husband to lodge report, but it was not lodged. When accused Manvendra Singh @ Sonu came to know that she had submitted a complaint against him, he threatened her to leave his fields and also threatened that her obscene videos and photos would be circulated publicly if she dared to lodge a report. The informant became afraid on account of the said threats and told the entire incident to her in-laws. After one year of the incident, accused Manvendra Singh called her to the fields by sending a message through a boy that if she did not arrive at his field, he would circulate her obscene photos. Distressed by this blackmailing, informant filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The said application was allowed by the concerned Magistrate who directed the S.H.O. to lodge an FIR against the appellantaccused. The matter was investigated and the I.O. did not find any evidence during investigation and submitted a final report. Aggrieved by the submission of the final report, the respondent/informant preferred a protest petition before the court. The learned court allowed the protest petition by disagreeing with the final report and summoned the appellants vide its order dated 20.11.2025 under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. to face trial for offences under Sections 376D, 504, 506, 328 IPC and 3(2)(V) SC/ST Act. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.11.2025, the appellants have preferred this criminal appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that impugned order passed by learned court in rejecting the final report and summoning appellants under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is patently wrong and illegal. The law is crystalised on this point that a Magistrate can either agree or disagree with a police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., but he cannot reject the said police report. If the Magistrate rejects the final report, he is left with no material to take cognizance. In this case, if the Magistrate has rejected the police report (final report), then his order summoning the accused-appellants under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is illegal and unsustainable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of Satyendra Jain and 2 others vs. State of U.P. and another by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Application U/S 482 No. 27903 of 2024 .

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It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the entire allegation arose after a PIL against one Abhimanyu Singh was filed by the appellants who had captured all the civil and construction works of the State and embezzled public money at large through his firms. Father of Abhimanyu Singh is the Block Pramukh of Block Nadi Gao. Husband of opposite party no. 2 (informant) is a stooge of Abhimanyu Singh. When appellants unfolded the misdeeds of Abhimanyu Singh before this Court by means of

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the filing PIL, they became enraged and got the FIR lodged against appellants through husband of informant. The concocted story which was non-existent for a year became an issue for lodging FIR just after 15 days of filing of PIL in order to restrain the appellants from prosecuting their PIL. It is evident that the FIR was lodged after an inordinate delay of one year and soon after filing of the PIL. The prosecution against the appellants is a misuse of criminal proceedings and has been initiated only with an intent to stop the appellants from disclosing the misdeeds of Abhimanyu Singh and his father.

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It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the I.O. who conducted a fair investigation and collected evidence to bring forth the falsehood of the prosecution version, was ignored by the learned court. The I.O. has found that the mobile location of the appellants was not found at the alleged place of incident as stated by the informant. It was a material fact which goes to the root of the prosecution story and establishes its falsehood. Hence, the impugned order of summoning the appellants under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is erroneous and patently illegal.

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Learned AGA as well as learned counsel for the informant submitted that the learned trial court has not committed any illegality in summoning the appellants under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. It is very much evident from the reading of the impugned order that despite availability of sufficient evidence collected during investigation which cogently establishes the offence against the appellants, a final report was deliberately submitted by the I.O. in order to favour the appellants. The learned trial court has considered the statement of the informant recorded under Sections 180 and 183 BNSS alongwith the statement of her husband Sanjeev under Section 180 BNSS who have consistently corroborated the prosecution story. Therefore, placing reliance upon the statement of a rape victim does not suffer from any infirmity. The victim has corroborated the prosecution story not only at the time when she was interrogated by the I.O. but also at the time when her statement on oath was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. It was further submitted that the learned court also considered the evidence relating to the CDR locations of the appellants. It was observed that although Investigating Officer found that the appellants' CDR locations were not found at the place of occurrence on the alleged day, but he ignored to match the alleged mobile numbers' CDRs with the respective identities of the appellants, rendering such evidence unreliable.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. It is apparent from the impugned order that the learned trial court has placed reliance upon the statement of the victim recorded under Sections 180 and

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183 BNSS along with the statement of her husband recorded under Section 180 BNSS. The victim as well as her husband have corroborated the allegations mentioned in the FIR. In cases where the allegation is of rape, the best evidence to be considered is the evidence of the victim particularly if incident was not witnessed by any one. Offences of such nature are mostly committed in seclusion and only option is to scrutinise the statement of victim. In such circumstances, the sole testimony of the victim is the only piece of evidence upon which the court either relies or disbelieves it. Courts look for corroboration only when statement suffers from any infirmity. The statement of the victim in this case prima facie appears to be convincing and reliable. Hence, it cannot be said that the court has committed any error in placing reliance upon the statement of the victim.

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So far as the motive for lodging the FIR after an inordinate delay is concerned, the said motive cannot be considered at the stage of taking cognizance as it is a fact which has to be scrutinized at the time of trial. Similarly, the findings of the court vide which it has discarded the CDRs of the appellants collected during the investigation also seem logical. It is apparent that by means of the CDR location, an attempt to produce a plea of alibi has been made. Evidence pertaining to Plea of Alibi can be considered only if it is clinching, convincing and reliable. If it doesn't qualify of being of such a nature, it can not become a basis either for submission of final report or of acquittal of an accused.

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A legal issue that a Magistrate cannot reject the final report rather he can either agree or disagree with it, was also considered. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in para 14 of its judgment in Satyendra Jain (supra) , which is reproduced herein below:

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"14. The issue so raised is no longer res-integra and stands concluded by the judgments of this Court in following cases;- (1) Hari Ram Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2016 ADJ Online, 0185 (Criminal Revision No. 695 of 2001) and (2) Application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 8563 of 2023 (Smt. Bhuri Vs. State of U.P. and Another) decided on 15.03.2023 . This Court in aforementioned judgments has held that once the Magistrate has rejected (NIRAST) the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. then the Magistrate is denuded of his jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and proceed with the matter as a state case. In view of above, the order impugned cannot be sustained and is, therefore, liable to be set aside."

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It is settled law that while applying judicial mind to a police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., a Magistrate may either agree with

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or disagree with the conclusions of the police. In view of what has been held in Satyendra Jain (supra) , it is necessary to consider following two questions :

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(i) Whether the mere use of the expressions "rejected" or "disagreed" by the Magistrate at the stage of taking cognizance is material and decisive in law; or

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(ii) Whether the entire order passed by the Magistrate is required to be read as a whole to ascertain the true intention and substance of the decision taken at the time of passing such order.

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After due contemplation, this Court is of view that legality of the order cannot be tested on the basis of the terminology employed therein in isolation. An order of court must be judged by what it actually does and the power it exercises, not by the language or terminology used in isolation. The true nature of an order must be determined by its substance and effect and not by its form or the label affixed to it. The order passed by the Magistrate is required to be read as a whole to ascertain whether there has been due application of judicial mind and lawful exercise of jurisdiction. Judgments and orders are not to be construed as statutes and that stray or inadvertent use of incorrect expressions or legal terminology does not vitiate the order if the substance of the decision, the reasons recorded, and the material relied upon clearly disclose the true intention of the court and conformity with law. In the present case, a holistic reading of the impugned order demonstrates that the learned Magistrate, upon consideration of the materials on record, has consciously disagreed with the police report and has taken cognizance by exercising jurisdiction under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C.

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This Court also agrees that using the word "rejected" in reference to a police report is improper. Instead, the Magistrate or Court should use the word "disagree". Though the term "reject" is generally not used in the context of police reports, it is not entirely impermissible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has employed it in judgments such as Zunaid v. State of U.P., 2023 INSC 778 (Para 5), and Dharmendra Singh Chhawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 9105/2022 . Therefore, questioning legality of impugned order merely because the learned Court used the expression 'rejecting the police report' instead of 'disagreeing with the police report is untenable'. Impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. Hence, the legal ground raised by the learned counsel with a view to challenge the legality of the order is untenable. The findings of the learned trial court in order to summon the appellants by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C.,

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does not suffer from any infirmity. 14. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. January 21, 2026 Ujjawal (Anil Kumar-X,J.)

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Digitally signed by :- UJJAWAL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Dharmendra Singh and Another v. State of U.P. and Another

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Dharmendra Singh and Another v. State of U.P. and Another

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